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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines British government policy towards Russian refugees in the 
aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War in Russia. As a consequence of 
these two events, approximately one million Russians opposing the Bolshevik rule 
escaped from Russia.
The Russian refugee problem was one of the major political and humanitarian problems 
of inter-war Europe, affecting both individual countries of refuge, as well as the 
international community as a whole. The League of Nations had been formed in 1919 in 
order to promote international peace and security. The huge numbers of refugees from 
the former Russian Empire, on the other hand, were seen as a threat to the intemational 
stability. Consequently, the member states of the League for the first time recognised 
the need for intemational co-operative efforts to assist refugees, and the post of High 
Commissioner for Russian Refugees was established under the auspices of the League. 
Significantly, this action marked the beginning of the intemational refugee regime; the 
active co-operation of states in the field of refugee assistance.
European countries, in addition to intemational co-operative efforts on behalf of Russian 
refugees, also took individual actions for their assistance by offering them asylum in 
their countries. However, there were big differences in the policies of various European 
countries. Britain had long enjoyed a reputation of being a country of liberal refuge, 
where political refugees and immigrants could find asylum. This liberalism, however, 
started to be undermined at the beginning of the Kf" century, particularly since the First 
World War. Although a principle that political refugees should be considered separately 
remained, my thesis will argue that this mle was not followed in the case of Russian 
refugees. From the very beginning the British government took a rigid attitude against 
the admission of Russian refugees to Britain, and strict provisions were set for the entry 
of individual refugees. Because of this, the number of Russian refugees in Britain was 
much smaller than in many other European countries, for example France or Germany. 
The policy of the British government towards Russian refugees thus offers a good 
example of the general decline of liberalism in Britain.
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
In my thesis I have followed systematically the Library of Congress system of 
transliteration from Russian to English. In the footnotes and bibliography, however, the 
Russian names and words are given in the form they are presented in the sources and 
documents.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BCRRC British Committee of the Russian Red Cross
BRRC British Russian Relief Committee
CO Colonial Office
CRC Central Russian Committee
FO Foreign Office
HO Home Office
ICRC Intemational Committee of the Red Cross
ILO Intemational Labour Organisation
RRA Russian Refugees Relief Association
RRCS Russian Red Cross Society (old organisation)
RRF Russian Relief Fund
RRRF Russian Relief and Reconstmction Fund
URR Union for the Regeneration of Russia
YMCA Young Men’s Christian Association
WO War Office
ZEMGOR Union of Zemstvos and Towns
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Russian emigration in the aftermath of the First World War, the Bolshevik Revolution 
and the Civil War in Russia, constituted one of the major political and humanitarian 
problems of inter-war Europe, both for individual countries and for the intemational 
community as a whole. Between 1917 and 1923 over a million Russian refugees 
escaped from Bolshevik Russia and were scattered to a number of different European 
countries, as well as to the United States, the Far East and elsewhere.
The post-revolutionary Russian emigration, unlike the earlier migrations from the 
Russian Empire, was concentrated in a period of a few years. The Soviet government 
started to restrict emigration fi*om 1922 onwards, and by mid-1923 the emigration to 
European countries had become virtually impossible by legal means. * Migration to the 
Far East continued until the mid-193 Os and some individual Soviet defectors continued 
to escape to the west, but the mass movement from Russia ended during the early 
1920s."
The estimates of the total number of Russian refugees have varied a lot. Early estimates 
mostly varied from one and a half to three million. The League of Nations estimated in 
1922 that there were 1,5 million Russian refugees in Europe. According to the Central 
Information Office of Countess Bobrinskii, established in Constantinople in May 1920, 
there were slightly over one million Russian refugees in Europe in January 1921. The 
American Red Cross estimate in January 1922, on the other hand, was about two 
million. Even higher was the estimate of a German author, H. von Rimscha; his estimate 
for the total number of Russian refugees, including the Far East, was almost three 
million.
A more critical examination of the records at the time of a survey by Sir John Simpson, 
The Refugee Problem: Report o f A Survey, which was taken at the behest of the Royal
 ^ Dowty, Alan. Closed Borders. The Contemporary Assault o f the Freedom of Movement. New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1987, p. 69; Marrus, Michael. The Unwanted. European Refugees in the Twentieth Century. 
New York 1985, pp. 59-60.
2 Skran, Claudena. Refugees in Inter-War Europe. The Emergence o f a Regime. Oxford 1995, p. 36. On Soviet 
defectors see Gordon Brook-Shepherd. The Storm Petrels: The Flight o f First Soviet Defectors. New York 1977.
7Institute of Intemational Affairs and published in 1939, resulted in a reduction of these 
estimates. In the survey it was pointed out that the earlier estimates, given at the time of 
the exodus, were often too high, as they were made at a time of chaotic conditions and 
constant flux of refugees from one country to another. Estimates of various countries 
were not simultaneous, which made the duplication of figures very probable. Neither 
was there any proper machinery for accurate statistical records in the countries of 
emigration.^
According to Dr. Izjumov, whose figures were published in Simpson’s survey, there 
were between 635,600 and 755,000 Russian refugees in Europe in January 1922.  ^The 
figure does not, however, include those in the Far East.  ^The material consulted by 
Izjumov consisted largely of various documents relating to Russian emigration, 
deposited in the Russian archive in Prague Other documentation used by Simpson for 
compiling the survey were, for example, the documents of the Red Cross, statistics of 
the countries of asylum and various refugee organisations, as well as the League of 
Nations. According to Marc Raeff, one of the leading historians on Russian emigration, 
Simpson’s survey can be considered one of the most comprehensive and on the whole, 
reliable study on Russian emigration. He points out that Simpson and his collaborators, 
for example Dr. Izjumov, used all available documentation and nothing new has 
surfaced since. ^
Nevertheless, estimates in recent studies still vary a great deal. Heller and Nekrich 
(1986) cite figures ranging from 860,000 to two million and end up with an estimate 
that more than one million people left Russia. However, they also conclude that the 
exact figure can not be stated. * Michael Marrus (1985) estimates that the number of 
refugees numbered close to a million at the highest point, but that the total fell quite
3 Simpson, Sir John Hope. The Refugee Problem: Report o f A Survey. London 1939 (Issued under the auspices o f  
the Royal Institute o f  Intemational Affairs), pp. 80-81.
 ^ Simpson 1939, pp. 80-81.
5 Marrus 1985, p. 61.
6 The Historical Archive o f the Russian Emigration was organised in Prague at the beginning o f  1920s. The archives 
contained various material and statistics on Russian emigration. (Reference: Simpson 1939, p. 388)
 ^ Simpson 1939, pp. 68, 81-82; Raeff Marc. Russia Abroad. A Cultural History o f the Russian Emigration, 1919- 
1939. Oxford 1990, pp. 23-24.
8 Heller, Michael and Nekrich, Aleksandr. Utopia u vlasti. Istoriia Sovetskogo Soiuza s 1917 goda do nashikh dnei. 
London 1986, p. 151.
8substantially in the late 1920s as the situation stabilised. His conclusion seems to be 
largely based on the results of Simpson’s Survey. He also refers to the detailed enquiry 
carried out by the Intemational Labour Office in 1926. The ILO recorded 755,305 
refugees, although this figure excluded Germany. ^
Evan Mawdsley (1987) cites the estimate of demographer Frank Lorimer, about two 
million refugees, as well as the highest estimate by unofficial Soviet source, M. 
Maksudov, that of 3,5 million refugees. However, neither Lorimer nor Maksudov give 
information about the sources at which they base their figures. Compared with other 
estimates, at least Maksudov’s figure clearly strikes as being far too high.
Thus, it has to be concluded that due to the lack of reliable and comprehensive statistics, 
the precise number of Russian refugees can not be stated. Nevertheless, it seems that 
Simpson’s survey, especially in view of the number of materials consulted, remains the 
most extensive study in the field, estimating the number of Russian refugees in Europe 
as close to a million in the early 1920s. It should, however, be noted that emigration also 
included other than pure Russian nationals, such as Jews, Balts, Poles and Ukrainians.
In the statistics of the 1920s they were often simply included in the Russian figures, 
since this was a common practice as regards the citizens of the former Russian Empire.
Some individual European countries became greatly involved in helping Russian 
refugees and offered asylum for large numbers of them. However, there were also great 
differences in the level of involvement and the practices of different countries. As it will 
be pointed out in my thesis, despite the liberal reputation of Britain as a ‘country of 
asylum’ the British government took a very non-liberal attitude towards Russian 
refugees, especially in relation to their admission to Britain. This is apparent also in the 
number of Russian émigrés in Britain. Compared with many other European countries, 
the number of Russian refugees admitted to Britain was very small, probably no more 
than 10,000 at its highest.
9 Marrus 1985, p. 61.
Mawdsley, Evan. The Russian Civil War. London and Boston 1987, p. 286; Lorimer, Frank. The Population o f  
the Soviet Union: History and Prospects. Geneva 1946, pp. 39-40; Maksudov, M. Losses Suffered by the 
Populations o f the USSR 1918-1958. In Medvedev, Roy (ed.). The Samizdat Register II. London 1981, p. 232.
On the other hand, the policies of the British government were challenged by the 
different policies of, for example, France, Germany and Czechoslovakia. France, as 
Britain, held a reputation as a country of liberal refuge. That this was so also in practice 
can be seen by the fact that in the 1930s none of the other European countries 
approached France in the total number of refugees that were given permanent residence. 
Russian refugees were one group included in this category. As vrith many other 
countries there are, however, problems in stating the actual numbers. Throughout the 
1920s the French government repeatedly stated that there were 400,000 Russian 
refugees in France, even though this figure bore no relation whatsoever to the census 
returns. This figure was then cited in the League of Nations documents throughout the 
1920s, even though it was acknowledged that there were no real statistics available on 
the number of refugees in France.
The estimate of Dr. Izjumov, presented in Simpson’s survey, was however very 
different. According to him there were about 60-68,000 Russian refugees in France in 
January 1922.*  ^After this date the number of Russian émigrés in France nevertheless 
further increased, especially as many Russians left Germany for France between 1923 
and 1924 to take advantage of better employment possibilities. Pierre Kovalevskii, the 
principal émigré historian of the Russian emigration, has considered the range 100,000-
150,000 to be the most realistic estimate for a total of Russian emigration in France 
during the inter-war years. Robert H. Johnston, in his book New Mecca, New Babylon, 
a monograph on Russian emigration in Paris, states that it is reasonable to suggest that 
the maximum number of Russians in France did not much exceed 120,000. His estimate 
is based on French census records and police estimates, vrith comparisons to figures 
presented by Kovalevskii and Simpson. As emigration to France increased in the 
1920s for material, cultural and political reasons, the estimate of 120-150,000 seems 
quite reliable.
 ^  ^ Simpson 1939, pp. 297-98.
12 Skran 1995, pp. 35-36, Simpson 1939, pp. 82-83; FO 371/10467, File 17, Paper N 5200. Report by Nansen 
7.6.1924. PRO.
13 Dr. Izjumov. Great Exodus. 29 April 1938, pp. 33-34. Refugee Survey 1937-38. Special reports. Vol. II. Russian 
refugees (2). The Royal Institute o f International Affairs.
14 Kovalevskii, Pierre. Zarubezhnaia Rossiia. Istoria i kul’tumo-prosvetitel’naia rabota russkogo zarubezh’ia za 
polveka 1920-1970gg. Paris 1971, p. 31;
15 Johnston, Robert H. New Mecca, New Babylon. Paris and the Russian Exiles, 1920-1943. Kingston and Montreal 
1988, p. 25.
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By the middle of 1920s Paris had become ‘the intellectual and spiritual mecca’ of 
Russian emigration and its position as cultural and political capital of Russian diaspora 
remained unchallenged throughout the 1920s and 1930s.'^ The special lure of Paris was 
partly explained by the fact that the pre-Revolutionary political and cultural elite who 
had close relations to French culture and language was heavily represented amongst 
émigrés. None of the other cities, even if hospitable to Russian emigration, could 
compete with the intemational attraction of Paris for various material, cultural, political 
and ideological reasons.*^
Importantly, however, the large-scale emigration of Russians was only possible with the 
consent of the French authorities. As a consequence of labour shortages that had 
intensified during the First World War, the French government was willing to accept 
Russian refugees who wanted to work, and the French Ministries of Labour and 
Agriculture facilitated the entry of able-bodied refugees into France. Perhaps some
50,000 Russian refugees entered France during the twenties on labour contracts with 
large industrial and agricultural ministries.*^ Although the attitude towards employment 
changed quite radically during the 1930s Depression, the French practice can be 
considered as quite unique, since no other European country deliberately encouraged 
immigration of refugees for employment purposes.^® As it will be shown in my thesis, 
the attitude of the British government towards the employment of refugees was 
completely the reverse.
In addition to liberal employment policies in the early 1920s, the French authorities 
granted long-term residence permits. The French government also provided educational 
help to émigré children and Russian children were admitted to French public schools on 
equal terms to French children. Throughout the 1920s the French authorities continued 
to consider Vasilii Maklakov, the former Russian Ambassador of the Provisional 
Government in Paris, as the ambassador of ‘Russia Abroad’, the Russian émigré society
16 Huntington, Chapin W. The Homesick Million. Russia-out-of-Russia. Boston, Massachusetts 1933, p. 22; 
Johnston 1988, p. 15; Raeff 1990, p. 37.
17 Johnston 1988, pp. 21-22.
18 Hassell, James E. Russian Refugees in France and the United States Between the World Wars. Transactions o f the 
American Philosophical Society, Vol. 81, Part 7. 1991, pp. 22-23.
19 Hassell 1991, p. 25.
20 Adams, Walter. Refugees in Europe. The Annals o f the American Academy. May 1939, pp. 41-44.
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in France. In addition, the French government granted official and legal status to so 
called 'Offices russes". The main office was located in Paris and directed by Maklakov. 
Together with regional offices it was empowered to issue various civil certificates for 
émigrés and to attest signatures and translations.
In New Mecca, New Babylon., Johnston notices that the Russian émigrés in France 
shared a common belief on the importance of the preservation of Russian culture and 
values. Therefore, strong efforts were made to teach the émigré youth about Russia, 
through the establishment of various committees and organisations, as well as various 
schools and educational establishments for émigré children. Thus, fear of assimilation or 
denationalisation, as it was called, led to the maintenance of a close émigré community 
and efforts to prevent the absorption of émigré children into French culture. Although 
many of the younger generation of Russians did not always share the fear of the their 
parents, Russian émigrés in France were nevertheless slow to assimilate. According to 
one Russian émigré in France, Nina Gourfinkel, even after thirty years residence many 
Russians in France remained ‘on the margin of French life, unassimilated and 
unassimilable’. My thesis will suggest that in Britain this was not the case, but 
assimilation seems to have been a much quicker and easier process.
Germany also admitted a large number of Russian refugees to its territory. Robert C. 
Williams in his study on Russian émigrés in Germany from 1881 to 1941, Culture in 
Exile, points out that Germany’s role as the first centre of Russian emigration was not 
due solely to the easy geographic access, but also to the fact that visas were easy to 
obtain from the German government. This is particularly interesting in view of the 
fact that the economic situation in post-war Germany in no ways encouraged foreign 
immigration. O f course, the liberal attitude of the German government can also be 
compared with the different attitude of the British in adverse economic conditions.
21 Hassell 1991, pp. 22-23; Raeff 1990, pp. 35-37.
22 Johnston 1988, p. 68; Hassell 1991, p. 24.
23 Johnston 1988, pp. 21, 85-90, 148.
24 Quoted in Johnston 1988, p. 208, note 34.
25 Williams, Robert. Culture in Exile. Russian Émigrés in Germany, 1881-1941. Ithaca and London 1972, p. 112.
26 Hammar, Tomas (ed.). European Immigration Policy. A Comparative Study. Cambridge 1985, pp. 167-68.
12
Until 1923 Germany hosted more Russian refugees than any other country in Europe 
and Berlin had become the intellectual and literary centre of the Russian emigration/^
At its highest point the post-war Germany hosted over 200,000 Russian refugees. ®^As 
with France, the earliest estimates were clearly too high, varying from 300 to 600 
thousand.^^ Dr. Izjumov’s estimate reduced the figure of Russian refugees in Germany 
on 1 January 1922 to 230-250,000.""
The main attraction for the refugees was the low value of the German mark that 
guaranteed the lower cost of living compared with other European countries, even if 
finding a job could be more difficult than, for example, in France. Another attraction, 
especially for émigré writers and politicians, was the large number of German and 
Russian publishing houses in Berlin."* According to Williams, the social composition of 
the Russian émigré community in Germany largely consisted of the upper classes and 
the intelligentsia. Many monarchists, however, found Germany inhospitable to their 
political activity and moved on to Paris or the Balkans. The Russian emigration in 
Germany included a number of non-Russian nationals, such as Ukrainians, Poles and 
Armenians and, most importantly, the Baltic Germans and Jews. ""
In 1923 the German economic situation changed quite dramatically with the inflation 
and temporary stabilisation of the German mark, which put an end to cheap living.
When at the same time France was encouraging immigration, many Russian refugees 
left Germany for France, and Paris replaced Berlin as the capital of Russian 
emigration."" The move was also hastened by the worsening political situation and, 
especially after the 1931 Depression, by the restrictive regulations placed on 
employment of foreigners."'* From 1923 onwards there was a steady decline in the 
number of Russians in Germany, until by 1930 there were less than 100,000 left. ""
27 Williams 1972, p. 111.
28 Williams 1972, pp. 111-12: Skran 1995, pp. 35-36.
29 League o f Nations. Official Journal, March 1923, p. 392; Simpson 1939, p. 82. 
20 Simpson 1939, p. 82.
31 Williams 1972, p. 112.
32 Ibid., pp. 112-13, 147.
33 Huntington 1933, p. 22; Williams 1972, p. 112.
34 Raeff 1990, p. 37.
35 Williams 1972, p. 112; Simpson 1939, p. 109.
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Another reason which encouraged the emigration of Russians from Germany was the 
warming of relations between the German and Soviet governments. The conclusion of 
the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, in which Germany recognised the Soviet government had 
the most significant influence on the legal status of Russian émigrés in Germany. After 
the conclusion of the Treaty, those émigrés who did not agree to recognise the Soviet 
government became legally stateless. Until 1924 it was still possible to obtain identity 
cards and passports firom the Russian Delegation, which was unofficially recognised as 
the representative organ of Russian émigrés by the German authorities. However, the 
German government was under constant pressure from the Soviet government not to 
issue them. As a result the powers of the Russian Delegation were gradually reduced 
and the attitude of the German Foreign Office towards it became much cooler. Those 
Russian émigrés that continued to live in Germany to a great extent responded by 
isolating themselves from German society.
The policies of the Czechoslovak government also offer an interesting example of 
benevolent attitude towards Russian refugees. Although the number of Russian refugees 
in Czechoslovakia was never very large, the government initiated a set of special 
policies for their assistance. This was something very special, as Czechoslovakia was 
the only European state with a comprehensive programme of assistance for Russian 
refugees
The governmental program of assistance, known as the Russian Action, was bom out of 
humanitarian and political aspirations of the leadership of Czechoslovakia. As the 
Bolshevik regime was expected to be temporary, the maintenance of the Russian culture 
through training and education was considered an important task for the future of 
Russia. The objectives of the programme also largely determined the social composition 
of the refugees in Czechoslovakia. The main bulk of the Russian refugees consisted of
36 Williams 1972, pp. 116-17, 144-146.
37 Williams 1972, p. 322.
38 Chinyaeva, Elena. ‘Russian Emigres: Czechoslovak Refugee Policy and the Development o f the International 
Refugee Regime between the Two World Wars’. Journal o f Refugee Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1995, p. 143
39 Chinyaeva, Elena. The Russian Emigration into Czechoslovakia in the Interwar Period. D. Phil, thesis. University 
o f Oxford 1994, p. 16.
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the intelligentsia, which in 1926 constituted up to 60 per cent of the émigré community 
in Czechoslovakia, while agricultural workers made up the remaining.
As a result, various educational establishments for Russian émigrés were set up, mainly 
in Prague, including the Russian University, the Law Faculty and the Pedagogical 
Institute, as well as several high schools, technical schools, primary and secondary 
schools. Also the so-called People’s University was established in Prague, with evening 
courses for people who could not attend a regular university By 1924 the number of 
Russian students under the supervision of the Russian Committee, which was 
established in 1922, was already over 3,000 and they were educated in different areas of 
engineering, science and agriculture. As a result of the Russian Action, Prague 
developed as an important academic and scholarly centre of Russian emigration.
However, Elena Chinyaeva in her thesis on Russian émigrés in Czechoslovakia, also 
points out that despite the official policy of the Czechoslovak government for the 
assistance of refugees, the status of Russian émigrés in Czechoslovakia during the inter­
war years remained largely that of ‘stateless foreigners’. Moreover, relations between 
Czechoslovak society and Russian émigrés could best be described as ‘uneasy’. 
Although the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry was committed to continuing the Russian 
Action, the left-wing parties, influential among the working class and intelligentsia, 
were hostile to the anti-Soviet Russian exiles. This hostility contributed to the isolation 
of Russian émigrés from the host society. Interestingly, in Britain the situation seems 
to have been ‘the other way round’; the government maintained very strict rules against 
the entry of refugees, but those who were admitted were generally treated equally and 
without discrimination.
To conclude, Paris was the unchallenged political and cultural capital of Russian 
diaspora. Academically, however, Prague was probably the more important centre.
40 Chinyaeva. ‘Russian Emigres: Czechoslovak Refugee Policy Journal o f Refugee Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1995, 
p. 143; Simpson 1939, pp. 384-85.
41 Raeff 1990, p. 63.
42 Simpson, Sir John Hope. ‘The Refugee problem’. International Affairs, Vol. XVII, No. 5, September-October 
1938, p. 611; Simpson 1939, pp. 386-88.
43 Raeff 1990, p. 64; Chinyaeva 1994, p. 17.
44 Chinyaeva 1994, pp. 182-83, 293-94. (Full reference o f the thesis in footnote 39)
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Germany, on the other hand, attracted émigrés by its large variety of book publishing 
activities and, until 1923, by the lower cost of living. Importantly, it was the liberal 
admission policies of these countries that facilitated the entry of Russian émigrés. My 
thesis will show that opposite was the case in Britain, as from the beginning the 
government adopted a very strict attitude against the entry of Russian refugees, justified 
mainly by the economic reasons. Because of this Britain did not have the possibility of 
becoming similar cultural, political or academic centre of Russian emigration as, for 
example, France did.
Russian émigré society in Britain was also more ‘homogeneous’ than in many other 
countries of emigration. The strict policies of the British government regarding 
admission meant that the Russian refugees in Britain represented more well-to-do, 
upper-class and educated elements. As it will be pointed out in my thesis, this fact 
undoubtedly also had an influence on the relations between émigrés and British society 
and made assimilation easier. The social composition of the émigré communities also 
varied in other countries. France, for example, attracted a large number of intelligentsia, 
but also a number of soldiers and civilians who arrived in the aftermath of the collapse 
of General Vrangel’s army. Czechoslovakia, as already pointed out, invited students and 
intellectuals, but also a number of Cossack farmers. In Germany there were a large 
number of Baltic Germans and Jews, as well as other non-Russian nationals.^^  ^At least 
in France and Germany the size and heterogeneity of the émigré communities seem to 
have led to their greater isolation from the host society than, for example, in Britain.
The historiography of Russian emigration or émigrés is not very extensive. Despite a 
large number of memoirs of individual émigrés, as well as studies on various émigré 
writers and artists and on émigré literature, there are only few general studies on 
Russian emigration, or on individual countries of emigration. An authoritative book by 
Marc Raeff, Russia Abroad (1990/^, concentrates mainly on cultural life of Russian 
émigrés in the societies of exile, its institutional framework, basic traits and also.
45 Simpson 1939, p. 86; Williams 1972, pp. 113, 147.
46 For full reference o f the book see footnote 7.
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importantly, its contribution to the culture of the host countries, particularly in the 
flourishing émigré communities of Paris, Berlin and Prague.
Michael Glenny and Norman Stone, on the other hand, have compiled an excellent oral 
history of Russian emigration, where three generations tell their different stories about 
their emigration, over the period of the early 1900s to the late1980s. The book contains 
various émigré accounts of their escape and lives in various countries around the world, 
including some accounts of émigré life in Britain in the 1920s and 1930s. The 
material consists of interviews of émigrés, carried out by Michael Glenny and his 
assistants mainly during the 1980s, as well as of various memoirs etc. The fact that the 
interviews were carried out only in the 1980s naturally put some limitations to the 
‘accuracy of the information’. Nevertheless, Glenny and Stone have carried out a 
number of interviews of the actual first generation émigrés, as well as traced some 
interesting early memoirs, that provide valuable information on various aspects of 
Russian emigration.
Generally speaking, Britain has been largely neglected as a research topic of Russian 
emigration. Its role has only been treated in few sentences for example in Sir John 
Simpson’s Refugee Problem, from which much information has been ‘borrowed’ for 
more recent studies on Russian refugees. The main piece of information relating to 
Britain in Simpson’s study is that ‘very few Russian refugees entered to Britain and that 
at one time there were probably about 15,000 refugees in all, but the greater part of them 
were assisted to emigrate to France, the Balkans and elsewhere’. My thesis will 
suggest that even this estimate might have been too high.
The lack of studies on Britain and Russian émigrés is largely explained by the fact that 
as there were only a few Russian refugees in Britain, it simply has not been considered 
an important topic for research. Recently some interest has been aroused and as a result 
two separate studies have been published by Russian scholars. The book by Olga 
Kaznina, Russkie v Anglii, is a very detailed study on Russian emigration to Britain in
47 Glenny, Michael and Stone, Norman. The Other Russia. London 1990.
48 Simpson 1939, p. 339.
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the context of Russian-English literary connections of the first half of the 20^ century. 
Even though Kaznina’s book mainly concentrates on the literary and academic circles of 
Russian émigrés in Britain, primarily by considering the role of various individuals, it 
also contains information on the émigré community in Britain more generally.
Elena Kudriakova has also published a small survey on Russian émigrés in Britain 
under the title Rossiiskaia Emigratsiia v Velikobritannii v Period Mezhdy Dvumia 
Voinami.^^ In her study Kudriakova sketches the life of Russian émigrés in Britain in the 
1920s and 1930s, their cultural and educational activities and various organisations 
established by Russian émigrés in Britain.
These two studies, although providing highly valuable new information on Russian 
émigrés in Britain, nevertheless concentrate only on the émigré community itself, and 
not the reasons behind the development of this community. In this, the policies of the 
British government clearly played an important role. None of the earlier studies paid 
much attention to these policies, apart from the notion that only a few Russian émigrés 
entered to Britain. The main interest of my thesis is to consider the policies of the 
British government in detail as well as to assess the importance of these policies to the 
development of the Russian émigré community in Britain.
In the field of refugees Sir John Simpson’s The Refugee Problem still remains a basic 
book on different refugee problems in inter-war Europe, including Russian refugees, to 
which more recent studies often refer. More recent studies on refugees in inter-war 
Europe include, for example, Claudena Skran’s Refugees in Inter-War Europe (1995) 
and Michael Marrus’s The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century 
(1985). The main importance of these books is that they provide general context for 
understanding the Russian refugee problem and particularly the response of the 
intemational community to it. Both Skran and Marrus point out that it was particularly 
because of the Russian refugee problem that the League of Nations decided to establish
49 Kaznina, Olga. Russkie v Anglii. Russkaia Emigratsiia v Kontekste Russko-Angliiskih Literaturnyh Sviazei v 
Pervoi Polovine XX veka. Moskva 1997.
50 Kudriakova, Elena. Rossiiskaia Emigratsiia v Velikobritanii v Period Mezhdu Dvumia Voinami. Moskva 1995.
51 For full references o f these books see footnotes 1 and 2.
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the Office of the High Commissioner for Russian Refugees, a post taken by the 
Norwegian Explorer, Fritjof Nansen/^ According to Skran, this action marked the 
beginning of the intemational refugee regime and the organised co-operation between 
states for the assistance of refugees. From this starting-point the intemational regime 
gradually increased its scope, as other groups, such as Armenian, Greek, Bulgarian, 
Turkish and German refugees were included in the assistance schemes/^
In this context it is important to consider why the intemational community, namely the 
League of Nations, decided to take actions for the assistance of refugees. According to 
Skran, the emergence of refugees as an international issue was related to a wider 
process; the growth of interdependence of nations after the First World War. In the case 
of refugees, the mass exodus from one country potentially threatened the economic and 
social life of a receiving country.M oreover, refugees en masse threatened the security 
of the receiving countries, causing instability, which could even lead to wars.
Although it is clear that the First World War, and the process of the new nation-state 
building in the aftermath of the war led to huge refugee movements, there had been 
mass movements of refugees before the war, such as the Jewish emigration from the 
Tsarist Russia However, it was only after the war and the establishment of the 
League of Nations, that this notion of refugees as a threat to ‘international stability’ 
became under closer consideration. The League of Nations had been formed in 1919 by 
forty-two governments ‘in order to promote intemational co-operation and to achieve 
intemational peace and security’ Although the League’s decision to take up the role 
of refugee advocacy was at least to some extent guided by humanitarian motives, the 
fact that refugees threatened intemational stability was undoubtedly at least as important 
motivator.
On British immigration policy in general there are a large number of studies. For 
example studies by Colin Holmes, such as John Bull’s Island: Immigration and British
52 Skran 1995, pp. 74, 84-85; Marrus 1985, pp. 86-89.
53 Skran 1995, pp. 66, 84-85.
54 Skran 1995, p. 65.
55 Marrus 1985, p. 26, 51.
56 Skran 1995, p. 30.
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Society, 1871-1971 and^ Tolerant Country? Immigrants, Refugees and Minorities in 
Britain provide excellent general background on the development of the British 
immigration policy during the 19‘*’ and early 20* centuries. His main conclusions are 
that the liberal attitude towards immigration, prevalent in Britain for the main part of the 
19* century, started to be undermined in the early 20* century. The First World War 
further increased the anti-alien attitude of the British politicians and public. 
Consequently, the Aliens Restriction Acts of 1914 and 1919 finally swept away the 
liberal procedures of the Victorian age regarding immigration.^* As it will be pointed out 
in my thesis, this development was clearly evident also in the British government’s 
attitude towards Russian refugees.
My thesis will argue that from very early on the British government adopted a very 
strict and definite policy of not admitting Russian refugees to Britain. It was officially 
stated by the government that as a general rule no Russian refugees were admitted to 
Britain, except in special cases. Therefore, strict provisions for entry prevailed and all 
visas were issued on an individual basis. In order to be accepted the refugees had to 
fulfil various requirements, for example, regarding property and personal relations.
All this is particularly interesting when compared with the reputation of Britain as a 
country of liberal refuge. Thus, my thesis will also suggest that the British policy 
towards Russian refugees challenge this reputation. The notion of Britain as ‘a safe 
haven for the persecuted of other lands’ had prevailed throughout the 19* century.
Even if this liberalism had been clearly challenged already in the early 20* century and 
especially after the First World War and the passing of the Aliens Restriction Acts of 
1914 and 1919, there however remained a general agreement on the notion that political 
refugees should be considered separately. As it will be shovm in my thesis, this 
principle was not however followed in the case of Russian refugees.
57 Holmes, Colin. John Bulls’s Island. Immigration and British Society, 1871-1971. London 1988; Holmes Colin. A 
Tolerant Country? Immigrants and Minorities in Britain. London 1991.
58 Holmes 1988, pp. 94-116; Holmes 1991, pp. 23-27.
59 Holmes 1988, p. 19.
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Chapter 2 of the thesis will discuss the issue of the widening demands for immigration 
regulations, consider the development of the British immigration policy and the reasons 
and motives behind the passing of the first pieces of immigration legislation during the 
early 20^ century. The important emphasis of the chapter is the notion of Britain as a 
liberal country of refuge during the 19^ century, and how this liberalism was to be 
undermined during the 20^ century. These considerations provide an important 
background against which the British government policies on the Russian refugee 
question will be evaluated in the following chapters.
Chapter 3 deals with the British involvement in the Russian Civil War. Attention will be 
drawn to the British role as the most important foreign supporter of the White forces; 
the reasons behind the British involvement in the Civil War; its decision to withdraw 
British forces from Russia and to eventually discontinue their support for the White 
Russian forces. The end of the chapter will then concentrate on the refugee problem that 
was bom as a consequence of the defeat of the White armies, whom Britain had been 
actively supporting. The chapter will point out that despite its active support to the 
White forces during the Civil War, after their defeat Britain was much less willing to 
provide assistance to these Russians ‘who had remained loyal to the Allied cause’. The 
British did assist in the evacuation of Russians in North and South Russia, but was 
careful to avoid any further responsibilities to Russian refugees and upheld strict rules 
so as to not take them to Britain.
In Chapter 4 the policies of the British government towards White Russian refugees, 
especially in relation to admission of refugees to Britain will be considered in more 
detail. As already mentioned, the government adopted a strict attitude against the 
admission of Russian refugees to Britain. According to the official statements of the 
Home Office, as a general rule no Russian refugees were admitted to Britain, except in 
special cases. Therefore, strict rules were set for the entry of individual refugees, for 
example regarding the financial position of refugees. This was clearly one of the most 
important requirements for entry, though it was by no means sufficient in itself. 
However, it was particularly important, as the government refused to maintain any 
Russian refugees in Britain from the public funds. The importance of economic
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considerations can also be seen in that the government remained firmly against 
admitting refugees for the purpose of employment.
Exceptions were, however, made towards individual refugees, especially if they could 
support themselves financially, had close business or personal relations in Britain or 
were likely to be an ‘advantage to Britain’, as well as for educational and academic 
purposes. The chapter will evaluate the policies of the British government especially in 
view of the existing immigration legislation, and whether these policies were consistent 
with this legislation. The reasons behind the strict policies Avill also be considered in 
detail, as well as the effect of these policies on the development of the émigré 
community in Britain, especially in relation to the numbers and the composition of the 
community. A further question addressed in this chapter is the policies of the 
government in maintaining a specific group of refugees as a result of the evacuation of 
General Denikin’s forces. The government policies in this episode were clearly 
consistent with the general attitude adopted in the refugee question.
In Chapter 5 the emphasis will be on the question of intemational assistance for Russian 
refugees. As noted earlier, intemational actions on behalf of Russian refugees resulted 
from both humanitarian and political concems of individual European states. It is 
important to notice that the Russian refugee problem actually marked the beginnings of 
the intemational refugee regime. As an outcome, the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Russian Refugees was established under the auspices of the League of Nations and 
the member states of the League participated in various intergovernmental conferences 
on Russian refugees.
In my thesis the emphasis is particularly on the role of the British government in the 
work of the intemational refugee regime, the government’s attitude towards the 
establishment of the Office of the High Commissioner and their participation in its 
work. The important notion of the chapter is that the British participation in the 
intemational co-operative efforts on behalf of Russian refugees was more active than 
one would have expected on the grounds of its policy towards Russians in the individual 
level. Thus, compared with a strict policy of not admitting Russian refugees to Britain,
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the British government was much more generous in providing, for example, financial 
assistance for Russian refugees. Behind this seemingly ambivalent attitude, the 
government was, however clearly guided by selfish motives, as financial assistance was, 
nevertheless, a more modest way of assisting than admitting refugees to one’s country.
Attention will also be drawn to the activity of certain British individuals in the refugee 
field. In addition, the chapter will evaluate the work and achievements of the 
intemational community in general, primarily that of the League of Nations and the 
High Commissioner’s Office, and the importance of this work to the settlement of the 
Russian refugee problem.
In Chapter 6 the focus is changed from the British government policy to the Russian 
émigré community that developed in Britain in the early 1920s. The admission policies 
of the government to a large extent determined the size and the composition of this 
community, by deciding how many and what kind of people were allowed to come to 
Britain. My thesis will suggest that this also had a great influence on the further 
development of the Russian émigré community, for example in regard to the attitudes of 
the émigrés towards assimilation and their relationship with the British society more 
generally.
The chapter will concentrate on the early years of the Russian émigré community in 
Britain, primarily in London, where the majority of émigrés stayed. It will deal with the 
difficulties that the émigrés faced in their new country, for example the problems in 
maintaining themselves and the channels through which assistance was given, as well as 
other questions important to émigrés such as education, religion, social relations and 
culture. One of the important conclusions of the chapter is that, despite the smallness of 
the émigré society in Britain, Russian émigrés were very active in their cultural and 
social life. Various Russian organisations and periodicals were set up in Britain, and 
émigrés enjoyed a wide variety of cultural and social activities.
In general, Russian émigrés abroad considered it one of their primary tasks in exile to 
preserve and carry on traditional Russian culture, to be utilised after the collapse of the
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Bolshevik regime and their return to Russia. This was especially visible in the countries 
that hosted large numbers of émigrés and where the émigrés formed close communities, 
such as Paris, Berlin or Prague. To facilitate the task of preserving Russian culture 
schools were established for Russian émigré children and various literary, artistic and 
intellectual circles flourished in the major Russian communities in exile.
Because of the relatively small number of émigrés in Britain, no specific schools for 
Russian émigré children were established. Instead, children of Russian émigrés 
mainly got their education in British schools, universities and other educational 
establishments. This, on its part, clearly promoted the assimilation the of the émigré 
children into British society. On the other hand, in Paris, Berlin, Prague and some other 
major cities, the fact that Russian children largely attended the émigré schools had the 
opposite effect and thus worked towards the preservation of the feelings of Russianness 
and exclusiveness amongst the émigrés.
In Britain, due at least partly to the smallness of the émigré community, as well as to the 
fact the children were educated in British schools, assimilation of the Russian émigrés 
into British society seems to have been easier and quicker than in many other host 
countries. More generally, the relationship between the British society and Russian 
émigrés seems to have been quite relaxed. This was probably facilitated both by the 
smallness and homogeneity of the émigré community in Britain. Thus, it clearly seems 
that the strong ‘selection process’ in admission actually furthered easy relations between 
the host society and émigrés, which, again, made the assimilation process easier for 
émigrés.
However, this does not mean that Russian émigrés in Britain were not concerned about 
preserving their Russian identity. Russian identity clearly remained very important, 
especially to the first generation of Russian émigrés. The preservation of a Russian 
identity was naturally facilitated by the existence of fellow émigrés. An important role 
was also played by the Orthodox Church. My thesis, nevertheless, would like to suggest 
that the preservation of Russian identity did not mean similar isolation from the host 
society as it did in many other, larger, Russian émigré societies.
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Finally, the source material for the thesis deserves some further attention. Despite the 
small number of published studies, there are nevertheless various documents available. 
In relation to the attitude of the British government towards Russian refugees and the 
policies adopted by the government, the official documents of the Foreign Office and 
the Home Office provide most of the important information. In the general 
correspondence of the Foreign Office (Class FO 371), for example, there exists a 
number of documents and letters between the Home Office and the Foreign Office that 
deal with the question of Russian refugees, starting from early 1918 and continuing 
through to the 1920s. The Home Office papers, especially class HO 45, also contain 
much information on the admission of Russian refugees to Britain.
When considering intemational actions for the assistance of Russian refugees, important 
material can be found in the Phillip Noel-Baker papers, located at the Churchill College 
Archives Centre, Cambridge. Phillip Noel-Baker worked in the Secretariat of the 
League of Nations, which had an active role in the refugee affairs inside the League.
At the School of Slavonic and East European Studies there exist two collections that are 
very useful for the research of British government policies and the case of Russian 
émigrés in Britain. The Pares Collection contains material on British activities in 
Russia, especially in Siberia, British co-operation with the White forces in Siberia and 
negotiations for British assistance in the work of ‘cultural and educational 
reconstmction of Russia’. The collection also contains material relating to the 
educational and employment assistance and other relief work for Russian émigrés and 
their children. The Michael Glenny Collection contains all the material: tapes, articles 
and memoirs relating to Russian émigrés in the period of 1900-1945, used for compiling 
the book The Other Russia (1990), which has already been mentioned above.
Other collections that hold material on Russian émigrés in Britain include the Russian 
Archive at the Brotherton Library of the University of Leeds, especially the collection of 
Sablin family (MS. 1285), which holds material on Russians in Britain dating from the 
1920s onwards. The H. W Williams Papers at the British Library relate to the activities 
of the Russian Liberation Committee, established in London in early 1919 by some
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Russians and British with the aim of the overthrowing of Bolshevism in Russia. The 
journal of the Liberation Committee, The New Russia/Russian Life and the other 
publications of the Committee also provide useful material for the thesis, as do some 
other journals published in Britain in the 1920s, which mainly advocated support for the 
anti-Bolshevik cause.
An important part of information regarding the émigré community in Britain has been 
gained by a number of interviews of Russian émigrés carried out specifically for this 
thesis. These include representatives of both the first generation of émigrés, mainly 
those who came to Britain as children, as well as the second generation of émigrés, 
those who were bom in Britain.
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CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH IMMIGRATION AND 
REFUGEE POLICY 
2 .1 .19th Century Developments
During the 19th century Britain was widely perceived as a centre of refuge where the 
persecuted of other lands could take shelter. In addition its position as the world’s major 
economic power drew labour from less-developed nations. As a result immigrants and 
refugees arrived in Britain throughout the 19th century. ^  This formal toleration towards 
refugees was almost unlimited. Between 1826 and 1905, no immigrant or visitor could 
legally be prevented from landing. In many respects toleration was perhaps greatest 
towards political refugees. The tolerant attitude towards immigrants was, however, 
probably less humane than it would seem at first glance, more a benign indifference as 
immigrants rarely constituted a major inconvenience or danger. Their numbers were 
never large enough to become a social problem, except for the influx of Jewish refugees 
from Russian Poland between the late 19^ and early 20^ centuries. Although Russian 
Jews were not particularly associated with political extremism, mixed in with this group 
were, however, individuals who were politically active and involved in anti-Tsarist and 
revolutionary activities. Among the. most famous examples are for example Joe 
Fineberg, Fedor Rothstein, Maksim Litvinov, Georgii Chicherin and Ivan Maiskii. ^
Different groups of refugees arrived in Britain from Tsarist Russia throughout the 19* 
century, including intellectuals. Populists and at the end of the century also anarchists 
and revolutionaries, for instance those Jewish ‘revolutionaries’ mentioned above. In 
general, the number of politically active refugees from Russia, as well as from other 
European countries increased throughout the 19* century, including such distinguished 
persons as Victor Hugo, Karl Marx, M. Bakunin, P. Kropotkin and Lenin. Nevertheless, 
they were never numerous enough to create wide-scale concern among the British 
authorities. After ail, those concerned were still individuals who had chosen their
 ^ Holmes 1988, p. 19.
 ^Porter, Bernard. ‘The British Government and Political Refugees’, pp. 23-26; Holmes, Colin. ‘Immigrants, 
Refugees and Revolutionaries’, pp. 9-13. Both articles in Slatter, John (ed.). From the Other Shore; Russian Political 
Emigrants in Britain, 1880-1914. London 1984.
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political path, rather than large masses of people involved in political activities. The 
successive British governments therefore largely continued to adopt a benign attitude 
towards foreign revolutionaries. ^
Numerically the two major phases of immigration in the 19th century Britain were the 
Irish of the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s, and the Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe 
towards the end of the century The scale of Irish emigration increased considerably 
after the Act of Union in 1800 by which Ireland became part of the United Kingdom. 
This movement was particularly evident in the 1840s and 1850s. By 1861 the Irish 
community in England and Wales had increased to 601,634 with an additional 200,000 
in Scotland.  ^The Irish immigrants were met with greater hostility than any previous 
immigrant community before. Much of the resentment against the Irish was religious 
but there were clearly racial features, too. The Irish were all considered diseased and 
lazy and almost all of them were regarded as criminals in the eyes of public opinion.
The ‘racial savagery’ between the Irish, English and Scots during the 19th century 
makes all the more remarkable the second main characteristic of the British 
community’s attitudes to immigration - the almost total indifference of the politicians. 
Despite the considerable feeling within the host community against immigrants, 
particularly the Irish, this feeling was not translated into a coherent political demand for 
immigration control either inside or outside Parliament. ^
The major factor behind the indifferent attitude of British politicians towards 
immigration was the idealism of Victorian Liberalism. Both parties, especially the 
Liberals, regarded themselves as champions of the right to political asylum and 
therefore persecuted foreigners could come to Britain without hindrance. On the 
economic side, the industrial revolution in the boom years of the early 19th century 
lapped up labour insatiably and immigration controls were considered irrelevant and
 ^Marrus 1985, pp. 15-26; Simpson 1939, pp. 62-63.
 ^Bevan, Vaughan. The Development o f British Immigration Law. London 1986, p. 64. 
 ^ Holmes 1988, p. 20.
^ Foot, Paul. Immigration and Race in British Politics. Harmondsworth 1965, pp. 81-82.
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even perceived as a symbol of national decline. This unchallenged supremacy did not, 
however, last forever. New industrial nations rose to challenge Britain in the world 
markets and British politicians were to taste the first economic crisis in the country’s 
industrial history. The prolonged economic depression from the 1870s onwards had a 
serious effect on the earlier endorsement of unrestricted movement of people. As a 
consequence people started to talk about ‘protection’ as a solution. ^
It was at this juncture that Jewish immigration to Britain began in full scale. The Jews 
had been emigrating in small numbers from Europe and Russia for decades. However, it 
was in the early 1880s that latent anti-Semitism, especially in Russia, Russian Poland 
and Romania turned into systematic persecution. The starting point was given by the 
assassination of Alexander II on 10 March 1881 by a Polish student. This event was not 
connected with the Jews but was immediately followed by anti-Semitic outbreaks In 
the following month a wave of terror spread throughout the provinces. In January 1882, 
Alexander Ill's Minister of Interior, Count Ignatiev, made the statement to be published 
in Jewish journals stating that the Western frontier was open for Jews In May the 
Temporary Orders concerning the Jews, (the so called ‘May laws’) were promulgated. 
They attacked the basis of Jewish economic life in Russia by prohibiting them for 
engaging in any business activity on Sundays and Christian holidays. They also aimed 
at preventing Jews from owning or working land or residing in the agricultural areas 
and restricted their mobility and rights of residence.
It is estimated that a million Jews left Eastern Europe for the West between 1881 and 
1905. By far the greatest number, 800,000, went on to the USA but Britain remained the 
second largest destination. The mass immigration of Jews proceeded from 1881 to 1905 
and continued at a reduced rate after 1905, due to the Aliens Act of that year until
 ^Foot 1965, p. 84; Cesarani, David. ‘An Alien Concept? The Continuity of Anti-Alienism in British Society before 
1940’, p. 28. In Cesarani, David & Kushner, Tony (eds). The Internment o f the Aliens in the Twentieth Century 
Britain. London: Portland, Or., 1993.
 ^Reports o f Commissioners. Royal Commission on Alien Immigration; 1903,
Cd 1741, vol. IX, p.3.
 ^Rogger, Hans. Tsarist Policy on Jewish Emigration, p. 28. Soviet Jewish Affairs. Vol. 3, No. 1, 1973.
Gainer, Bernard. The Alien Invasion. The Origins o f the Aliens Act o f 1905. London 1972, p .l; Lipman, V.D. 
Social History o f the Jews in England, 1850-1950. London 1954, p. 85; Foot 1965, p. 85.
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1914J1 It is estimated that between the 1880 and 1914 about 100-120 thousand Jewish 
immigrants came to Britain. Taking the natural growth of the Jewish community into 
account the estimate for the size of the Jewish community in Britain was about 150,000 
in 1902-03 and about 180,000 in 1914.13
Why did they come to Britain? Naturally the fact that there was no existing immigration 
control in Britain was an important factor. If the Government did not exactly bestow 
sympathy, it at least practised tolerance and undesirable aliens wpre nonetheless 
permitted to land, i^  The existence of native Jewish community in Britain was also of 
great importance. The incumbent community could offer not only general 
encouragement but also the possibility of active assistance for new arrivals.
Ferry-boat routes largely influenced the pattern of immigration settlement in Britain. 
Most of the immigrant ships docked in London and between 1881 and 1905 about 60 
per cent of immigrants lived there. Within London most of them lived in the East End.^^ 
This was also the case with the Jewish immigrants: they were almost exclusively 
concentrated in the East End of London. The majority of those who lived outside 
London were also concentrated in bigger cities, such as Manchester, Liverpool, 
Birmingham and Leeds. In Scotland a Lithuanian community of around 7,000 
developed between late 1880s and 1914. They got employment in the coalmines and 
iron and steel works of Ayshire and Lanarkshire.^^
Despite the liberal tradition of Britain in relation to the immigrants and refugees, the 
Jewish immigrants became the group that faced the greatest hostility from the host 
community as well as from official circles. The first reactions of British public opinion
Lipman 1954, p. 85.
Lipman 1954, p. 87; Foot 1965, p. 86.
^3 Lipman 1954, pp.99-100.
Gainer 1975, p. 2.
Jones, Catherine. Immigration and Social Policy in Britain. London 1977, pp. 69-70.
Lipman, V.D. A History o f the Jews in Britain Since 1858. London 1990, p. 16.
Rodgers, Murdoch. ‘The Anglo-Russian Military Convention and the Lithuanian Immigrant Community in 
Lanarkshire, Scotland, 1914-20’, pp. 61-62. Immigrants and Minorities, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1982; Rodgers,
Murdoch. ‘Political developments in the Lithuanian Community in Scotland, 1890-1923’, p. 141. In Slatter (ed.)
1984.
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to the persecution of the Jews had been sympathetic. The Lord Mayor of London 
convened a great meeting of protest against the persecution at the Mansion House in 
February 1882. However, when these Jews decided to come to Britain at the time of the 
worsening economic conditions, their reception was somewhat less sympathetic.
Thus, whatever difficulties the Irish had to face they nevertheless encountered less 
hostility than this much smaller group from Russian Poland and Russia.
The ‘material’ reasons clearly played an important role in the hostilities towards Jewish 
immigrants. Actually without the economic deprivation and social concern, the 
immigrants in the East End might have gone unnoticed.^o The mass immigration of 
Jews took place at the time of prolonged and severe recession within the British 
economy. The industrial slump of the 1880s also coincided with an agricultural 
depression. At the end of the 19th century the harsh reality of mass unemployment 
could not be without effect on the host society’s reactions towards the Jevdsh 
immigrants.2i
What is, however, impossible to measure is how different the reactions of the native 
population would have been had not the immigrants been so visibly different from 
them.22 The impression of strangeness was enhanced by the appearance of the people 
themselves; their clothes, speech and behaviour. Some reactions were more obviously 
to do with the immigrants as strangers. The English were not known as great lovers of 
foreigners and the novelty and quantity of Jews in the cities made them likely targets for 
xenophobia. If the Irish were accused of being roughs and drunkards, the Jews were 
charged with more sinister transgressions. They were considered to be liars and were 
often accused of petty crime and vice. 3^
Gartner, Loyd P. The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870-1914. London 1973, p. 275; Lipman 1990, p. 67. 
Holmes 1991, p. 83.
20 Gainer 1972, p. 166.
2  ^ Taylor, Simon. A Land o f Dreams. A Study o f Jewish and Caribbean Migrant Communities in Britain. London; 
New York 1993, p. 32.
22 Jones 1977, p. 74.
2^ Lunn, Kenneth (ed.). Hosts, Immigrants and Minorities. Historical Responses to Newcomers in British Society, 
1870-1914. Folkestone 1980, pp. 112-15.
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Other charges held against Jewish immigrants were that they were destitute and dirty, 
included criminals, anarchists and immoral persons, provided cheap labour for sweated 
industry and by competition depressed English workers’ wages. 4^ The so called 
sweating system was an important part in the Jewish question. This was described as a 
system ‘ under which subcontractors undertake to do work in their own houses and 
workshops, and employ others to do it, making a profit for themselves by the difference 
between the contract prices and the wages they pay their assistants’. Because Jewish 
immigrants were willing to work for less money than the English and additionally could 
not speak English, which meant that it was more difficult to find alternative work, a 
majority of sweated workers were Jewish. 5^
The main consideration which the newcomers were judged by were largely the same as 
those of the Irish immigrants earlier namely public health and morals, standards of 
living, employment, law and order. However, two new important themes were housing 
and education. Apart from lowering the tone and threatening the sanitary standards of 
the East End, the Jews were also accused of aggravating or even creating a local 
housing shortage. Their presence served apparently to drive up the rents and increase 
the overall rate of overcrowding in the East End. The landlords took advantage of the 
situation by increasing the rents and, even though the majority of the immigrants were 
not wealthier than the natives, their options were more restricted. In most cases they 
were dependent on remaining within the East End of London, to a greater extent than 
even the local population.^^
During the last two decades of the 19* century Jewish immigration became a party 
political issue. The issue first emerged in the early 1880s and continued to be the major 
issue in party politics during the whole period before the passing of the 1905 Aliens 
Act. During the period of 1880 to 1888, much of the anti-alien agitation outside
Lipman 1954, pp. 134-35. 
Bevan 1986, p. 67.
Jones 1977, pp. 72-77.
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Parliament seems to have been fairly moderate and most of the pressure, at this stage, 
was still exerted behind the scenes. 7^
The political parties were, however, clearly divided on the immigration question. The 
Liberal Party, apart from few individual exceptions, was a defender of free immigration 
whilst the Conservatives were against it. Historically, protection was enshrined in 
Conservative Party dogma, while the Liberals worshipped free t r a d e T h e  fact that the 
immigrants were Jewish created a special situation for the Liberals. The driving force 
behind the Liberal attitude was in their ideology. The immigrant was poor, a religious 
refugee and he was a Jew. At a time when the Liberals were also threatened with no 
longer being the sole party of the left, the Jewish question provided unity for Liberals; 
an act of nostalgia. To attack the destitute Jewish immigrant was to attack L iberalism .^^
The Liberals were in office between 1880 and 1885 and again between 1892 and 
1895.30 Their almost unanimous opposition to the anti-alien legislation largely explains 
why no legislation was passed despite the growing demands for it. However, it has to be 
pointed out that also the Conservatives, in office from 1886 to 1892 and from 1895 to 
1905 31 by and large supported the doctrine of free immigration from 1888 to 1892. It 
was only after this that their policies were changed, largely because they saw the 
electoral advantage of the aliens’ issue. 32 From the beginning the individual supporters 
of the immigration restriction, however, came almost without exception from the 
Conservative Party.
Meanwhile the Liberal Party had undergone a split with the Liberal-Unionists moving 
nearer to the position of the Conservative Party. By 1895 they were in the alliance with 
the Conservative Party by joining Salisbury’s Conservative Cabinet in an Unionist
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government. 33 The most prominent ‘protectionists’ and ‘restrictionists’ among the 
Unionists were Joseph Chamberlain, Sir Charles Howard Vincent and Major Evans- 
Gordon. They worked actively inside the Parliament for restriction from the 1890s and 
also played an important part in the later projects for alien legislation of the early 1900s. 
They also had clearly anti-Semitic views even if in public they denied charges of anti- 
Semitism. Chamberlain, for example stated that ‘there is only one race that I despise - 
the Jews’. Yet he denied to Herzl that anti-Semitism existed in Britain. Sir Howard 
Vincent not only denied anti-Semitism but even anti-foreign bias, and claimed that his 
only criterion was ‘British interest’. 34
The fact that there were no reliable statistics of the actual size of the immigration led to 
the ludicrous claims being made both inside and outside Parliament. The statistics of the 
Board of Trade, as well as other offices, were wide of the mark because of the lack of 
reliable methods of collecting information. Still the restrictionists were convinced that 
the statistics underestimated the number of the immigrants and came up with dizzying
figures.3 5
The Select Committee of Inquiry, set up in 1888, reported on immigration in August 
1889. The main conclusions of the Committee were that 1) it was impossible to state 
with accuracy the number of aliens in the UK, 2) the alien population was not numerous 
enough to create alarm, 3) the better class immigrants only arrived in transit but the 
poorest and worst class remained in the UK, 4) the immigrants worked longer hours and 
for lower wages than English workmen. The Committee recommended that more 
accurate and detailed data should be collected about the aliens who remained in 
England. The final conclusion of the Committee was that while it was not prepared to 
recommend legislation at present, they contemplated the possibility of such legislation 
becoming necessary in the future. 36
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Despite the failure of legislative actions during the period from 1888 to 1895, the anti­
alien atmosphere became stronger and wider. The Trades Union Congress passed anti­
alien resolutions in 1892, 1894 and 1895. These clearly indicated the feelings prevalent 
at the time among organised labour. In 1894 the Marquess of Salisbury introduced a 
bill for the control of immigration in the House of Lords. The Bill was given a second 
reading in the House of Lords by 89 to 37 voters but went no further. It was strongly 
opposed by Lord Rosebery, the Liberal Prime Minister.
Four years later Lord Hardwicke re-introduced almost the same Bill in the House of 
Lords and asked for the support of Salisbury, who was then Prime Minister in the 
Unionist government. Ironically, Salisbury had brought in his Bill in 1894 in order to 
embarrass Lord Rosebury, and now that the Unionists were back in power, he did not 
wish to be reminded of the measure. However, since the Unionist Party was by then 
officially committed to it, Salisbury had to give the Bill his support.
According to Liberal opinion, the worst failure of the Bill was that it made no mention 
of the right of asylum and gave Board of Trade inspectors the power to exclude a 
political refugee on grounds of destitution.^^ Sir Charles spoke for all Liberals when he 
declared that every Jewish immigrant was a religious refugee and referred to the 
principle of the right of asylum. The restrictionists opposed this argument wdth the 
counter-argument that there was no such thing as a ‘right’ of asylum and that the 
principle was anyway safeguarded because religious and political refugees were outside 
the scope of the legislation proposed.^o
The Bill passed through all its stages in the House of Lords. Since Salisbury had 
stated right at the beginning that there was no time to consider the measure in the 
Commons, this was, however, a barren victory. On the whole, the period from 1895 to 
1900 can be classified as a period of ‘obscurity’ on the immigration question. The
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election of the Conservatives did not reverse the decline in the campaign for anti-alien 
legislation. This was partly linked to the Government’s unwillingness to be associated 
with anti-Semitism, especially as the restriction had served its purpose for the Unionist 
Government in the elections of 1895 with the victory over the Liberals. Agitation 
outside Parliament also seemed to be in decline due to declining unemployment and a 
steady level of immigration.
A change occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century. The outburst of anti- 
Semitism in Russia and Romania reversed the declining exodus. During 1900 about 
3,000 Romanian Jews reached England and a further mass exodus took place between 
1903 and 1904 after a series of outrages in Russian cities and again in the pogroms 
following the 1905 Russian Revolution.
All this coincided with the worsening employment situation in Britain which gave those 
in favour of immigration controls the opportunity to start pushing for restrictions. The 
turn of the century marks a turning point in the nature and scope of anti-alien 
atmosphere, as the issue also moved ‘on the streets’ of London. The first organisation 
devoted to the restriction of immigration was established in 1901 by William Shaw.
This was the British Brothers’ League, which was to lead the people’s protest against 
‘the East End of London...becoming the dustbin of Europe into which all sorts of 
human refuse is shot’.^  ^The basis of the League’s organisation was the East End 
working man, and Sir William Evans-Gordon, the Conservative MP for Stepney, had an 
important part in its construction.
The League maintained a spurious claim to be putting national interest above party 
politics but in reality it had strong links with the Conservative Party organisation in the 
East End. The ideology of the British Brothers’ League was also clearly politically anti- 
Semitic and its aim was to press for restrictive legislation.
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Mass meetings were the League’s well-tried formula to exploit to best advantage the 
enthusiasm created by the aliens’ question. The first meeting was held in Stepney in 
March 1901 and the hall was packed to overflowing, as was the case with all subsequent 
meetings.
The activities of the League began to taper off towards the end of 1903 at least partly 
because anti-alien Tory MPs attempted to distance themselves, alarmed by its descent 
into rabid anti-Semitism. However, it is clear that the League had an important role in 
pushing for immigration restrictions. In January 1902 Evans-Gordon moved an 
amendment to the King’s Speech in the House of Commons demanding immediate 
immigration control. He insisted that immigration was not objected to because the 
newcomers were Jews but ‘purely on social and economic grounds’.
2.2. Towards Immigration Regulations: Aliens Act 1905 and Its Followers
The outcome of the actions of Evans-Gordon and his Conservative associates was that 
the Government promised to appoint a Royal Commission on the Alien Question. The 
seven-man Commission, under Lord James, was appointed on 21 March 1902 to inquire 
and report on 1) the character and extent of the evils which are attributed to the 
unrestricted immigration of aliens, especially in the metropolis; 2) the measures which 
had been adopted for the restriction and control of alien immigration in foreign 
countries and British colonies; and 3) to advise on what remedial and precautionary 
measures it thought was desirable to adopt in the UK.
In the summer of 1903 the Royal Commission reported after hearing a mountain of 
evidence and examination of charges made by the anti-alien lobby over the previous
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years, as well as evidence from Jewish witnesses. At its conclusion the Commission 
stated that it seemed to be established that a large number of alien immigrants had 
entered the country during the last 20 years and that it was mainly composed of Russian 
and Polish Jews. However, the Commission found that the charges of the restrictionists, 
especially regarding the numbers of immigrants, were inaccurate and exaggerated. The 
number of immigrants in Britain was still very small compared with other countries. 
Only 0.609 per cent of the British population were aliens while the figures in some 
other countries were: Germany 1.38, France 2.66, Austria 1.98 and Switzerland 9.58 per 
cent respectively.
The Commission did not find substance in the claim that Jewish immigrants were 
taking jobs from British workers. However, it found greater substantial evidence to 
allegations that by congregating in certain parts of cities, immigrants were to some 
extent responsible for the shortage of housing and increase in rents. The Commission 
was unanimous in its view that there was no case for the total exclusion of alien 
immigrants from Britain. However, they formed the view that it was necessary to 
regulate the entry of certain classes of immigrants, especially those arriving from 
Eastern Europe. They also thought that special regulations should be made for the 
purpose of preventing aliens choosing their residence within districts that were already 
overcrowded.
As a practical recommendation, the Commission formed the view that a Department of 
Immigration should be established either in connection with the Board of Trade or as an 
independent unit. This Immigration Department should have the power to make and 
enforce orders and regulations that might be made applicable to immigrants generally, 
or to vessels arriving at, or from, certain ports, or to certain classes of immigrants. They 
also stated that there should be a provision for medical examination of alien immigrants 
at the port of arrival and that in case of infectious disease or mental incapacity, the 
medical officer should have power to prevent such immigrant from landing. The other 
undesirable groups that might be prevented from landing were criminals, prostitutes,
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and those likely to become a charge on public fiinds.^® The last provision was very 
significant because it was the one that could most effectively be used for preventing 
poor Jewish immigrants from landing in the country. This had been the most important 
reason for the Liberal opposition of Salisbury’s and Hardinge’s Bills in the 1890s and it 
became an important issue once again.
The Tories around Vincent and Evans-Gordon were jubilant. Their demands for rigid 
controls on immigration were no longer merely the outpourings of reactionary Tories, 
but were now written into the recommendations of the Royal Commission. It is also 
clear that Balfour’s (Unionist) Government was not by this time particularly worried 
about the aliens lobby. The Conservatives, who had been in power, almost without 
interruption, for twenty years were tom internally by the powerful protection lobby 
around Chamberlain and stubborn in their opposition to any social reform for the 
working class. Vincent and Evans-Gordon might have actually supplied an answer that 
could please all the warring factions of their own party and had the added advantage of 
winning a few cheap votes around the East End.
In February 1904 the King’s Speech announced the birth of the Government Aliens 
Bill, which followed the recommendations of the Royal Commission. In pages it was 
longer than any of its predecessors but its provisions were rather simple and vague. Its 
main provision was to empower the Home Secretary, through immigration officers, to 
prohibit, without appeal, the landing of any alien who had been convicted in a foreign 
country of crime in previous years; who was likely to become a charge on public funds; 
who was without means of visible means of support; and, finally, who was ‘of 
notoriously bad character’.
The Bill came up for second reading in April, at which time the Liberals opposed it 
vigorously on the grounds that it constituted an attack on political asylum and that the 
problems were best met by anti-sweating legislation. The Government’s defence was
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inept and the spokesmen of government denied that real refugees or aliens of good 
quality would be kept out at all. In the Grand Committee, the fierce Liberal opposition 
under the leadership of Winston Churchill led to the rejection of the Bill, though with 
fervent assurances for its re-introduction in the f u t u r e . ^ 2
After the withdrawal of the Bill there was pressure for its réintroduction throughout the 
winter from the Unionist MPs. Also the Government by now may have had its own 
reasons for wishing to push the Bill through Parliament. While iijimigration continued 
to rise, a series of heavy by-election defeats at the beginning of the year 1905, a 
probable election year, made the Government’s position difficult. Soon the 
Conservative Central Office was circulating anti-alien and anti-Liberal leaflets.
The new Bill introduced on 18 April 1905 was an improvement over its egregious 
predecessor. There were several omissions from the Royal Commission’s 
recommendations It did not mention overcrowded ‘prohibited areas’ or certificates of 
good character. The Bill stipulated that immigrant ships were permitted to land only at 
eight designated ports and that aliens could be refused to land if they could not prove 
they had the means of decently supporting themselves and their dependants, or if they 
were insane, idiots or likely to become a charge on the rates through disease or infirmity 
(a significant modification) or if they had been sentenced abroad for a non-political 
crime. However, permission to land was not to be refused on grounds of poverty if  the 
immigrant could prove that he or she was a refugee from religious or political 
persecution. This recognition of the right of asylum was an important feature of the 
first aliens legislation, as this clause was not to be included in the following 
immigration legislation.
There were no new features in the debates. By this time the Labour Members had joined 
the Liberals in opposing the Bill. During the earlier Bill, the Labour Party, although
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moving toward a strong pro-alien stand, had not spoken against the Bill and had even 
abstained from voting. This time they took even stronger position than the Liberals 
against the Bill and all four members of the Labour Representative Committee voted in 
an unwhipped division on the Second Reading of the Aliens Bill in 1905.^6
However, a more important change for the future of the Bill was the one that had 
happened inside the Liberal Party. Although the opposition by Dilke and Trevelyan and 
some other leading pro-aliens of the Liberal Party was as strong as earlier, the overall 
Liberal opposition to the Bill was considerably less effective. Most of the front bench 
abstained from voting altogether on the grounds that this was ‘a different BilT. The 
Government, on the other hand, had prepared its case much more carefully than earlier. 
On 19 July, the House voted to give the Bill its third reading by 193 to 103. It was 
forced rapidly, and without amendments, through the Lords and by the end of August it 
had become law.^7 It came into operation on the first of January 1906.
In 1906 the future of the Act was obscure. The 1906 election cut short Tory rejoicing at 
its passage as the election gave the biggest trouncing in its political history. Of the 
twelve Conservative East End MPs, only William Evans Gordon and Claud Hay 
returned to witness the further emasculation of the Act by the Liberal Home Secretary. 
Mr. Herbert Gladstone, the Home Secretary in the new Liberal Government was faced 
with the difficult task of carrying out an Act, which he and his party had opposed. 
However, he decided not to repeal the act but made some immediate concessions to the 
radicals in his own party and in the Labour Party. 9^
The actual effect of the modifications by Gladstone is very difficult to assess. What can 
be stated definitely is that during the first five years of its operation, the ratio of those 
rejected to those liable to inspection was generally low. It seems that the Liberals did as 
much as was possible to soften the effect of the Act without actually amending or
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repealing it. There was a decline in the number of immigrants following the 1905 Act 
but it was not a very severe one and later, in 1912 and 1913 the number of immigrants 
again increased. In spite of the spasmodic demands from the ‘anti-alienists’, the Liberal 
Government did not consider restricting the flow further.^^
In the light of subsequent legislation the Aliens Act 1905 seems a modest measure. Its 
principal provisions were to prohibit aliens from landing the United Kingdom other 
than at designated ports and with a leave of an immigration officer. However, the Act 
did not become ‘dead letter’, as manifested by some supporters of stricter restriction of 
aliens. The Act provided immigration authorities with powers to prevent the landing of 
‘undesirable’ immigrants, those who could not prove they had means of supporting 
themselves and who therefore were likely to become a charge upon the rates. Similarly, 
the Home Secretary could deport undesirable aliens on similar grounds to those on 
which they could be excluded. Moreover, the Act was clearly the first demonstration of 
the Government’s preparedness to respond to political pressures on immigration from 
both inside and outside Parliament.
The outbreak of the First World War increased xenophobia in Britain significantly and 
heightened pressure for the stricter control of foreigners and immigrants. Suddenly all 
the Liberal arguments of asylum and the talks about the free haven of Britain were 
washed away by a single act passed through its parliamentary stages on a single day. 
The Liberal Home Secretary, Reginald McKenna, asked leave of the House of 
Commons to introduce the Aliens Restriction Act. The purpose of that Act was ‘in time 
of war or imminent national danger to impose restriction on a l i e n s T h e  primary 
justification was the need to protect the security of the realm from the activities of alien 
spies. The Act gave the Executive wide powers over aliens. It enabled the state, through 
the agency of the Home Secretary and immigration officers, to impose restrictions on 
aliens by giving the Home Office powers to prohibit aliens from landing and embarking
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in the UK, to deport aliens from the UK and the ability to regulate the areas where 
aliens could live in the UK. 3^
The outbreak of the war usually has a tendency both to divide and reinforce, to draw a 
distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’. ^  In this light the fact that the Germans faced 
opposition both from the public and government is hardly surprising. From August 
1914 to May 1915, with the powers given by the Act, the government implemented a 
policy of selective arrest and internment of about 10,000 Germans and Austrians of 
military age. In addition, women and children and men above or below military age 
were encouraged to return to their countries of origin. After the Germans sank the 
Lusitania on 7 May 1915, a wave of popular xenophobia prompted the Government to 
order the internment of all enemy alien males and the systematic repatriation of women 
and children. The number of those interned rose to 32,000 and 10,000 were forcibly 
deported over a period of next two years.^^
The British attitude towards Belgian minority also offers an interesting case. Following 
the German violation of Belgian neutrality, a number of Belgian refugees were admitted 
to Britain. By 1919 about 240,000 Belgian refugees were registered in Britain.
Initially the Belgians received widespread sympathy from a British public who admired 
the courageousness of the Belgians stand against the Germans. Several private 
philanthropic organisations were also assisting the refugees, and led to the formation of 
the War Refugees Committee in August 1914. Importantly, the interest in the refugees 
also spread beyond private charities. By October the Local Government Board was 
regulating the arrival and welfare of the refugees.
Further evidence of the government’s wish to exercise control over the Belgians was the 
decision on compulsory registration of refugees. Under the Aliens Restriction
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(Belgian Refugees) Order 1914, the government ordered a central register of the 
Belgian refugees to be kept by the Registrar General. Belgian refugees were required to 
comply with certain requirements in registration, such as furnishing the registration 
officer in the district they were resident with full particulars. The 1914 Order also 
prohibited Belgians to reside in any prohibited areas unless provided with a permit 
issued by the registration officer.
The Belgian refugees were also directly affected by the conscription measure introduced 
by the government in January 1916 as a response to the insufficient number of 
volunteers for country’s military requirements. The conscription issue became a cause 
for antipathy towards Belgians who did not always respond positively to conscription.
In addition, despite the generally widespread sympathy towards the refugees, different 
opinions on the refugees had been visible from the beginning. The Times, for example, 
had soon after the arrival of the first refugees complained about Belgian workers 
invading Britain. Opposition was also emerged from the ranks of organised labour, 
concerned at possible implications for employment as a consequence of the influx of 
refugees.^^
The anticipated use of powers that the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 gave to 
government agencies rested on the premise that friendly and enemy aliens could be 
distinguished. As shown with the case of Belgian refugees, in practice this proved to be 
very difficult and was to have a direct effect on Jewish refugees in Britain. The 
resentment towards Russian Jews was further intensified because of the reluctance of 
some Jews to serve in the Allied forces. The main opinion of Anglo-Jewry was that they 
should support the war and on the whole they played an active part in the war.
However, there were those among the immigrants of the late 19th and early 20th 
century who had no desire to fight in the same side as their former country of 
oppression. Moreover, the socialists of the group declared their total opposition to any 
involvement in the ‘capitalist war’. As a consequence some took advantage of their
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Russian nationality to evade both voluntary military service and conscription. The 
public resentment towards Russian Jews, as earlier, assumed anti-Semitic dimensions.^®
The attitude of those Jews who refused to take part in the military service became also 
increasingly unacceptable to the Government. Consequently, in July 1917 the British 
and Russian Governments signed a Military Service Convention by which Russian Jews 
could be compelled to serve in either the Russian or the British armed f o r c e s . An  
important provision of the Convention was that males of Russian nationality who 
declined to be conscripted into the British forces were made liable to deportation. 
Further hostilities, related to the conscription issue, occurred after the signing of the 
Convention. The most serious incident happened in Bethnal Green, London, in 
September, where 5,000 demonstrators became involved in violence ’^2 .
The Home Office estimated that by December 1917 about 4,500 Russians had left the 
country under the Convention. 3^ After the war, the question of the future of the families 
of those Jews who had left caused a new problem to the British government. By the 
decision of the Treasury, these families received support from the British government 
until the end of March 1920. The withdrawal of ftmds forced the families to accept the 
repatriation ‘offer’. As part of this exercise for example about six hundred women and 
children, members of the small Lithuanian community in Scotland, were repatriated to 
Russia between February and March 1920. The Russian Dependants’ Committee, 
consisting of voluntary workers, took over the task of helping remaining families from 
the government.
The conscription issue was never fully settled in a manner that suited the British 
government. The only real satisfaction it received was through the deportation of certain 
‘revolutionary’ Russians such as Chicherin and Petrov who were both strong opponents
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of the war and, even more importantly, socialists. Clear connections can be seen 
between the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and not only anti-Bolshevist but also anti- 
Semitic feelings in Britain. There is no doubt that anti-Semitism received a great fillip 
as a result of the Russian Revolution, both because of the prominence of a number of 
Jews in the Bolshevik leadership and because of association of Jews with Bolshevism in 
general.
These exaggerated perceptions of the Jewish role in the Bolshevik Revolution were also 
accompanied with the allegations of Jewish complicity in the murder of the Tsar and his 
family. Anti-alienism, anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism, therefore, were common 
features of British politics at the time of the Russian Revolution and Allied intervention 
in the Russian Civil War and hostile attitudes towards Jews appeared in politics, the 
Civil service, the military and the press.
The end of the war did not have much effect on the anti-alien feeling in Britain. The 
deportation of Jews continued to take place under the existing legislation. The 
government also refused to re-admit those who were unable to prove evidence of 
military service in the allied cause during the war or intervention in Russia. The anti­
alien feeling was by no means limited to Jewish immigrants fi"om the Eastern Europe. 
The German immigrants had had their share of anti-Semitism already during and after 
the war, even though it was the 1930s which properly revealed the apogee of anti- 
Semitism in inter-war Britain, fuelled by the prospect of an increasing number of 
Jewish exiles from central Europe. The Irish immigrants also began to feel the anti-alien 
feeling of the public in inter-war years, as did the black minority and other groups from 
the British Empire.
Those at the centre of the British politics did not show great enthusiasm for the arrival 
of the refugees, either. One of the first Bills introduced by the Lloyd George coalition
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Government after the war was the Aliens Restriction Bill. The main aim of the Bill was 
‘to continue and extend the provisions of the 1914 Act’. Mr Edward Shortt, the new 
Liberal Home Secretary, was careful to explain that the new Act would only last for the 
next two years. In his view the country was still in a state of emergency. The speeches 
in the Parliament, however, clearly witnessed the anti-alien, anti-Semitic and anti- 
German feelings of many members of the Parliament. The anti-alien lobby also started 
tabling amendments to the original Bill, in particular, allowing for the deportation of all 
former aliens. In October 1919 Lloyd George received a deputation of the anti-alien 
lobby and agreed to let the clause through. Opposition to the Bill came only from the 
Labour Party and in particular from Josiah Wedgewood, who had originally entered the 
parliament as a Liberal but had crossed the floor to the Labour Party in April 1919. 
Despite Labour resistance, the Bill was enacted in December 1919.
The 1919 Act extended the 1914 Act into peacetime. More remarkably, although 
initially passed for one year, it was in fact renewed annually until 1971 Even if the 
Act was primarily concerned with imposing restrictions on aliens already within the 
UK, rather than with immigration it also contained several measures against 
immigration. The Act endowed the Home Secretary and immigration officers with 
considerable powers over the entry, employment and deportation of aliens and thus 
constituted an important landmark in the state’s control over alien immigration. By 
now, at the latest, it was clear that the liberal procedures of the Victorian age were 
history.
By the passing of the 1919 Act, the Aliens Act 1905 was repealed. This meant that the 
immigrants’ rights of appeal, secured in the 1905 Act, were swept away. This remained 
the case until 1969 when the Immigration Appeals Act was passed which meant that 
between 1919 and 1969 there was no legal guarantee of due process in the
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administration of immigration law. 4^ The absence of the right of appeal was explained 
by the unsatisfactory nature of the arrangements under the 1905 Act and the 
‘experimental’ character of the 1919 Act.
Also the statutory recognition of the right of asylum for political refugees was not 
included, despite of the strong pressure from Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy. 
Instead, assurances were given by the Home Secretary, Edward Shortt, that any ‘decent 
political refugee’ would be admitted to Britain, even if there was no special clause for 
this in the law. The fact that many members of the Russian Royal family were in Britain 
at the moment was given as an example. However, Mr. Shortt insisted that the clause 
which would guarantee that no political refugee shall be refused the right of asylum in 
the UK, demanded by Kenworthy, would oblige the Secretary of the State to admit 
anybody, ‘no matter if he were the most blood-stained murderer in the history of 
Russia‘.
On the other hand, the fact that the Tsar and his family were killed had probably 
influenced the government’s willingness to offer asylum to other members of the 
Russian royal family. The government might even have felt some guilt over their 
destiny, as during 1917 several enquiries were made from the Russian side for the Tsar 
and his family to come to Britain, but the British government had been reluctant to 
accept them. In any case, as Lord Balfour had remarked already in 1905: ‘The truth was 
that the only immemorial right of asylum given by this country was to allow aliens in 
with whom the country agreed’.
The fact that there was no real ‘right’ of asylum meant that the refugees who were 
permitted to enter Britain were admitted on a purely temporary basis, on the assumption 
that they would eventually re-emigrate and certainly on the basis that they would not at 
any point become a charge on the state. There was, for instance, a general 
understanding between the Jewish community and the British government that the Jews
84 Juss 1993, p. 33.
85 House o f Commons. Official Report (vol.4), Standing Committee A, 16th of July, 1919, col. 294-302; Evans 
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would look after their own without recourse to public funds 7^. The provisions of the 
Aliens Restriction Act of 1919 and particularly the Aliens Order of 1920 enabled the 
British government to refuse entry into Great Britain of any alien who could not 
demonstrate that he or she had a means of support, other than through obtaining 
employment, while in Britain.**
The Aliens Order, 1920, in accordance with the 1919 Act remained on the statute 
books, with few amendments, until a new order in 1953. *^  The Order listed at length 
restrictions on the landing of aliens. Included were provisions that an alien could not 
land in the UK except with the leave of an immigration officer and that leave to land 
should not be given to an alien unless he was in a position to support himself and his 
dependants and had not been prohibited from landing by the Secretary of State. 90
The new Order also ensured that from now on aliens in general would only be admitted 
subject to conditions. Aliens who sought entry into Britain for the purpose of 
employment had to possess a work permit issued to an employer by the Ministry of 
Labour. These work permits were available only for certain classes of work for which 
British or resident alien labour was not available. Permission for certain categories of 
workers, such as doctors, to be admitted without permits was given by the Home 
Secretary in his ‘General Instructions’. Moreover, the requirement of the work permit 
finally established a linkage between economic conditions and immigration control, and 
was to become a cornerstone of immigration legislation, The provision relating to 
work permits can be directly linked to the post-war economic depression, 
unemployment and the consequential discontent this caused in the British public. Even 
if economic conditions had clearly influenced already the passing of the 1905 Act, it
Holmes 1988, p. 142.
Alderman 1992, p. 276.
89 Gordon 1985, p. 11.
9^ The Aliens Order, 1920. Statutory Rules & Orders 1920. Vol. I, pp. 139-40.
91 Juss 1993, p. 38.
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was only after the First World War that the protection of the labour market from the 
foreign competition was unequivocally linked to immigration policy. 93
The Aliens Order of 1920 also further extended the Home Secretary’s power to deport, 
on his or her own initiative, any alien whose presence was not ‘conducive to the public 
good’. The Home Secretary in his circular advised the chiefs of police that deportation 
would not ‘as a rule’ be ordered simply where someone had been convicted but not 
recommended for deportation. However, the ‘rule’ was very quickly broken: A Russian 
Jewish émigré, Henrik Breslov, was prosecuted in 1922 for giving his passport to 
someone who spoke better English in order to obtain a visa. He was fined £20 by the 
court and a prosecution request for deportation was turned down. The Home Office, 
however, took a different view and ordered his deportation on the ground that his 
staying would not be ‘conducive to the public good’. The Divisional Court also rejected 
Breslov’s application to have the deportation order revoked. Another immigrant,
Samuel Venikov was ordered to be deported and refused to be given a hearing. The 
court rejected his argument because the Home Secretary had made an administrative 
and not a judicial decision and therefore Venikov was not obliged to be given a 
hearing.94
The nationalist fervour and xenophobia present at the end of the First World War that 
had contributed to the passing of the 1919 Aliens Act was strongly present during the 
early 1920s. This atmosphere was evident, for example, in the parliamentary debate of 
1923 during which Conservative spokesmen stressed the need for a strict control over 
alien immigrants. The Jewish dimension, though not being the only focus of attention, 
had an important part in the discussions. As earlier, the continuing concern about 
Jewish Bolshevism was very much present. 95
Significantly, the attitude of the Labour Party towards immigration had also gone 
through an important change. The earlier anti-restrictionist attitude, clearly still present
93 ibid.p. 37; Evans 1983, p. 12, 23.
94 The Times 11.4.1922: R v. Governor o f Brixton prison and another-Ex parte Bressloff; 
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at the time of the passing of the 1919 Act changed during the few months of Labour 
Government in 1924. This ‘change of attitude’ was clearly influenced by the anti-alien 
public opinion and by the desire of the Labour to stay in power. In early 1924 the 
general opposition to their anti-restrictionist attitudes frightened the Labour government 
into operating the legislation against aliens even more firmly than their predecessors 
had done.
Despite this, the aliens issue was used ruthlessly by the Tory Party in the 1924 General 
Election with accusations of the Labour Party’s sympathy towards aliens. The 
campaign featured a ‘Red Scare’ and allegations of foreign subversion similar to the 
spy-mania of the 1910s. Stanley Baldwin, the Tory Party leader, pointed out that Britain 
could not afford to tolerate ‘revolutionary agitation’ and promised to ‘examine the laws 
and regulations as to entry of aliens into this country’
This ruthless use of the aliens’ issue in their campaign worked for the Tories. The 
Conservative victory brought Sir William Joynson-Hicks into office as a new Home 
Secretary. He was one of the key figures of the continuity of the anti-alienism from 
before the First World War through to the end of the 1920s. During his time, the lives of 
aliens, especially Jews, were fraught with insecurity. Non-British bom Jews, even if 
they were naturalised, and their children, were denied employment in the civil service 
and local government. In London they were also barred from council housing and 
scholarships. This coincided with the death of the Liberal party as the main opposition 
and there was a clear tendency among Jews towards the Labour Party between the 
wars^7. In 1927 Joynson-Hicks tried to make the Aliens Act permanent, but the proposal 
was dropped because of the pressure of business and died with the election of a Labour 
Government in 1929.
The Labour administration proved more sympathetic to the plight of aliens and agreed 
to set up an appeals procedure for aliens subject to a deportation order. Nevertheless
Cesarani. ‘An Alien Concept’, p. 40. In Cesarani & Kushner (eds) 1993.
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‘the right of asylum’, had been buried also by the Labour Government. A notable 
demonstration of this was the refusal of the Labour Home Secretary, John Clynes, to 
grant political asylum to Leon Trotskii. The essentials of the 1919 Act also remained in 
place. One important reason was that its principles had by now become a standard 
Home Office view, regardless of the party. ^
2.3. International Comparisons
The first immigration laws of Britain, especially the 1905 Act, were largely influenced 
by foreign immigration laws. The Royal Commission of 1903 was given the task to 
‘inquire and report upon the measures adopted for the restriction and control of Alien 
Immigration in foreign countries’ and use them as an example for measures to be taken 
in Britain. The recommendations of the Commission followed the example of some 
existing immigration laws, especially the United States and Canada. The Commission 
was particularly impressed with their ability to prohibit specific classes of aliens,
From 1798 to 1875 there were no Federal laws in the United States dealing with the 
immigration. However, as in Britain, in the second half of the 19th century, opposition 
to aliens grew. The complaints were similar to those in Britain, mainly the destitute 
state of the aliens on arrival and their tendency to crime and disease. The laws passed 
from 1875 onwards were specifically directed against defined classes on aliens. In 1875 
the law was passed against prostitutes and criminals and, in 1882, against lunatics and 
those liable to become chargeable to public funds. In 1885 came an enactment 
prohibiting the immigration of any alien who had entered into a contract to perform 
labour or service of any kind in the United States, with certain exceptions. Further 
legislation followed in 1887, 1888 and 1891.
The act of 1891 provided that ‘all persons likely to become a public charge, persons 
suffering from a dangerous contagious disease, persons who have been convicted of a
Cesarani. ‘An Alien Concept’, p. 41. In Cesarani & Kushner (eds) 1993; Foot 1965, p. 112-13. 
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felony or other infamous crime and also any person whose ticket is paid for with money 
of another, or who is assisted by others to come’, could be prohibited from landing. 
Penalties were also imposed upon persons who did not follow these regulations and all 
aliens belonging to the prohibited classes or who had become a public charge were 
made liable to deportation. An officer, the Superintendent of Immigration, was 
appointed with a staff of clerks and inspection officers, whose duty was to board and 
inspect all vessels carrying immigrants. All decisions made by them, touching the right 
of any alien to land, were final, unless an appeal was taken to the Superintendent, whose 
action was subject to the review by the Secretary to the Treasury.
The Act of 1903 further extended the classes of prohibited aliens by adding ‘epileptics, 
persons who have been insane within five years, professional beggars, anarchists and 
contract labourers who had been deported within five previous years’. Some changes 
were made in procedure. If the officer whose duty it was to examine the aliens on 
landing decided in favour of the admission of any alien, any other immigration officer 
could challenge his decision and bring the alien before a Board of Special Enquiry. It 
became their task to decide whether an alien should be allowed to land or be deported. 
Also, both the alien and any member of the Board dissenting from the decision, had the 
right to appeal to the Secretary to the Treasury, whose decision was f i n a l . Y h Q  battery 
of restrictions that had started in 1882 and was mainly directed against immigrants from 
southern and eastern Europe reached its culmination in the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act.
This Act related future immigration quotas to national origin and to the numbers present 
in 1890 census.
The Immigration Act of 1905 in Britain was clearly most strongly influenced by the 
existing immigration laws in the United States. The 1903 Act was actually almost a 
ready model for it, the main aims of it being qualitative control of designated aliens, and 
therefore most of the excludable categories in the United States law were encompassed
Reports o f the Commissioners. Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, 1903, Cd 1741, Vol. IX, Part II, p.32.
102 ibid., p. 33.
103 Holmes 1991, p. 107.
53
in the United Kingdom l e g i s l a t i o n .* However, it can be stated that despite restrictive 
legislation, the United States legislation was still quite favourable to refugees, even if 
no special privileges were prescribed in the law for refugees from persecution. There 
were not, for example, any restrictions as to their employment in industry, trade or the 
professions.
It is true that the immigration laws passed in Britain in the early 20th century were more 
favourable than most continental laws, so that aliens in Britain were admitted to several 
of the liberal professions, such as doctors, dentists, barristers and architects, and aliens 
could qualify on the same terms as British subjects. On the other hand, for example, the 
Aliens Order of 1920 ordered that the alien had to produce a written permit from the 
Ministry of Labour in order to be able to enter employment. Since the permits were 
issued very scarcely, the authorities clearly had effective means for restricting the 
employment of aliens.
Canadian legislation also made an impression on the 1903 Royal Commission. The 
principal provisions of the 1886 Immigration Act and the 1902 Amending Act were that 
no vessel bringing immigrants was admitted to entry unless she had been visited by an 
immigration agent. The master of every vessel was also required to hand to the 
Collector of Customs at the port of landing a report, giving full particulars of the 
passengers, specifying in each case the port of embarkation, the name, sex and age of 
each passenger, the number of each family, and the profession, occupation and 
nationality of each passenger. The governor-general could prohibit the landing of any 
immigrant suffering from any dangerous or infectious disease and any criminal alien.
He could also prohibit the landing of destitute immigrants, until the master of the vessel 
in which they arrived, had paid to an Immigration Agent a sum of money necessary for 
their temporary support and transport to their place of destination. ***^
*04 Bevan 1986, p. 70.
*05 Bentwich, Norman. The Legal Status o f Refugees, pp. 3-5 and 13. Refugee Survey 1937-38. Special reports. 
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In Europe there were clear differences between different countries in existing 
immigration legislation at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. 
Germany shared a common history with Britain in immigration; it was a country of 
emigration until 1885 lo?. The enquiry of the Royal Commission of 1903 about the 
existing laws in Germany brought out information that in most of the states on the 
frontiers of the empire there were no special regulations for the admission of aliens. The 
law of 1867 regulating the passport system provided that foreigners were not required to 
carry papers of identity either on entering or leaving. Only if the security of the empire 
or a single state was threatened by the means of war or equivalent danger, the Imperial 
authority could require passports. In Prussia there were some stricter regulations for the 
immigrants. The decree from 1896 directed local authorities to keep lists of foreigners 
residing within their district and that ‘this will render it possible to remove any 
undesirable elements immediately on their arrival, before they have established 
themselves permanently’. In Bavaria foreigners were required to produce evidence of 
their nationality and they could also be expelled for specific periods. The Ministry of 
State had power to refuse admission into the Kingdom to foreigners and to expel them 
in the interest of public necessity,
The state intervention in the shape of the immigration control in Germany was a result 
of ‘a concern for the preservation of the German national character’. Manpower 
shortages that could not be met by the indigenous population occurred mainly in the 
eastern provinces of Prussia in the 1870s. At first compensation was found through the 
employment of Poles from Russia and Austria, but this policy soon caused a severe 
political problem. The Government of Prussia had been enforcing a rigid policy of 
Germanisation on the Poles living in the previously Polish areas annexed by Prussia. 
The government feared that the employment of ‘foreign’ Poles would jeopardise this 
policy, and reacted by ordering mass expulsions and the closing of borders. The big 
landowners and mine ovmers reacted strongly against this policy, and therefore it was 
settled by a compromise. In 1890 the Prussian government suspended the immigration
Hammar 1985, p. 165.
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ban on foreign Poles for three years and their further entry, as well as their status as 
seasonal workers, was authorised in 1894. Continued economic development gradually 
pushed back political opposition and immigration restrictions were relaxed. However, 
despite a loosening in restrictions on employment, the general controls over the 
residence of Polish workers were retained. By 1907 a system of identity cards had also 
been instituted especially to control this immigrant group.
The First World War brought about a drastic change in the policy towards the Polish 
workers. In a reversal of the earlier policies Poles were forbidden even to return home. 
On the day the war broke out passports were made compulsory to prevent them leaving 
the country. During the war foreign Poles were no longer prohibited from working in 
the industries of the western provinces, and new Poles were recruited after the 
occupation of the Russian part of Poland. About 700,000 Poles were ‘recruited’ by the 
fashion that as soon as they crossed the German border, they lost their right to return or 
change jobs. Beside the Poles, a large number of Hungarians and Belgians were forced 
to work in the German war economy. After the war the policy was reversed. With the 
breakdown of the German Empire and subsequent economic problems there was no 
significant employment of foreign labour. The policy of the German authorities
towards the admission of immigrants, however, remained quite liberal in the aftermath 
of the war and entry visas were relatively easy to obtain from the government.^
In France, as in Switzerland, according to mid-19th century legislation permission was 
required to establish domicile and this permission could also be withdrawn by 
administrative order at any time before naturalisation. The Minister of Interior had more 
general powers to order an immigrant travelling or resident in France to leave French 
territory immediately, and to have him taken to the f r o n t i e r s . However, immigration 
was not considered to be a problem in France in the 19th century and for the most part 
of the 20th century. France had a tradition of immigration since the second half of the
Holmes 1991, p. 106; Hammar (ed.) 1985, pp. 166-67.
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19th century, when thousands of foreigners were granted admission in an effort to 
compensate for the country’s insufficient labour supply and low birth-rate. The low 
birth-rate created a permanent demographic need and together with periodic labour 
shortages it served to encourage immigration. The aim of the immigration policy was to 
regulate the arrival and departure of the foreigners according to the interest of the 
moment. The problem was that immigration did not always follow the course of the 
plan and therefore the results were different firom the aims of the immigration policy.
During the late 19th century, at a time of industrialisation and urbanisation immigrants 
came to take places left by the native French who moved to the cities. Between 1850 
and 1913 the immigrant population increased fi*om 380,000 to 1,600,000. This was 
made easier by the fact that before the World War I there existed no special restrictions 
on the entry of aliens in France. During the war a decree was issued which described 
that aliens staying more than two months had to obtain a carte d ' identité in order to 
regularise their residence in the country. The number of French casualties in the First 
World War totalled 2 to 3 million. This led to a need for extra labour in order to 
compensate for the losses of war. As a consequence immigration was encouraged 
during the period of 1919 to 1921 but the increase in the numbers was still quite small. 
Between 1922 and 1931, as a consequence of economic growth and shortage of 
manpower, there was, however, a more significant increase in immigrant population. 
The numbers increased firom 1,532,000 in 1921 to 2,715,000 in 1931.
2.4. Concluding Remarks: The Free Haven of Britain?
The beginning of the 20‘*’ century witnessed an end to the Liberal procedures of 
Victorian Britain as regards to immigration controls. During the 19"' century Britain 
was widely perceived as a centre of liberal refuge, which offered shelter to various 
groups of immigrants and refugees from other countries. The prolonged economic
 ^ Hammar (ed.). 1985, p. 127.
 ^ Bentwich, pp. 6-7. Refugee Survey 1937-38, Vol. V. Refugees and the Law (1); Hammar (ed.) 1985, pp. 27-28.
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depression from the late 19* century, however, brought a change to these attitudes, and 
people started to talk about the need for ‘protection’. These feelings were strengthened 
by the arrival of a large number of Jewish refugees from the Russian Empire from 
thel880s onwards who became vulnerable targets of anti-alien feelings of the British 
public and politicians, especially supporters of the Conservative Party.
The passing of the first immigration legislation, the Aliens Act of 1905, was an 
important landmark in the decline of liberal immigration procedures and the process 
was further strengthened by the passing of subsequent legislation, the Aliens Restriction 
Acts of 1914 and 1919, and the Aliens Order of 1920. These provided the Home 
Secretary and immigration officers with wide powers over the entry, deportation and 
employment of aliens. Importantly, unlike the Aliens Act of 1905, none of the 
subsequent immigration legislation contained a statutory recognition of the right of 
asylum for political refugees. At the time of the passing of the 1919 Act this was 
justified by assurances from the Home Secretary that any ‘respectable political refugee’ 
would be admitted, even if there was no special provision for this in the law.
The last point becomes particularly interesting when considering the policy of the 
British government towards the Russian refugees from the Bolshevik regime in the 
aftermath of the Russian Civil War. As it will be pointed out in Chapter 4, the ‘principle 
of the right of asylum’ was not to be followed in the case of Russian refugees. Thus, the 
changed atmosphere in Britain as regards immigration was to manifest itself also in the 
British government’s policy towards Russian refugees.
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CHAPTER 3: THE EXODUS FROM RUSSIA FOLLOWING THE CIVIL WAR
3.1. British Involvement in the Civil War
Of all the foreign governments, the British government became the one most heavily 
involved in the Russian Civil War, both directly, by using its own military forces and 
indirectly, by providing material assistance and advice. The French clearly were more 
outspoken in their hostility to Bolshevism, however, at a practical level their actions 
were not as clearly formulated. Of the other Allied governments, the United States was 
a reluctant participant, while the Japanese actually only threatened the extent of the 
territory it ruled, i.e. Far East. ^
The British (and the Allied) involvement in a Russian Civil War can be understood 
through two important questions, the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution. 
These two events largely determined the British policies in relation to Russia and the 
new Bolshevik regime. They are also very closely related. The Allies were naturally 
concerned at the possibility of the Revolution being the spark that could ignite the fires 
of revolution in other countries. However, the more direct outcome was the fact that the 
new rulers of Russia aimed at making a separate peace with Germany, and thereby to 
withdraw their support for the Allies in the wæ* against Germany. This was the scenario 
that worried the Allies most; after all Russia’s role in the eastern front against Germany 
was of great strategic importance.^
A related problem was the fear of the Allied leaders that Germany might take advantage 
of Russia’s disorganised state to establish German domination in Russia.^ Although this 
was a fear common to all the Allied leaders, it affected Britain most as it had the most 
developed trade ties within Russia that could be disrupted by Germany. This was 
especially so in the Baltic provinces and the oil fields of the Caucasus, both areas of
 ^ Ullman, Richard H. Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921. Volume II: Britain and the Russian Civil War, November 
1918- February 1920. London; Princeton, New Jersey 1968, p. 8.
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major importance of British investors that wanted to be safeguarded from Germany’s 
‘aggressive’ commercial penetration/
The Treaty of Brest -Litovsk thus provided the Allies with varied reasons with which to 
intervene in Russian affairs. However, the British, and more generally the Allied, 
attitude towards different fractions in Russia was far from united and logical. Between 
late February and early May 1918, for example, when the Bolsheviks themselves 
manifested pro-war opinions, the British tried actively to bring about co-operation with 
the Bolsheviks. Thereafter, the Allies favoured action against the Bolsheviks, but at first 
action organised by Russian democrats like N.V. Chaikovskii, not the White generals. ^
By September 1918 there actually were two socialist states in Russia, that of Lenin and 
the Bolsheviks in Moscow and that of the SR-dominated Directory formed at Ufa. The 
latter included the northern territory around Archangel. The main difference between 
them was that the Ufa administration had a more tolerant attitude to free trade and 
private enterprise and the local democracy was exercised through regionally based 
councils rather than workplace soviets. ^
On 15 February 1918, Bruce Lockhart, the British government’s agent in Russia, had 
his first interview with Trotsky who had just arrived from Brest- Litovsk. For his own 
part, Lockhart explained his government's willingness to reach a modus vivendi with the 
Bolshevik regime. Trotsky expressed his policy towards Germany to be ‘no war- no 
peace’ which he had announced at Brest-Litovsk and also expressed his willingness for 
co-operation with Britain but only if the Allies would cease their support of the counter­
revolution. Lockhart then came away from this meeting convinced that Trotskii had 
offered a basis for a successful policy on Russia. Lockhart was by no means the only 
one to advocate a detente with the Bolsheviks in February. General Poole, soon to 
become to be in charge of British military forces in North Russia, was also convinced
 ^The Russian Outlook, No. 1, vol. 1, 10 May 1919, p. 11; Ullman 1968, p. 8.
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that if the Allies recognised the Bolsheviks they would turn anti-German and join the 
Allies.®
Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, although repeating that the internal affairs were not a 
concern of the British, stated that Trotskii’s proposal would require Britain to abandon 
her allies in those parts of Russia where Bolshevism could not be regarded as de facto  
government. According to him Britain could never do this.  ^With the ratification of 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russia and Germany, Britain’s Russian policy 
changed quite radically. The other Russia: Siberia, North Russia, the Cossack 
territories, the Caucasus and Transcaspia began to be looked at as sectors where 
resistance could be organised against the Bolshevik authorities but even more 
importantly against the Central Powers. The final end to co-operation with the 
Bolsheviks, however, came only in May, when it became clear that the Lenin did not 
intend to annul the Treaty of the Brest-Litovsk, and agreed to make further economic 
concessions to Germany.
Already before this, however, there had been a military incident that greatly influenced 
the relationship between the British and the Soviet government. This happened on 6 
March when a company of British marines landed at the North Russian port of 
Murmansk. Even though they had Bolshevik permission, their presence was considered 
very dangerous and there was a fear that the British would soon land in greater force not 
only at Murmansk but also at Archangel. Thus Lockhart’s efforts to persuade the 
Bolsheviks not to sign the treaty were virtually doomed from the start. The view of the 
Bolsheviks was that the ratification of the peace with Germany would bring at least 
temporary r e l i e f .   ^2
® Bradley, John. Allied Intervention in Russia. University Press o f America 1968, p. 19. 
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In April 1918a second body of 150 British marines landed at Murmansk. This was 
followed at the end of May by another 370 marines. They had been asked to come by 
the Murmansk Soviet to help them against the White Finnish offensive. The presence of 
Allied forces in North Russia was naturally a big source of concern to the Germans. A 
telegram from Chicherin to the Murmansk Soviet on 15 June demanded the immediate 
departure of British, French and American warships from Russian ports. However, on 
23 June a reinforcement of 600 men under the command of General Maynard was 
brought to Murmansk. This agreement between the Allied forces and the Murmansk 
leaders meant a complete break between the Murmansk Soviet and M o s c o w . g y  this 
time Soviet-Allied relations were passing from distrust to open hostility. Because the 
German government had informed the Bolsheviks that they had no intention to continue 
their military operations in Russia, the Allies had lost their last chance of securing the 
consent of the Bolsheviks for intervention. In these circumstances, Lockhart told 
Balfour in his telegram, the only policy left to the Allies was to prepare, quickly and 
secretly, to intervene on the largest possible scale.
The plan for combined Northern and Siberian intervention came to be the basis of the 
British military policy in Russia. However, in May 1918, because of the American 
opposition to the Siberian part of it, the British government decided to press for a 
decision on the North Russian phase. In June 1918 the Supreme War Council approved 
the Allied military effort to retain control of Murmansk and, if possible. Archangel. 
General Poole was chosen as a commander of both the land and naval defence. North 
Russia, even though it was a side-show in the actual Civil War, was considered of a 
great importance by the British, especially since there was thought to be a large 
amounts of military stores at Archangel which might fall into German or White Finn 
hands.
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Murmansk and Archangel were also the ports that were most accessible for the British 
and the Bolsheviks had neither the political support nor administrative capacity in the 
north. The Murmansk Soviet had decided to continue the co-operation with the Allies 
against the Moscow decisions, and Archangel, on its part, was already in anti-Bolshevik 
hands when Maynard’s troops arrived on 23 June. At the head of the Archangel 
government, the URR directorate, was N.V. Chaikovskii. The URR, Union for the 
Regeneration of Russia had been set up in April 1918 by right-wing Social- 
Revolutionaries, Popular Socialists like Chaikovskii and left-leaning Kadets. For the 
Allies these green patriotic socialists in North Russia offered at the time the only hope 
for establishing the Eastern Front.
During 1918 some serious problems arose between the directorate and its army. The 
attempted coup by the Russian army commander, Chaplin, was met with strong 
opposition jfrom the British, and the democratic government was ordered to be 
restored.20 Chaikovskii was not, however, ready for compromises demanded by Chaplin 
and on September 12 he dissolved all the departments and resigned.
The final defeat of the URR was not far away. Although the Ufa State Conference had 
resolved the differences within the Green camp and established a five-man Directory as 
the executive arm of the Provisional All-Russian Government based in Omsk in less 
than two months it was to share the fate of Chaikovskii’s government in Archangel. On 
18 November 1918 the Directorate was overthrown by Admiral Kolchak, the White 
veteran of one of the earliest attempts at counter-revolution in the summer o f  1917.^2 As 
the British took the pragmatic decision to continue to aid Kolchak and other White 
generals, some members of the URR swallowed hard and joined Kolchak. Others 
quietly emigrated or joined the Bolsheviks in the common struggle against the White 
generals and thus sank their differences with the Bolsheviks until the victory from the
 ^  ^Mawdsley 1987, pp. 49-50.
Swain 1996, pp. 155-156.
20 Swain 1996, pp. 210-13.
2  ^ Figes, Orlando. A People’s Tragedy. The Russian Revolution 1891-1924. London 1996, p. 585. 
22 Swain 1996, pp. 213-219.
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Whites had been achieved. However, many leaders of the Right SR’s were also 
imprisoned by Kolchak and later escorted to the Chinese border. 3^
The British Cabinet considered a plethora of papers on British involvement in Russia 
during October and November of 1918. Lockhart argued that Britain should have a firm 
and clear approach to the Russian situation, in that it must totally oppose the Bolshevik 
regime or accept it ‘warts and all’. A middle course between them, by giving the anti- 
Bolsheviks financial and material aid, would only prolong the Civil War without 
changing its eventual outcome. Ironically, this was exactly what Britain had chosen to 
do in Russia. Sir Henry Wilson recommended that all possible aid would be given to the 
anti-Bolshevik forces in the North and South of Russia to give them opportunity of 
defeating their enemies. However, he also concluded: ‘ If the Bolsheviks are the better 
men, we cannot indefinitely continue to protect the others
Balfour insisted that British government had not decided to support or oppose a 
particular political system in Russia. However, Britain could not abdicate all its 
obligations, for example towards anti-Bolshevik administrations that had grown up 
under the shelter of Allied forces. He considered that the British government was bound 
by the ‘obligations of honour’ to assist those Russians who had remained loyal to the 
Allied cause. This argument was repeatedly put forward during the whole period of 
British involvement in Russia.25 After the Armistice with Germany in November 1918 
it became harder and harder for Allies to justify their interference in Russia.26 Therefore 
the argument of obligations of honour was especially useful as a justification for 
intervention.
At the meeting on 13 November at the Foreign Office the first specific decisions 
regarding British policy in Russia for the period following the Armistice were made. It 
was decided to remain in occupation in North Russia, to establish contact with General
23 Swain 1996, pp. 11-12, 253-54; Figes 1996, p. 587.
24 cited in Ullman 1968, p. 13.
2^ Haigh et al. 1980,pp. 9-12; Ullman 1968, pp. 12-16.
2^ Luckett, Richard. The White Generals. An Account o f the White Movement and the Russian Civil War. 
Edinburgh 1971, p. 205.
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Denikin and give him all possible assistance in military material and to supply the 
Baltic states with military materials after their governments could give evidence that 
they would be able to make effective use of such support. 7^ This does not imply that 
there was a unified consensus inside the government on the lines of Russian policy. The 
statements of the government were often quite conflicting. Not least were those of the 
Prime Minister, Lloyd George, which varied from the statements that Britain would be 
leading the intervention in Russia to statements strongly against intervention.^^
Lloyd George’s position soon hardened against intervention whilst Winston Churchill, 
then Secretary of State for War advocated a more robust intervention against the 
Bolsheviks. At the meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet on 30 and 31 December 1918, 
Churchill argued strongly for collective intervention against the Soviet regime. Lloyd 
George gave some facts about the size of the Red army compared to that of the Allied 
forces and asked where the necessary troops would be found. British troops were not 
willing to be involved, neither were probably other troops. Thus, Lloyd George became 
‘definitely opposed to military intervention in any shape ‘. 9^
Even though the Prime Minister, not to mention the British Labour Party were 
becoming more anti-interventionist in their views, the British policy in Russia remained 
unchanged until the spring of 1919. British involvement remained greatest in North 
Russia for the whole period. It was the only place where British took part in combat 
operations (and also civil administration), with local Russian forces serving only to 
augment their efforts. In June 1919 there were about 13,300 British involved in 
Archangel, about 8,000 of them in the Relief Force. In comparison, there were only 
118 French left (originally there were about 2,500 French troops) and about 300 Poles. 
In Murmansk there were about 5,000 British troops and 710 Americans, (though the 
American troops mostly withdrew by May 1919) 1,500 French, 1,900 Italians and
1,000 Serbians. Altogether, these made about 23,500 men in Archangel and
Ullman 1968, pp. 13-14.
Haigh et al 1980, p. 27.
Ullman 1968, pp. 95-97.
Strakhovsky, Leonid. Intervention at Archangel. The Story o f Allied Intervention and Russian Counter­
revolution in North Russia, 1918-1920. Princeton 1944, p. 193.
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Murmansk.^’ As a head of the White government in Archangel was General K.E.
Miller, with whom the British started to co-operate after the fall of Chaikovskii’s 
directorate.
It was also in Archangel where one of the severest conflicts in relation to the British 
involvement arose. The incident involved the British Consul in Archangel, Douglas 
Young. He protested strongly against the British offensive against the Bolsheviks in 
Archangel and as a result he was forced to resign from the Diplomatic Service on 9 
October 1919. In his memorandum Young pointed out that during April and May of 
1918 his position was a British representative at Murmansk and Archangel instructed by 
HMG to give the local Soviet authorities an assurance that HMG had not and never had 
had any intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Russia. By mid-August he was 
confirmed in his belief that the British intervention had been based upon false 
assumptions, e.g. first, that the Bolsheviks were pro-German and second, that the 
Russian Whites were anti-German and anxious to continue the war. Young had accused 
the Foreign Office of preventing his information from reaching the Secretary of the 
State, to whom he was responsible.
In Siberia, Allied intervention took a different form from that in the North. The total 
number of the Allied troops was much larger with 60,000 Czechs, 70,000 Japanese, 
nearly 9,000 Americans and more than 4,000 Canadians. British were, however, only a 
force of about 2,000. Also, with the exception of the Czechs, none of the foreign forces 
ever engaged in actual fighting against the Bolsheviks. Their role was almost entirely 
restricted to training and supplying White Russian troops and to guarding the towns and 
lines of communication behind the zone of operations. The mission of Major-General 
Alfred W.F. Knox, the senior military official in Siberia, was entrusted with the task of 
training Russian troops and a training school for Russian officers was established in the 
bay of Vladivostok. This restricted role, however, did not satisfy Knox, whose clear
War Office (WO) 106/1177. Public Record Office (PRO).
Figes 1996, p. 652.
Rothstein, Andrew. When Britain Invaded Soviet Russia. The Consul Who Rebelled. London 1979, p. 110.
Memorandum by Douglas Young. Douglas Young Papers, Add. 61848. British Library. Department of 
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wish was to make crusade against Bolshevism. Acting on his own authority, he allowed 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Ward and his detachment to go to the front. The War Office, 
however, carefully pointed out that unless specific orders came to the contrary, no 
further British troops were to go west of Urals. 5^
Kolchak’s coup in November 1918 was met by a warm approval of British military 
authorities in Siberia, especially by Major Knox. He had met Kolchak in the summer of 
1918 and in the lengthy conversations in Japan they had come to a conclusion that the 
only form of government that could save Russia was a military government. Knox was 
clearly impressed with Kolchak which could be seen in his message to the War Office 
in August 1918, stating that he considered Kolchak the best Russian for British 
purposes in the east. It seems that Knox also influenced the decision of Kolchak to 
accept the title of Supreme Ruler of Russia after the coup in Omsk 6^, a position which 
was recognised by other White generals.
The reactions were not quite as warm in London. Nevertheless, Balfour almost sent a 
telegram to Kolchak with a message of British government’s support for his 
government. After second thoughts a very urgent telegram went out to Eliot, the British 
High Commissioner in Siberia, with a message : ‘Please suspend action in regard to 
message for the present ‘.3? As it will be noticed, this provides an example of the 
ambivalent attitude of the British government towards Kolchak during the whole period 
of intervention.
Sir Bernard Pares, British representative in Siberia, did his best to maintain a good 
relationship between British and Siberian governments. His attitude was clearly anti- 
Bolshevik which can be seen in various reports, memoranda and newspaper articles.38 
He also worked hard for the British co-operation in the work of Russian Reconstruction 
in Omsk. The initiative of the co-operation was partly due to the personal interest of
Ullman 1968, pp. 28-32.
36 Figes 1996, p. 587.
37 Ullman 1968, pp. 32-42; Smele, Jonathan D. Civil War in Siberia. The anti-Bolshevik government o f Admiral 
Kolchak 1918-1920. Cambridge 1996, pp. 74-75.
38 The good examples are for example his report on Bolshevist atrocities and his article in The Times, 15 December 
1919. Pares collection, PAR/6/5. SSEES.
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Pares and partly the interest of several Anglo-Russian institutions of which he was a 
member. These attempts were also supported by various Russian émigré scholars in 
Britain, for example Sir Paul Vinogradov. The whole issue was naturally a quite 
sensitive one, and Pares carefully made clear in his memorandum that this policy was 
more a matter of voluntary initiative and not a direct responsibility of the British 
government. 9^
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the project of Russian reconstruction had also 
official support. The idea of intervening in Russia by cultivating patriotic socialist 
groups had arisen during 1917 and this strategy dominated the British thinking until 
November 1918.^® The changes in the political situation in Russia brought these 
policies to an end in relation to the patriotic socialist groups, but the plans for Russian 
reconstruction were continued with the White government in Omsk through the efforts 
o f Pares and others.
In his letter to the Acting Foreign Minister in Omsk, Mr. Soukine, Pares laid out ideas 
on British assistance to Russia. He pointed out that the most obvious general directions 
of such help were the preparation of British persons for posts in Russian service and the 
similar preparation of Russians for the same work. According to Pares the work of 
social reconstruction, especially that of training of social workers was among the most 
urgent needs and that need had further increased because of the ‘sheer destruction 
conducted by the Bolsheviks’. Pares continued that it was generally recognised in 
Britain that the first interest of Britain in Russia was that Russia herself should be 
strong and self-supporting. For this reason there could not be any monopoly of British 
effort. However, it had long been realised in Britain that the task of social 
reconstruction had sooner or later to engage all energies in Russia, and that there were 
‘few tasks which were more likely to be attractive to young and public-spirited 
Englishmen than a share in the work of building up a new and free Russia’. The
Pares collection, PAR/6/11/2. Memorandum on British co-operation in the work of Russian reconstruction, 
Omsk, 1919. SSEES.
Swain 1996, p. 103.
68
government of Omsk, on its side, welcomed the ‘noble intention manifested in Britain 
to assist Russia in her cultural and educational reconstruction’.
In the same letter Pares also described the existing machinery for the co-ordination of 
this work in Britain. Among these were the Central Russian Committee (CRC) of Sir 
George Buchanan, which was connected with the Foreign Office; The Russo-British 
Chamber of Commerce; The British Russia Club, which was also presided by Sir 
George Buchanan; The United Russia Societies Association, and the various University 
schools of Russian study, particularly the School of Slavonic Studies at the London 
University. He pointed out that it would be desirable that some organ of co-ordination 
should also exist in S i b e r i a .^2 xhe idea of the creation of the special service of the 
Foreign Office for Russia had been initiated by Pares in 1918. His proposal was to 
create a special and independent committee, with a status of a department of the Foreign 
Office, which would act as an Intelligence Bureau on Russia and to draft and submit 
proposals relating to Russia."^  ^Pares’s proposal was approved by the Inter-Departmental 
Committee of the Board of Trade and the Central Russian Committee was officially 
established with an expenditure of £9,850 for its execution
The Central Russian Committee also took part in a project for the tabulation of Russians 
in Britain in 1918 with the purpose of ‘service, relief and information of a confidential 
character for the use of all departments having relation to Russian affairs’. The project 
was undertaken by Mr. L.G. Gall, the Secretary of the Central Russian Committee, at 
the request of Pares. Its aim was to gather information on the Russians in Britain who 
might be of use for the service of the Allies, as well as general information for 
educational, employment and relief purposes. British daily papers assisted on their part 
by inviting Russians with technical knowledge or general educational qualifications to 
register at the Consulate. This method did not, however, achieve a great deal of success.
Pares collection, PAR/6/7/3 and 6/15/2. Pares’s letter to Soukine ‘British co-operation in the work o f Russian 
reconstruction’, 30.5.1919 and Soukine's reply to Sir Bernard Pares, 21.6.1919. SSEES.
Pares collection, PAR/6/7/3. Pares to Soukine 30.3.1919. SSEES.
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Pares pointed out that although the majority of Russians in Britain were unskilled 
workers and artisans, it would be nevertheless possible that some five thousand 
Russians could come within the scope of the tabulation, having specialist knowledge or 
skills, which could be useful for the Allies. There is no further information on the 
success of the project, except that the Central Russian Committee did not provide any 
funds or staff for the use of Mr. Gall. Pares pointed this out in his letter to the 
Committee and expressed a view that without funds Mr.Gall could not continue to 
work."^ 5
Pares also worked actively in the Educational Committee and in the Russian Relief and 
Reconstruction Fund. The Educational Committee was a special committee of the 
Central Russian Committee for the matters of educational needs of Russia. The 
Committee was involved in the project of getting help from British universities and 
schools for the Russian ones and in educational propaganda in Russia. Among other 
things it encouraged British universities and schools to offer free places for the children 
of distinguished Russians, who had offered valuable services to Britain. The Russian 
Relief and Reconstruction Fund (RRRF) was originally established for the 
reconstruction work in Siberia with training of Russian and British personnel. Later it 
was involved in general relief work in Russia as well in work for the assistance of 
Russian refugees.'^^
In the south of Russia the scope of British involvement was that of a midway between 
the North Russia and Siberia. In November 1918, a decision was taken to furnish 
assistance to the anti-Bolshevik forces in South Russia and the Don region led by 
General A.I. Denikin. At the same meeting it was decided to reaffirm the British 
government’s adherence to the Anglo-French convention of 23 December 1917, 
according to which the British were to take charge of the ‘Cossack territories’, 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia. The only important military intervention of the British
Pares collection, PAR/6/4/1. The tabulation o f Russians in England. SSEES.
Pares collection, PAR/7/2/3. ‘Education for Russian families’, recommendations by the Educational Committee; 
Par/6/4/3. Educational Relief for Russians. SSEES.
Pares collection, PAR/7/3/3. Russian Relief and Reconstruction Fund. SSEES; FO 371/4013, File 63588, Paper 
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happened in the Crimea on December 1918 when 500 British marines landed at 
Sevastopol to supervise the evacuation of German forces and to make sure that the 
remaining vessels of the Russian Black Sea fleet did not fall to the partisan 
detachments. The marines remained only 25 days after which they were relieved by a 
much larger French force. Except for this episode, British intervention in South Russia 
was limited to giving material assistance to Denikin. On the other hand the amount of 
the material assistance was quite notable."^^
British forces also came in the Caucasus in large numbers in November 1918. They 
occupied Baku and the railway between Baku and Batum in order to assure the safety of 
this important line and also to enforce the terms of the armistice with Turkey. These 
troops in the Caucasus were actually the largest commitments of British troops in 
Russia. The nature of the British commitment in the Caucasus was, however, somewhat 
different from the British involvement elsewhere in Russia. The going of the British 
forces to the Caucasus happened at the time of the closing moments of the First World 
War, after only cursory discussions about the reasons and objectives of their role. The 
involvement of the British troops in the Caucasus, however, grew from the initial task 
of enforcing the armistice with Turkey to much greater involvement in the affairs of the 
various ‘border states’ of Russia in the Caucasus. In this, the British policies were 
largely guided by the commercial interests of Britain, primarily that of the importance 
of oil in the area.^^
The other region where the British became engaged during the months following the 
Armistice with Germany was the Baltic. The British government had clearly reacted 
warmly to the independence movements of Baltic countries. In May 1918 it had granted 
de facto recognition to the Estonian constituent assembly until the Peace Conference 
should take place. In September the Foreign Office sent the Estonian representative in 
London a note which formally assured that the British government ‘would be entirely 
opposed to any attempts to impose on Estonia a government which would not be in
48 Ullman 1968, pp. 44-50 
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accordance to self-determination’. Similar assurances were sent to the Latvian National 
Council in November. The Lithuanian case was complicated by Polish claims and the 
policy of Britain toward Lithuanian developments was a prudent silence.
In the late autumn of 1918 it seemed likely that the Baltic provinces would be settled by 
the Red Army, which followed on the heels of the withdrawing German troops. At this 
point the Imperial War Cabinet decided to send five light cruisers, nine destroyers and 
seven mine-sweepers to the Baltic ‘to show the British flag and support British policy 
as circumstances dictate’. The British naval forces also landed at Riga, though they 
were forced to leave at the beginning of January in front of advancing Bolsheviks.
The situation in the Baltic was complicated by the presence of different actors in the 
area: the north-western army of White General ludenich; German forces under the 
command of general von der Golts; Allied military mission Under Sir Hubert Gough, 
whose responsibility was to supervise the withdrawal of von der Goltz’s troops and 
finally, the Soviet troops. Von der Goltz, however, refused to take orders from Gough 
and began to advance against Estonian and Latvian troops. The Estonian troops 
managed to beat Goltz’s troops but as a consequence of this episode the Estonians cut 
their support to General ludenich’s army because of the alleged connection between 
Germans and ludenich’s troops. The complexity of the events in the Baltics had its 
influence on the British policy in that the government did provide material support to 
General ludenich but his assistance was on a much less generous scale than any of the 
other generals.
Thompson 1968, p. 56; Ullman 1968, pp. 51-53. 
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3.2. From Prinkipo to the Change of Policy
Although the Imperial War Cabinet had not reached an agreement on Russian policy in 
its meetings during November and December 1918, Lloyd George resolved to proceed 
himself to attempt to bring about an end to the Civil War in Russia. On 12 January 1919 
the question whether Russia should be represented at the Peace Conference was 
considered at the Paris Peace Conference. The Omsk government had urged that 
discussion be delayed until their delegates reached Paris. The French Foreign Minister, 
Pichon was of an opinion that the Omsk delegates should not attend the meeting 
officially but that their views could still be heard. Lloyd George, on the opposite, stated 
that the Omsk delegates did not represent the opinion of whole Russia more than the 
Bolsheviks did, and pointed out that it would give an impression that they represented 
Russia. As a compromise it was decided that there would be no formal Russian 
representation at the Peace Conference.
As an alternative, at the meeting of the Council of Ten, 21 January, both Lloyd George 
and President Wilson put forward a proposal that all the various Russian delegates 
would confer together elsewhere. This proposal was accepted by the Council of Ten and 
on 23 January the Allies sent an invitation to all Russian factions to attend the peace 
conference on the Princes Islands (Prinkipo) in the Sea of Marmora. The attempt, 
however, failed because all the anti-Bolshevik elements indignantly refused the 
invitation.^"  ^There is also no doubt that there were disagreements among the Allied 
governments on the Prinkipo policy as well, and that the French government was 
actually strongly opposed to the whole idea of inviting Bolsheviks to Prinkipo.
In any case, the Prinkipo episode clearly revealed the limited understanding of the 
western leaders of Russian life and politics. It was certainly unrealistic to expect that the 
different factions in Russia would immediately cease hostilities at a word from the 
Peace Conference. The reactions of the anti-Bolsheviks were a mixture of incredulity
53 Kettle 1992, pp. 82-83; Ullman 1968, pp. 99-109.
54 FO 418/53, File 11563, No. 7. PRO; Ullman 1968, p. 113.
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and indignation with amazement and resentfulness that they, friends of the Allies and 
recipients of the Allied support, should be expected to sit down at the same with the 
Bolsheviks. It was considered both unbelievable and unthinkable. In a press interview 
S. Sazonov, the former Foreign Minister in the Tsarist government, denounced the 
whole concept and said that the invitation itself was unacceptable and insulting.^^
The White Russians were unanimous that it was only the anti-Bolshevik Russia that 
should be represented at the Peace Conference. Virtually all the anti-Bolsheviks agreed 
on the urgency of persuading the Allies to recognise one Russian government. The 
problem, especially from the Allied point of view was that there was no single all- 
Russian government, but several separate ones. The Western governments had, 
however, continued to consider the diplomatic representatives of the Provisional 
government as the legal representatives of Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution, since 
none of the Allies recognised the Soviet government.
During 1918 some European ambassadors of the Russian Provisional government had 
also formed an informal body which met in Paris under aegis of V.A. Maklakov, the 
Russian Ambassador of the Provisional government, and exchanged information and 
views on a regular basis. Their initiative was also to form a Russian Political 
Conference for discussing the Russian interests in peace and the position they should 
take before the Allies. The aims of the Conference were to secure official admission to 
the peace talks as the empowered representative of Russia, to promote unification of 
White Russian governments and to persuade the Allies to send more aid to the anti- 
Bolshevik movement. It was decided to invite to the Conference representatives of both 
camps of anti-Bolsheviks; those who represented the old pre-Revolutionary Russia, as 
well as the representatives of the ‘New Russia’, i.e. those who accepted the February 
Revolution of 1917.
In the end Maklakov and his colleagues managed to bring together a remarkably 
disparate group of Russian political figures to the Conference, ranging from the 
representatives of Kolchak’s Siberian government and Denikin’s South Russian
Thompson 1966, p. 119, 129.
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government to Chaikovskii, the former head of North Russian government; other 
‘democratic’ and ‘leftist’ representatives as well as representatives of the ‘old regime’. 
There were, however, some important names absent from the rolls of the Conference. 
Among them was Aleksander Kerenskii, who had irritated both the Allies and the 
Russian diplomats during 1918, so that his participation in the Conference was never 
even considered. Pavel Miliukov, the leader of the Kadet Party (National Freedom, i.e. 
Constitutional Democratic Party) and the former Foreign Minister in the Provisional 
government, did not attend, either, though mainly because of reasons independent of 
him. The French press raised such a big storm over his alleged collaboration with 
German forces in the Ukraine that Maklakov made a decision to send him to London.
Absent was also Konstantin Nabokov, Russian Provisional Government’s Chargé 
d'Affaires in London His view was that it was unwise for the Conference to accept 
anything less than full representation at the peace talks. In London he was, however, 
persistently urging upon the British the necessity of having Russia represented at the 
peace talks. After Foreign Minister Balfour’s rejection of his arguments, Nabokov 
concluded that the denial of Russian representation was part of British policy of keeping 
Russia weak and divided in order to give British imperialism a free hand in the Middle 
and Far East.^^
The decision of the Supreme War Council to deny the official representation of the anti- 
Bolsheviks at the Peace Conference and to hear the émigrés by means of memoranda 
and private interviews instead was naturally much less than the Political Conference 
had hoped to achieve. A further and perhaps heavier blow to the anti-Bolshevik 
Russians was the Prinkipo proposal that followed few days later,
Thompson 1966, pp. 66-77.
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The existing Russian society in Britain also strongly objected the British plans for 
negotiations between the Bolsheviks and White forces. They also held a firm opinion 
that only ‘White Russia’ should be represented at the Paris Peace Conference. Many 
members of the colony were well-known figures of the former provisional government 
and individuals representing other anti-Bolshevik political groupings. To mention a few 
there were persons such as P. Miliukov, K. Nabokov, S. Poliakov-Litovtsev, editor of 
the Russian Commonwealth and liberal democrat, TV. Shklovskii, member of the 
‘Narodnaia Volia’ (People’s Will) Party, which subsequently gave birth to the SR and 
Populist Parties. Shklovkii, however, had settled in England already in 1896.
In February 1919 the Russian Liberation Committee (Union) was established in London 
with an aim of ‘the overthrow the Bolshevism, the restoration of order and the 
regeneration of Russia’. Among its members of the Committee was for example 
Ariadna Tyrkova-Williams, a Russian journalist, who had emigrated to Britain in 1918, 
as well as P.B. Struve, who was also at that point staying in Britain for a short time.
The Committee published a during 1919 and early 1920, as well as several
pamphlets relating to situation in Russia. In April 1919, an appeal to the Allies to give 
help for Denikin and Kolchak in ‘their liberation of the whole Russia and restoration of 
the unity’ was made by Leonid Andreiev in the Committee’s pamphlet. In the same 
pamphlet the Prinkipo proposal ‘to put loyal Russia on the same moral level with 
Russia’s murderers and hangman’ was recognised as ‘a terrible blunder’.
The Russian Commonwealth magazine, with Poliakov-Litovtsev as its editor, was 
published twice monthly from 1918 until early 1920 by the Union of ‘Russian 
Commonwealth’. It represented a liberal view and stated as its aims the establishment 
of the republican form of government in Russia, not even the ‘mild’ form of 
autocracy.^'* At the time of the Prinkipo proposal the editorial of the magazine 
condemned the peace negotiations between the Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks as
The Russian Outlook, vol. 1, no. 1, 10 May 1919, p. 12; Russian Liberation Committee, Pamphlet no. 1. British 
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strongly as the Liberation Committee. It also shared the opinion that the anti-Bolshevik 
Russia was the only possible representative of Russia at the Peace Conference.^^
Another Russian paper, The Russian/ Russkii zhurnal, which was published in London 
from late 1918 to August 1919, Edouard S. Liubov as its founder and editor, also 
expressed its opinion against the Prinkipo invitation. However, the editorial of the paper 
suggested that the new way of solving the problem would perhaps be to invite 
representatives of different nationalities; Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Jews and so 
on to the Conference. 6^ This clearly suggests a liberal tone of the editor, which more 
conservative émigrés, those of the opinion of the united and undivided Russia would 
have probably not shared.
The Russian émigrés in Britain, as in other countries of emigration, represented various 
political views and anti-Bolshevik fractions. Generally speaking the anti-Bolshevik 
Russia could be divided in two political groups; that of the old pre-Revolutionary 
Russia, mainly consisting of monarchists, and the camp of the ‘New Russia’ which 
generally accepted the February Revolution of 1917 67. The publications mentioned 
above represented mostly ‘New Russia’ in their political orientation, supporting the 
February Revolution of 1917 against the old centralised Russia. The common cause, the 
overthrow of Bolshevism, however, guaranteed general views on the Russian 
representation at the Peace Conference, on Prinkipo, as well as support to the White 
governments in Russia. Therefore, for example, a resolution was passed by the Russian 
colony in London at the end of 1918. It recognised the necessity of Russia being 
represented at the Peace Conference as a ‘fully authorised’ country, and stated that the 
representatives o f  the ‘United Russia’ should be representatives of the White 
governments of Archangel, Omsk and Ekaterinodar.68
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That the common struggle against Bolshevism united different sections can also be seen 
in the policy of the Russian Commonwealth. Even though the editorial of the magazine 
criticised the manner of the overthrow of the Omsk directorate by Kolchak in 
November 1918, it was later recognised that ‘during such a tragic and fateful time there 
was no right to make a stand with regard to such a tremendous task as the regeneration 
of Russian state-power merely on vague feelings’. The paper also stated that a strong 
hand in a Civil War was necessary, and that it was its duty to ‘face the future rather than 
to brood on the past’.
At the War Cabinet meetings on 12 and 13 February 1919 Churchill again argued for a 
definite decision to make war against the Bolsheviks by using much larger Allied forces 
than were at the time in Russia. The principal arguments opposing Churchill came from 
Lloyd George. Since neither the House of Commons nor Balfour supported Churchill, 
his proposals failed. The questionnaire of the War Office had indicated of the extent of 
popular opposition to the use of conscript troops in Russia, and the Cabinet was thus 
well aware of the unpopularity of the operations in Russia, both with the troops and 
with the public at home.^®
An important step towards ending the British involvement in the Russian Civil War was 
taken on 4 March 1919 when the War Cabinet reached a decision that no additional 
troops would be sent for the operations in Russia and that British forces would be 
withdrawn from Murmansk and Archangel ‘as soon as the ice melts in the White Sea’."^  ^
Also another decision was made by the Cabinet, one of a great importance for the 
Provisional Government of the Northern Region, namely that they would not be 
informed of the forthcoming withdrawal for the present. This was an action directly 
contrary to the advice of P.O. Lindley, the British Commissioner in North Russia, 
whose opinion was that London had a moral obligation to inform the Archangel 
government. However, according to Earl Curzon, the Acting Foreign Secretary, the
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Soviet government would be certain to regard this announcement as a sign that Allied 
Governments had decided to abandon the White Russian groups,
Winston Churchill was given a broad authority to bring about the evacuation of the 
British troops but these operations could not actually be described easily as a 
withdrawal. His plan was to let Ironside, in command of British forces in North Russia 
after General Poole, join Gaida, the Czech General commanding Kolchak’s northern 
army at Kotlas. Lloyd George agreed to this plan. However, the Czechs were not 
willing to give help to Kolchak and without their help this junction of anti-Bolshevik 
forces became a military impossibility. The mutinies among the Russian regiments were 
the final straw for Ironside and in July he became in favour of a rapid withdrawal. The 
worst of these mutinies happened on 7 July in Troitsa in the Slavo-British legion, where 
eight members of the battalion shot nine British and Russian officers.
The evacuation of the British forces began formally on 1 September 1919 and by 27 
September the last British troops had left Archangel. On 12 October the evacuation of 
Murmansk was completed. The British offered General Miller to evacuate his forces to 
Murmansk which was easier to defend and also more accessible to supplies from 
England. Miller refused, partly because Kolchak had ordered him to stay in Archangel 
but also because his men were defending their homes, unlike British soldiers. He 
requested the British to remain for one more month but this plea was firmly rejected by 
the British.'^^
The decision of the withdrawal from North Russia, even if it clearly was a sign of 
changing attitude of the British in relation to their involvement in the Civil War cannot, 
however, be interpreted as an acknowledgement by the British that the Bolsheviks were 
going to be victorious. It was more that militarily North Russia was viewed as relatively 
unimportant, especially compared to South Russia and Siberia.^^ Actually, at the end of
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April 1919, the Cabinet had decided that Kolchak should receive continued support, and 
in addition he should be offered de jure recognition as the head of the Provisional 
government in Siberia. This recommendation was introduced by Lloyd George at the 
meeting of the Supreme Council in May 1919.^  ^The growing Allied interest in the 
possibility of recognising Kolchak was utilised also by the Russian Political 
Conference, which at this time had also began to lobby more actively for this. In early 
April the Conference had sent an emissary to London to press the British politicians for 
the recognition of Kolchak’s govemment.^^
The question of recognition was carefully considered in Paris. In late May the Supreme 
Council sent a despatch to Admiral Kolchak declaring that the Allies were prepared to 
continue to help Kolchak and other Russian groups to establish themselves as single 
Russian government. In return of Allied support Kolchak was expected to establish a 
democratic government in Siberia; that he would permit free local elections and 
summon the Constituent Assembly. Not surprisingly, especially since he knew that 
there was no possibility for the Allies to monitor conditions in Omsk, Kolchak replied 
to the note with a liberal tone.
It is, however, important to notice that in the end the Allies never offered an official 
recognition to Kolchak as the Supreme Ruler of the Russian government, despite the 
opposite comments for example in the British Press. The fact that General Denikin had 
issued a proclamation on 12 June, which recognised Kolchak as the Supreme Ruler of 
the Russian state and the Supreme Commander-in -Chief of the Russian Armies had 
little effect on the actions of the Allied governments. It is clear that the Allies were not 
convinced that Kolchak would follow the democratic direction; his liberal reply did not 
carry much weight, since it was well known that General Knox had guided him in the 
formulation of the letter. The Allied support to Kolchak also depended directly upon his 
military success. In June 1919 Kolchak’s military success suddenly reversed; on 9 June,
'76 Smele 1996, p. 211.
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only four days after Kolchak’s reply was received in Paris, the Bolsheviks recaptured 
Ufa, and a few days later his forces were in full retreat.
At this point the British government re-examined its policy. As equipment and material 
provided by the British did not seem to do any good for Kolchak the British decided to 
concentrate their support on Denikin, even though he was clearly considered to be more 
reactionary and less democratic than Kolchak.^^ The decision, therefore, was based 
solely on his rapid success. At this time hopes were high for the downfall of the 
Bolshevism. During early autumn, even Kolchak seemed again to share the success 
started by Denikin’s offensive in the south.
Even though the British clearly opposed Denikin’s ‘Great Russian’ policies in the 
Caucasus and elsewhere, the Cabinet actually never properly discussed whether British 
policy should be for a united or a dismembered Russian Empire. In the spring of 1919 
the Cabinet had emphasised that in return for the military support of Denikin, Britain 
should secure from Denikin undertakings not to attack Georgia and other Caucasian 
states. If he failed to agree, British support would be withdrawn. 2^ This decision was 
not, however, followed until much later, and the decision then was made purely to 
facilitate British withdrawal from the Civil War.
The whole issue of united versus dismembered Russia clearly seems to have been 
considered too complicated and time-consuming for detailed discussion in Cabinet. At 
the same time it is clear that there were strong views among the members of the 
Cabinet, not least the Prime Minister himself, that the united Russia might be ‘a great 
menace’ to the British in the East. In September 1919, at the meeting of the War 
Cabinet, Lloyd George stated that the future of the British empire might depend on how 
the Russian situation developed. His personal view was that the thought of a powerful 
and united Russia of 130 million inhabitants could not be viewed with equanimity. The
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other members of the Cabinet seem to have agreed with his opinion; Winston Churchill 
was actually the only Cabinet-level advocate of the ‘Great Russian’ position. 83
Consequently, all British troops, except for two battalions left at Datum until the 
completion of the Turkish peace settlement in the summer of 1920, had left the 
Caucasus by mid-October 1919. The decision of the withdrawal of the British military 
forces had been made already in March, after several meetings of the Inter- 
Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs. The actual withdrawal coincided 
with the evacuation of North Russia and the decision to inform the Baltic republics that 
Britain could not be involved in protecting them against their Russian enemies. 84
During the summer 1919 the so called North West government had been formed, 
composed of prominent Russian émigrés. It had recognised the Estonian independence 
in August hoping to secure the Estonian participation in the attack on Petrograd together 
with General ludenich’s forces. The British position was made difficult by the 
allegations that the North-West government had been formed as a result of Allied 
pressure. There was indeed truth in these allegations, as the British officers in the 
Baltics were participating in the process, although without London’s authority. 
Lieutenant-General Gough, in command of the Allied Military Mission to the Baltic 
states, telegraphed to Balfour that the Allies should comply with the Estonian demand 
of full de jure recognition from the Allies.
The British reacted with the decision of the Cabinet on 20 August that all the British 
officers involved should be formally reprimanded and told that London would not 
assent to their proposals to recognise the North-West government of Russia or the 
Estonian government. At the Paris Peace Conference, the Estonian request for de jure  
recognition was brought before the Supreme Council by Balfour. His opinion was that 
their statement to make peace with the Bolsheviks if the Allies would not recognise
83 Ullman 1968, pp. 219-221.
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them was pure blackmail, and that the Council should not do anything. This instruction 
was followed by the Conference.^^
On 21 May 1919 Winston Churchill suggested a parliamentary statement about British 
policy in Russia, which was agreed by Lloyd George. It stated that ‘Russia must work 
out her own salvation. We had never any intention of sending British armies into Russia 
to enforce any particular solution of their internal affairs ‘. However, the 
memorandum by Churchill on 25 September gives a totally opposite view of the 
situation when it stated that ‘in return for the expenditure for supporting Denikin, the 
means will be provided for influencing Russian policy in a wise direction and in a 
direction friendly to Great Britain ‘. 8? The statements are clearly contradictory, as the 
British policy on the whole even at this point still was.
Yet the situation in the Civil War changed very quickly on all fronts. On 20 October,
1919, the Red Army captured Orel (200 miles from Moscow) from Denikin and by the 
end of the year they were on the Black Sea. The troops of General ludenich in the 
Baltics also found their way finally barred. The end of October also brought the 
beginning of the end in Siberia. On 12 November Kolchak’s government abandoned 
Omsk and began the journey to Irkutsk. After the fall of Irkutsk to the Bolsheviks, 
Kolchak was executed by the Bolsheviks at the beginning of February 1920. British 
involvement in Siberia did not long survive Kolchak. General Knox had left Omsk on 
November 7 and in an interview he admitted Omsk could not be saved and that he 
expected it to fall in five to fifteen days’ time In late February and early March,
1920, the remains of the British military mission in Siberia were withdrawn; the very 
last party of the Mission left Vladivostok in early May 9^. At the beginning of 1920, 
Denikin’s forces had retreated beyond the Don to Rostov and Novocherkaask.
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By this time there was already a clear change in British government policies towards 
final termination of the British involvement in Russia. At the meeting of the Cabinet on 
January 29, 1920, the decision was made that active war against the Soviet government 
was out of the question. The important decision to cut British assistance to Denikin 
had been made already in October 1919, when Winston Churchill had informed the 
House of Commons of the amount of the ‘packet of final aid ‘ to Denikin. The final 
shipments of supplies were scheduled to arrive at Novorossiisk in late March 1920, 
after which no additional materials would be given.^^
The policy of non-intervention had been promoted mostly by Lloyd George himself 
over the preceding months and were presented most powerfully in his Guildhall address 
of 8 November 1919, in which he publicly called for a halt to intervention. However, 
even if the individual role of Lloyd George was important, his Cabinet was largely in 
agreement with him. Churchill was the only member in total dissent with Lloyd George 
but the agreement of the majority of the Cabinet with Lloyd George guaranteed that 
there was no real contest between these two opinions.
The decisions of the Cabinet to end British involvement in Russia were an outcome of 
variety of reasons. There were practical reasons for the downfall of the White generals 
and the fact that their defeat seemed inevitable by then. The cost of the intervention, as 
well as the fact that it was becoming increasingly unpopular in the eyes of the British 
public and among British troops, were undoubtedly important factors. The Labour Party 
had, on its part, been opposed to intervention from the beginning, and during the winter 
and spring of 1918-1919 it had started a more vigorous campaign against British 
intervention in Russia The so called Hands off Russia movement had started almost
immediately after the armistice with Germany. Rallies and protests were organised by 
the campaign throughout the period of British involvement in Russia.^^ This, together
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with the wide unpopularity of the British intervention in Russia among British public, 
naturally had to be observed by the government. The number of strikes and riots in 
February 1919, for example, had reached such proportions that Lloyd George had to 
rush back to London from the Peace Conference to deal with the situation.^^
In material side, the cost of the British operations in North Russia alone had amounted 
to £18,219,000. The total expenditure of military operations in Russia between 
November 1918 and March 1920 amounted to £55,973,000. The financial cost of 
intervention was simply becoming too high for the government. There was also another 
important reason, that of the importance of trade with Soviet Russia to Britain. Lloyd 
George had advocated peace with the Soviet government already at the Paris Peace 
Conference in January 1919; the possible acquisition of trade with Russia had certainly 
strongly motivated his actions. At this point there were no real possibilities for opening 
of trade negotiations, but from then on his efforts were guided towards possible trade 
negotiations.
The first open move on the issue was made in January 1920 in a form of a 
memorandum of E.F. Wise, British representative on the Supreme Economic Council, 
proposing the lifting of the blockade of Soviet Russia and the opening of trade through 
the Russian agricultural co-operative societies. Lloyd George was very much in favour 
of the proposal and at the Supreme Council Meeting in Paris on 14 January 1920, he put 
these suggestions to the French and Italian premiers. After two days the Supreme 
Council decided to lift the blockade and allow the trade through co-operatives. The 
determination of Lloyd George in the issue can be seen in the fact that he did not take 
anyone from the Foreign Office to the Paris meeting. Absent was even the Foreign 
Secretary, Earl Curzon, who had officially replaced Balfour in October 1919, although 
in practice he had taken care of the duties of the Foreign Secretary already for some 
time. Lloyd George justified this on the grounds that the proceedings concerned the
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Ministry of Food and not the Foreign Office, but the real reason probably was that he 
was afraid Curzon would not have agreed to the plans. Indeed, together with Churchill, 
Curzon had actually been a severe critic of Lloyd George.
Even if  in principle, the trade negotiations were initiated with the Russian co­
operatives, Lloyd George’s conversation with his friend George Riddell in March 1920 
shows that there was no doubt that in reality the British would be dealing with the 
Soviet Government. His answer to Riddell’s question about the nature of the 
representatives that would come to Britain was that they would undoubtedly be the 
representatives of the Soviet government and not the co-operatives.
The issue of trade was without doubt an important factor behind the British decision to 
withdraw from Russia. The replacement of Maksim Litvinov 0^2  ^Leonid Krasin, first 
arrived in London in May 1920 for trade negotiations, which proceeded slowly and with 
long interruptions. In the summer the Soviet representatives left Britain without any 
success, but returned in August to reopen the negotiations. Finally, an agreement was 
reached in November 1920, even though it took until March 1921 before the agreement 
was officially signed. With this agreement, however, the British government had 
decided to give de facto recognition to the Soviet government.
The Russian Liberation Committee in Britain protested strongly against the British 
decision not to continue their support to the White forces in Russia, as well as against 
the resumption of trade with Soviet Russia. In its last Bulletin on 21 February 1920, it 
stated that they were witnessing an abrupt change in the British Russian policy. The 
Committee acknowledged that providing mere information had proved to be 
insufficient. Therefore, it had thought it necessary to re-shape the character of its work
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and to 'state the Russian problem in full and discover the principal object of the Allies' 
Russian policy'. For this purpose, the Committee began on 5 February 1920 the 
publication of a weekly review entitled The New Russia and continued to include its 
Bulletin in the review under the 'Facts and documents' h e a d i n g . '^ 4  it was further stated 
that The New Russia would include contributors in all the principal European centres of 
Russian emigration and it wished to represent Russian opinion. ^^ 5
In its first issue of 5 February 1920, the Liberation Committee informed its readers of 
the retreat of Kolchak and Denikin, and of the decisive change in the attitude of the 
British government towards Russia. They stated that the sympathies of the Committee 
were fully on the side of the policy of active support of Kolchak and Denikin, and that 
the impending change of British policy was the main reason for the appearance of their 
new journal. They also pointed out that the watchwords on their publications: 'No 
compromise with Bolshevism' and 'Russia united and free' were generally accepted by 
a very large section of Russian public opinion in Britain. The most important event 
during the last few weeks, according to the Committee, had been the formation of the 
United Council, a consultative organ of different Russian organisations. Its aim was to 
bring into contact different Russian political groups and give them the opportunity of 
free discussion and to establish a common ground of united Russian opinion.
TTzg Aew also stated that it was impossible to declare that the national resistance
to Bolshevism was non-existent. Of the criticism of their other motto 'Russia united and 
free' the journal gave the example of the Prime Minister's 'fatal' speech in November 
where he had treated United Russia as a menace to Britain. According to the article, this 
speech cast gloom on all loyal Russians. It was the opinion of the Committee, that only 
people who fought under the banner of Russian unification would be able to re-establish 
Russia, and only those who acknowledged this banner could be looked upon by Russia 
as her friends. However, the article stated that this did not mean that United Russia 
would be the old centralised Russia. The New Russia could by no means return to the
Russian Liberation Union. Bulletin no. 52, 21 February 1920. 
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past, but the paper would not argue about terms or decide whether ‘autonomy’ or 
‘federation’ would be the most appropriate form for the New Russian UnionJ^^
In the following issues, The New Russia continued to protest against the change in 
British policies and manifested their gratitude to the French for maintaining their 
friendly attitude towards anti-Bolshevik Russia and for resisting the British policy of 
trade negotiations with the Soviet government. The comments of the Prime Minister 
on 10 February were also published in New Russia as ‘the most important event of the 
Russian week in London’. According to the Prime Minister it was the fault of the 
volunteer army that during its occupation of large tracts of Southern Russia it managed 
to alienate the population. It was an opinion of his that Bolshevism could not be crashed 
by force of arms. Lloyd George also pointed out that the British ‘obligations of honour’ 
had been fulfilled and the chance to recover Russia given to the a n t i - B o l s h e v i k s ,  
Unsurprisingly the Russian émigré society did not agree with any of these comments.
In March a resolution was passed by the United Council of the Russian organisations, 
according to which the resistance towards the Bolshevik Russia was by no means 
broken, and no peace was possible with the Bolsheviks regardless of any ‘guarantees’ 
they might offer. The Council also condemned the lifting of the blockade against 
Bolshevik Russia and the resumption of trade that followed from the decision. The 
resolution was signed by the Liberation Committee, Russian Luncheon Club, Russian 
Manufacturers and Traders’ Association, Russian National Committee, and the Russian 
section of the Russo-British Bratsvo (Fraternity).
Pavel Miliukov, the former Minister of the Foreign Affairs under the Provisional 
Government, published a leaflet called ‘Russia and England’ which was published as a 
Pamphlet No. 13 of the Russian Liberation Committee. Later Miliukov was to become 
the leading émigré ‘opponent’ of the White movement, and the supporter of the ‘New 
Tactic’ with the aim of the Kadet Party forming an alliance with the Right Socialist
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Revolutionaries. At the beginning of the 1920, Miliukov was, however, still supporting 
the White case. In his leaflet Miliukov urged the Western Governments to accord 
Kolchak and Denikin recognition and assistance. He also condemned the ‘non­
intervention’ policy of Britain that was adopted at the beginning of 1920 and gave both 
sentimental and legal points of view why the Allies should help the non-Bolshevik 
forces.
Other prominent Russian émigrés also expressed their views against the change of 
British policy and trade negotiations with the Soviets. Vladimir D. Nabokov, a well- 
known lawyer and one of the leading members of the Kadet Party (and a father of the 
future famous writer V.V. Nabokov) condemned the British policy in his article in The 
New Russia. According to his article Russian Liberals had always relied on the support 
and sympathy of British Liberalism. To their great dismay, the British had continued 
their efforts towards discrediting all the anti-Bolshevik elements that had been fighting 
for the salvation of Russia. According to Nabokov, Bolshevism was in contradiction 
with accepted fundamentals of British Liberalism and should be treated as a real fact 
which threatened to spread like an epidemic. ' ' ^  His brother, Konstantin Nabokov also 
firmly insisted that the Russian national movement was still in existence, although it 
seemed to fail to impress the Western Europe. Naturally, because of his official 
status as Russian representative he had to be more careful with his comments.
These arguments did not, however, have any influence on the British policy. After all, 
there were more important political and economic considerations than the opinion of the 
Russian colony in Britain. The final decision of the discontinuance of involvement in 
Russia had been made by the government in January 1920 at the meeting of the 
Cabinet. The trade negotiations with the Soviet government had been started in May 
1920. Britain could not, however, totally abandon its duty towards the White Russian 
forces it had been supporting, and towards whom it was considered to have certain 
‘obligations of honour’.
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3.3. The Refugee Problem
The question of obligations of honour towards non-Bolshevik forces first became an 
issue in Archangel and Murmansk from where the British forces were withdrawn in the 
autumn of 1919.
The evacuation of Russians might have actually become a more serious problem to the 
British had the decision of Miller, or in the end Kolchak as the Supreme Commander, 
been different. General Ironside made an offer to General Miller on 30 July 1919 to 
evacuate also the North Russian government, the officers and part of the civilian 
population, all up to 13,000 persons for whom Britain was ready to provide the 
necessary shipping. General Sir Henry Rawlinson, who had been sent out as the 
Commander-in-Chief of North Russia in August 1919, also suggested to Miller that the 
British would evacuate his forces to Murmansk, which would have been easier to 
defend as well as more accessible to supplies from Britain. General Miller, however, 
firmly declined this offer.
However, the British government had also announced that it considered it to be its duty 
to offer a means of escape to all Russians who had remained loyal to the Allied cause in 
Northern R u s s i a . ^  j n  the War Office estimates for the possible evacuation of 
Murmansk and Archangel it was stated that for 13,000 Allied troops in Archangel about 
10 to 15 ships would be n e e d e d .H e r e  civilians or Russian officers were not 
mentioned. The report of the General Staff from 20 June 1919, on the present intentions 
regarding evacuation of Archangel and Murmansk, listed very carefully the number of 
Allied troops in these places. However, in the end it was also mentioned that it might be 
necessary to evacuate certain civilians and local Russian troops, estimated as 18,000 in 
Archangel and 1,000 in Murmansk. These estimates were, however, done before the 
final decision of Miller not to evacuate his troops to Murmansk, or anywhere else. 
Another question is whether the British could have actually found the necessary
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shipping had it been necessary to evacuate all those people. The Ministry of Shipping 
had informed Ironside through the War Office in July that difficulties would be 
expected in obtaining the necessary tonnage and that they should be informed by the 
end of July if Russians, civilians and others were to be evacuated by the British. ’
It is difficult to state the exact number of the Russian refugees that in the end were 
evacuated from Archangel and Murmansk because of the conflicting figures given in 
different sources. However, it is clear that the numbers were much less than it was 
originally estimated. According to Ullman, the total number of Russians evacuated from 
Archangel was 5,596, of whom 911 were military and the rest civilians. This 
information is based on the telegram of General Rawlinson to War Office on 4 October 
1919. In his telegram Rawlinson reported that although every facility was given to 
civilians at Archangel, ‘the poorer classes did not come forward in the numbers 
expected
Of those who left most were taken to the Baltic states, and the rest to the Black Sea. 
There were, however, also other nationalities than Russians among those who were 
evacuated; about 1,000 Poles, 2,000 Lithuanians and 250 Estonians forming a 
substantial proportion of those evacuated to the Baltics. Those taken to South Russia 
(Black Sea) were Russians whom Denikin had agreed to receive According to 
Rawlinson's report only 192 civilians were taken to E n g l a n d . evacuation of 
Murmansk was completed couple of weeks later, but only a few hundred Russian were 
added to general evacuation figures,
The Black Sea refugees had created a ‘small’ refugee problem during the spring 1919. 
These refugees were mainly from Odessa and the Crimea as a result of the Bolshevik 
successes in the area. The success of the Bolshevik army also resulted in the withdrawal
 ^ w o  33/967A, File 2673. From WO to Major-General Ironside 16.7.1919. PRO.
Ullman 1968, p. 198. The same figure is given in Strakhovsky 1944, p. 121.
 ^  ^  ^ WO 33/975, File 3717. From Commander-In-Chief, North Russia, to WO 4.10.1919. PRO. 
 ^ WO 33/967A, File 3074. From Denikin’s Mission, Ekaterinodar, August 1919. PRO.
^ W O  33/975, File 3717. From Commander-In-Chief, North Russia, to WO 4.10.1919. PRO. 
Ullman 1968, p. 198.
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of the French from Odessa in April 1919. Some refugees were evacuated by the British 
ships and taken to a British refugee camp in Malta. However, the British claimed that 
because these refugees came entirely from Odessa and the Crimea that fell under the 
French sphere, they should be taken care of by the French. The British ships in the 
Black Sea were also under French direction. Therefore the Treasury stated in June that 
no more refugees should be sent to British territory and no further expenditure from 
British funds should be incurred in respect of refugees from this region. Steps should 
also be taken to approach the French government that any further refugees who may 
have to be evacuated from the Black Sea should be sent to French t e r r i t o r y .  122
In July the Crimea was again in ‘White hands’ and it was possible to consider the 
repatriation of these refugees back to the Crimea. In the end many refugees were 
successfully repatriated, although the Governor General of Malta pointed out that 
finances were the chief difficulty. He also stated that many Russians who were destitute 
had friends in Paris or London who would finance them but they were unable to obtain 
visas from Military Control Offices in Paris or England. ^^ 3
The retreat of Denikin’s forces in South Russia in the spring 1920 caused a new, and by 
far the most severe refugee problem. For the British the situation became more 
problematic because of the guarantees that the British authorities had given to the White 
armies without the consent of the Foreign Office. British consular representative in 
Odessa, Mr Lowdon, had given assurances about the evacuation of about 30,000 people. 
This was strictly denied by the Cabinet in a telegram message: ‘It is impossible to 
evacuate refugees from Odessa or any other Russian port, for on sanitary grounds no 
country will receive them. The only policy for the population is to organise itself for a 
vigorous defence’. ^^ 4 in the end at least some Russians were evacuated at the time of 
the evacuation of the British Military Mission from Odessa in early February, when 
Odessa fell to the Bolsheviks. Captain Swinley stated in the papers relating to his 
service in HMS Ceres, used for the evacuation of Odessa, that although it was originally
122 F o  371/4022, File 87800, Paper N 90170. Treasury to FO 6.6.1919. PRO.
123 FO 371/4022, File 87800, Paper N i l  6322. The Governor o f Malta to the Secretary o f State for the Colonies 
8.8.1919. PRO.
124 Silverlight 1970, p. 353.
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intended to remove about 500 cadets and their families, the number evacuated was more 
like 1,300.125
Major General H.C. Holman, head of the British Military Mission and Sir Halford 
Mackinder, British High Commissioner in South Russia 126  ^acting on their own 
authority and without reference to London, had guaranteed Denikin that the British 
would take responsibility for the evacuation of the families of Russian officers. This 
promise was made on 10 January 1920.12? Their justification was that White officers 
were becoming completely demoralised by the fear of Bolshevik reprisals against their 
families and that ‘in view of the Archangel precedent, it seems unthinkable we could 
leave these women and children to be murdered’. 128
In London it was felt that they had been left no alternative but to keep this promise. 
However, in the Cabinet meetings of 27th and 29th of January the decision was taken 
that refugees could not be removed from Russia. The main reason for this was that 
because of the likely incidence of disease, few countries would receive them. Also it 
would be impossible to find the money required for settling a large number of Russian 
refugees abroad and the British government certainly could not provide it. Therefore the 
Cabinet decided that the refugees would only be taken to the Crimea which was still in 
anti-Bolshevik hands. Although the formal British guarantee applied only to the 
families of White officers, the Cabinet decided that if Denikin lacked sufficient 
shipping of his own to transport all the troops to the Crimea that were necessary for its 
defence, any unused British shipping could be used for that p u r p o s e .   ^29
The final defeat of Denikin’s forces came quickly in early March 1920. The race was on 
to reach Novorossiisk before the Red forces. The situation there became catastrophic
^25 Swinley, Captain C.S.B, RN: Papers re service in light cruiser HMS Ceres, used for evacuation o f the British 
Military Mission to the White Russians from Odessa. Imperial War Museum, 83/44/1.
 ^ Mackinder has probably the shortest record as High Commissioner. The British did not have a political officer 
attached to Denikin before January 1920, when Mackinder arrived at Denikin’s headquarters. At this point there was 
little to do for him, besides arrange for the evacuation o f the Volunteer Army. Mackinder only served as High 
Commissioner from 10 January to 16 January when he returned England. Reference: Ullman 1968, pp. 217-18 and 
Ullman 1972, p. 87.
^27 w o  106/1194. General Milne to WO 15.1.1920. PRO; Ullman 1968, p. 325.
128 Haigh et al. 1980, pp. 56-57; Ullman 1968, pp. 250-53, 325.
129 Ullman 1972, pp. 61-62.
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and there were many more refugees than there were places on ships, both foreign and 
Russian. The only guarantee of some order was the presence of the nearly 2,000 officers 
and men of the British military mission. The troops of the military mission were 
augmented in these tasks by a battalion from Constantinople, sent by General Sir 
George Milne, the commander of the British Army of the Black Sea.
Mackinder had only guaranteed Denikin that the families of the officers would be 
evacuated. In Milne’s view it was also essential for the future of Russia that the 
Volunteer army and the non-Bolshevik intelligentsia be evacuated to the Crimea from 
where they could enter into negotiations with the Bolsheviks. London gave instructions 
leaving the decision up to Milne but the War Office was careful to point out that the 
safety of Denikin should be guaranteed. The office for the evacuation of the wives and 
families of the Don and Volunteer Armies, as well as various officials, had already 
opened in Novorossiisk on 19 January. The first boat, S.S. Hanover left Novorossiisk 
for Prinkipo, an island on the Sea of Marmora, on 26 January with 1,600 people. Two 
other ships also left before 4 March 1920.
On 25 and 26 March Russian ships evacuated over 60,000 people and on the following 
night another 10,000 troops of Denikin’s army, together with the British military 
mission, were removed by British warships. The evacuation was completed on 27 
March, i i^ General Denikin together with some of his Volunteer Army also left 
Novorossiisk for Theodosia in the Crimea on a Russian destroyer. General Milne’s 
report from Constantinople on the situation in South Russia in April, stated that the 
situation in the Crimea was not very hopeful. About 40,000 troops had been evacuated 
there and the country was literally crowded with refugees. There was also still a part of 
British Military Mission in the Crimea, about 275 officers and 450 other ranks, but no 
fighting troops.
130 \YO 106/1210. Evacuation o f Refugees from Novorossiisk, March 1920. PRO.
131 The Times 30.3.1920; Ullman 1972, p. 68.
132 The Times 30.3.1920 and 31.3.1920; WO 158/746. Report by Gen. Bridges March 1920. PRO.
133 WO 106/1211. Situation in South Russia, April 1920. PRO.
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Lloyd George used his best efforts trying to persuade the Red Cross to provide some 
doctors and nurses for the refugees who were evacuated from Novorossiisk to the 
Crimea^^"  ^Sir Arthur Stanley from the British Red Cross answered that the Red Cross 
could supply doctors and nurses but could not finance the undertaking. He said that if 
the government were willing to find the money, the required personnel could easily be 
found. According to him the poor results attained by an appeal recently made by the 
British Committee of the Russian Red Cross in England did not encourage the belief 
that any money was likely to be forthcoming from the public, either. The 
government, on the other hand, did not seem to be more willing to spend money than 
the ‘great public’.
The huge number of refugees crowded in the Crimea naturally caused a very serious 
situation. Despite this there was general agreement inside the British government that 
evacuations to foreign countries were out of question. General Denikin had appealed to 
the British in the middle of February to provide coal and tonnage so that refugees could 
be evacuated to foreign countries. The optimistic tone of his message saying that he was 
sure British government would not forget its promises did not affect the British 
decision. As an alternative ‘solution’ the British shipped several thousand refugees to 
camps in Egypt, Cyprus, Prinkipo and Lemnos to be maintained at British e x p e n s e . '^ 7 
However, a number of refugees also managed to go to foreign countries, especially if 
they could pay their way abroad. They went primarily to Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Yugoslavia. Some stayed in Constantinople, where most of the ships embarked for from 
the Crimea.
In London the Cabinet discussed the situation in 31 March. A memorandum was 
presented, stating that thousands of refugees had been evacuated and were scattered 
among the islands of the Aegean and in the Crimea. It was decided that Denikin would
Lloyd George papers, F 9/2/14. Lloyd George to Sir Arthur Stanley 29.3.1920. House o f Lords Records Office. 
Lloyd George papers, F 45/10/4. Arthur Stanley to Lloyd George 2.2.1920.
136 33/996, File 4761. From Denikin’s Mission, Novorossiisk, to WO 17.2.1920; FO 371/4013, File 63588,
Paper 179777. Appeal from Denikin 5.2.1920. PRO.
w o  106/1210. Evacuation of refugees from Novorossiisk, March 1920. PRO; WO 33/1000, File no. 5932. 
General Headquarters, Constantinople to WO 16. 4.1920.
138 FO 371/4013, File 63588, Paper 178828. FO to Sir A. Stanley 25.2.1920; Simpson 1939, pp. 68-69.
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be advised to give up the struggle. Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of Imperial General 
Staff, commented the episode in his diary: ‘So ends in disaster another of Winston’s 
military attempts - Antwerp, Dardanelles, Denikin ‘ This comment of course seems 
quite unfair, since although Churchill had remained the strongest supporter of 
intervention, he by no means could dictate the British policy. Moreover, his influence 
certainly never approached that of Lloyd G e o r g e ,
Soon after the collapse of Denikin’s army the British government sent instructions to 
the British High Commissioner at Constantinople, Admiral deRobeck, to advise 
Denikin to come to an agreement with the Soviet government. It was further stated that 
if  Denikin failed to do so, the British government would cease to furnish him with any 
assistance. Denikin answered to the British ‘proposal’ that he would never act as a 
mediator for the armistice with the Bolsheviks At the same time he announced his 
intention to resign and to name General Vrangel’ to his place. Vrangel’ took command 
on 4 April 1920, and Denikin left immediately for Constantinople. From there he soon 
continued to England, arriving at Southampton on 18 April with his wife and son and 
the daughter of General Kornilov, whom he had succeeded as commander of the 
volunteer army. This meant that de Robeck had to hand the British government note to 
Vrangel’.
At first the note seemed to accomplish its purpose, and Vrangel’ agreed to negotiate 
with the Soviet government to secure a safe asylum for those who had fought against 
the Bolsheviks. These negotiations, however, never occurred. Instead, in June his 
forces launched an offensive against Bolshevik forces. As a consequence, the British 
broke relations with him and withdrew their military mission from the Crimea in June 
1920.143 Therefore, when the final defeat of the White forces happened in November 
1920 the British refused to take any part in the evacuation of the Crimea. France, on the 
other hand, had recognised his government in the Crimea as the de facto  government of
Silverlight 1970, p. 356; Ullman 1972, p. 69. 
Ullman 1968, pp. 294-295.
Denikine 1930, p.350.
142 Silverlight 1970, p. 357; Ullman 1972, pp. 71-72.
143 Simpson 1939, p. 70; Ullman 1972, pp. 73, 83-87.
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South Russia and felt therefore obliged to assist in the evacuation of military and 
civilian refugees.
The evacuation numbered over 130,000 people who were distributed to various camps 
in the Aegean, for example in Gallipoli and Lemnos, as well as to Bulgaria, Romania, 
Yugoslavia and other foreign countries. Some 35,000 stayed in Constantinople, which 
was already crowded with refugees from the earlier evacuations.Constantinople had 
been occupied by the Allied forces already in March and the Turks had been informed 
that the occupation would be continued until peace terms were executed.
The British Cabinet had reached the decision on 11 November that no help would be 
given even in evacuating women and children, not to mention fighting forces. Thus 
there were no British ships among those who embarked from the Crimea with Vrangel’s 
refugees.i^'^ The official statement of the Cabinet was that the British Government 
should not undertake any action for the evacuation of refugees other than those of 
British nationality, and that this policy of strict neutrality should not be compromised 
on any account. The Secretary of State for War, Winston Churchill, asked that his 
protest would be recorded against this decision. According to his view this decision 
would probably result in a massacre of civilians in the Crimea. His view, however, 
had no wider support inside the Cabinet.
The reasons behind the Cabinet decision were naturally to a large extent material; the 
government did not want to take responsibility for the maintenance of new refugees. 
There were probably also political considerations behind it; one of these being the 
progressing trade negotiations with the Soviet government which were considered of a 
great importance to the British government who did not want any disturbances in these 
negotiations.
144 Ullman 1972, p. 237.
145 Simpson 1939, pp. 69-70.
145 Cameron, Evan. Goodbye Russia. Adventures of H.M. transport Rio Negro. London 1934, pp. 82-83.
147 Cameron 1934, p. 311.
148 Silverlight 1970, pp. 358-59.
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The decision of the Cabinet was also kept despite appeals from the French and 
American governments, from Mr. Evgenii Sablin, the Russian representative in Britain, 
and even from King himself. The reply of Earl Curzon to the request of a French 
Admiral for British assistance for the evacuation of Sevastopol was that no more 
refugees should become a charge of HMG which was already heavily overburdened in 
this respect. He instructed the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean that no 
assistance should be given by British ships to Russians attempting to leave South 
Russia. Curzon continued that the guarantee given to General Denikin by Sir Halford 
Mackinder in January was fulfilled on the collapse of the Denikin’s volunteer army at 
the end of March and HMG did not have any further obligations towards the Russians at 
present. The only obligation they had was to protect those refugees they had assisted 
earlier.
The French Ambassador who had requested assistance of British vessels in evacuation 
was also notified of the negative answer from the British government. In the Foreign 
Office Minutes Emrys Evans made a comment that he was afraid that if the British 
helped by sending ships, they would quickly have refugees on their hands. Therefore he 
was of an opinion that French should be allowed to do everything or the British should 
at least obtain a guarantee that refugees carried on British ships would be looked after 
by the French.
The U.S. Ambassador also approached the Foreign Secretary requesting British 
assistance for Russian refugees in Constantinople. The British government repeated in 
its reply that HMG had already assumed very large liabilities in connection with the 
refugees who had left South Russia on the collapse of General Denikin’s army earlier 
that year and were therefore unable to enter into any fresh commitments .Evgeni i  
Sablin, who followed Konstantin Nabokov as unofficial Chargé d ’Affaires of Russian 
interests in September 1919 asked if Admiral de Robeck, the British High
149 p o  371/5424, File 46, Papers N 2262 and N 2264. Correspondence between C-in-C, Mediterranean and Lord 
Curzon. November 1920. PRO.
150 PO 371/5424, File 46, Paper N 2462. French Ambassador to FO 15.11.1920 and Evans’ comment in
16.11.1920. PRO.
151 FO 371/5419, File 29, Paper N 3604. FO to the U.S. Embassy 8.12.1920. PRO.
152 FO 372/1263, File 123957. FO to His Excellency Mons. Sazonov 10.9.1919. PRO.
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Commissioner in Constantinople, could assist in the evacuation of the refugees in the 
Crimea. The government reply was again negative, even though Admiral de Robeck 
himself had proposed that he would be willing to direct the evacuation of refugees to
Egypt. 153
Quite surprisingly, a message was also sent by Lord Stamfordham, Secretary of the 
King, to the Prime Minister on November 14, that the King appealed to the government 
‘to save, if possible, the women and children from a massacre by the Bolsheviks ‘. The 
reply from Davies stated that Lloyd George had pointed out that the difficulty was the 
maintenance of the refugees afterwards. The maintenance of the refugees left by 
Denikin had already cost a million pounds and the House of Commons would not be 
willing to give further fimds, especially because Vrangel’ had refused to take the advice 
of the British government. Therefore, Britain did not have any further responsibility 
with regard to him. 154
As a ‘friendly gesture’ the British, however, agreed to let the French use Lemnos as a 
camp for r e f t i g e e s . i 5 5  in addition, despite constant refusal to accept any responsibility 
for refugees, the chaotic situation in Constantinople led the British government to 
promise a grant of £ 20,000 for the relief of destitute civilian refugees in Constantinople 
in December 1920. This money was authorised for the use of General Harington, the 
Commander-in Chief in Constantinople, to be expended directly by him and was stated 
to be entirely independent of the responsibilities in connection with refugees undertaken 
by the French. 5^6 Apart from this grant, the British did not take any responsibility for 
the maintenance and help of Vrangel’s refugees in late 1920.
In January 1921 the French Embassy addressed the British government asking about the 
£1,200,000 which the British were alleged to owe to the Russian Volunteer Fleet. The
 ^53 PO 371/5424, File 46, Paper N 2743. Mr. Sabline to Mr. Gregory 15.11.1920 and Mr. Gregory to Mr. Sabline
18.11.1920. PRO.
' 54 Lloyd George papers, F/29/4/32. Lord Stamfordham to the PM 14.11.1920 and Davies to Lord Stamfordham
15.11.1920. House o f Lords Record Office.
*53 PO 371/5419, File 29, Paper N 3388. British High Commissioner in Constantinople to Earl Curzon 22.11.1920. 
PRO.
*56 PO 371/5419, File 29, Paper N 3971. WO to FO 6.12.1920. PRO; WO 33/1000, File no. 6806. WO to General 
Headquarters, Constantinople, 6.12.1920. PRO.
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Foreign Office replied that as the British government had never recognised General 
Vrangel’s government, they were not prepared to consider the question of paying any 
sum to it in respect of the Russian Volunteer Fleet. The French Ambassador 
explained that the payment was not required on behalf of General Vrangel’s 
government, but on behalf of the Russian Relief Committee, set up in Paris. The British 
decision nevertheless remained unaltered. The comment of Emrys Evans from the 
Foreign Office was that this did not alter British contention in the least because they did 
not recognise the Russian Relief Committee as a representative of the old Russian 
government. The French Ambassador was informed accordingly about the British
view 158
The British view was dealt with a greater detail in a memorandum by Evans from 22 
January 1921. In the memorandum Evans pointed out that the French had announced 
they would cease to give support for refugees after January and that a Russian 
Committee had been set up in Paris to take care of the refugee problem. The French had 
urged the British to join in supporting this refugee body. According to Evans this 
proposal practically meant that half of Vrangel’s refugees should be provided by the 
British, and that any effort of this kind by the French should be firmly resisted. Evans 
also reminded that French had promised eleven million francs towards the maintenance 
of Denikin’s refugees in early 1920 but had later replied that the money had already 
been spent. The fact that French did not keep their promise with the Denikin 
refugees who were left as British responsibilities was a further factor of justification for 
the British refusal to take any responsibility of the evacuation and maintenance of 
Vrangel’s refugees.
 ^ FO 371/6889, File 366, Paper N 707. FO to Mons. le Comte St. Aulaire, French Embassy 20.1.921. PRO.
158 pQ 371/6889, File 366, Paper N 1098. From French Ambassador to the FO 22.1.1921 and Emrys Evans’ 
comment in the Minutes 25.2.1921. PRO.
FO 371/6864, File 38, Paper N 1087. Memorandum by Emrys Evans 22.1.1921. PRO.
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3.4. Concluding Remarks
Despite the fact that of all the foreign governments, the British government had 
provided most support to the White forces in the Russian Civil War, after the defeat of 
the White forces the government tried carefully to avoid responsibility for the ‘White 
Russian’ refugees. The British involvement in the Russian Civil War started with the 
aim to reconstitute the eastern front against Germany. From this initial aim the 
involvement grew to a ‘crusade against Bolshevism’ in the form of military and 
material support to various anti-Bolshevik governments and armies. By February 1920 
this campaign had been abandoned, the British forces withdrawn, and the British 
government was anxious to establish relations, primarily trade relations, with Soviet 
Russia. Earlier statements on the ‘obligations of honour’, with which the British 
government had repeatedly justified its involvement in the Russian Civil War, were not 
the most important principles to govern the future policies of the government towards 
Russian refugees. This can clearly be seen in the careful policies of the British 
government not to enter into any further responsibilities for Russian refugees after the 
collapse of General Denikin’s army, as well as in the strict policy of the government 
against the admission of Russian refugees to Britain.
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CHAPTER 4: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE RUSSIAN 
REFUGEES
4.1. The Question of Entry to Britain
This chapter will concentrate on the official policy of the British government towards 
Russian refugees from the Bolshevik regime, primarily in relation to their admission to 
Britain, and the British policy of maintaining a specific group of refugees in camps. The 
chapter will evaluate the reasons and the outcome of the British policies as well as 
consider whether the treatment of Russian refugees was consistent with the existing 
immigration procedures and legislation.
The main period of the Russian emigration to Britain occurred during the coalition 
government of Lloyd George, in office from 1916 to 1922. This government consisted 
of Conservatives, Liberal-Unionists (defectors firom Liberal Party) and roughly half the 
Liberals in the House of Commons. The Labour Party was also officially part of the 
coalition, but they only held few ministerial positions, and the majority of the 
ministerial positions were held by the Conservatives and the Liberals (or Liberal- 
Unionists). In 1922 the Conservatives took office and stayed in power, except for a short 
period of Labour government during 1924, until 1929 when Ramsay MacDonald came 
to power at the head of Labour government.’
From the very beginning the British government took a strict attitude against the entry 
of Russian refugees to Britain. The political lines of the government in the refugee 
question were formulated immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. This 
was considered necessary because emigration from Russia had started already before the 
Bolshevik Revolution, and had further increased after the Revolution. British subjects 
were evacuated in large numbers from Russia after the Revolution. At the same time
’ Morgan 1993, pp. 591-608; Butler, David & Freeman, Jennie. British Political Facts 1900-1968. London 1969, pp. 
9-18.
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British representatives in Russia received increasing numbers of applications from 
Russian subjects to leave Russia for Britain. ^
At the end of 1917, the Conservative Home Secretary Sir George Cave forwarded to the 
Foreign Office a Memorandum, according to which the conditions at the present time 
did not enable Britain to welcome any incursion of aliens. It was further noted that 
Russian refugees were very numerous and yet they were unlikely to be of economic 
value to Britain. Cave’s opinion was that if the general admission of refugees from 
Russia should be desirable on grounds of humanity, the burden should be shared equally 
between France and Britain. He also instructed that if Mr. Balfour, the Foreign 
Secretary, concurred, he should submit the matter without delay to the War Cabinet with 
necessary recommendations.  ^Mr. Balfour agreed to Sir George Cave’s opinion that 
aliens should not be allowed to take refuge in the UK, except in special cases.
As an outcome of these considerations, a Home Office letter to the Foreign Office on 18 
January 1918 stated that the Foreign Secretary should instruct the British Embassy at 
Petrograd that ‘facilities should not be given, save in exceptional cases, for Russians and 
other aliens to leave Russia for the UK’.  ^The latter part of Home Secretary Cave’s 
consideration, that of the equal burden of refugees between France and England, was not 
going to be of much importance in the future considerations of British authorities. The 
statement of the Home Office, that facilities should be given only in exceptional cases 
for Russians to leave Russia for the UK became the official line of British policy. All 
cases were considered and treated individually in relation to entry to Britain. The British 
Consul in Archangel, Mr. Young, was instructed that no visas should be granted to 
Russian subjects to come to England without reference to the military control officer, or 
if  necessary, to the authorities in London. ^
 ^ FO 371/3297, File 1334. Evacuation o f British subjects from Russia; HO 45/11068, File 374355. Decypher from 
Sir George Buchanan 26.12.1917. PRO.
3 FO 371 /3020, File 241424. HO to FO 21.12.1917. PRO.
4 HO 45/11068, File 374355. From FO to HO 28.12.1917. PRO.
5 FO 371 /3307, File 4790. HO to FO 8.1.1918. PRO.
6 FO 371/3297, File 1334, Paper 78229. HO to FO 2.5.1918. PRO.
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Actually, the outcome of the British policy on the issue of asylum to the Russian royal 
family already provided an example of the future attitude and policy of the British 
government towards the entry of Russian refugees. The issue was first raised by Pavel 
Miliukov, the Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government in March 
1917, after the royal family had been placed under supervision at Tsarskoe Selo. The 
British Ambassador in Russia, Sir George Buchanan approached the Foreign Office on 
19 March, informing them that he had met both Miliukov and Kerenskii, and that 
Miliukov had enquired whether any arrangements were being made for the Tsar and his 
family to go to England. Buchanan had replied in the negative."^
A few days later Buchanan approached the Foreign Office again. He advised that 
Miliukov had stated that he was most anxious to get the Tsar out of Russia, especially as 
the radical elements were very much against the royal family, and that he would be 
grateful if King and HMG would at once offer him asylum in England. Miliukov had 
also urged that an immediate answer should be given to this enquiry. Sir George 
Buchanan himself added that he entirely agreed with the opinion of Miliukov that the 
Tsar should leave before the agitation grew and asked the Foreign Office to offer 
asylum in Britain as soon as possible. ^
At this point, the British government could not postpone their answer any more. The 
issue was considered at the Imperial War Cabinet meeting of Lloyd George, Lord 
Hardinge, the Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, Lord Stamfordham, King’s private 
secretary and Andrew Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer.  ^A decision to offer 
asylum was made and an immediate telegram was sent to Sir George Buchanan from the 
Foreign Office stating that ‘in order to meet the request made by the Russian 
government, the King and the HMG readily offer asylum to the Emperor and Empress 
in England’. It was, however, carefully pointed out that in order to avoid any possible
 ^FO 371/2995, File 811, Papers 58700 and 58780. Sir George Buchanan to FO 19.3.1917. PRO.
8 FO 371/2998, File 3743, Papers 60234 and 61184. Sir George Buchanan to FO 21.3.1917 and 22.3.1917. PRO.
 ^Occleshaw, Michael. The Romanov Conspiracies. London 1993, p. 89; King, Greg. The Last Empress. The Life 
and Times o f Alexandra Feodorovna, Tsarina of Russia. London 1994, p. 313.
10 FO 371/2998, File 3743, Paper ( ?). FO to Sir George Buchanan 22.3.1917. PRO.
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doubt in the future, Buchanan should emphasise the fact that the offer had been entirely 
due to the initiative of the Russian government.  ^’
The travel arrangements of the royal family could not, however be facilitated right 
away. Pressure from extremists to prevent the Tsar leaving was increasing, and in 
addition the Tsar’s children had measles, and they had to wait until they were better.
This delay proved fatal, because the asylum issue was meanwhile reconsidered in 
Britain by the King. At the time of the asylum offer King George V seemed to be very 
much in favour of granting an asylum and he had sent a very sympathetic telegram to 
the Tsar Nikolai on 19 March. In the telegram he pointed out that the events of the last 
week had deeply distressed him, that his thoughts were constantly with the Tsar, and 
stated that he would always remain the true and devoted friend to him. This message, 
however, was considered too politically sensitive, both by Miliukov and British 
authorities, and it was never delivered to the Tsar.^^
It is therefore surprising that it was actually the King himself, and not the government, 
who soon changed his view on the asylum issue. The February Revolution in Russia, 
with the abolition of an autocratic system, had clearly been met with satisfaction by 
wide circles in Britain. More radically, however, it also led to expressions of anti­
monarchist opinions at home in Britain. Opposition to the British asylum offer to the 
Tsar and his family was most prominent in the left-wing circles.
Fearing over his own position, George V changed his mind on the desirability of the 
Russian royal family coming to Britain. Only a week after the British government’s 
offer of asylum, a message from the King was sent to the Foreign Secretary by Lord 
Stamfordham pointing out that the King had been thinking over the government’s 
proposal that the Tsar should come to England, and could not help doubting whether
1  ^ FO 371/3008, File 61920. FO to Sir George Buchanan 22.3.1917. PRO.
Summers, Anthony & Mangold, Tom. The File on the Tsar. London 1976, p. 248.
FO 800/205, File 53. Telegram o f King George V to Tsar Nikolai II, 19.3.1917. PRO.
Nicolson, Harold. King George V. His Life and Reign. London 1952, pp. 299-300; FO 371/2998, File 3743, 
Paper 63163. FO to Sir George Buchanan 23.3.1917.
War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Vol. I, pp. 969-71. London 1938; King 1994, pp. 311-12; Nicolson 1952, 
pp. 299, 307-8.
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this would be advisable. Balfour, however, replied that even though HM’s ministers 
realised the difficulties, they did not think that it was possible to withdraw the 
invitation, which had been sent.^  ^As a constitutional monarch, the King had to accept 
the decision of his ministers, and a reply was provided by Stamfordham that if  this was 
the government’s wish, he had to regard the matter as settled.
The King, however, did not leave the issue there. A few days later he asked Lord 
Stamfordham to write to the Foreign Secretary. Two letters reached the Foreign Office 
on 6 April. In the first letter it was stated that the King was becoming more and more 
concerned about the question of the Tsar and his family coming to Britain. It was stated 
that His Majesty had received letters from people of all classes, saying how much the 
matter was being discussed, not only in clubs but also by working men and Labour 
Members of the Parliament. The King again asked whether, after consulting the Prime 
Minister, Sir George Buchanan should not be advised to ask the Russian government to 
make some other plans for the further residence of the imperial family. A postscript of 
the letter was even more outspoken: ‘ Most people appear to think the invitation was 
initiated by the King, whereas it was his government who did so’.^ ^
At this point the Prime Minister seemed to become more receptive to the arguments of 
the King. At the Cabinet meeting on 13 April Lloyd George repeated the words of the 
King, although without mentioning the ‘sensitive source’, and it was decided that ‘in 
these circumstances the South of France... might be more suitable place of residence for 
the Imperial family’. The Foreign Secretary was authorised to telegraph these 
considerations to Sir George Buchanan, as well as instruct him not to make any 
communication to the Russian government on the subject, On the same day Buchanan 
was invited to express his opinion.^^ Sir George replied that he entirely shared the view 
that if  there were any danger of anti-monarchist movement in Britain, it would be better
800/205, File 63. Lord Stamfordham to Balfour30.3.1917. PRO 
17 FO 800/205, File 65. Balfour to Lord Stamfordham 2.4.1917. PRO.
1  ^FO 800/205, File 66. Lord Stamfordham to Balbour 4.4.1917. PRO.
1  ^ Summers & Mangold 1976, p. 249.
CAB 23/2(1 March-31 May 1917), Minute 118, Meeting o f the War Cabinet 13.4.1917. PRO. 
21 FO 800/205, File 88. FO to Sir George Buchanan 13.4.1917. PRO.
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that the Imperial family did not come to Britain. He continued that if only France would 
consent, it would be far better from the British point of view that the Tsar should go to 
France. 22 The British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Bertie, however, clearly stated in his 
letter that he did not think the royal family would be welcomed in France, either. 3^
Years later Aleksander Kerenskii offered an account of these happenings in his memoirs 
La vérité sur le Mass sacre des Romanovs. According to him it was either in June or 
early July when the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, had called on 
Tereshchenko, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs. According to Kerenskii, Sir George 
had been greatly distressed and had brought with him a letter from a high official of the 
Foreign Office which communicated the British government’s final refusal to give 
refuge to the former Tsar of Russia. 4^ This account brought a storm of denials in Britain 
and both Lloyd George and Sir George Buchanan contradicted Kerenskii. Lloyd George 
in his War Memoirs firmly insisted that the asylum offer had always remained open, and 
quoted the memoirs of Sir George Buchanan, where he stated: ‘Our offer remained open 
and was never withdrawn. If advantage was not taken of it, it was because the 
Provisional government failed to overcome the opposition of the Soviet’. 5^
At the time of the allegations o f  Kerenskii, Sir Alfred Knox MP asked the Foreign 
Office to produce documented facts on the issue. The Foreign Office offered the early 
cables of asylum offers but, conveniently, did not produce any of the later ‘refusal 
messages’. 6^ Meriel Buchanan later ‘nailed’ this official version by stating in her book 
that her father had deliberately falsified his memoirs. She stated that after her father had 
retired from the diplomatic service he had had the intention of including in his book the 
truth about the question of the admission of the Imperial family to Britain. However, he 
had decided not to do this because he was instructed by the Foreign Office that if he did
FO 800/205, File 90. Sir George Buciharan to FO 15.4.1917. PRO.
Summers & Mangold 1976, p. 25 3.
Kerensky, Alexander. The Road to the Tragedy (La Verite sur le Massacre des Romanovs), p. 118. In Bulygin, 
Paul. The Murder of the Romanovs. N .Y . 1)35.
Summers & Mangold 1976, p. 252; WarMemoirs o f David Lloyd George, Vol. 1, pp. 971-976; Buchanan, 
George. My Mission to Russia and 0)ther Dplomatic Memories, Vol. II. London 1923, p. 106.
FO 370/273, File 50, Paper L 50 Sir .Alfed Knox to Locker Lampson 20.12.1927 and Lampson to Knox 
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so he would not only be charged with an infringement of the Official Secrets Act, but 
would also have his pension stopped. 7^
The question of royal asylum nevertheless remained somewhat separate from the more 
general question of the admission of ‘ordinary’ Russian refugees from the Bolshevik 
regime. Although the King’s influence on the government policy in the particular case 
of the royal family was strong, the policies towards ordinary Russian asylum seekers 
were dictated by the government and its various departments. It was primarily the 
Aliens Branch of the Home Office which was ultimately responsible for the admission 
of aliens and refugees in Britain. The Foreign Office, who was often first approached on 
the issue by various British consular representatives abroad, normally referred the case 
to the Home Office. This was done to avoid ‘misunderstandings’, especially as the 
Home Secretary, or the immigration officer who was an official and ‘advance guard’ of 
the Home Office could still refuse a refugee leave to land in the UK, even if  the visa had 
been granted by British consuls abroad. 8^
It was officially stated by the Home Secretary that as a general rule Russian refugees 
were not admitted to Britain, save in exceptional cases. 9^ From the beginning this 
policy became the basic principle of the British govemirient, and it was followed 
throughout the main period of Russian emigration, between 1918 and 1923. All the 
cases were treated on an individual basis, and strict rules and provisions were set for the 
entry of individual refugees. The most important requirement, although this alone by no 
means guaranteed admission, was that the persons admitted were in a position to 
support themselves and their dependants. Thus, evidence of support from some source 
was always required.^^
^^Buchanan, Meriel. Dissolution of an Empire. London 1932, pp. 192-93; Summers and Mangold 1976, p. 252.
^^Dr. A. Goldenweiser. Reports on the legal position o f Russian Refugees in various countries: England. 1938, pp. 
4-). Refugee Survey 1937-38. Special Reports, Vol. VI. Refugees and the Law (2). The Royal Institute o f  
Inemational Affairs; Tabori, Paul. The Anatomy o f Exile. London 1972, p. 364.
2^F0 371/3307, File 4790. HO to FO 8.1.1918; FO 371/6871, File 38, Paper N 12655. HO to FO 14.11.1921. PRO. 
3^F0 371/6871, File 38, Paper N 12655. HO to FO 14.11.1921. PRO.
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The question of entry of Russian refugees and the rules governing their admission were 
discussed several times by the Home Office and the Foreign Office. The Home Office 
clearly wanted to ascertain that there was no confusion about the principles guiding the 
admission of Russians inside the Foreign Office. In 1921, for example, it was pointed 
out that the general rule was to refuse admission, with exception of those who had close 
British personal or, even more important, business connections, previous long domicile 
in UK, or certain special cases, such as young persons for educational purposes.^’
In addition, exceptions to the general rule were made for a number of White soldiers 
who had fought with the British forces in Russia, and their families, as well as for other 
prominent Russian officials and representatives of former Russian governments. They 
were also made in favour of ‘well-to-do and upper class Russians’, especially if they 
had close British relatives or friends who would support their case. However, these 
were, as stated, ‘exceptions’ and it was frequently stated by the Home Secretary that the 
Home Office considered it necessary to maintain a strict policy in the matter.
However, as it will be seen in this chapter, the Home Office itself did not always follow 
systematically the general rules adopted for the entry of Russian refugees.
In early 1919 a group of 200 refugees were brought to Britain from Riga on a British 
warship Princess Margaret, because of the advance of the Bolsheviks in the area. Why 
this specific group was brought to Britain despite the guidelines of the Home Office that 
Russian refugees should not be admitted to Britain, is not clear. Nevertheless, once in 
Britain their situation soon became quite desperate according to Konstantin Nabokov, 
the Russian representative in London and Sir George Buchanan, the chairman of the 
Central Russian Committee (CRC) and the British Russian Relief Committee (BRRC).
Sir George Buchanan sent the Foreign Office two memoranda on the situation of 
Russians in Britain. The first memorandum was a general report of the Central Russian
FO 371/6887, File 216, Paper N 12951. Admission of Russians to UK, FO Minute 22.11.1921. PRO.
FO 371/3968, File 176, Paper 28740. Russian refugees. Memorandum on the question o f allowing them to enter 
UK, 21.2.1919; FO 371/4008, File 52089, Paper 65747. FO Minutes, April 1919. PRO.
33 See for example FO 371/4016, File 66404, Paper 97221. HO to FO 2.7.1919 and HO 45/11549, File 380030/5. 
HO to FO 1.7.1919. PRO.
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Committee on the position of Russian population, the majority of whom consisted of the 
‘earlier’ classes of Russians, mainly Jewish immigrants who had arrived at the turn of 
the century. The report also considered the effect of the Bolshevik Revolution on the 
increase in number of ‘middle-class and well-to-do Russian refugees’ in Britain. This 
question will, however, be considered in more detail in chapter 6.
In the memorandum Buchanan pointed out that prior to the outbreak of the war, the 
presence of Russian population, consisting mainly of Jewish refugees from the Russian 
empire, did not attract public attention, at least before the conclusion of the Anglo- 
Military Convention in 1917. He continued that at the time of the conclusion of the 
Anglo-Russian Military Convention a grant was made to be distributed to the wives of 
those Russians who had elected to return to Russia to serve in the Russian army. The 
allowance, however, was totally inadequate, as compared with the rise in the cost of 
living. As a consequence, a United Russian Committee, under the chairmanship of Dr. 
Jochelman, was established to deal with questions arising out of the Anglo-Military 
Convention and to represent the interests of these Russians.
In July 1918 a deputation led by Konstantin Nabokov discussed with Sir George 
Buchanan the unfortunate position of the Russian population in Britain, especially of the 
families of those Jews that had gone to Russia under the Military Convention. As a 
consequence of this meeting the Russian Advisory Council, consisting of prominent 
Russians in Britain, was formed as an auxiliary body to the Central Russian Committee. 
K. Nabokov, A.M. Onu, the former Russian Consul-General in London, E.E. Gambs, 
the former Russian vice-consul in London, A.S. Ostrogradskii, the Financial agent of 
the former Russian government in London and representing the Russian Government 
Committee at India House, E. S. Liubov, the United Russian Committee, and Mr. I.V. 
Shklovskii, former correspondent of the Russkie Vedomosti of Moscow, were all 
members of the Council
Pares collection, PAR/6/4/1. The tabulation of Russian in England. SSEES.
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The Council was to present to the CRC the cases of Russians that it constituted to be 
deserving of relief, for which it had small sums at their disposal. However, according to 
Sir George Buchanan the sums were totally inadequate to cope with the size and 
character of the demand made upon them. The Central Russian Committee itself tried 
actively to find employment for those recommended by the Advisory Council, but 
owing to the distrust with which the Russians were regarded in Britain and to the bad 
employment situation in general, it was stated to be practically impossible. For example 
the appeal to the public by the British Russian Relief Committee, established in 
September 1918 for the relief of British and Russian refugees from Russia and of 
distressed Russian subjects in Britain, met with an unsatisfactory response.
Buchanan stated that the armistice had made a large number of Russians, who had been 
working in the munitions factories, unemployed with no hope of finding new 
employment. As a consequence a large number of destitute Russians had asked 
assistance firom the British Russian Relief Committee, which, however, had very limited 
funds at its disposal. Therefore, Sir George Buchanan was strongly of the opinion that 
the Treasury should release part of the funds of the Russian Government for the purpose 
of relief of Russians and for assisting, when possible, their return to Russia. These 
funds consisted of £50,000, allocated by the Russian Provisional government for the 
purpose of relieving Russian political emigrants.
The second report of Buchanan was a specific memorandum on the critical situation of 
200 Russian refugees brought recently to Britain on Princess Margaret. According to 
Sir George it was impossible for the British Russian Relief Committee to assist these 
refugees, because it had only very slender funds at its disposal. Therefore, he again 
suggested that the Treasury would release the whole or part of funds of the former 
Russian government.
Buchanan also stated that many of these refugees were well-to-do citizens but because 
of the existing situation their securities were useless. Among the refugees were, for
FO 371/3989, File 3191, Paper (?). Memorandum No.2 by Sir George Buchanan, ‘The Position o f Russians in 
Great Britain’. PRO.
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example, Prince Obolenskii and Prince Volkonskii, both of whom possessed vast estates 
in Russia, which were however of no value at present. Also Baron Alexander 
Meyendorff, a well-known lawyer and politician and vice-president of the third Russian 
Duma, was on board Princess Margaret. The Meyendorff family belonged to the old 
Baltic German nobility. Alexander Meyendorff stayed in Britain from 1919 to 1934 
(and again from 1939 onwards) and became a well-known expert in Russian history and 
politics; he was a Reader in Russian Institutions and Economics at the London School 
of Economics between 1922 and 1934.38
As a representative of Russians in Britain, Konstantin Nabokov also approached the 
Foreign Office to point out the critical situation of the Russian refugees that had arrived 
to Britain on Princess Margaret. The refugees had elected a special deputation and 
wrote Nabokov a letter, requesting him, as a representative of Russian interests, to 
support their case before the government. Nabokov stated in his letter to the Foreign 
Office that these refugees did not have any possibility of obtaining employment and 
therefore were completely destitute and even facing starvation. Therefore he also urged 
that the funds of the former Russian government should be released for the relief of 
these refugees. 39
The view of Home Secretary Edward Shortt, who had replaced Sir George Cave as 
Liberal Home Secretary on 10 January 1919, was not very optimistic. According to him 
it would not be possible for the Home department to take any direct action in the matter. 
Generally, Shortt was of opinion that a satisfactory solution would be reached only 
when the whole Russian question had assumed a more normal aspect, but he was also of 
the opinion that arrangements for the repatriation of as many refugees as possible to the 
Baltic ports should be encouraged.
36 FO 371/3989, File 3191, Paper 32691. Memorandum No. I by Sir George Buchanan 22.2.1919. PRO.
3^ The Russian/Russkii zhumal, vol. I, no. 16, 28 January 1919.
38 Alexander Meyendorff collection. Introduction and table of contents. Finnish National Archives in Helsinki; 
Rapp, Helen. Obituary o f Alexander Meyendorff (1869-1964). The Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 42, no. 
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39 FO 371Z3989, File 3191, Paper 28401. Nabokoff to Sir Ronald 19.2.1919. PRO.
40 FO 371Z3989, File 3191, Paper 60505. HO to FO 16.4.1919.
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The reply of the Foreign Office to the appeals of Buchanan and Nabokov was also 
discouraging. The Foreign Office letter to Buchanan stated that the information had 
been forwarded to the Treasury and the Home Office. However, it was also pointed out 
that Treasury’s reply to the similar appeal of the United Russian Committee on behalf of 
the destitute families of (Jewish) Russians in England had been negative. Therefore, the 
Treasury’s reaction to the appeal of the Central Russian Committee was likely to be 
similar. Behind the refusal of the Treasury was the British decision not to dispose of 
any property or money of the former Imperial Russian government pending recognition 
of its legal successor.
The Foreign Office also took a very negative attitude to the suggestion of Mr. Hagberg 
Wright, from the Russian Delegates Committee, that the Committee should send a 
deputation to the Bolshevik government, with a view to securing assistance. According 
to the Foreign Secretary, Earl Curzon, this might, however, furnish the Soviets with an 
opportunity for propaganda. The Delegates Committee had been appointed by the 
Provisional government to deal with the repatriation of Russians, consisting mainly of 
the anti-Tsarist Russian political emigrants and the families of those Jewish Russians 
that had gone to Russia under the Military Convention. As pointed out above, the 
Provisional government had allocated a certain sum of money for the relief of political 
refugees, which could be used by the Delegates Committee. This, however, had become 
impossible after the British government’s decision not to dispose of any money 
belonging to the former Imperial Russian government.
The British Government was nevertheless very keen on solving the problem of the 
refugees who had to be maintained at public expense. A plan was made to repatriate 
some of the Russians who had arrived in Britain on the Princess Margaret together with 
approximately 800 other Russians, among whom were, for example, families of 
Russians who had returned to Russia under the Military Convention, as well as certain
41 FO 371/3989, File 3191, Paper 37902. FO to Sir George Buchanan 7.4.1919. PRO.
42 FO 371/8154, File 43, Paper N 1791. Russian refugees, FO Minutes 24.2.1922. PRO. 
• 43 FO 371 /3989, File 3191, Paper 24402. FO to HO 12.3.1919. PRO.
44 FO 371/3989, File 3191, Paper 66131. C. Hagberg Wright to FO 29.4.1919.
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other undesirables. Director of the Military Intelligence instructed the Foreign Office 
that it did not have any objections to the refugees brought to Britain on Princess 
Margaret, being repatriated, since having been given asylum in Britain during the 
Bolshevik occupation of their homes, they were likely to strengthen the elements 
favouring the Allies, as opposed to the Bolsheviks.
In the meeting of the representatives of the Admiralty, War Office, Foreign Office,
Home Office and Colonial Office on 15 May 1919, it was decided that pure Russians 
could not be sent back under existing conditions because they would not be accepted in 
Estonia or Latvia. The Home Office should nevertheless ascertain how many Latvians 
and Estonians could be repatriated. It was decided that the Estonian government should 
be consulted whether they would allow the repatriation of certain people in the 
following four categories; those connected with the Russian Delegation Committee; 
wives and families of Russians who had returned to Russia under the Military 
Convention; certain ‘undesirables’, though not Bolshevik sympathisers and certain 
numbers of destitute seamen.
The meeting concluded that those who could not be landed in Estonia or Latvia, i.e. 
Russian nationals, could not be repatriated before Petrograd had fallen into the hands of 
a friendly government. 6^ i f  this rule was followed, pure Russian refugees were never 
repatriated. However, the Estonian government informed Britain in July 1919 that it was 
willing to let a number of persons from different categories; families of Russians who 
returned under Military Service Act, certain undesirables, and also other ‘unclassified 
Russians’ to be landed at Reval for transit through Estonia."^  ^It is possible that some 
Russians that were categorised earlier as ‘non-repatriable’ were included in this 
agreement.
The meeting of 15 May also addressed the problem of the Black Sea refugees from 
Odessa and the Crimea. This question had been already considered during the previous
FO 371/3989, File 3191, Paper 51914. Dir. of Military Intelligence to FO. PRO.
46 FO 371/3989, File 3191, Paper 76788. HO to FO 20.5.1919; FO 371/4013, File 63588, Paper 78921. Meeting of 
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month, when the Commander-in-Chief of Mediterranean Fleet requested facilities for 
237 Russians to proceed to England from Malta. The Foreign Office Minutes had then 
pointed out that although the rule was not to accept Russian refugees to Britain, 
exceptions had been nevertheless made in favour of upper class Russians and that there 
would be trouble if the government did not make any rule one way or another. 8^ The 
view of the Treasury, as expressed in a letter to the Foreign Office, was that on financial 
grounds it was desirable to repatriate these refugees as soon as possible to parts of 
Russia that were not occupied by the Bolsheviks. They also considered it important that 
refugees should not be assisted to come to Britain unless it was clear that they were self- 
supporting.
At the meeting it was stated that over 2,000 refugees were expected in Malta from the 
Black Sea. It was agreed that at present it was not possible to send back any of the 
refugees to the Black Sea, but that on no account should any of these refugees be 
brought to England. Instead, the Governor of Malta should be asked how many could be 
employed in Malta and what was the maximum number that could be accommodated. 
The Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean should also be asked whether 
accommodation could be found elsewhere, for example in Mudros or Cyprus. 
Interestingly, the Commander-in-Chief had earlier suggested that refugees should be 
transported from the Black Sea to Vladivostok. At the meeting it was, however, decided 
that this would not be possible for practical and financial reasons.
The Governor General of Malta informed the Foreign Office that many destitute 
Russians had friends in Paris or London who would finance them but they were unable 
to obtain visas from Military Control Offices in France or England. This again shows 
the strict attitude the British authorities, primarily the Home Office, had adopted on the 
question.
48 FO 371 /4008, File 52089, Paper 65747. FO minutes, April 1919. PRO.
49 FO 371/4008, File 52089, Paper 74944. Treasury to the FO 16.5.1919. PRO.
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In April 1919 G. Volkov, a naval attaché at the former Russian Embassy approached the 
Foreign Office informing it that Vladimir Nabokov, the brother of Russian Charge d’ 
Affaires, Konstantin Nabokov was in Athens and wished to come to London with his 
family. The same was true with the head of the Crimean government, M. Salomon 
Krymm and his family. Mr. Volkov pointed out that he would personally be very 
grateful if visas were granted to all of them.
The Foreign Office informed Lord Granville, the British representative in Athens, on the 
same day that there was no objection to granting a visa to Vladimir Nabokov and his 
family. It was further stated that permission only covered his immediate family and not 
a large party of relatives. Konstantin Nabokov had also personally approached the 
Foreign Office on the issue, and they informed on 12 May that Lord Granville had been 
instructed to grant the necessary visas. The Foreign Office seems to have made the 
decision before the Home Office had given their view on the issue, because the Home 
Secretary, Edward Shortt, informed the Foreign Office on 2 July that in his opinion the 
visas for Mr. Nabokov and Mr. Krymm and their families could not be granted. He 
explained that due to the large number of applications received by the British 
government from Russian refugees in Constantinople, Malta and elsewhere it was 
necessary to maintain a strict policy on the matter.
The Home Secretary continued by referring to the decision of a conference of 15 May 
1919 that no further Russian refugees from the Black Sea should be allowed into the 
United Kingdom, but instead arrangements to take them in Malta should be made. He 
stated that a strict rule against the admission of Russian refugees at the present time was 
necessary, and that exceptions could not be made in favour of individuals, no matter 
how strongly they were recommended or supported, without creating numerous 
embarrassing situations and giving rise to great dissatisfaction. He continued that the 
rule would not, however, effect or conflict with the policy of admitting Russians with 
business or other adequate reasons.
^2 FO 371/4016, File 66405, Paper 66405. G. Wolkoff to J.D. Gregory, FO 29.4.1919. PRO.
^3 FO 371/4016, File 66405, Paper 71749. FO to Lord Granville, Athens 29.4.1919. PRO.
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Interestingly, this advice seems to have arrived too late for Nabokov’s case because in 
the minutes of the Foreign Office it was stated that Mr. Nabokov was already in 
England. It was, however, recognised by the Foreign Office that the letter of the Home 
Secretary gave them ‘a definite mling in these questions’ in future. 6^ This incident 
seems to have been one of the infrequent occasions where the Foreign Office made 
decision to grant visas without waiting for the Home Office opinion. Normally, the 
Home Office view was asked before permission to grant a visa was given. Presumable 
in Nabokov’s case the Foreign Office assumed that there would be no objections from 
the side of the Home Office.
Despite the general policy not to admit refugees, a number of prominent Russian 
émigrés were nevertheless granted visas as ‘exceptions to the general rule’. Countess 
Sofia Benckendorff s case is one example of a successful application. In April 1919 she 
approached the Foreign Secretary, Earl Curzon, with a list of 28 relatives and friends, as 
well as their children, altogether perhaps 50 people and requested visas for them to 
proceed from Malta to UK. In June the Foreign Office informed Mr. Volkov at the 
Russian Embassy that the War Office had informed them that instructions were to be 
sent to Passport Control Officer in Malta to grant the visas.^^ In his letter to Countess 
Benckendorff, Curzon stated that he had been informed that instructions had been sent 
to the passport officer at Malta to grant the visas required, and regretted the long delay 
due to the large number of refugees in Malta.
The success of this application was due to a fact that the Home Office, which was 
naturally consulted in the matter, concurred to the opinion of the War Office that visas 
could be granted to these people. ^  That the people in question were members of 
Russian aristocratic and well-known families also most certainly had influence on the 
decision of the Home Office to grant visas. Among the relatives of Countess 
Benckendorff were for example Countess Elena Bobrinskaia (sister), as well as her
56 FO 371/4016, File 66405, Paper 97221. FO Minutes. PRO
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husband Count Andrei Bobrinskii, Countess Elena Benckendorff (daughter-in law), 
Countess Maria Bobrinskaia and her husband Count Petr Bobrinskii (nephew), Princess 
Maria Trubetskoi (niece), her husband lurii Trubetskoi and their daughter Olga,
Countess Sofia Fersen (niece), her husband Count Nikolai Fersen and their two 
daughters, Madame Varvara Kochubei (niece), her husband Nikolai Kochubei and their 
child. Princess Petr Dolgorukii (wife of nephew) and her two children, and Princesses 
Sofia (grandniece), Aleksandra and Elizaveta (cousins) Viazemskii. The list of friends 
included for example Madame Liubov Kochubei and her young children. Princess Maria 
Obolenskaia, and Countess Palen with her young children.
The Director of Military Intelligence also informed the Foreign Office that they did not 
have any military objection to the arrival of Mrs. Belaiev and her family, for whom 
visas were applied through Sir George Buchanan’s Central Russian Committee. Visas 
seemed to have been granted for them, but the Foreign Office was informed that they 
never reached her. Meanwhile the family had travelled to Genoa with two servants. Fay 
Morgan & Co., a British company, informed the Foreign Office that they would be very 
glad if permission could also be granted to servants. In this case a private company in 
Britain seems to have been backing the applications. In fact important business or other 
connections in Britain could ease admission and be a sufficient reason for ‘an exception 
to the general rule’. For example, the entry of Isaiah Berlin’s family to Britain in 1919 
was also probably largely due to important business connections of Isaiah’s father, 
Mendel, as he owned large timber business in Riga and had done trade with Britain.
A visa was also granted for example to Mr. Grigorii Aleksinskii, a former member of 
the Imperial Duma, and his family; the HO in this case having no objection to granting a 
visa presumably because of his earlier position. Other important political figures 
were also admitted to Britain, as shown for example by the cases of Pavel Miliukov and 
Vladimir Nabokov, although in Nabokov’s case permission was given more or less 
‘accidentally’.
61 FO 371/4013, File 63577, Papers 63577 and 87326. PRO.
62 FO 371/4016, File 66708, Paper 107067. Fay Morgan & Company to FO 23.7.1919. PRO. 
62 Ignatieff, Michael. Isaiah Berlin: A Life. London 1998, pp. 12, 25, 31-32.
64 FO 372/1262, File 82464, Paper 102755. HO to FO 14.7.1919. PRO.
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While in Britain, Nabokov edited the Journal of the Russian Liberation Committee, The 
New Russia, together with his ‘Kadet colleague’ P. Miliukov. In autumn 1920 Nabokov 
decided to move to Berlin, where he was to edit the liberal émigré daily Rul ’ until his 
assassination in 1922. His move was at least partly initiated by fact that while editing 
The New Russia, both Nabokov and Miliukov found their political differences greater 
than they had anticipated. Miliukov had come to favour a political ‘opening to the left’, 
while Nabokov considered this as an unwarranted compromise of Kadet policies. At the 
time of Nabokov’s departure for Berlin, Miliukov also left Britain for Paris, to edit what 
was to become the most popular émigré newspaper. The Poslednie NovostiT>  ^The fact 
that the British government had by then clearly abandoned the anti-Bolshevik cause 
most probably also influenced their decisions to emigrate.
Also Aleksander Kerenskii was briefly staying in Britain after his escape Ifom Russia. 
This was not, however, openly discussed in public, probably because of sensitiveness of 
his position and the antipathy he faced from the majority of Russian émigrés who 
largely blamed him for what had happened in Russia. In Britain, The Russian Outlook, 
published an article in May 1919, according to which the journal had been informed that 
Kerenskii had, until recently, been living in retirement somewhere in Britain writing his 
recollections of what had happened in Russia. The article stated that ‘every true and 
patriotic Russian regarded Kerenskii as being almost solely to blame of the present state 
of Russia’.
The most famous ‘exceptions to a general rule’ were without doubt the Dowager 
Empress of Russia Maria (Marie) Fedorovna, mother of Nikolai II and sister of Britain’s 
Queen Alexandra (queen mother), and her daughter Grand Duchess Ksenia. The 
Empress Maria Fedorovna, together with her daughters Ksenia and Olga, their husbands 
Grand Duke Aleksander Mikhailovich, and Colonel Nikolai Kulikovskii, as well as for 
example, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, the former Supreme Commander of the 
Russian Army, had moved from Kiev to the Crimea in March 1917. Until August 1917,
Nabokov, Vladimir. Speak Memory. An Autobiography Revisited. Harmondsworth 1969, p. 197; Williams 1972, 
pp. 182-84; H.W. Williams Papers, Add. 54466, Vol. XXXI, ff. 37-38, British library, manuscript collection.
The Russian Outlook, No. 4, vol. 1,31 May 1919.
119
under the Provisional government, they were free to enter and leave, and the first 
deprivation of freedom coincided with General Komilov’s campaign in the late August. 
After the Bolshevik Revolution, the new rulers placed the family under close guard.
In spring 1918 the Germans were advancing in the Crimea and occupied the city of 
Yalta. In late autumn disturbing rumours of the Bolshevik advance in the Ukraine 
started to arrive. In October German plans were under way to move the Romanovs out 
of the Crimea before Bolshevik or Ukrainian nationalist troops could move in. Before 
these plans were put into effect, however, the Armistice was made and the Germans 
started to evacuate the peninsula. Their place was taken by the British and French troops 
which landed in the Crimea in late 1918.
After the arrival of the Allied troops in the Crimea, the Dowager Empress was visited 
several times by British naval officers, who also brought her letters from her sister in 
Britain. The officers instructed the Dowager Empress and her family to leave the 
Crimea, since the Bolsheviks were advancing in South Russia. King George V sent, in 
April 1919, HMS Marlborough to Yalta out of concern for ‘Aunt Minnie’ and his 
Russian cousins. This action might well have been advanced by the ‘guilty conscience’ 
he may have felt for not helping Nikolai II and his family to leave Russia for Britain 
during 1917.
The Dowager Empress, of course, was totally unaware of the whole issue of the 
negotiations of the admission of the Tsar and his family into Britain, as well as of the 
murder of the royal family in Ekaterinburg. She firmly believed that her son was alive 
somewhere in Russia; a belief she held until her death Her determination not to leave 
Russia was largely due to her belief that it was her duty to remain in Russia with her 
son. At the beginning of April, however, she was again informed by British officers that 
there was real danger of the Bolshevik advance in the Crimea, and that she should leave.
Countess Yekaterina Petrovna Klenmichel in Glenny and Stone 1990, pp. 160-61; Alexander Mikhailovich, 
Grand Duke. Once a Grand Duke. G.B 1932, pp. 331-337; Vorres, Ian. The Last Grand-Duchess. London 1964, pp. 
161-163.
Williams 1972, pp. 75- 76; Countess Kleinmichel in Glenny and Stone 1990, pp. 162-63.
Kurth, Peter. The Lost World o f Nicholas and Alexandra. Great Britain and Canada 1995, p. 205; Occleshaw 
1993, p. 131.
120
Finally, the Dowager Empress gave way and agreed to leave on board of HMS 
Marlborough, but only if the British would evacuate all the persons she listed who were 
also staying in Yalta and neighbouring areas. This was agreed to by the British, and a 
number of (mainly aristocratic) Russian refugees were evacuated on British vessels and 
at British expense. The Dowager Empress only gave permission for HMS Marlborough 
to depart when all the other ships had departed, after which, on 11 April it left Yalta, 
first for Sevastopol, and then for Malta via Constantinople.
From Malta the Dowager Empress Maria Fedorovna and the Grand Duchess Ksenia, 
with her five children made their way to Britain on HMS Lord Nelson, arriving in 
Britain in early May 1919. The Foreign Office informed the Home Office that the 
Empress was due to arrive in Portsmouth on 9 May, and requested that the competent 
authorities grant Her Majesty, and her suite, all possible facilities for disembarkation. 
With them sailed some friends and relatives, for example Prince and Princess 
Viazemskii, Mr. and Mrs. Chatelain with their son, Madame Erschov, Prince 
Dolgorukii, Princess Dolgorukii with two children. Count and Countess Mengden with 
their two children. They were also allowed to bring twenty servants with them into the 
UK. 71
Empress Maria’s other daughter, Olga and her husband, did not accompany them on the 
journey. They had left the Crimea for Caucasus earlier, although Olga and her family 
later joined the Empress in Denmark. 72 For a while the Dowager Empress stayed in 
Britain with her sister. Queen Alexandra, but soon decided to go to Denmark, from 
where she had originally left to marry Aleksander III. She died in Denmark in 1928 at 
the age o f  81 .73 The Grand-Duchess Ksenia continued to live in Britain until her death 
in 1960. King George V offered her the use of grace-and favour- mansion, Wildemess 
House.74
70 Kurth 1995, p. 205; Vorres 1964, pp. 162-64; Glenny and Stone 1990, pp. 164-66.
71 HO 45/11549, File 380030/3. FO to HO 3.5.1919 and Tel. from Senior Naval Officer, Malta 25.4.1919. PRO.
72 Vorres 1964, pp. 163-167.
73 Tisdall, E.E.P. The Dowager Empress, Marie Fedorovna. London 1957, pp. 255-59; Kurth 1995, p. 205.
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Other well-known Russian individuals and families, such as Anna Pavlova, D.S.Mirskii, 
Baron A.F. Meyendorff, Golitsyns, Volkovs, Kutaissovs, Trubetskois or Obolenskiis, 
came to Britain. Some of them only stayed for a short period and then moved on to 
Paris, Berlin and other more prominent émigré centres. During their stay they 
nevertheless were respected members of Russian émigré society, which, as Russian 
colonies elsewhere, preserved much of the structure of old Russia by for example 
maintaining their former ranks and titles. From the British side, however, there was no 
‘special treatment’ for any ‘refugees’ once they had arrived in Britain. It was, for 
example, pointed out that all the members of the former Russian Embassy, once their 
diplomatic exemption had lapsed, were placed on the register of aliens, and no special 
treatment was extended to them.^^
However, although individual well-to-do, upper-class and other prominent Russians 
were occasionally admitted as ‘exceptions to the general rule’, there does not seem to 
have been a clear rule governing their admission. Thus, visas were often denied also to 
well-to-do refugees with influential friends. Even the Dowager Empress of Russia was 
refused application for her friends in Malta, about twenty people, whom she wished 
visas to be granted to UK. Sir A. Davidson informed Sir Ronald Graham in the Foreign 
Office that the Empress was aware of the restrictions upon the transfer of Russians from 
Malta to England, but that she hoped that it would be possible to make an exception in 
these particular instances. The Foreign Office Minutes stated that ‘the Home Office 
would not like this at all, but that the Foreign Office could not do more than put the case 
up in usual way’. The point was also made that if an exception was made some Labour 
members would probably ask questions and that on these grounds it might be best to 
refuse permission.
Davidson approached the Foreign Office a week later in May 1919, informing them that 
the War Office looked favourably on the request, and that these people were all able to 
support themselves in England. He also made a comment that the situation regarding the
75 FO 372/1721, File 8628, Paper T 9974. From HO to FO l 7.8.1921. PRO.
76 FO 371/4013, File 63588, Paper 76543. Letter from Sir A. Davidson to Sir Ronald Graham, FO 20.5.1919 and 
FO Minutes. PRO.
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applications would most probably ease after this because the Empress and the Grand 
Duchess Ksenia understood the difficulty of admitting Russian refugees to England in 
any numbers and no matter what class they were. The Empress was said to be grateful 
of the consideration shown to them.'^ '^  However, the Home Secretary, Edward Shortt, 
instructed the Foreign Office that ‘he much regretted that permission can not be granted 
for Russians at Malta asked by Dowager Empress of Russia because it would make it 
extremely difficult to maintain the rule that had hitherto been strictly enforced
As a consequence, Davidson again approached Sir Ronald Graham in the Foreign Office 
enquiring the reason for the refusal. According to him there was no valid reason for it 
because all the persons in question had relatives in England, took no part in politics and 
had money to support themselves. In addition there was no objection from the 
Admiralty, War Office or Foreign Office, and according to him no intimation had been 
publicly made that Russians were not allowed to come to England. Graham replied that 
the admission of aliens to the UK was dealt by Mr. Haldane Porter of the Home Office, 
and agreed that it would be a good thing for Mr. Davidson to deal with him direct on 
this and similar questions.^^ There is no further information about this case in either the 
Foreign Office or the Home Office documents, so it has to be assumed that the original 
decision of the Home Secretary, not to grant visas, was followed.
It would be interesting to find out why the application of the Dowager Empress was not 
successful but the application of Countess Benckendorff, for example, was. Even more 
so because one would assume that the application of the Dowager Empress would have 
carried at least as much weight, if not more. In addition, some of the people in the two 
applications were actually the same: Mr. Nicholas Kochubei and his family, as well as 
Count and Countess Fersen and their children. This clearly makes the policy of the 
Home Office look rather inconsistent. Thus, the Home Office seems to have made 
‘exceptions to the general rule’ in somewhat desultory method.
77 HO 45/11549, File 380030/7. Mr. Davidson to FO 28.5.1919. PRO.
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Another very interesting example is the case of Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich, the 
cousin of Tsar Nikolai II, and his wife Grand Duchess Victoria Fedorovna. Grand Duke 
Kirill was the pretender to the Russian throne and in August 1924 he proclaimed 
himself the Emperor of all the Russians. For some Russian émigrés, especially for the 
reactionary group and the members of so called ‘Mladorossy’, Union of Young 
Russians, he became the new Emperor of Russia. However, the émigré opinions were 
divided in this question, and the majority of Russian monarchist émigrés never accepted 
him as the rightful claimant to the throne. Instead, they supported Grand Duke Nikolai 
Nikolaevich, the uncle of Grand Duke Kirill, until his death in 1929. Even after Grand 
Duke Nikolai’s death most of the émigrés did not accept Grand Duke Kirill as the 
rightful claimant to the throne and only recognised him as ‘the eldest member of the 
House of Romanov’.^ o
In the early 1920s the Grand Duke and Duchess wanted to come to live in Britain, but 
they were refused permission. Sir Stuart Coats made a parliamentary question in March 
1921 asking why certain members of Russian Imperial House had been refused 
permission to reside in Britain, and whether these objections would now be withdrawn. 
Mr. Shortt replied that he did not know what particular individuals Sir Stuart referred, 
but that it had been necessary to maintain, with great strictness, the general rule not to 
admit refugees from R u s s ia .S ir  Stuart Coates also approached Cecil Harmsworth at 
the Foreign Office on this matter. He pointed out that the refusal was ever more 
surprising because the Grand Duchess was a ‘British princess’, the daughter of the Duke
of Edinburgh. 2^
The Home Office requested the view of the Foreign Office on the case and they replied 
that the Foreign Secretary Curzon had considered that an exception should be made in 
favour of their Imperial Highnesses. They also stated that Sir Stuart Coates had been 
informed that HMG did not wish to raise any objections to their entry. 83 During 
the 193Os the Grand Duke and Duchess nevertheless continued to live in the small
8^ Huntington 1933, pp. 184-89.
81 HO 45/11549, File 380030/19. P.Q by Sir Stuart Coats 3.3.1921. PRO.
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village of St. Briac in Brittany, surrounded with the ‘court’ of their devoted followers 84, 
Whether they changed their minds about coming to Britain or whether the British 
government refused visas despite its promises is not clear,
Mr. Volkov at the former the Russian Embassy personally approached the Home Office 
several times asking certain émigrés to be admitted. For instance, in April 1919 he 
asked the Home Office to grant visas for six Russians from South Russia, some of them 
personally known to him, and some others recommended by well-known Russians, for 
example Countess Sumarokov-Elston. Her case was recommended by S. Sazonov, the 
former Foreign Minister of the Tsarist government. Also in this case, despite the fact 
that these applications were backed by influential persons, the replies seem to have been 
negative. The Home Secretary informed the Foreign Office that ‘in view of the general 
decision that Russian refugees other than businessmen should not be allowed to come to 
the UK, he regretted that he did not think facilities should be granted to Countess 
Sophie Chemikhen-Bezobrazov’ who was among the applicants.^^ There are no 
decisions on the other cases, but the same rule was most probably followed in each case.
The British government also had to deal with Russian refugees who had made their way 
from North Russia to Finland and other Scandinavian countries. In late 1918 Britain was 
asked by the Scandinavian governments to take responsibility for some 5,000 refugees 
who had made their way into Finland, and who could not be maintained in Finland. The 
British government replied that they could not, except in particular cases, give them 
hospitality in England. This was done despite the offer from Mr. Denisov to place a 
million roubles at the disposal of the British authorities for the relief of refugees. The 
answer of Britain was that ‘the difficulty is not financial but it is that the Home Office 
will not have any more Russians here who might benefit by his generosity’. 8? However, 
the question was definitely also a financial question because the government wanted to 
avoid the possibility of becoming responsible for the maintenance of refugees.
Huntington 1933, p. 34 and 184.
85 HO 45/11549, File 380030/10. Mr. Wolkoff to Mr. H. Crookshank, FO 16.4.1919. PRO.
86 HO 45/11549, File 380030/14. HO to FO 7.7.1919. PRO.
87 FO 371/3307. File 4790, Papers 168045 and 181231. PRO.
125
The question of the British attitude towards the Russian refugees in Finland was again 
dealt in early 1919. A telegram from Mr. Clive informed the Foreign Office that there 
were approximately 13-15,000 Russian refugees in Finland. These refugees had formed 
a Committee to look after their interests, and it had been supplied by the Finnish 
government with 500,000 Finnish marks. Mr Clive suggested that Britain should 
approach the Finnish government to see what steps they would desire Britain to take. 
The reply from the Foreign Office was that they should not take any action in the matter 
at present, and that the only way they could come in would be by Mr. Bell, the British 
representative in Finland, cooperating in giving relief and assistance.^^
A conference between Sir John Pedder and Mr. Haldane Porter of the Home Office, 
Major Spencer of the War Office, Mr. Steward of the Treaty Department and a Foreign 
Office representative, on the question of Russian refugees in Finland and their 
admission to UK was held in February 1919. The Foreign Office memorandum of the 
meeting pointed out that, hitherto, permission had been granted in very exceptional 
cases, such as persons intimately connected with this country, those owing property in 
England, those likely to be use to the government, or else to some wives and families of 
Russians who had joined the Allied forces on the Archangel front.
In the memorandum it was pointed out that Major Spencer from the War Office had 
stated that the matter was one which did not really concern his department. On the other 
hand, the attitude of Sir John Pedder from the Home Office was that all Russian 
refugees should remain where they were, and if this could be achieved, the means 
whereby it was done did not really interest the Home Office. He was also of a view that 
the admission of people who were likely to carry on monarchist propaganda was 
undesirable. This is of course quite an interesting view, especially as Britain itself was a 
monarchy.
FO 371/3968, File 176, Paper 15559. Telegram from Mr. Clive to FO 26.1.1919. PRO.
FO 371/3968, File 176, Paper 28740. Russian refugees. Memorandum on question o f allowing them to enter UK, 
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On the other hand, it is understandable that the government did not want to receive 
politically active monarchists, as the British government clearly wanted to distant itself 
from people carrying propaganda for the Russian monarchy. The collapse of the Tsarist 
system in Russia had also led to anti-monarchist expressions at home in Britain, which 
made the issue more sensitive. Pedder continued that he also objected to the admission 
of people who would be likely to compete with workers in Britain. However, he also 
pointed out that there would probably be difficulties (moral difficulties?) if persons of 
means and influence were admitted whilst those without means were left destitute in 
Scandinavia or driven back to Russia.
The memorandum then considered the advantages and disadvantages of the admission 
of Russian refugees from Finland into the UK. The advantages would be that the 
refugees admitted would be grateful towards Britain and that the Scandinavian countries 
would at the same time be relieved. The disadvantages were that a large proportion were 
unable to support themselves and most of them were not the ‘best elements’ but had 
instead fled in order to save their own skins. Some undesirable persons would then 
probably be able to enter, too. Additionally it was considered that as soon as the door 
was opened, at least several thousands would probably make applications for entry.
As different possible solutions it was considered a) that all except undesirables would be 
admitted (meaning those without sufficient means, criminals?) b) that the British 
government would maintain their present attitude (not to admit refugees), c) that the 
subsidies to the Scandinavian countries would be increased, d) that the Allied 
governments would be consulted to persuade them to help the British government. ^  
The documents do not contain any decisions on the issue, but considering the general 
line of government’s policy on the refugee question there is little doubt that the option 
to maintain the present attitude was chosen as the best course.
The evacuation of Russian refugees from North Russia and especially the question of 
how many Russians were brought to Britain had been the subject of much controversial 
and conflicting information. The report by Rawlinson, the Commander-In-Chief in
90 FO 371/3968, File 176, Paper 28740. Russian refugees. Memorandum on... PRO.
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North Russia, stated that only 200 civilians were taken from Archangel to England, and 
the rest were taken to the Baltics and South Russia. On the other hand, there are also 
statements pointing out that the refugees from North Russia were the largest single 
group that came to Britain, approximately 15,000.
Sir John Simpson, in his Refugee Problem (1939) stated that very few Russian refugees 
entered Great Britain after the war and that the only single large group coming to Britain 
after 1917 were those evacuated in British ships from Murmansk after the fall of the 
popular government in Archangel. His estimate was that, at one time, there were 
probably about 15,000 refugees in all, but the greater part of them were assisted with 
funds raised for the purpose to emigrate to France, the Balkans and the elsewhere in 
1922-23.93 Marc Raeff and Claudena Skran simply state that 15,000 Russians were 
evacuated directly from North Russia to Britain 94^  but their information is based upon 
Simpson’s study.
There is some uncertainty by what Simpson means with the ‘fall of the popular 
government’. Most probably he is referring to the evacuation of the British forces and 
the evacuation of some Russians that coincided with it, in autumn 1919. The actual fall 
o f the Archangel government happened in February 1920. 95 All the British ships, 
however, had left Murmansk by October 1919 and thus could not be involved with any 
evacuations in the following February.
In fact the final fall of the Archangel government happened very quickly, thereby 
preventing any organised evacuation of troops or civilians. In early February the 
successful Bolshevik offensive on the Dvina front caused panic in Archangel. In the 
middle of February most of the officers left Archangel in the direction of Onega and 
Finland. On 18-19 February the remainder of the North Russian government evacuated 
Archangel and General Miller left from Murmansk by sea, first to Norway and later to
91 WO 33/975, File 3717. The Commander-In-Chief, North Russia to WO 4.10.1919. PRO.
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93 Simpson 1939, p. 339.
94 Raeff 1990, p. 28; Skran 1995, p. 36.
93 Strakhovsky 1944, p. 252.
128
Britain. He soon emigrated to France, where he disappeared in 1936, allegedly 
kidnapped by Soviet agents. Many others, however, never managed to leave North 
Russia. The British attitude towards the whole issue can be seen in a message stating: 
‘there is nothing we can do. Miller was given a chance of going to Murmansk and of 
evacuating all who wanted and he refused’.
This does not, however, mean that the British had planned to evacuate refugees from 
Russia to England. The telegram of Rawlinson, the Commander-in Chief of North 
Russia, enquired in August 1919 whether certain Russian families who had either 
relations in England or direct business connections with England could be sent to 
Britain, provided that they could show proofs of being able to maintain themselves. The 
War Office telegram to Archangel stated clearly that ‘in no circumstances can Russians 
be received in England ‘. It was also informed that the Home Office view was that the 
destination of these Russians should be ‘anywhere but England ‘. 9^
The letter of Under Secretary of the State for the Home Department to the Director of 
Military Intelligence on 2 September stated that no definite decision could be given as 
to whether any refugees with connections to England should be granted admission to the 
UK. The Home Office could not provide either accommodation or maintenance for a 
large number of refugees. Thus a telegram had been despatched to the Military 
authorities in North Russia saying that in no circumstances could refugees be received 
in Britain. The Home Secretary was strongly of the opinion that all possible ships 
should be taken to transfer Russians who wish to leave Archangel by direct sea route to 
other ports of Russia. Considering the strictness of the message to the authorities in 
North Russia, the more accurate statement would have probably been that the Home 
Office was not willing to provide accommodation or maintenance ‘ to miy number of 
refugees ‘.
w o  106/1183. Fall o f  the North Russian government. Report from the East Finland Mission, March-May 1920. 
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The proposal of the Secretary of the State for War, Winston Churchill, was to repatriate 
these civilians to Southern Russia. This was also the recommendation Curzon and that 
of the Foreign Office in general, The War Office telegram to General Ironside stated 
that at the conference held between the representatives of the Home Office, Foreign 
Office and the Ministry of Shipping it was decided that all Russian civilians would be 
sent to South Russia when evacuated from North Russia and would not be allowed to 
land in the UK unless passed at the port of call by Home Office officials. The remainder 
would be accommodated on board ships bringing them to UK ports until re-embarkation 
on vessels proceeding to South Russia. ^^ 2 The C-in-C of North Russia was informed 
that civilians should not leave North Russia under the impression that they were going 
anywhere but South Russia.
In the light of currently-available documents it is reasonably clear that, contrary to 
earlier suggestions, the number of Russians evacuated from North Russia to Britain 
never reached more than a few hundred. The fact that the figure 15,000 is repeated in 
many studies is partly due to the fact that they have merely repeated the figures given in 
older studies, for example that of Simpson. Originally, the mistake might have happened 
because of several reasons; because of the marked difference between the estimations 
and the actual evacuation numbers; because of the uncertainty about the destination of 
the evacuated refugees, and so on. For example, General Rawlinson replied to the War 
Office enquiry about the earlier estimation of General Officer Commanding, i.e. that of 
15,000 refugees, that this estimation had included refugees that were to be taken to 
Murmansk. The refusal of General Miller to evacuate his troops to Murmansk, however, 
reduced the figures. In addition, as Rawlinson stated, the number of Russians that were 
evacuated from Archangel was also less than had been originally estimated.
The most difficult refugee problems were still ahead; the final fall of the Archangel 
government, the defeat of Denikin’s army and finally the evacuation of Vrangel’s 
refugees. British policy in relation to the admission of refugees remained, for the most
FO 371/4029, File 124546, Papers 126913 and 127720. PRO.
102 33/967A. File 346/A. From WO to General Officer Commanding, Archangel 11.9.1919. PRO.
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part, unaltered. A letter of General Miller of the 23 March 1920, written in the refugee 
camp in Norway, where part Miller’s troops had managed to escape after the fall of 
Archangel, critically requested reasons for the refusal of the British government to allow 
few hundred refugees to enter Britain. He stated that human laws are imperfect but in 
England the laws of honour and humanity always stood far above any other laws. He 
continued that these few hundred Russians who in Soviet Russia would be threatened 
with imprisonment and execution could not believe that laws will prevent the English 
people ‘fulfilling now a small part of what they considered their direct duty in the 
autumn of 1919 ’. The Russian representative in Britain, Evgenii Sablin, also 
considered it to be a moral responsibility of the British to take care of these refugees.
Surprisingly, in this case, the efforts of Mr. Sablin and Miller seemed to have helped, 
because on 30 March the statement was made by the Foreign Office that ‘on further 
consideration Lord Curzon is disposed to recommend the Home Secretary that an 
exception should be made in this particular instance ‘. What might have helped was the 
fact the Miller had stated that he had sufficient funds at his disposal to ensure the 
maintenance of these refugees for a considerable period. The letter from the Foreign 
Office to Mr. Sablin stated that they had received a reply from the Home Office that ‘as 
an exception to the general rule, they were willing to agree to Lord Curzon’s suggestion 
that 200 refugees now in Norway may be permitted to enter this country ’. However, the 
Foreign Office pointed out to Sablin that they should be let know whether Russian 
authorities were prepared to assume full financial responsibility for the maintenance and 
transport, because the British government could not use any public funds for this 
p u r p o s e . '0 8  The agreement was also made on the understanding that these people would 
not stay in Britain indefinitely.
The defeat of Denikin’s army had most influence on the British government, because it 
took responsibility of over 10,000 refugees involved with the evacuations of the spring
Lloyd George papers, F 58/1/7. Miller to Lloyd George 23.3.1920. House o f Lords Record Office.
Lloyd George papers, F 58/1/7. G. Sabline to J.D Gregory ,F0, 20.3.1920. House o f Lords Record Office. 
Lloyd George papers, F 58/1/7. J.D. Gregory to the Under Secretary o f the State 30.3.1920. House o f Lords 
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1920. The attitude and policies towards admitting refugees to Britain, however, did not 
change. In early 1920, when the defeat of Denikin’s army was already a fact, Samuel 
Ho are, from the Foreign Office, considered the question of the future of the ‘would-be- 
refugees’. He said that in Archangel the British had removed about 7,000 persons to 
South Russia, but that the situation was then different because there was still hope of a 
Bolshevik collapse. In his opinion, Britain should do what they could to assist those 
who could escape to foreign countries but he did not think that emigration from South 
Russia should be encouraged ‘en masse’. He pointed out the difference between helping 
people to escape and helping those who had escaped, and considered that it would be 
better to confine British efforts to the latter.
Sir Halford Mackinder, the British High Commissioner in South Russia who had 
guaranteed the British evacuation of Denikin’s forces and families, approached the 
Foreign Office on 13 January asking if refugees with sufficient means to maintain 
themselves could come to England. The answer of the Foreign Office was: ‘ We must 
consult the Home Office. We cannot possibly allow Russians into this country that have 
no means at all ‘. Curzon approached the Home Office on the question, with a view 
that it was quite impracticable to admit destitute refugees. The reply of the Home Office 
was that Mr. Shortt ‘regretted that he could not see his way to admit anv refugees, with 
or without means to England’.^
Interestingly, there nevertheless seem to have been some conflicts between the Foreign 
Office and the Home Office in relation to the admission of refugees to Britain. Emrys 
Evans from the Foreign Office approached Mr. Hoare in October 1920 complaining 
about the attitude of the Home Office in refusing all the applications they were making 
for Russians to enter England. According to him it was particularly short-sighted in the 
case of refugees in the camps at present under British control because of the enormous 
expense they made for the government and, therefore, it would be wise to encourage 
those refugees who could, to leave the camps. He also stated that the number of Russian
109 PQ 371/4013, File 63588, Paper 167526. Refugees from South Russia, extracts from the departmental file South 
Russia. 5.1.1920. PRO.
^ O pO  371/4013, File 63588, Paper 173286. Sir Halford Mackinder to FO 23.1.1920. PRO.
FO 371/4013, File 63588, Paper 179643. HO to FO 17.2.1920. PRO.
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refugees likely to find asylum in England would, in all probability, be comparatively 
small but that in all cases where proper accommodation and maintenance in Britain was 
guaranteed, the Home Office should grant the necessary applications
The Home Office replied in late October, stating that the cases mentioned ‘did not differ 
from large numbers of applications received from other sources, which were, as a 
general rule, in accordance with the decisions of the Cabinet, refused ‘ J  Actually, the 
question of the admission of Russian refugees was not dealt with at the Cabinet level 
even once during the whole period of the refugee problem. This clearly implies that the 
matter was not considered of major political importance, or as an issue of major 
controversy. The Foreign Office by no means supported unrestricted admission of 
Russian refugees, either. They merely seem to have suggested a somewhat more flexible 
practice towards individual cases, especially towards those who could properly support 
themselves.
More importantly, even if there were certain disagreements between the Foreign Office 
and the Home Office about the rules of admission, at least they did not have any impact 
on the attitude or policy of the Home Office, which had the ultimate power on the issue. 
Of course, the position of the Home Office on the issue was quite different from that of 
the Foreign Office. Thus, it was easier for the Foreign Office to adopt more ‘benevolent’ 
attitude towards the admission of refugees, as after their arrival in Britain, the refugees 
were the responsibility of the Home Office.
The Home Office nevertheless maintained a strict policy also in this particular case. The 
Home Secretary also pointed out that in no case was any recommendation being made 
by the Foreign Office, except that in one case reconsideration was asked. The whole 
question was related to seven individuals whom the Foreign Office had asked 
permission for admission to Britain, pleading the fact that they could provide for 
themselves. After the refusal of the Home Office, the Foreign Office could, however, do
 ^ FO 371/4057, File 204610, Paper 214546. Emrys Evans to Mr. Hoare 2.10.1920. PRO. 
i i ^ F O  371/5419. File 29, Paper N 3432. HO to FO 27.11.1920. PRO.
’ 14 Ibid.
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little in the matter. The Minutes of the Foreign Office were marked with a peculiar 
statement of Emrys Evans: ‘ I do not think we need to pursue the matter, for it is clear 
that if you press a case, they will "let the people go” .’’
In fact the Foreign Office had earlier approached the Home Office. In February 1919a 
Foreign Office letter to the Home Office enquired if the future policy of the Home 
Office was not to grant facilities for Russians to come to Britain for residence, even if 
nothing was known to be held against the applicants and they were in possession of 
private means to support themselves. In the letter it was pointed out that it would seem 
preferable if these refugees could spend their unearned income in Britain rather than 
somewhere else. The Minutes of the Foreign Office pointed out that it might also be 
desirable to encourage Russians who were experts in trades that were little known in 
Britain to be allowed to come to Britain.
The Home Office reply by Haldane Porter, dealing with the admission of aliens at the 
Aliens’ Branch of the HO, was that in dealing with the Russian cases they have had to 
be guided to some extent also by public sentiment. Mr. Porter pointed out that ‘he was 
afraid that the public sentiment at present was not very friendly to the settling of 
Russian refugees in this country ’. At the Foreign Office this comment was marked with 
a note that they did not know where Mr. Porter had got this impression because these 
people would not be competitors in labour market. Mr. Porter, however, continued that 
in his opinion the argument that it would be better for well-to-do Russians to spend their 
money in England than abroad would not carry much weight.
To some extent Porter’s comments were justified because economic problems and 
especially the high unemployment did not make the British public sympathetic to the 
plight of refugees. In this kind of situation the fact that those refugees that would be 
admitted to Britain were supposed to be able to support themselves might, indeed, not 
have carried much weight. The ‘public apathy’ to the plight of the refugees could be
”   ^ FO 371 /5419, File 29, Paper N 3432. FO Minutes. PRO.
116 FO 372/1258, File 3246, Papers 13844 and 24888. FO to Mr. Haldane Porter, HO, 4.2.1919 and Mr. Haldane 
Porter to FO 12.2.1919. PRO.
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seen also in the outcome of the appeals made for example by the British Committee of 
the Russian Red Cross and the British-Russian Relief Committee. Both of these 
organisations had made appeals to the British public for the assistance of Russian 
refugees, but these appeals met with an unsatisfactory response. ’
Although the war-weariness and growth of unemployment largely explains the lack of 
sympathy for Russian refugees • it was probably also linked to general anti-alien 
feelings of the British society that had further increased as a consequence of the war. As 
already pointed out, stricter immigration legislation in the form of the 1914 and 1919 
Acts had been passed because of the increased anti-alien attitude among British 
politicians and public. The passing of these immigration controls was also clearly linked 
to both economic, social and political developments and international turbulence of the 
inter-war years, from which Britain could not isolate herself.  ^ In a situation of 
‘declining national confidence’ the Home Office, on its part, was determined to interpret 
the existing immigration legislation in an ‘unforgiving’ manner.
At the level of politics, the question of entry of Russian refugees and the existing 
immigration control legislation provides quite an interesting case more generally.
During 1919 the opposition to the Aliens Act of 1919 had only come from the side of 
the Labour members of the Parliament, against the Conservatives and some Liberals 
who had strongly supported the passing of the Act. Despite the general sympathy of the 
Labour Party with the immigrants, its duty was nevertheless to look after the interests of 
the British workers. Therefore it was also bound to be concerned about any competition 
in the labour markets that might worsen the already gloomy employment situation.
In addition, and this might have been at least as important reason, for political reasons 
the Labour party was hardly sympathetic to admission of Russian refugees to Britain, 
either. They had strongly opposed the British participation and support for the White
 ^ Lloyd George papers, F 45/10/4. Arthur Stanley, British Red Cross, to Lloyd George, 2.2.1920; FO 371/3989, 
File 3191. Memorandum No. 2 by Sir George Buchanan. PRO.
 ^ Wilson, Fransesca M. They Came As Strangers. The Story o f Refugees to Great Britain. London 1959, 
pp. 217-18.
Holmes 1988, p. 116.
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forces in the Civil War, and the question of admission of Russian refugees was linked to 
this. In the eyes of the Labour Party these people did not constitute ordinary refugees 
but rather well-to-do and right-wing émigrés. Therefore, the Labour Party, which 
normally would have been sympathetic to the plight of refugees, did not have similar 
sympathies with Russian refugees from the Bolshevik regime.
The control of aliens’ entry also produced several parliamentary questions from the 
Labour members of the Parliament. In August 1921 Mr. Chadwick asked the Home 
Secretary whether, in view of unemployment and also of the increasing exodus from 
Russia, the Home Office was exercising care in restricting destitute alien immigration. 
The Home Secretary’s answer to the question was that they were carefully restricting 
i m m i g r a t i o n .  ^20 Mr. lesson asked a parliamentary question in November 1921 of 
possibility of the amending the Aliens Restriction Act of 1919. He expressed the view 
that there was a lot of discontent among sections of workers who were being thrown out 
of employment by foreigners, through the failure of the Aliens Restriction Act. Home 
Secretary Shortt replied that all aliens coming to the UK to take up employment had to 
be in possession of a Ministry of Labour permit, and that aliens who came without this 
permit were refused landing. He did not think the difficulty would, therefore, be 
removed with any amendments to the existing Aliens A c t . 2^1
The Conservatives, on the other hand, had strongly supported the passing of the 1919 
Aliens Restriction Act. The Liberals, even though they had earlier been the strongest 
‘pro-aliens’ had by the time of the passing of the 1919 Act also changed their policies. 
In the Coalition government, in power until 1922, these two parties held the main 
ministries and continued to administer the Act in a strict manner, even towards ‘White’ 
Russians ^22 whom they had supported in the Civil War. Whether these strict policies 
towards admission of refugees were enforced ‘to avoid having Labour ask questions ‘, 
or whether it was due to actually providing a very useful justification for a strict 
immigration policy, is difficult to tell. It is also difficult to measure the level of
^20 FO 372/1661, File 10038, Paper T 10038. P.Q. by Sir Burton Chadwick 17.8.1921. PRO. 
*21 FO 372/1636, File 86, Paper T 13910. P.Q by Mr. Jesson 10.11.1921. PRO.
122 On the use of term ‘white’, see footnote 125.
136
influence the Soviet government had in the matter, especially in view of the issue of 
trade.
The basic rules for the entry of Russian refugees to Britain nevertheless remained 
unaltered during the main period of Russian emigration, which lasted up to 1923. From 
1922 onwards the Soviet authorities began to severely restrict emigration. Soon legal 
emigration from Russia had become virtually impossible; only a few individual 
defectors occasionally managing to find their way to the West.
The Foreign Office approached Mr. G. Volkov at the former Russian Embassy in 
London, to confirm the rules in relation to the entry of Russians into Britain, because 
there still seemed to be some doubt on the part of the Embassy on the policy. The 
Foreign Office letter on 23 July 1919 stated that in the Foreign Office it was understood 
from the Home Office instructions that while Russian refugees could not be admitted to 
England ‘as such’, they would not, however, as a rule be denied admission if they had 
some good reason for coming to Britain, as for example important business connections 
or the education of their children. The letter continued that it was hoped that this 
information would be useful to the Embassy in shifting the applications which it 
received on behalf of the r e f u g e e s . '^ 3
Although the former Russian Embassy in London ceased to have any official status after 
the Bolshevik Revolution, it nevertheless continued to function unofficially as a 
representative of Russians in Britain. It, for example, gave recommendations of 
Russians wishing to enter Britain. This, of course, did not mean that British government 
was in any way obliged to follow the recommendations of the Embassy. Mr. Volkov 
had also informed the Foreign Office already in the spring 1919 that the Russian 
Embassy in London, and Konstantin Nabokov as the Russian Charge d ’Affaires in 
particular, were placed in considerable difficulty as regards recommending Russians 
who wanted to come to Britain. Therefore, Volkov suggested that it would be better if 
Russians abroad were to apply through their own representative, who would then refer 
the application to British minister on the spot. This proposition was accepted by the FO,
2^3 FO 372/1263, File 103184. FO to Mr. Wolkoff, Russian Embassy 23.7.1919. PRO.
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and it was decided that British Ministers abroad would be informed accordingly. ’^ 4 xhe 
Russian Embassy, nevertheless, continued to receive applications from Russians, and 
they continued approaching the Foreign Office and Home Office with these 
applications, as well as giving personal recommendations in certain cases.
The conference held at the Foreign Office in November 1921, including the 
representatives of the Foreign Office, the Home Office, the Passport Control, the British 
Mission to Moscow and the Department of Overseas Trade clarified the conditions 
under which the Russians ‘not connected with the Soviet Trade Delegation’, i.e. ‘White’ 
Russian refugees from the Bolshevik regime izs, were admitted to Britain. The general 
rule was to refuse admission with exception of those who had either British connections, 
genuine trade interests, previous long domicile in Britain or in certain very special 
cases, for example young persons for education. ^^ 6
In 1923 it was introduced that instead of having different rules for ‘Red’ and ‘White’ 
Russians, i.e. the Soviet citizens and the ‘White Russian refugees’, all applications by 
Russians should be divided into applications under the Trade Agreement and 
applications for personal reasons. The granting of visas under the Trade Agreement was 
to be decided by an informal committee of the representatives of the Foreign Office, the 
Home Office and the Passport Control Office. Those outside the agreement were to be 
dealt exclusively by the Home Office, except in special cases when the Foreign Office 
was requested to give its views. The Foreign Office Minute of 8 August 1923, stated 
that so far the majority of the Russians admitted to UK had been ‘White’ Russians. The 
rules of entry had been that admission could be granted without reference to London to 
bona fide businessmen, to the officials of recognised Russian government, to children 
under 16 for education and to regular Russian residents in the UK. ^^ 7
124 p o  371/4008, File 52089. W. H Selby to FO 1.4.1919. PRO.
The term White Russian refugees refers to all those who were refugees from the Bolshevik regime, i.e. were anti-
Bolshevik, not only those directly connected with the White armies.
126 PQ 371/6887, File 216, Paper N 12951. Admission of Russians to UK, FO Minute 22.11.1921. PRO.
127 PQ 371/933] _ File 9, Paper N 6794. FO Minute 8.8.1923. PRO.
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The suggestion of unifying the practice of admission of Russians to Britain seems to 
have been adopted. Thus, the Foreign Office memorandum of 6 December 1923 stated 
that the applications were divided into trading applications, decided by informal 
Interdepartmental Committee, and personal applications, decided by the Home Office. 
The memorandum pointed out that before agreeing to admit a Russian, the Home Office 
desired to be satisfied that the person was not undesirable neither personally, nor 
politically, that he would not become a charge upon public funds and that unless as 
Ministry of Labour permit had been obtained, that they were not likely to enter the 
British labour market at any time.
The memorandum further stressed that even if the above conditions were fulfilled, the 
mere desire to enter was not sufficient, and that special grounds existed to justify an 
exception to the general rule. Categories for ‘favourable treatment’ for admission were, 
for example, those having close British connections and/or strong humanitarian 
grounds, women to marry a British subject, those being of ‘advantage to British 
interests’, or children for educational purposes. As before, it was stated that for 
employment purposes Russians were accepted only in exceptional c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  ^^8 
Thus, the rules governing the admission were very similar to the earlier practices.
In the light of these considerations, the entry of Russian refugees and the policies of 
British authorities were to a great extent guided by the existing immigration legislation, 
which endowed the Home Office with considerable powers over the entry of aliens. 
These policies were also facilitated by the fact that unlike the Aliens Act of 1905, the 
Aliens Restriction Acts of 1914 and 1919 did not contain statutory recognition of the 
right of asylum for political refugees. This question had proved to be a controversial 
issue especially at the time of the passing of the 1919 Act. The absence of a statutory 
recognition was justified by an assurance from the Home Secretary, Edward Shortt, that 
any ‘decent political refugee’ would be admitted to Britain, even if there were no special 
clause for this in the law. However, the policies of the British government in relation to 
the admission of Russian refugees clearly show that this principle was not followed.
FO 371/9331, File 9, Paper N 9529. FO Memorandum 6.12.1923. PRO.
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Thus, the absence of a ‘right of asylum’ clause enabled the government to treat 
‘political’ and non-political immigration as one and effectively ignore the difference.
In relation to the expulsion of refugees, the British government, nevertheless, adopted at 
least seemingly more liberal and ‘humane’ set of policies. The reply of the government 
to the questionnaire of the Nansen International Office ’^ 9 stated that it was not 
customary to expel stateless persons resident in the United Kingdom, and that the Home 
Secretary had never resorted to the deportation of stateless aliens resident in the United 
Kingdom. The practices of, for example, the French government were clearly 
different as they expelled several hundred Russian refugees, particularly as a 
consequence of the economic crisis in the early 1930s On the other hand, one should 
of course note that the number of Russian refugees in France was substantially higher in 
the first place.
Besides, the British government’s statement that it did not expel refugees should be 
questioned on a number of events, even if this was true in the case of ‘White’ Russian 
refugees. The government clearly used different policies towards, for example, families 
of those Russian who had left Britain for Russia under the Anglo- Russian Military 
Convention. Since the government refused to readmit their husbands to Britain, these 
families were forced to accept the ‘offer’ of repatriation. It is very clear that these people 
were not deported because they were considered not ‘conducive to the public good’, or 
for other similar reasons, but simply because they had to be supported by public funds. 
The British authorities could naturally justify this policy by the fact that these people 
were not strictly speaking ‘stateless’ aliens. On the other hand the Soviet officials 
clearly questioned their responsibility for allowing back those refugees that were bom 
outside the borders of Soviet Russia, especially on a view that the Western governments 
refused to recognise the Soviet government
The Nansen Office was established by the League of Nations in 1930, after the death o f Fridtjof Nansen, who 
had been appointed the High Commissioner for Russian Refugees by the League in 1921. The Nansen International 
Office continued the important work carried out by Nansen in the refugee field. The question o f the international 
assistance for Russian refugees will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 5.
Simpson 1939, p. 258; Bentwich, pp. 4-5. Refugee Survey 1937-38, Vol V. Refugees and the Law (1). Royal 
Institute o f International Affairs.
Simpson 1939, pp. 252-253.
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Evaluating the British government policy in relation to the admission of Russian 
refugees to Britain as a whole, it is clear that strict policies were adopted from the 
beginning. It was officially stated by the Home Secretary that as a general rule Russian 
refugees were not admitted to Britain, save in exceptional cases.G en era lly  speaking, 
any alien wishing to enter Britain had to be able to satisfy the Aliens Officer that he had 
adequate reasons for coming to Britain and that it was otherwise desirable that he should 
be admitted. And as Sir George Cave, the then Home Secretary, had stated already in 
1917, the Russian refugees by and large were unlikely to be of any (economic) value to 
Britain.
Strict rules and provisions were set for the entry of individual refugees. An important 
requirement for entry, though by no means sufficient in itself, was that the person was in 
a position to support himself and his dependants. ^^ 6 jh is  was the basic principle of 
British policies towards all aliens, and the comment of Emrys Evans from Foreign 
Office clarifies the situation in relation to the Russian refugees. In his statement in July 
1921 he pointed out that there were no Russian refugees in Britain being provided for 
from public funds. '^ 7 The Home Secretary, Edward Shortt further clarified the rule by 
stating that evidence of support from some source had to be always produced, either by 
the refugee himself, or possibly by some sponsor in Britain, who would promise to look 
after the refugee financially.
This requirement of sufficient means had been present already in the Aliens Act of 
1905, and it was listed carefully in the subsequent legislation, especially in the Aliens 
Order of 1920. Similarly, the Aliens Order also required that if an alien desired to enter 
employment, he had to have a written permit issued by the Ministry of Labour. The 
Home Secretary, Edward Shortt, had instructed already in 1919 that ‘under existing 
conditions aliens should not have facilities to come to England for the purpose of
133 FO 371/3307, File 4790. HO to FO 8.1.1918; FO 371/6871, File 38, Paper N 12655. HO to FO 14.11.1921. 
PRO.
134 FO 372/1262, File 74855, Paper 81955. HO to FO 29.5.1919. PRO.
135 FO 371/3020, File 241424. HO to FO 21.12.1917. PRO.
136 FO 372/1262, File 74855, Paper 81955. HO to FO 29.5.1919. PRO.
137 PQ 371/6867, File 38, Paper N 7768. Russian refugees at Malta. 6.7.1921. PRO.
138 FO 371/6871, File 38, Paper N 12655. HO to FO 14.11.1921. PRO.
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employment’ and this view was maintained in future. Thus, it was also a common 
practice that a special condition that the alien could not accept employment was added 
to the residence permit,
As already pointed out, exceptions were nevertheless made especially in certain trades 
and businesses where a person could be of advantage to Britain, for example towards 
well-to-do businessmen. Also, if successful businesses or individual employers in 
Britain backed application, a work permit could be issued. Interestingly, the British law 
was actually more favourable than those of most continental countries in that aliens 
could work in several liberal professions, such as doctors, barristers and architects; there 
being no restrictions in favour of British citizens. This was not the case for example in 
France, where aliens were disqualified for example from being lawyers or doctors.
Reality was somewhat different also in Britain. The provision of sufficient means for 
support was aimed at preventing the possibility of a refugee becoming a charge upon 
public funds, as well as becoming a competitor in the labour markets. Also, if  any 
employer wished to employ an alien he had to show that the post was necessary and 
could not be filled by any British subject, as well as that the wages and conditions were 
not less favourable than those given to British employees. Aliens were normally given a 
residence permit for a short period, not exceeding a year. This could then be renewed for 
further periods of a year or less. However, normally it was only after the alien had 
established himself in some employment or profession that an unconditional permit to 
reside was granted. It was also stated that after residence of several years the 
conditions attached to the residence permit in relation to employment were normally 
cancelled 4^3.
FO 372/1262, File 74855, Paper 81955. HO to FO 29.5.1919. (Statement o f Home Secretary Edward Shortt). 
PRO.
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There is not information on how much money a person had to have in order to ‘qualify’ 
for the entry. Some refugees were excluded from the requirement of being able to 
support themselves if they had close relatives or friends who promised to support them, 
or if there were very strong humanitarian grounds for admission. The latter reason could 
be taken into account for example in the case of Russians that had been supporting the 
Allied cause in Russia 4^4, Also women who married British subjects could be admitted 
more easily. As pointed out earlier, exceptions for individual well-to-do, upper-class and 
prominent Russians, especially those with strong British connections were made 
throughout the period of Russian emigration.
Exceptions were also made on educational grounds. However, permissions were in most 
cases granted only for children and not their parents. At this point, it is nevertheless 
important to mention the activity of certain individuals and committees that aimed at 
helping Russian refugees especially in the field of education. In this, the work of 
Educational Sub-Committee of the Central Russian Committee and the active work of 
Sir Bernard Pares, deserves a special mention. One important aim of the Committee was 
to collect funds for the education of Russian refugees, and to persuade British 
universities to offer free places for Russian émigré children.
As an outcome of this work, universities such as Oxford and Cambridge expressed their 
willingness to admit Russians without charge, or at least at a considerable reduction. 
Another organisation that worked actively in the field of educational assistance of 
Russians was the Russian Academic Group in Great Britain. Initially it consisted of 
some twenty academics, many of whom were actively representing the Russian 
community in various o r g a n i s a t i o n s . ’ 4 5  what is of course important to notice is the fact 
that these organisations could work only within the limits of the government regulations 
and policy. They could not, for example, overcome rules set on the admission of 
refugees to Britain.
’44 j e. White soldiers who were fighting with the British forces in Russia.
’45 Pares collection, PAR/7/1/1. Russian Academic Group in Great Britain. SSEES; Stow Hill (Soskice) papers. Box 
5, R.A.G/1. Russian Acadmic Group in G.B. House o f Lords Record Office; FO 371/4029, File 125746. Report of 
the Central Russian Committee, May 1918- September 1919. PRO.
143
Finally, the question of government policy towards Russian refugees can be considered 
in relation to the numbers admitted to Britain. The question of the total number of 
Russian refugees in Britain is clearly a problem to which none of the available sources 
give a definite answer. Several modem studies give estimates that in the early 1920s 
there were around 15,000 Russian refugees in Britain. This information, however, is 
probably due to the false belief that Britain evacuated almost 15,000 refugees from 
North Russia to England.
More importantly, in the early 1920s several League of Nations documents also stated 
that the number of Russian refugees in Britain was 15,000. The figures presented for 
Britain in the League’s statistics were, however, only estimates, since there were no 
statistics kept in Britain on the subject. In November 1921 the League advised Britain, 
among the other member states, to take a census of Russian refugees in British 
possessions as well as in the United Kingdom. It was advised that the census should be 
taken of the refugees that were maintained at the public expense and of those who had 
no reasonable prospect of finding employment.
In their reply to the League of Nations the British government stated that there was no 
official record in Britain of the number of persons who could be classed as refugees. 
The Home Secretary Edward Shortt clarified in his letter to the Foreign Office that as a 
general mle no Russian refugees were admitted to the UK. For a long time past the 
number of visas authorised in the case of Russians had been about 20 a month. The 
Home Secretary continued that even though practically all these visas had been granted 
to Russians who had been obliged to flee from Russia and who consequently might be 
termed ‘refugees’ the visas were granted not because they were refugees but for a 
variety of reasons, for example having British relations who would look after them or 
having close business connections.
See for example Marrus 1985, p. 149, Raeff 1990, p. 28, Skran 1995, p. 36.
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According to the Home Office, the total number of Russians in the UK in September 
1921 was 93,259. Because of the size of the figure, it must certainly have also 
included the Jewish immigrants who had arrived in Britain in the late 19"" and early 20“* 
centuries. This raises a more general question about who were defined as ‘Russians’.
The census of population for England and Wales in 1921 listed 49,360 persons as bom 
in Russia. This figure, however, also included Finland. In addition, 35,536 persons were 
listed as bom in Poland. It was further stated that in the censuses of 1901 and 1911 the 
figures for Poland referred to the area then described as Russian Poland. This was the 
area from which the majority of the Jewish immigrants had arrived in Britain in the late 
19^ and early 20^ ’’ centuries, and which at the time of the census of 1921 was not a part 
of the Russian empire any more.
Because of the lack of systematic classifying of the foreign-bom population, especially 
as regards the areas and countries whose boundaries changed after the war, it is probable 
that for example the birthplaces of Jewish immigrants were not always classified 
systematically. By nationality they were, however, commonly counted as Russians and 
were often referred as the largest group of ‘Russians’ in Britain still in the 1920s. In the 
census of 1921 the number of people classified under the category ‘Russian group’ in 
the whole Great Britain was given as 92,588. It was further explained that this group 
consisted of those bom in Russia, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.^^^ 
Thus, the Home Office figure, presented to the League ofNations in the end of 1921, 
merely quoted the census figure, without stating that this figure also included other than 
‘pure Russian’ nationalities. In any case, the total number of ‘Russians’ in Britain told 
very little about the number of Russian refugees from the Bolshevik regime, which was 
the interest behind the League’s enquiry, and of which there were no records available 
in Britain.
In March 1921, the Home Secretary answered a parliamentary question made by Mr. G. 
Doyle on how many Russians and other aliens had entered Britain for residence during
149 FO 371/6871, File 38, Paper N 12655. HO to the FO 14.11.1921. PRO.
1^^ Census o f England and Wales, 1921. General Report, p. 154. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1927. 
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the last 12 months. Mr. Shortt stated that it was impossible to tell the exact number, but 
he estimated that perhaps some 300 Russians had entered B r i t a i n . Again, this 
statement hardly supports the estimate of the total of 15,000 refugees in Britain, 
presented in the League ofNations documents. The fact that Home Secretary’s estimate 
was for the year 1920, during which the emigration from Russia was at its height, is also 
very significant.
Doctor G. Lodygenskii from the Russian Red Cross Societies in Geneva wrote a 
memorandum on Russian refugees for the League ofNations in early 1921. In this he 
estimated that there were 15,000 Russian refugees in Britain. The League of 
Nations’s general statement on the question of the disposal of Russian refugees in 
August of the same year concluded that it was difficult to obtain the exact figures from 
each country. However, the number of Russian refugees in Britain was again stated as 
15,000. Mr. A. Maudslay of the British Committee of the Russian Red Cross 
forwarded to the Foreign Office a copy of the statement of the distribution of Russian 
refugees in European countries in January 1921 that had been received from American 
sources. This likewise gave a figure of 15,000 for Britain. Even more surprising, 
however, was the comment of Emrys Evans put down in the Foreign Office Minutes: T 
feel certain that we have more than 15,000 refugees here’.^ ^^  Considering the very strict 
government policy of not allowing any refugees in Britain, the comment is quite 
unexpected.
Dr. Izjumov, who studied the Russian archives in Prague in the 1930s, estimated that in 
January 1922 there were 8,000-10,000 Russian refugees in Britain. He produced his 
own figures for Russian emigration in each country at the beginning of the 1922, as 
opposed to earlier statistics that were considered too high. These figures were published
FO 371/8170, File 123, Paper N 2304. Parliamentary question by Mr. Doyle 9.3.1921. PRO.
FO 371/6865, File 38, Paper N 2499. Memoranda by Dr. G. Lodygensky, 14.2.1921. PRO.
154 PQ 37 ] /6g69  ^Fde 38, Paper N 9990. League ofNations statement on the question o f disposal o f refugees
27.8.1921. PRO.
155 PQ 371/6863  ^ File 38, Paper N 323. Distribution o f Russian refugees in various European countries (comment o f  
Evans in the FO Minutes, 10.1.1921). PRO.
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in Simpson’s refugee study in 1939. Judged by the British policies, this estimate is 
probably closer to the truth than 15,000.
In 1930 the Sub-Committee of Private Organisations for Refugees produced some 
statistics on Russian emigration. They estimated the number of Russian refugees in 
Britain to be 4,000.'^^ Interestingly, also the League ofNations documents from 1924 
already state that there were about 4,000 refugees in Britain at that time. This was an 
estimate supplied by refugee organisations in Britain. '^ 9 The decrease in numbers from 
the early figures of 1920s could of course be partly explained by the fact that there was a 
movement of Russian émigrés between different countries during the whole of the 
1920s. In Britain’s case the Russian emigration was directed at the continent. Simpson 
estimated that there were about four to five thousand refugees left in Britain in the late 
1930s, because the greater part of the refugees had been assisted to emigrate to France, 
the Balkans and elsewhere.
However, the main problem with the 15,000 figure is that there is nothing in the official 
documents that would support the assumption that Britain admitted even 15,000 Russian 
refugees, although this figure is actually small. Judged by a strict policy of the British 
authorities in admitting refugees this figure is quite questionable. All the cases were 
considered carefully and on an individual basis and there is no information about any 
large groups of Russian refugees arriving in Britain.
Considering this, one has to conclude that the number of Russian refugees in Britain 
was probably less than 10,000 in the first place, and the number fell further through 
onward emigration. It is possible that the figure 15,000 included refugees maintained by 
Britain in refugee camps such as those in Egypt, Lemnos and Cyprus. For example the 
memorandum of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Cabinet in May 1920 stated
Simpson 1939, p. 68, 82, 339.
The Committee was attached to the Office o f the High Commissioner for Refugees, established under the 
auspices o f the League ofNations. The question o f the League’s assistance for refugees will be dealt with in more 
detail in the next chapter.
Simpson 1939, pp. 108-09.
FO 371/10468, File 17, Paper N 7383. Report of Nansen presented to the Council o f League in June 1924. PRO. 
Simpson 1939, p. 339.
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that ‘as far as the government departments in London were aware, the number of 
Russian refugees in British territory or care appeared to be about 16,000’.
Additionally, the memorandum of the British government, submitted to the Conference 
on Russian refugees in August 1921, only provided information on refugees that were 
maintained by Britain in various camps. On the other hand, the comment of Emrys 
Evans in 1921: ‘I feel certain that we have more than 15,000 refugees here’ seems to 
refer only to the British Isles.
What has to be acknowledged, though, is that even if there is no absolute certainty of the 
number of Russian refugees in Britain in the early 1920s, a distinctive Russian émigré 
community nevertheless existed in Britain. This community, despite its smallness also 
had its own special features compared, for example, with some larger Russian émigré 
communities in Europe.
4.2. Refugees Maintained in the Balkans and Mediterranean
The only group of Russian refugees that the British took direct responsibility for were 
some families of General Denikin’s officers to whom the British officers in South 
Russia had guaranteed assistance. At the Foreign Office conference on the evacuation of 
South Russian refugees on 20 February 1920 it was stated that the guarantee of Mr. 
Lowdon, to evacuate refugees from Odessa had already been carried on so far as 
possible. The most important question at the moment was the fate of Denikin’s refugees 
that fell under Sir Halford Mackinder’s guarantee. The possible destinations for these 
refugees were considered to be Salonika, Romania, Lemnos and Cyprus.
The officer administering the government of Cyprus informed the Foreign Office that 
the main difficulties for the use of Cyprus were housing and food shortages on the
CAB 24/105, C.P. 1206. Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Cabinet 3.5.1920. PRO. 
162 PQ 371/4013, File 63588, Paper N 181052. Conference on evacuation o f South Russian refugees, 20.2.1920. 
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island, and because of that no more than 150 refugees could be taken. On the other 
hand, if the Turkish prisoners of war could be moved from Cyprus, about 1,000 refugees 
could be accommodated. The arrangements were made to repatriate Turkish 
prisoners from Cyprus later in March in order to replace them with Russian refugees. 
Admiral de Robeck and General Miller took actions in Lemnos in order to form refugee 
camps for the Russians because Egypt and Greece refused to receive further refugees.
In the end several thousands of refugees were transported to the refugee camps 
maintained by the British and located on the islands of Prinkipo and Lemnos in the 
Aegean Sea and also in Cyprus and Egypt. About 1,000 sick and wounded were 
evacuated to the Allied hospital in Salonica. The Russian medical personnel were in 
charge of the hospital, but they were supervised by a British army medical Corps 
Officer.
In addition there were some 800-1000 refugees at Basra in Mesopotamia, part of the 
remnants of Denikin’s Volunteer Fleet and about 70 refugees in Malta, as well as 
around 200 refugees in Antigoni who were also maintained at British expense. The 
Foreign Office did not seem to have had any exact information about the refugees in 
Malta before July 1921, when the War Office sent them a report on these refugees. In 
most of the statistics on refugees maintained by the British government those in Malta 
were not mentioned. These refugees had arrived before the guarantee of Mackinder, i.e. 
during the earlier evacuation of Odessa in 1919, and therefore the Foreign Office felt 
that it was unreasonable that they should go on indefinitely providing for these people. 
The best solution was considered to be to concentrate these refugees in the camp in 
E gypt.A dditionally , at the end of 1921, a plan was made to transfer some of the 
refugees in Malta to Cyprus. The plans seem to have been carried out, since in
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November 1921 it was stated that there were only 14 refugees left in Malta, mostly old 
ladies4^<  ^The Antigoni refugees were transferred to the camp at Tuzla, near 
Constantinple, in March 19214^’
In July 1920 the High Commissioner in Constantinople stated that the total number of 
Russian refugees under British control was slightly under 10,000. They were distributed 
accordingly: in Prinkipo 2,150, in Lemnos 2,840, in Cyprus 1,343 and in Egypt 
3,520.^72 At highest point the British government was maintaining almost 11,000 
refugees at the cost of £56,300 per month in summer 1920. After this the number 
gradually declined, as the refugees were dispersed to European countries and back to the 
Crimea and Constantinople, some of who joined Vrangel’s forces.
The latter option could not, however, be publicly encouraged by the British government, 
since it had not recognised Vrangel’. However, the War Office seems to have been very 
keen on using this option in order to get rid of some of the refugees under British 
control. They approached the Foreign Office asking reasons for the instructions by the 
High Commissioner in Constantinople that no facilities should be afforded to any 
Russian refugees joining Vrangel’s army. They referred to the cost of refugee camps 
and pointed out that any means of reducing the number of refugees was an advantage to 
the British government. As a consequence, the Foreign Office sent the High 
Commissioner a telegraph pointing out that even though the British government were 
not bound to give facilities for the return of Russians to General Vrangel’s army, the 
refugees did not need to be prevented from returning to South Russia if they wished to 
do so.
The Foreign Secretary, Earl Curzon, was of the opinion that refugees could be 
repatriated to the Crimea if Vrangel’ would guarantee that they would not be employed
170 FO 371/6872, File 38, Paper N 13128. CO to FO 28.11.1921. PRO.
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against Soviet Russia. The War Office, on the other hand, stated that Vrangel’ would 
have a justification in refusing a guarantee, which would increase the amount of ‘useless 
mouths’ in the area. Therefore they considered that there was a strong possibility that all 
these refugees would remain indefinitely at British expense, and no opportunity should 
be missed of exploring every other possible means for the disposal of the refugees. A 
decypher from Admiral de Robeck in Constantinople had stated already in June that 
Vrangel’ was not able to take women and children back to the C r i m e a . Qf course, in a 
few months time the situation changed dramatically, with the final defeat of Vrangel’s 
army and the huge refugee problem it caused. Thus, the option of repatriating any 
refugees to the ‘White’ Crimea was gone for good.
During the summer 1920 refugees in Prinkipo were transferred to Lemnos. The camp 
in Lemnos was not, however, in a much better condition to accept them. The report in 
May 1920 stated that the staff in the camp had worked hard but they did not have much 
experience. The sanitary arrangements in the camp were described as disgraceful, and 
the camps themselves too close together. The only bright spot in the organisation of the 
camp were the hospitals that were admirably organised, but unfortunately they had not 
avoided typhus, measles and other illnesses in the camp. The biggest problem would be 
the winter, and how to provide clothing and accommodation for the refugees if they 
were to stay in camp during the winter. In the report it was, nevertheless, clearly pointed 
out that this was not the best solution, but that it would be better to send refugees onto 
Malta where the conditions were better and food would be easier to supply. These 
instructions were not, however, put into effect, perhaps because the transfer would have 
brought additional costs, or because there were objections to their transfer from the side 
of the authorities in Malta.
The British government was given invaluable help in the camps by the British 
Committee of the Russian Red Cross (BCRRC) during 1920 and 1921. BCRRC was an
FO 371/4014, File 63588, Paper N 215155. WO to FO 25.9.1920. PRO.
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entirely British organisation. It was pointed out by the FO that the Committee was a 
separate organisation from the Russian Red Cross, and should not be confused with it. It 
was further stated that the Russian Red Cross itself consisted largely of the 
representatives of ‘the old regime’, who would also use their position to further the aims 
of their own particular party. Instead, the British Committee of the Russian Red Cross, 
as a British organisation, had done excellent work in close conjunction with the Foreign 
Office.
The work of the BCRRC consisted mainly of supplying refugees with clothing and 
boots, medical supplies, food and milk, and other n ecessities .T h e  British government 
provided some funds for the Committee in order to facilitate their work in Egypt, 
Lemnos and other places. The funds given for this work came mainly through the 
reallocation of the remaining £50,000 of General Denikin’s ‘last packet’. These funds 
were not, however, sufficient for the amount of work that was needed in the camps, and 
it was constantly urged by the Committee that financial assistance was needed from the 
government. In the late 1920, Mr. A. Maudslay, the president of the Committee, 
requested assistance from the Foreign Office, pointing out that they were in urgent need 
of funds. He stated that if the organisation was provided with £50,000 they would be 
able to carry on for another six months, but if no further money was forthcoming, they 
would have to close down at the end of the year.
At the meeting of the Finance Committee of the BCRRC in November 1920, the 
resolution was passed that due to the recent development with the evacuation of General 
Vrangel’s forces, the refugee problem was ever more urgent and an immediate decision 
was needed from the British government in regard of help of the BCRRC. In his letter 
to the Foreign Office, Mr. Maudslay stated that the Committee also begged to draw to 
the government’s attention the distressing situation of Russian refugees in England, 
who, owing to the low state of the finances of the Committee, were not receiving their
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allowances. This probably referred particularly to the families of those Russians who 
had left Britain under the Anglo-Military Convention, whose situation had become more 
urgent after the decision of the Treasury to withdraw their support at the end of March
1920. The view of the Foreign Office, as expressed by Emrys Evans, was that the 
British government were doing their best, but the Committee ‘won’t be patient
From the very beginning of the ‘refugee problem’ the government made it clear that it 
had, at no time, agreed to the maintenance of Russian refugees for an indefinite period. 
As it was pointed out by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the fact was, however, that 
these refugees were in the hands of the British, and that they could not be left to 
starve.^
In the summer of 1920 a solution to the problem was thought to be found by the 
establishment of the Russian Refugee Committee, an initiative of Evgenii Sablin at the 
Russian Embassy. The aim of this Committee was to assume the entire responsibility for 
the maintenance and organisation of the refugees evacuated from South Russia.  ^^ 5 The 
president of the Committee was Count Ignatiev, and among its members were Sablin, 
Baron Rausch, the delegate of the Russian Red Cross Society and A. Maudslay, the 
president of the British Committee of the Russian Red Cross. In July they informed the 
Foreign Office that the Committee had been duly constituted and it would take over the 
responsibility for the maintenance and settlement of all Russian refugees maintained by 
the British government. All future expenditure of these refugees was to be undertaken 
by the Committee. This undertaking was given on the understanding that the Treasury 
would assist in raising funds to the amount of £500,000 from certain credit balances of 
different departments of the Russian Provisional government, i.e. funds belonging to the 
late Russian Embassy.
The Treasury, however, stated that it would not be possible to release this money 
because it belonged to the legal successor of the former government and at present there
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was no Russian government recognised by Great BritainJ^^ The British government had 
itself considered the possibility of using the funds of the former Russian government for 
the maintenance of the refugees under British control. This money consisted of 
approximately £5 million, which were looked after by Messrs. Baring Brothers. After 
careftil consideration it was, however, decided that this money could not be touched. ^^ 8 
When hearing of the decision Sablin stated that this information placed their Committee 
in a totally different p o s i t i o n . A t  the Russian Refugees Conference at the Treasury on 
20 July 1920 Sablin ftirther clarified that in the absence of funds the Refugee 
Committee would be unable to assist the government in any way. The conference agreed 
that at the moment it would be impracticable to send refugees back to the Crimea, but 
that it might be possible that Serbia would accept them if financial assistance were 
given. Mr. Sablin said that his Committee would send two representatives to Serbia to 
examine conditions for that.^^^
Negotiations with the Yugoslav government were started in the autumn of 1920. The 
aim of the negotiations was to come to an agreement on the transfer of all refugees 
under British control to Serbia. The Serbian government informed the Foreign Office of 
the conditions for receiving refugees. Their plan was to establish a new Russian colony 
with 9,000 refugees from the British camps, and they informed the Foreign Office that 
both the old colony in Serbia and the future new one would need to be under direction 
of the existing Serbo-Russian Committee. The sum paid by the British government 
should not be less than £60,000 per month in advance, although there is no information 
about the period it would cover. In addition the government required £120,000 as a first 
instalment.
An agreement was reached in October on the condition that the British would pay for 
the maintenance of the refugees on their arrival. Because the camp in Lemnos was
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considered unsuitable for winter accommodation refugees from that camp were 
transferred to Serbia first. Their transfer was completed at the beginning of November. 
The timing of the operation was both successful and unsuccessful because it happened 
just before the final defeat of General VrangeT in the Crimea. The French government 
appealed to the Serbian government to accept some of the refugees that were congesting 
Constantinople in the aftermath of the evacuation. Therefore the Serbian government 
requested the British government to postpone the transfer of refugees from Egypt and 
Cyprus. The British, no matter how eager they were to carry out the rest of the 
agreement, did not have much choice but to accept the request.
The BCRRC, which had assisted in the evacuation of refugees from Lemnos to Serbia 
started refugee assistance in Serbia, as well as continuing to assist the remaining 
refugees in Egypt and C y p r u s . T h e  situation, however, remained very difficult and in 
early 1921 the Treasury asked the Foreign Office’s view of the grant to the BCRRC.
The Foreign Office were of the opinion that a grant of £1,500 a month should be given 
to the BCRRC for three months beginning on 1 March for their work in Egypt and 
Cyprus. Meanwhile, negotiations with the Serbian government for the early transfer of 
the remaining refugees were in progress and the Foreign Secretary pointed out that the 
BCRRC should be informed that as soon as the refugees leave Egypt and Cyprus, the 
proposed grant would cease.
In early 1921 the Yugoslav government informed Britain that they were prepared to 
receive the remainder of the refugees in the camps. The arrangements were being made 
for their transfer until the Yugoslav government suddenly said that the transfer of the 
refugees would not be convenient for them at that time. The British government then 
asked if the Yugoslav government would be willing to admit these refugees on the 
payment of a lump sum of money. Negotiations on the issue were started and they 
continued the whole year, however, without success. The British government was very 
anxious to end its responsibilities for the refugees, and more and more irritated about the
^^2 FO 371/6870, File 38, Paper N 11574. Memorandum by Evans 19.10.1921. PRO.
FO 371/5419, File 29, Paper N 3187. Emrys Evans on the BCRRC 18.11.1920. PRO.
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actions of the Serbian government. In June the Yugoslav government agreed to admit 
3,500 of Vrangel’s refugees to Serbia. The British government asked them to admit the 
refugees in Egypt and Cyprus at the same time, but the request failed. Instead, the 
British were asked to postpone the matter again. ^^ 6 The situation looked increasingly 
difficult, especially since the government had ended its grant to the BCRRC already in 
the summer. Because of this the Committee had been compelled to finish its work both 
in Egypt and Serbia.
A further stimulation for the British government’s eagerness to end its responsibility for 
the remaining refugees was the British public opinion which was against cost of 
maintenance at the expense of the British taxpayer and opposition from the Labour 
Party. Several parliamentary questions were made to the government during the period 
that Britain was maintaining Russian refugees in camps and in Serbia. In December 
1920, Sir. J.D. Rees questioned the Foreign Secretary on how long it was proposed that 
the British tax-payer should continue to be responsible for the maintenance of Russian 
refugees. The reply of the Foreign Office was that the government had not yet fixed a 
time limit for responsibility but that it was hoped that the arrangements with the 
Yugoslav government could be concluded in near future. Meanwhile, it was stated, 
other measures to deal with the refugees were receiving careful attention.
On the other hand some MPs were sympathetic to the plight of the refugees and 
suggested that Britain should do more for them. In April 1920, Colonel Newman asked 
the Prime Minister whether he was aware that large numbers of middle class Russians 
had been driven to South Russia and were in danger of being massacred. He also asked 
if the government would despatch a sufficient number of ships to the Black Sea to bring 
these unfortunate people away. Mr. Bonar Law answered that it was materially 
impossible to evacuate and maintain an appreciably greater number than those who had 
already been moved. The British government felt that the Volunteer Army held a
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defensive position in the Crimea, and the government did not consider it justified in 
acting on a suggestion made by Colonel Newman
For the ‘opposition’ Sir J. Rees continued to push the government. In early June 1921 he 
asked about the cost of refugee camps and the possible closing of them. The government 
replied that it was attempting to find a solution to the refugee question, apart from the 
possibility of repatriation, in which it was under negotiation with the Soviet 
government. Repatriation would not be, however, possible for all refugees as some 
would not be accepted by the Soviets and some did not want to return, On 20 June 
Rees again addressed the government with a view that the British should announce that 
within the month these refugees, like others, would have to take care of themselves. 201 
Additionally, on the same day Captain Viscount Curzon asked a parliamentary question 
about he maintenance of refugees by the British govemment.202
Sir J. Rees repeated his question in October asking for the total sum that had been 
expended on Russian refugees, and when that expenditure would finally cease. The 
reply was provided by Mr. Edward Wood, instructing that 4,827 Russian refugees were 
being maintained by the British at the moment at the monthly cost of £21,970. The 
British government was, however, confident that it was possible to make some other 
arrangements to provide for these refugees apart from maintaining them at public 
expense. 0^3
The Daily Herald, a leftwing newspaper published an article on the cost of Russian 
refugees in the camps. It informed its readers that more money was paid to the 
unemployed Russian ‘Whites’ than to the British unemployed. It further commented 
that ‘the crime of the British unemployed was to be only British people of the working
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class, but the virtue of the Russia refugees in Egypt and Cyprus was to belong to the old 
capitalist regime’. 0^4
The secretary of the National ‘Hands Off Russia’ Committee, W.P. Coates, also 
approached C.R. Buxton, the Labour MP, in March 1923. He pointed out that the 
British government could have avoided the current refugee problem if it had come to an 
agreement with the Soviet government in the winter of 1919. According to him, the 
Soviet representative, Leonid Krasin, had also made a proposal on behalf of the refugees 
in June 1921, and had the British government accepted that proposal the refugee 
problem would have been quickly reduced. According to Mr. Coates the fear of the 
Foreign Office that there was a danger of refugees being mal-treated after they had 
returned to Russia was not well-founded. At the end of the letter Mr. Coates presented 
the figures on the cost of British maintenance of White Russian refugees, as well as 
pointing out that the payment received by the unemployed British worker was much 
smaller than the payment received by a Russian refugee in a camp.
The issue of the money spent on maintenance of Russian refugees caused much 
resentment among British workers and led to the criticism of the government. Mr. G. A. 
Shortt, for example, addressed the Prime Minister with a call for ‘fair play and a living 
wage for the British workers, instead of providing for Russian families’.
Meanwhile the government continued to negotiate with the Yugoslav government on the 
payment of a lump sum in exchange for taking full responsibility for all the remaining 
refugees under British control. The British government stated that during the year 1920, 
the total expense of the refugees had been nearly £1,000,000.207  Even though the total 
number of refugees maintained by the British had decreased to under 5,000 by August 
1921, consisting of about 2,000 refugees in Egypt, 600 in Cyprus, 2,000 in Serbia, 187
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in Tuzla and 60 in Malta 20%, in 1921 the government was still spending at least £20, 000 
a month for the maintenance of these refugees. 209
The government considered that even the option of merely transporting the refugees to 
Serbia and paying their maintenance there, without the final liquidation of British 
responsibilities, would have been cheaper than maintaining them in the camps. Mr. 
Maudslay of the British Committee of the Russian Red Cross estimated that if refugees 
were transported from Egypt to Yugoslavia, almost half of the expenses of the 
Committee would be saved 210. xhe monthly cost of 2,800 refugees in Serbia was about 
£2,200, while the cost of those slightly less than 3,000 refugees in Egypt and Cyprus 
was about £16,000 a month.2’  ^ This was probably because it was more expensive to 
provide these camps with food and other supplies than in Serbia.
However, no matter how eager the British government was to end its responsibilities 
towards these refugees, negotiations with the Yugoslav government did not lead to an 
agreement. Sir A. Young, the British representative in Yugoslavia, sent a telegram to the 
Foreign Office stating new Yugoslav conditions for receiving the refugees in Serbia. 
They asked for British government to pay 600 dinars per head monthly and 5 million 
dinars for expenses at reception. The Foreign Office Minutes show that these payments 
were considered far too high. They stated that the telegram showed that the Yugoslav 
government had not realised that the British were determined to have a settlement of 
this question, and that the Yugoslav proposals could only be described as dishonest. The 
Foreign Office suggested that they should refuse to pay more than 400 dinars per head. 
Also the proposal that the refugees from Lemnos should be maintained by the British as 
long as they remained on Serbian territory was against an earlier agreement. Moreover, 
the Foreign Office considered the request for 5 million dinars on reception of the 
refugees as absurd. 212
208 ibid.
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211 FO 371/6872, File 38, Paper N 13157. FO to the Treasury 9.12.1921. PRO.
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At the same time as the negotiations with the Serbian government were taking place, the 
British were also negotiating an agreement with the Soviet government on the basis of a 
general amnesty for refugees, which would enable their repatriation to Russia. 
Negotiations on this were started with the Soviet government during 1 9 2 1 . 213 However, 
these negotiations did not progress very smoothly either. Emrys Evans from the Foreign 
Office pointed out already in May 1921 that the Bolsheviks would probably object to 
the return of some of the people under British control,
The most important obstacle that prevented the British and the Soviets coming to an 
agreement were their different views on the ‘preliminary measures’ required in order to 
facilitate the repatriation. M. Litvinov, earlier the Soviet representative in Britain and 
now the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet government, informed the 
British government in early June that the Soviet government was prepared to receive 
back those Russian refugees at present in camps or living in a state of destitution outside 
Russia ‘who were willing to become good Russian citizens loyal to the existing 
government’. On the other hand, Litvinov pointed out that certain conditions had to be 
stipulated, dictated by economic and political necessities. The Soviet government was, 
for example, unable to undertake the transportation of the persons to be repatriated. 
Precautions against the inclusion of ‘counter-revolutionary agents’ also needed to be 
taken, and therefore the Soviet government required that their ‘representative 
commissions’ would be allowed to visit the camps to collect information in regard to 
those who wished to retum.^’^
It is unclear whether it was only those terms which the British considered impossible to 
accept, or whether there were also other reasons. The Soviet government itself did not 
seem to be very consistent in its views. In August 1921, G.V. Chicherin, the People’s 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, stated that no reply had been received from London on 
the question of the representative commission, which was considered an indispensable 
condition for the re-admission of refugees. However, it seems that the government soon
213 FO 371/6867, File 38, Paper N 7462. FO Minute 24.6.1921. PRO.
214 FO 371/6867, File 38, Paper N 6497. Evans’ comment 25.5.1921. PRO. 
213 Phillip Noel-Baker papers 4/607 b. Letter from M. Litvinoff 6.8.1921.
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changed its opinion on the repatriation issue. This can be seen in the statement of 
Chicherin, according to which the Soviets were not prepared to consider the return of 
refugees from Egypt, Serbia or any European capitals. He also informed the British that 
‘aristocratic’ classes would not be allowed back because they were still actively hostile. 
According to him this could be seen through the actions of the White organisations 
abroad, proclaiming that they were prepared to use the current famine as a political tool 
against the Soviet government. 2'6
The British government, frustrated at the slow progress, decided to adopt more radical 
measures. The Foreign Office had suggested already in June that Chicherin should be 
told that unless amnesty was granted to refugees the British would have to transport all 
refugees that were under their control to Vladivostok. It was further stated that French 
government should be suggested to follow the British example. It was considered that 
this would be especially useful as the Bolsheviks were more afraid of the Russians taken 
care by the French since they consisted mostly of men from Vrangel’s army.
The suggestion did not materialise in its ‘extreme’, but in October 1921 the British in 
any case repatriated a number of refugees from Mesopotamia (Basra), India and Egypt 
to Vladivostok. The British government stated that they were remnants of the anti- 
Bolshevik Caspian Fleet and Russians evacuated from Baku prior to the Bolshevik 
occupation in April 1920. The group consisted of 881 men, 100 women and 61 children. 
The government reply to the parliamentary question of Commander Kenworthy whether 
it had not been possible to arrange an amnesty instead of shipping them to Vladivostok 
was that the Soviet government had declined to take the necessary measures for 
repatriation.^^ ^
Leonid Krasin, the representative of the Soviet Trade Delegation, immediately 
approached Curzon on the issue, asking reasons for the British government’s decision to 
send these refugees to Vladivostok and whether the British would give assurances that
FO 371/6869, File 38, Paper N 9535. Tel. from Mr. Hodgson, Moscow 18.8.1921. PRO 
217 FO 371/6867, File 38, Paper N 7462. FO Minute 24.6.1921. PRO.
21^ FO 371/6897, File 1279, Paper N 11991. Parliamentary question by Commander Kenworthy 26.10.1921. PRO.
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they were not for purpose of hostile action against Soviet government. He also stated 
that the official statements in the British press, according to which ‘Moscow could not 
see its way to grant an amnesty’ to these refugees, was not accurate. He pointed out that 
the Soviet government had never refused to grant an amnesty, but had put up a practical 
scheme of repatriation, to which the British government had, however, never seen fit to
reply.219
The Foreign Office, in its reply to Krasin, stated that despite what the British 
government had hoped, the Soviet government had consistently refused to admit even 
the sympathisers of the Bolsheviks to the Soviet Union. Because of that the British 
government had been left without any other alternative but to send a certain number of 
refugees to Vladivostok where a non-Bolshevik government still existed. 220 This 
‘incident’ further blocked the road to an agreement between the British and the Soviet 
governments on the repatriation issue.
The above arrangement of the British government to ship a single group of refugees to 
Vladivostok did not, however, remove their responsibility for almost 5,000 refugees still 
in Egypt, Cyprus and Serbia at the end of 1921. Negotiations with the Yugoslav 
government on the lump sum of money for the exchange of responsibility for refugees 
had not progressed. The British government had also approached the British Dominions 
and colonies asking about the possibility of them receiving some refugees under British 
control. The replies of these governments had, however, been negative. 221 For example, 
both the Australian and Canadian governments had firmly stated that Russian refugees 
that were maintained by the British could not be admitted to their territories. 222 New 
options were therefore being desperately explored by the British government. One of the 
main plans was to come to an agreement with the High Commissioner for Russian 
Refugees, a post established under the auspices of the League of Nations in autumn
1921.
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4.3. Concluding Remarks
From the beginning of the Russian refugee problem the British government adopted a 
strict attitude against the entry of Russian refugees to Britain. These policy lines were 
formulated immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution, when it became evident that 
large numbers of Russians opposing the Soviet rule wished to take refuge abroad. 
Consequently, the then Home Secretary, Sir George Cave, instructed the Foreign Office 
that facilities should not be given, save in exceptional cases, for Russians wishing to 
leave Russia for Britain. Later the Home Secretary Edward Shortt stated that as a 
general rule Russian refugees were not admitted to Britain. This was the basic principle 
governing the admission of Russian refugees, even if certain exceptions to the general 
rule were made throughout the period of Russian emigration.
The categories for ‘favourable treatment’ were, for example, prominent businessmen, 
those with close personal connections in Britain, White soldiers who had fought with 
the British in Russia, officials of the former Russian government, and young people for 
educational purposes. Exceptions were also occasionally made for other individual well- 
to-do upper class Russians, especially if their applications were supported by prominent 
people. The Home Office policy on deciding whether the person qualified for an 
‘exception to the general rule’ was not, however, always systematic.
In general, however, the Home Office maintained a strict policy of not admitting 
Russian refugees. All the cases were treated carefully and on an individual basis, and 
strict provisions were set for the entry of individual refugees. One of the most 
important- though by no means sufficient in itself- was the necessity to provide 
evidence of financial support, as the Home Office was particularly reluctant to admit 
destitute refugees. For employment purposes Russians were also admitted only in 
exceptional cases. In 1919 the Home Secretary pointed out that ‘under existing 
conditions aliens should not have facilities to come to Britain for the purpose of 
employment’. 2^3 The outcome of the policies of the British government can also be
223 PQ 372/1262, File 74855, Paper 81955. HO to FO 29.5.1919. (Statement o f Home Secretary Edward Shortt). 
PRO.
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seen in the number of Russian refugees. The number of Russian refugees in Britain was 
probably less than 10,000 at its highest and this number fell further through the onward 
emigration. Both France and Germany, on the other hand, hosted between 100,000- 
200,000 refugees in the 1920s.
Economic considerations clearly played an important role in the decision of the British 
government not to admit Russian refugees to Britain, as Russian refugees were 
considered to be very numerous and yet they were unlikely to be. of any economic value 
to Britain. The declining economy and the growth of unemployment made both the 
government and the public hostile towards the admission of refugees. The government 
was especially reluctant to maintain any Russian refugees at British expense, as seen for 
example in the case of those refugees that had to be maintained in camps by the British. 
However, the Home Office was clearly unwilling to admit even well-to-do refugees 
with sufficient means for their support, although exceptions were made for individual 
refugees. In addition to economic considerations, the British policy towards Russian 
refugees might thus have also been influenced by various political considerations, such 
as the opposition of the Labour Party to the admission of ‘White’ Russian refugees, or 
the changing attitude of the British government towards Soviet Russia, especially in 
view of the importance of trade.
Moreover, the question of the entry of Russian refugees can also be seen in the light of 
the development of the British immigration policy in general. As pointed out earlier, the 
Aliens Restriction Acts of 1914 and 1919 were symptoms of ‘declined national 
confidence’ and the economic and political turbulence of the inter-war years, which 
resulted in the increase of anti-alien feelings in Britain. Consequently, Russian refugees 
among others got caught up in the strict provisions of the 1919 Act, which endowed the 
Home Secretary and immigration officers with considerable powers over the entry of 
aliens. This was facilitated by the fact that unlike the Aliens Act of 1905, none of the 
subsequent immigration legislation contained a statutory recognition of the right of 
asylum for political refugees. This meant that the entry of Russian refugees could be 
regulated by rules governing the entry of ‘normal immigration’.
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The British government did, however, become responsible for a certain group of 
refugees after the evacuation of General Denikin’s forces, due to ‘guarantees’ given to 
Denikin and his officers by the British officials in South Russia without the consent of 
the Foreign Office. As a result, the government took responsibility for some 10,000 
refugees that were placed in various refugee camps, for instance, in Lemnos, Cyprus and 
Egypt and maintained at British expense. Although the numbers were gradually 
reduced, in autumn 1921 the government was still maintaining almost 5,000 refugees, 
despite various efforts to end its responsibility for these refugees. Meanwhile, Russian 
refugees had become an international concern, and the League of Nations was to take up 
the role of refugee advocacy. For the British this meant participation in the international 
efforts for the assistance of Russian refugees, but also a possibility of finding a solution 
to the problem of those refugees that the government was still maintaining at British 
expense.
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CHAPTER 5: SEARCHING FOR SOLUTIONS: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME
5.1. The Origins of the Regime
This chapter will consider the emergence of Russian refugees as an international issue in 
the early 1920s. As pointed out earlier, the scale of the Russian refugee problem was very 
wide, and individual European countries, not least Britain, were not enthusiastic or even 
capable of solving the problem by themselves. The British government, as well as for 
example the French government, wanted to minimise their individual responsibilities, and 
more importantly, their expenditure towards refugees. The same was true with other 
European countries that contributed to the refugee work. The chapter will explore 
international efforts for the assistance of Russian refugees through the establishment of the 
international refugee regime.
The emphasis of the chapter will be on the work of the regime especially through the 
activity of the League of Nations, and particularly the High Commissioner for Russian 
Refugees, established under the auspices of the League in 1921. At the same time the 
emphasis is kept on the British government by evaluating its motives, attitude and 
involvement in the refugee work in the international arena, keeping in view the earlier 
policies of the government that were considered in detail in the previous chapter.
Claudena Skran, in her book Refugees in Inter-War Europe (1995) has considered the 
emergence of refugees as an international issue with useful concepts. In considering the 
international responses towards refugees she uses a theoretical concept of an international 
refugee regime. It refers to the formal and informal arrangements created by states to deal 
with refugees by using shared principles and norms, as well as having established decision - 
making procedures. For the purpose of this study the framework is especially useful in
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analysing how different governments responded and co-operated internationally in the 
Russian refugee problem in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution and the Civil WarJ
Skran points out that the emergence of refugees as an international issue after the First 
World War can be related to a wider process of the growth of interdependence of nations.
As a consequence, individual European countries could not stay isolated to the same extent 
as earlier. The interdependence also meant that circumstances in one country affected other 
countries. As with Russian refugees, the huge outflow of refugees from the former Russian 
Empire into different European countries had a major impact on the economic, cultural and 
political life of the receiving countries. The immigration restrictions in one country also had 
influence on other countries. In this situation, even if the increased interdependence on the 
one hand was undermining the ability of individual states to deal with the problem 
unilaterally, on the other hand it was serving as a catalyst for the formation of an 
international regime to manage this interdependence. 2
Importantly, it was the Russian refugee problem that actually marked the beginning of 
international and organised co-operation between governments, i.e. the formation of the 
international refugee regime. This, however, did not happen according to a comprehensive 
‘grand plan’. Instead, it resulted from ad hoc responses of the member states of the League 
to various refugee crises, beginning with the exodus of Russian refugees from the 
Bolshevik regime.
The initiative for the League to adopt a leading role in the assistance of Russian refugees 
actually came from the group of private and voluntary organisations, led by Gustave Ador, 
the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  ^The emergency 
relief for the Russian refugees during the evacuations and afterwards in the camps had been 
provided to a large extent by voluntary charitable organisations, notably the American Red
 ^ Skran 1995, pp. 7-8, 65. 
^ Skran 1995, p. 65.
 ^ Skran 1995, p. 84.
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Cross, the American Relief Association, The Russian and the International Red Cross, the 
Save the Children Fund and others. Their resources were, however, quite inadequate and in 
addition there was not any central co-ordinating body to organise the relief work."*
Therefore the Joint Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies and the ICRC decided 
to call a conference of the voluntary organisations concerned in Russian refugee work in 
February 1921. As a result of this meeting, Gustave Ador approached the League of 
Nations Council meeting in Paris in February 1921. In his letter Ador stated that the 
problem of 800,000 Russian refugees scattered throughout Europe was beyond the power of 
humanitarian organisations and called the League as the ‘supranational political authority’ 
to appoint a Commissioner for Russian refugees. The tasks of this Commissioner would be 
co-ordinating the refugee assistance, defining the legal status of refugees and assisting the 
refugees by organising their employment outside Russia or alternatively securing their 
repatriation back to Russia. ^
The League of Nations responded by calling an intergovernmental conference on Russian 
refugees in August 1921. Before the actual conference the member states were asked for 
their views on the establishment of the High Commissioner’s Office. The governments 
were also asked to submit information as to the numbers and conditions of Russian refugees 
in their territories.  ^The countries represented at the conference were Bulgaria, China, 
Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Greece, Poland, Romania, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes and Switzerland. Britain was not represented but the government supplied a 
memorandum to the conference on the situation of Russian refugees under their control in 
Egypt, Cyprus, Tuzla, Malta and Serbia.^
 ^ Innes, Kathleen. The Study o f Nansen and the League of Nations, (1931?), pp. 17-18; Simpson 1939, pp. 198-99.
 ^ Reynolds, E.E. Nansen. London 1932, p. 214; Skran 1995, pp. 84-85.
 ^League of Nations. Official Journal. November 1921, p. 1006.
 ^League o f Nations. Official Journal. November 1921, pp. 1012-1018. Memorandum from the British government.
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The conference was also attended by the International Labour Organisation (ILO); the 
International Committee of the Red Cross; the League of Red Cross Societies and the Save 
the Children Fund. The conference came to the conclusion that the Russian refugees should 
not be compelled to return to Russia but that it would be expedient to collect, without delay, 
particulars of the number of refugees desiring to be repatriated. The conference also 
considered it especially desirable that the High Commissioner should endeavour to extend 
special protection and employment for Russian refugees. Governments should also adopt a 
common practice towards travelling and identity papers for refugees.* All these 
considerations came to play an important role in the future work of the High Commissioner.
After the conference the League Council made an official decision to follow the proposition 
of ICRC and invited the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen to become the first High 
Commissioner for Russian Refugees. Dr. Nansen was considered a suitable candidate for 
the post because he was already acting as League High Commissioner for the repatriation of 
the prisoners of war and had been co-operating with the Soviet government in this work as 
well as being assisted by the national Red Cross Societies. He had also accepted an 
invitation of governments and private organisations to act as a commissioner for the 
organisation of famine relief in Russia. All this made him a suitable person for the post of 
High Commissioner for Russian refugees. Nansen accepted the commission at the 
beginning of September 1921.  ^From this initial starting-point for the assistance of a 
specific group of refugees, e.g. Russian refugees, the international refugee regime gradually 
increased its scope, as other refugee groups were included in the assistance schemes. It was 
only after the outbreak of fighting in 1939 that the regime ceased to function.
During the 1920s the international efforts in the arena of the Russian refugee crisis were 
centred round the refugee agencies of the League of Nations, most importantly, the Office
 ^Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/607. League of Nations Conference on the Russian Refugee Question 24.8.1921. 
Resolutions. Churchill College Archives Centre, Cambridge.
 ^ Simpson 1939, pp. 199-200; Skran 1995, p. 85.
Skran 1995, p. 85.
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of the High Commissioner for Russian refugees. Even though the League of Nations as a 
whole served as a forum, especially for decision-making, particularly in the 1920s the High 
Commissioner, Fridtjof Nansen, dominated the League’s refugee work.
It is important to note that because of the role of the League of Nations as a general 
decision-making forum, virtually all European states were, or at least could be involved.
The international refugee regime, concentrated around the League of Nations and its 
refugee agencies, was therefore state-centric at least in the sense that states constituted its 
membership and were the major decision-makers. In addition, various private, voluntary 
organisations also participated actively in the regime. The refugees themselves were not 
totally excluded from the process, as they were able to make their voices heard through the 
several organisations representing their interests. Many private voluntary organisations 
assisting refugees were to a large extent composed of refugees. Also a number of the 
delegates of the High Commissioner that were sent to host countries were refugees or 
naturalised refugees.  ^^
The question that has not been yet explained, is why the international community made the 
initial decision to assist Russian refugees. The fact that the League of Nations became so 
directly concerned with the Russian refugee problem is actually quite surprising. As an 
association of states aiming at universality, a direct involvement in protection of a certain 
refugee group, in this case the Russian refugees, was bound to incur a certain amount of 
hostility from Soviet Russia. The fact that Soviet Russia was not a member state of the 
League clearly made this decision easier; in fact had this been differently, it could have 
even been impossible for the League to take this step.^^
This does not, however, explain the reasons behind the League’s decision to assist refugees. 
As pointed out by Claudena Skran, this was linked to the wider process of the growth of 
interdependence of nations, especially after the First World War. The League of Nations, on
 ^  ^ Skran 1995, pp. 73-84.
Simpson 1939, p. 191.
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its part, had been established in 1919 by forty-two governments ‘in order to promote 
international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security’. The war and 
its aftermath led to huge refugee movements that clearly created a threat to the international 
stability and security. Although there had been earlier mass movements of refugees before, 
it was only after the war and the establishment of the League of Nations that refugees 
emerged as an international issue, as for the first time individual states recognised the need 
for international co-operation in order to manage the problem.
In addition to the considerations above, Claudena Skran has considered three alternative 
explanations for the creation of the international refugee regime. The most obvious 
explanation, according to Skran, is the principle of humanitarianism. Clearly without any 
humanitarian motives, the governments would have refused to take responsibility for the 
refugee problem and would not have agreed on the establishment of the post of High 
Commissioner for Russian Refugees. Many countries that were not hosting refugees 
themselves, like Belgium and Spain, supported the refugee assistance for humanitarian 
reasons.
The humanitarian reasons alone are nevertheless an inadequate explanation. In fact co­
operation on humanitarian issues rarely took place. The most striking example is the refusal 
of the League of Nations to assist the starving people in Russia and Ukraine at the 
beginning of the 1920s despite the urgent pleas from Dr. Nansen. The main reason for the 
refusal was the view shared by most of the delegates that by helping starving people the 
League would in fact be helping the Bolshevik government, something the League wanted 
to avoid very carefully.
Another theoretical explanation for the creation of the international regime is the theory of 
the ‘hegemonic power’. According to this point of view, the creation of the regime and the 
setting the rules for the regime were dictated by the most powerful country, the one that had
Skran 1995, pp. 4-5, 30-31, 65. 
Skran 1995, pp. 85-86.
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hegemonic power over the others. In inter-war Europe the problem with applying the 
hegemonic power theory is that it is actually impossible to identify any superior power. The 
United States, though it was the strongest economic and military power after the war, 
refused to join the League, which signalled its political isolationism. Both France and 
Britain attempted to gain a leadership role in world politics after the war but neither of them 
was so powerftil in relation to the other that they could have adopted the absolute leading 
role.
The fact that might speak for the leading role of France in the creation of the regime is that 
it announced its support for the establishment of the post of High Commissioner, while the 
British seem to have maintained more ambivalent attitude towards the proposal. In its letter 
to the Secretary General of the League, the British government welcomed the proposal that 
the League should take up the question of refugees. However, they were more of an opinion 
that a joint organisation should be established by the League of Red Cross Societies and the 
ICRC, than that the post of High Commissioner should be established under the auspices of 
the League of Nations. Also, the British delegate did not attend the initial 
intergovernmental conference on Russian refugees in August 1921.
The French ‘willingness’ to support the proposal does not, however, equal to the 
proposition that the French government played the role of ‘hegemonic power’ in the 
creation of the regime. It was not that the French government initiated the proposal or 
pushed other governments to support it. In fact, other governments, such as Belgium, 
Czechoslovakia and Switzerland also offered initial support to the appointment of the High 
Commissioner. Finally, in the intergovernmental conference on Russian refugees in August 
1921, the governments present gave their unanimous support for the establishment of the 
post.
FO 371/6867, File 38, Paper N 5827. The Secretary to the Cabinet to the Secretary-General o f the League o f Nations, 
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Skran 1995, pp. 87-88.
1  ^Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/615. League of Nations. Summary of the documents received by the Secretariat since the 
12th session of the Council, 16.6.1921 ; Skran 1995, pp. 85, 88.
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In addition to two previous explanations, there is another quite evident reason behind the 
establishment of the international regime, that of the ‘pursuit of self-interest’. European
governments were eager to diminish their individual responsibilities for the Russian 
refugees by making them a responsibility of an international organisation. It was especially 
Britain and France who had special national interests in the issue, since both governments 
had found themselves both morally and financially responsible for certain groups of 
refugees in the aftermath of the Russian Civil War.
According to the information provided by the governments, by August 1921 France had 
spent over 150 million francs (approximately £3,8 million) mostly on the evacuation and 
maintenance of Vrangel’s refugees and in August 1921 was spending about 4 million francs 
a month on the refugees. Britain on her side had spent a million pounds on Denikin’s 
reftigees and was still maintaining almost 5,000 refugees in Egypt, Cyprus and Serbia at a 
cost of around £20,000 a month. As seen earlier Britain had desperately tried to come to 
an agreement both with the Serbian government by offering a lump sum for the ending of 
their responsibilities towards the refugees, as well as with the Soviet government on the 
repatriation of refugees, but both these plans had failed.
France on her side had also tried to come to an agreement with the Soviet government on 
the repatriation of the refugees, equally without success 20. Thus, the failure of national 
policies to settle the refugee problem led to the conclusion that some international methods 
were required sooner or later. This view was firmly expressed, for example, by J.S. Gregory 
from the British Foreign Office in May 1921. Many other European states had also in their 
interest the internationalisation of the problem, especially those Central European states 
who themselves hosted a considerable proportion of refugees and were unable to cope with 
the problem merely with the help of the private relief agencies.21
Skran 1995, pp. 88-89.
League o f Nations. Official Journal. November 1921, pp. 1010-18; FO 371/8154, File 43, Paper N 1791. Russian 
refugees, FO Minutes 24.2.1922.
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21 Skran 1995, pp. 89-90.
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The interesting question to consider is why the British government, being very eager to find 
a solution to the refugee problem and liquidate its responsibilities, remained somewhat 
ambivalent towards the proposal of the establishment of the post of High Commissioner. 
They did not, for example, attend the initial intergovernmental conference on Russian 
refugees in August. There might be truth in the comment of F. P. Walters, writer of the 
official history of the League of Nations, that the British were unwilling to contribute to the 
solution of the problem for which they admitted no responsibility 22.
On the other hand the British ambivalence should not be exaggerated. After all the 
government did announce its support for the proposal that the League of Nations should 
take up the refugee question, even if it did not specifically advocate the establishment of the 
post of High Commissioner. However, the government undoubtedly had an interest in 
' internationalising' its financial burden on refugees. It was also clear that the British 
government, as a major political power in Europe and a member of the League, had to 
participate in the international efforts to assist Russian refugees, even if it wanted to keep a 
distance. At no time was the government, however, willing to alter its individual policy 
towards Russian refugees, for example, regarding their admission to Britain.
Nevertheless, some British representatives in the League wholeheartedly supported the 
proposal of the ICRC for the establishment of High Commissioner’s post from the very 
beginning. Among them was for example Philip Noel- Baker, a member of the Secretariat 
most directly concerned with the refugee affairs, strongly supported the proposal of the 
establishment of the post of High Commissioner. He was of an opinion that the Russian 
refugee problem could not be solved otherwise than by international action and also 
believed that governments had a common interest in doing so.
It is clear that the role of individuals was very important in the creation and work of the 
international refugee regime more generally. Personal motivations of certain prominent 
individuals guaranteed that there was a driving force for the settlement of the refugee
Walters, P.P. A History o f the League of Nations, Vol. 1. London 1952, p. 188.
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problem. In this the role of Fridtjof Nansen as the High Commissioner was of particular 
importance. It can be stated that during the whole 1920s his work as High Commissioner 
dominated the refugee work of the League. Similarly, for example, the role of Philip Noel- 
Baker as a member of the Secretariat closely involved with the refugee affairs can be 
considered significant.
Moreover, the whole Secretariat provided an important leadership in the refugee issues, 
necessary in the absence of the clear hegemonic power among the member states. The work 
of the Secretariat and the High Commissioner was assisted by several private relief 
agencies, led by the ICRC. It can actually be stated that it is very unlikely that without the 
leadership provided by the Secretariat and private associations the governments would have 
joined together to form an international regime for the assistance of the r e fu g e e s .2 3  
Nevertheless, the consent of the international community to assist Russian refugees marked 
the beginning of international co-operation in the field of refugee assistance.
5.2. The Office of High Commissioner for Russian refugees: the Beginnings
The main principles of the League action for the assistance of Russian refugees were laid 
down on Dr. Nansen’s appointment in September 1921. Firstly, it was pointed out that the 
League had accepted the responsibility for political and legal protection of certain classes of 
refugees and no official encouragement was made for the extension of League protection 
to all classes of refugees. Secondly, the League intervention was considered to be only
23 Skran 1995, pp. 74, 97-100, 287-90.
2'^  Originally, the aid was to be limited to Russian refugees, as the title ‘High Commissioner for Russian refugees’ 
suggests.
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temporary 5^. Also Nansen from the beginning regarded his appointment as temporary and 
hoped that the problem could be solved at an early stage. 6^
The third principle of the League’s refugee work was that its funds could be used only for 
administrative purposes, and not for the relief work itself. The funds for the relief work 
were expected to be supplied by governments and private o r g a n i s a t i o n s .When Dr.
Nansen was appointed it was made clear that the High Commissioner should not give direct 
assistance to refugees, but should limit his work to help the refugees to proceed to countries 
where they could support themselves. Only very small exceptions were made to this 
principle, for example, in the height of the refugee crisis in 1921 and 1922, two small grants 
were made by the League amounting to £5,500. For the administrative expenses the League 
gave a small grant, £1,500 for the end of year 1921 and £4,000 for the succeeding year. 
Nansen himself did not receive any sa lary . 8^
The immediate tasks of new High Commissioner were defining the legal status of the 
refugees, developing plans for repatriation and organising the dispersal of the refugees, 
particularly from Constantinople. At the time of the appointment of Nansen there were still 
some twenty five to thirty five thousand refugees whose situation was very serious and 
needed urgent consideration. The next conference on Russian refugees was held at the 
Assembly in September 1921. In this conference, in addition to the countries represented in 
the previous conference, Britain and Germany were also represented 9^. Jn the resolutions of 
the conference it was decided that 1) a census of refugees was to be taken according to the 
occupation and a special delegate was to be appointed in each country to co-ordinate action,
2) the High Commissioner would welcome the collaboration of private relief organisations,
3) the High Commissioner was to get into immediate touch with the governments
It was assumed that only Russian refugees were being addressed and also that the problem would be solved quickly, in 
maximum ten years. This is why no one bothered to define ‘refugees’, either. (Reference: Marrus 1985, p.89.)
Simpson 1939, pp. 192-94.
Simpson, Sir John Hope. Refugees. Preliminary Report of a Survey. The Royal Institute o f International Affairs 1938, 
p. 75.
MacCartney (C.A) R. Refugees: The Work o f the League. London 1931, pp. 21-22; Simpson 1939, pp. 195, 200. 
Skran 1995, p. 91.
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concerned in order to procure the necessary identification papers for Russian refugees, 4) 
the conference should call on the ILO to communicate with authorities in countries where 
the unemployment crisis was less acute in order, if possible, to transport refugees to these 
countries, 5) the aim of the High Commission was the final settlement of the problem and 
not charitable relief.
The conference also acknowledged the special problem of Constantinople and asked the 
High Commissioner to get in touch with the French government ^ d  the American Red 
Cross. Nansen was also to get in touch with the largest private, foreign and Russian 
organisations for aid in the refugee problem. The French government had been 
responsible for feeding the military refligees from Vrangel’s army and the American Red 
Cross, assisted with other private and Russian organisations, the civilian refugees. The 
French government had announced in April that it would end all aid to refugees in 
Constantinople stating that the continued existence of Vrangel’s military units on foreign 
territory ‘was inadmissible from an international point of view’ and therefore they should 
be d i s b a n d e d .^2 Also the American Red Cross had announced that it would end feeding the 
civilian refugees in Constantinople. 3^
Nansen’s first task, therefore, was to persuade the French and the American Red Cross to 
continue their support for refugees until organised evacuations could be arranged from 
Constantinople. His appeal was partly successful, so that the French government agreed to 
continue feeding the remainder of the General Vrangel’s army until its members could be 
evacuated. The American Red Cross, which had been feeding approximately 14,000 
civilian refugees, however, indicated that it had no further resources to continue their work. 
It nevertheless promised to hand over its stores to other assisting agencies before their
Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/607. Resolutions passed at Conference o f delegates on 16-19 September 1921.
Simpson 1939, p. 73; Schaufuss, Tatiana. ‘The White Russian Refugees’. The Annals o f the American Academy. May 
1939, p. 47.
Johnston 1988, p. 194, footnote 11.
Simpson 1938, p. 43.
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w ithdraw al.T he High Commissioner appealed to private organisations in order to take 
over role hitherto carried by the American Red Cross. As a consequence, a number of 
women’s and international associations gathered around £1,000. 5^ The American Relief 
Administration also took over some of their work.^^
Nansen clearly recognised the extent and value of the work carried out by private voluntary 
organisations in helping refugees. In order to organise the co-operation of refugee work, he 
invited the voluntary organisations to form a joint Advisory Conimittee to assist the work 
of the High Commission at the very beginning of 1922. By February 1922 the Committee 
had already held a number of meetings, as well as passed important resolutions and 
recommendations. Nansen pointed out that the help of the Committee was invaluable to the 
office of High Commissioner. The Committee was represented by sixteen private 
organisations, among which were the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League 
of Red Cross Societies, the Save the Children Fund and the Comité des Zemstvos et villes 
Russes (Union of Zemstvos and Towns, i.e. Zemgor). During the war, the Zemgor had 
assisted civilians behind the jfront lines and assisted in the evacuations from areas of 
military operations. After 1918 it had constituted itself in Paris, having also executive 
offices in Prague and other major émigré centres. Its work aimed at helping émigrés in 
different areas, especially in matters of health and education. The funds for the work came 
largely from the assets of the Russian embassies abroad that were distributed by the 
Conference of Russian Ambassadors in Paris under the chairmanship of V.A. Maklakov.^^
Among other organisations represented in the Advisory Committee were the European 
Student Relief, The Russian Red Cross (old organisation), the Jewish Colonisation 
Association, The Armenian Refugees Fund, the Russian Famine Relief Fund, the Imperial
League of Nations. Official Journal. April 1922, p. 343. 
ibid., p. 344.
Simpson 1939, p. 201.
Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/472. Russian refugees. General report up to February 1922 by Fridtjof Nansen; FO 
371/8159, File 43, Paper N 8934. Report by Nansen to the Third Assembly 15.9.1922.
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War Relief Fund, the Y.M.C.A, and the Russian Relief and Reconstruction Fund (RRRF).^^ 
These organisations were also represented in Britain, and were actively involved in the 
refugee relief. The RRRF as earlier mentioned, was established in Britain through the 
activity of some British individuals in the field of Russian affairs. The Headquarters of the 
Russian Red Cross (old organisation) were in Paris, where in 1921 a General Committee 
was established to act as the administrative organ of the RRC.^ o^ In Britain the Red Cross 
changed its name officially to Russian Benevolent Society in 1920, although it was still 
continued to be referred as the Russian Red Cross Society (old organisation).
In his general report of the work accomplished up to March 1922, Nansen further explained 
the problems of the Russian refugees and actions taken for their relief since the 
establishment of the commission. He pointed out that during 1921 several governments had 
spent immense sums in maintaining Russian refugees by a system of doles. According to 
Nansen if only a small part of these sums had been placed at the disposition of the High 
Commissioner and had he been invited with these sums to secure productive employment 
for refugees, the whole problem might have been solved very quickly, and for much less 
expenditure than already had been made by governments.
The problem was that the High Commissioner did not have funds for relief apart from small 
sums for administrative purposes and what he had secured from the private organisations. 
Therefore Nansen considered it his most important task to find employment for refugees, so 
that they could be dispersed from places where they were living destitute to places where 
they could work. This was also a measure that he could start without undue expenditure. In 
order to carry out this task he proceeded immediately to carry on the recommendation of 
the intergovernmental conference of September 1921, by instructing the governments to 
take a census of Russian refugees in their countries. The purpose of this census was to
League o f Nations. Official Journal. April 1922, p. 343. 
Kudriakova 1995, pp. 13-14.
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secure reliable data as to the numbers and professions of refugees who were unemployed or 
without means of subsistence.
The British government was also informed in November 1921 by the League of Nations 
that a census should be taken of Russian refugees in British possessions as well as in United 
Kingdom. It was further instructed that the census needed to be taken only of refugees who 
were maintained at the public expense and who had no reasonable prospect of finding 
employment. As regards those refugees who were not interned in camps, it was stated to be 
sufficient to know the total number of men, women and c h i l d r e n . ' ^ ^
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the British government informed the League of 
Nations that there was no record of ‘Russian refugees’ in Britain. According to official 
statements of the British government no Russian refugees were maintained at the public 
expense in the United Kingdom, but only refugees that were placed in the camps were 
maintained from the public funds. Their number and cost of maintenance, on the other 
hand, could be stated exactly by the government. In fact Britain had forwarded a 
memorandum to the intergovernmental conference on Russian refugees in August 1921, 
stating the history, present situation and the total number of refugees maintained by the 
British Therefore, as no refugees were maintained by the government in the United 
Kingdom, there was actually no need to take a census for the information of the High 
Commissioner. On the other hand, the general census of Russian refugees would have 
naturally helped to clarify the number of Russian refugees in Britain, and therefore been 
useful both for the British authorities and the High Commissioner and the League of 
Nations in general.
At the international level the High Commissioner received invaluable help from the ILO 
which to a large extent carried out the censuses for the High Commissioner in several
League of Nations. Official Journal. April 1922, p. 342.
FO 371/6871, File 38, Paper N 12375. From Mr. E.A. Frick, League o f Nations to the FO 3.11.1921. PRO.
League o f Nations. Official Journal. November 1921, pp. 1012-1018. Memorandum from the British government.
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countries where Russian refugees constituted significant numbers. As a next stage Nansen 
approached all the governments that were likely to be able to help by giving them 
information on the numbers of refugees and their occupations and asking if the 
governments could offer any employment for the r e fu g e es T h e  results, however, were 
disappointing. Many governments failed to reply at all, and majority of those who did reply 
informed him that they had no openings for refugees. The British government was also 
approached by Nansen with an enquiry regarding the prospects of its providing employment 
for refugees. The Foreign Office replied that in view of unemployment in the UK 
employment could not be found for Russian refugees. The comment of Mr. Evans at the 
Foreign Office clearly pointed out the negative attitude of the British government to the 
question by stating; ‘We certainly cannot help Dr. Nansen here, I am afraid’. 6^ This, of 
course, is not surprising considering the strict policy of the British government regarding 
the entry of Russian refugees to Britain, especially so for the purpose of employment.
The responses of other governments were hardly more promising. With the exception of the 
reply from the Brazilian government, the few replies returned to the enquiry were all 
negative. The Brazilian government intimated that there might be some work for a certain 
number of refugees in the coffee plantations. Nansen pointed out that emigration to totally 
different climate and as far as, for example, Brazil, would cause several problems, and the 
conditions under which this might go ahead should be studied carefully. He also stated that 
in all the replies it was pointed out that owing to the economic depression and its effect 
upon the labour market, it was impossible for governments to find work for the refugees.
As already mentioned, during the 1920s France nevertheless recruited Russian refugees to 
work in factories and mining concerns, as a consequence of the manpower losses in the 
First World War. The situation in other major émigré countries, like Germany, was much
Innes (1931?), p. 20; League o f Nations. Official Journal. April 1922, p. 342. 
League o f Nations. Official Journal. April 1922, p. 342; Reynolds 1932, p. 215. 
FO 371/6870, File 38, Paper N 11496. ILO to FO 14.10.1921. PRO.
League o f Nations. Official Journal. April 1921, p. 342.
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less promising. The German government, among with many other governments, informed 
the League of Nations that since the government was unable to cope with the 
unemployment of its own nationals, it could not possibly take any official steps to provide 
work for Russian refugees.'*^ Despite this, until 1923 Germany hosted more Russian 
refugees than any other country in Europe. Thus, the liberal attitude of the German 
government in admitting refugees despite the economic situation has to be admired, as well 
as of course contrasted with the different policy of the British government.
In addition to appealing for employment opportunities for the refugees, Nansen made a 
similar appeal for Russian refugee students. He pointed out that there was a very close 
relation between the economic reconstruction of Russia and the training of the future 
experts in different areas. As a result of the Civil War, the vast majority of different experts 
had left Russia. Also, under present conditions the Russian universities could not produce 
the numbers of technical experts who would be required for the reconstruction of Russia, 
Therefore, he hoped that European governments would be willing to take a share of at least
10,000 Russian students scattered in Europe, following the example of the Czechoslovakian 
government which was supporting 5,000 Russian students, for example, at the University of 
Prague. He had also made suggestions to large charitable organisations to give assistance in 
the education of Russian children. To this end, he had been co-operating with the British 
Russian Relief and Reconstruction Fund in their effort to raise money for the establishment 
of the school for refugee children.'^^
In future the RRRF would be responsible for the maintenance of two schools for refugee 
children in Constantinople, one each for girls and boys, which altogether hosted about a 
thousand children. The aim of the Fund was to maintain and educate these children until 
they could become s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g . ^ ®  There were, however, constant financial problems and
Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/615. League o f Nations. C.126.M.72.1921.VII. Annex 2. Legal status o f refugees in 
Germany, by Von Haniel 18.4.1921.
League of Nations. Official Journal. April 1922, p 349.
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the RRRF asked for help for its work by appealing to the British public. The British 
government was also asked to support the work of the Fund, for example in March 1925, 
when ‘owing to the acute difficulties there was an imminent danger of the schools being 
suddenly closed’. It was stated that the Fund was the only British organisation working for 
Russian refugee children, and through its work a certain number of children had already 
become self-supporting. The chairman of the Fund, Mr. Locker-Lampson asked for a grant 
from the British government in order to be able to continue its work for the next four years, 
after which it would be able to close the schools. Not very surprisingly, the Foreign 
Office turned down the appeal by stating that ‘in view of very large sums already expended 
by HMG on behalf of Russian refugees, no favourable answer to the grant could be
given’.
As with employment, Nansen approached the British government personally, requesting it 
to assist refugee children by offering them free study places at educational establishments 
in Britain.^'^ The document itself does not, however, exist among the Foreign Office 
documents, and therefore there is no recorded reply from the British government. As it was 
pointed out in the previous chapter, the British authorities were willing to make some 
exceptions to non-admission of refugees for educational purposes. Some British universities 
had also expressed their willingness to offer free places for the children of Russian émigrés. 
There were also both English and Russian organisations working in the field of education 
for Russian children. However, the British government was not prepared to make any 
concessions to its admission policies or agree to admit Russian refugees in general. The 
decisions of the government to admit certain Russians for educational purposes were 
always carried out on an individual basis. Generally speaking, the results of Nansen’s 
appeals to governments were clearly disappointing as the governments made clear that the 
majority of them were not in a position to render support to refugee students. Because of
FO 371/8154, File 43, Paper N 2177. Letter from the RRRF in the Times, 7 March 1922. PRO.
52 FO 371/11019, File 340, Paper N 1734. RRRF to FO 20.3.1925. PRO.
53 FO 371/11019, File 340, Paper N 1734. FO to RRRF 13.6.1925. PRO.
54 FO 371/8212, File 3024, Paper N 3024. PRO.
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this, Nansen pointed out, the High Commissioner decided to ‘change the direction’ and to 
support various charitable organisations working in the field. 5^
In order to secure the co-operation of the government and other authorities Nansen invited 
all the interested governments to appoint official representatives to the High Commissioner. 
After some delays and reminders from Nansen several governments appointed their 
representatives to deal with the Russian refugee question. The special officials were 
appointed in sixteen countries; Britain, France, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, all the Baltic states, Finland, Italy, Switzerland and 
Greece. In Britain the special representative of the High Commissioner was the Foreign 
Office, as well as in Czechoslovakia. In France it was the Russian department at the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs; in Germany the Ministry of Interior.
In addition to this, the Commissioner also appointed his own representatives. These 
representatives were to keep in close touch with the government representatives, as well as 
the Russian refugee organisations, to assist them carrying out the census and to execute the 
instructions of the High Commissioner. Nansen also instructed these representatives to 
carry out a special census of Russian refugee children, including an enquiry into the schools 
in which they were being educated^^. Altogether fourteen countries appointed 
representatives to deal with the refugee question in co-operation with the High 
Commissioner. The governments who agreed to appoint the delegate for Nansen were 
Britain, France, Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Austria, Turkey and Hungary. In Britain Mr. L.B Golden from 
Save the Children Fund was appointed a representative of the High Commissioner.^'^
League o f Nations. Official Journal. November 1922, p. 1137.
League o f Nations. Official Journal. April 1922, p. 349.
League o f Nations. Official Journal. April 1922, pp. 342-43, 350-351.
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5.3. The Constantinople Problem
After the preliminary tasks of establishing the organisational framework, appointing 
representatives and securing the co-operation of the different voluntary organisations, the 
High Commissioner had to turn his attention to the urgent refugee problem in 
Constantinople. After the evacuation of General Vrangel’s armies in South Russia in 
November 1920, large number of refugees were congested in Constantinople. At the time of 
the appointment of Nansen, there were still some 35,000 refugees left in and around the city 
without means of support. 8^ Strictly speaking the Constantinople problem did not properly 
fall within the functions of the High Commissioner, as he was supposed to concentrate on 
the legal status of refugees, as well as on repatriation and employment prospects. However, 
Nansen pointed out that the distress among the refugees was so wide and acute that he did 
not consider it useful to try to find employment for people who were actually starving.
The main problem was that the High Commissioner did not have any funds at his disposal 
to tackle the problem. In the critical situation Nansen made an appeal to the High 
Commissioners in Constantinople of Great Britain, France and Italy asking them to give all 
the possible assistance they could in the serious situation and to draw the attention of their 
governments to the matter. He also appealed personally to the heads of three principal 
Allied governments, suggesting that they would make a special grant of funds. 9^ The 
British government, however, was careful to point out to the League of Nations that it did 
not consider itself responsible for refugees at Constantinople, but was of an opinion that 
Italian and French governments should relieve distress among refugees there.
The replies of the British government to the appeals of the private organisations were as 
negative. Mr. L.B Golden from the Save the Children Fund approached the Foreign Office 
in November 1920 and asked for a grant to the relief of Russian refugee children in
Simpson 1939, pp. 69-73.
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Constantinople, as money at the disposal of the Fund was inadequate in itself to give any 
substantial aid to the children. He also pointed out that the whole refugee problem had 
reached dimensions that were beyond the resources of a charity, and that the governments 
of Europe should make further efforts to control and alleviate it. Therefore, the Committee 
of the Fund trusted that the British government ‘which had generously supported the 
Russian refugees who had been given an asylum in British territory’, would be prepared to 
extend that support to those refugees congested in Constantinople.
Mr. Golden pointed out that if the British government were prepared to give a substantial 
grant, for example, the sum of £50,000, the Fund could subscribe the further £10,000, 
which together would constitute a sufficient sum for the help of these children. Lord 
Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, however, replied that because the British government had 
already undertaken large liabilities in connection with Russian refugees, it was not possible 
for it to supply any further money to the Fund.^  ^The Russian Relief and Reconstruction 
Fund also asked for funds from the British government for its work for the relief of refugees 
in Constantinople and surrounding areas. In November 1920, after the collapse of General 
Vrangel’s troops it took care of Russian children that had been evacuated from the British 
hospital. 62 As mentioned the Fund had also established two schools for refugee children in 
Constantinople. In summer 1921 the RRRF approached the Foreign Office with a 
suggestion that the British government would support agricultural colonies for refugees in 
the vicinity of Constantinople. Consistent with the earlier replies, the Foreign Office stated 
that ‘they regretted that HMG was unable to offer any assistance because they had already 
spent large sums on refugees’. 63
Pressure on the part of prominent British individuals working actively in the refugee field, 
however, proved more successful. The British High Commissioner in Constantinople, Sir
6  ^ FO 371/5419, File 29, Paper N 3529. L.B. Golden to Earl Curzon 29.11.1920 and FO to the Secretary o f the Treasury 
11.12.1920. PRO.
62 FO 371/5424, File 46, Paper 2312. Admiral de Robeck to FO 11.11.1920. PRO.
63 FO 371/6867, File 38, Paper N 7321. RRRF to FO 23.6.1921 and FO to Colonel Ward, RRRF, 15.6.1921. PRO.
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Horace Rumbold appealed to the Foreign Office at the end of 1921 by stressing the urgent 
situation in Constantinople. Also the Allied Commander-in-Chief in Constantinople, 
General Harington had made urgent appeals to the British government and public during 
the autumn of 1921. In his letter to the editor of The Times on 4 November 1921 he stated: 
‘we are faced with 28,000 starving Russians on the streets, mostly invalids, women and 
children, faced with winter, starvation and death ‘ Sir Samuel Hoare, the new head of the 
Constantinople Office, established to co-ordinate the refugee work in Constantinople, also 
used all his efforts to persuade the British government to agree to make a special grant for 
the relief of refugees in Constantinople. 65
The issue was considered by the Foreign Office in December 1921. The report on Russian 
refugees at Constantinople stated that many had already died of starvation and further 
deaths should be expected. It was also pointed out that the private relief organisations did 
not have nearly sufficient capacities for solving the problem. 66 Among the private 
organisations working in Constantinople were for example a Relief Committee led by Lady 
Rumbold, Sir Horace Rumbold’s wife, Colonel Procter’s International Relief Committee, 
various Red Cross organisations, the Save the Children Fund and the Russian Relief and 
Reconstruction Fund 67. The British Committee of the Russian Red Cross also assisted in 
the refugee work by for example by handing over some stores to Colonel Procter and 
sending other grants for his com m ittee.68
Russian organisations in Britain, primarily the Russian Red Cross Society and the Russian 
Refugees Relief Association also carried out important work for Russian refugees in 
Constantinople. The Russian Refugees Relief Association (RRRA) was established in 
London after the collapse of General Vrangel’s army for the relief of refugees evacuated
64 The Times 4.11.1921.
66 Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/472. Report by Samuel Hoare; Stoessinger, John. The Refugee and the International World 
Community. Minneapolis 1956, p. 17.
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from the Crimea. Because of the seriousness of the situation in Constantinople, the RRRA 
concentrated primarily on assisting refugees in Constantinople by sending money and 
clothing. Many well-known members of the Russian colony, as well as some prominent 
British participated in the work of RRRA, such as Konstantin Nabokov, E.V. Sablin, A.M.
Onu, Adriana Tyrkova-Williams, who was the Chairman of the Committee, her husband 
Dr. Harold Williams, Princess E.G Golitsyn and Prince V. Golitsyn, Baron Alexander 
Meyendorff, S.V. Shklovskii, Count G.P Beningsen, Professors D.D. Gardner and V.I.
Isaev, Sir Alfred Knox and Rev. H.J. Fynes-Clinton.
The fact that the RRRA united so many prominent members of the Russian colony meant that 
they managed to arrange the work of the association very effectively. Appeals were published in 
the British and émigré press, and members also distributed appeals in churches. It was stated by 
the Association that the British press had granted them great help by letting them publish their 
appeals in the papers free of charge.^o
The report considered at the Foreign Office in December 1921 further emphasised the 
British role in the relief work. It was pointed out that the voluntary relief had been carried 
out to a large extent by British community and that Lady Rumbold's Committee was 
carrying an important part of this work. The British troops were also giving up part of their 
rations to provide food for the refugees. The Foreign Office pointed out that the policy of 
the British government not to give any help or relief to refugees in Constantinople, apart 
from a grant of £20,000 to General Harington after the collapse of General Vrangel’s army, 
had been successful until now. The French had promised to continue to feed refugees until 
recently, but they had now refused to give any further help. As a consequence of this, the 
situation of the refugees in Constantinople had become much worse.
The report also pointed out that Sir Samuel Hoare was going to leave for Geneva to meet 
the League of Nations and that it was hoped it was possible to produce the scheme for the
H.W. Williams papers, Add. 54466, Vol. XXXI, ff. 71-72, 74-78. British library, department o f manuscripts. 
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disposal of refugees before spring. Therefore it was urgent to produce relief for the next two 
or three months. According to a report there was £7,000 worth of food at Constantinople 
and if this would be placed immediately at the disposal of Lady Rumbold's Committee, the 
situation would be considerably relieved. The Foreign Office considered that besides 
humanitarian there were also political reasons. Starvation meant that refugees were more 
desperate and therefore more responsive to Bolshevik propaganda. The British were also 
responsible for the maintenance of order, as the Allied Commander-in-Chief, General 
Harington, was British. In addition to these reasons, epidemic diseases such as typhus, 
cholera and smallpox were spreading among the refugees who were facing starvation, and 
constituted therefore a threat to British troops.
After a careful consideration the British government agreed in late December 1921 to 
allocate a grant of £20,000 worth of military stores, foodstuff and other supplies for the 
relief of the refugees. The Foreign Office also was of the opinion that the British 
representatives in Paris and Rome should be instructed to urge the French and Italian 
governments to follow the example of the British, and make special grants for the relief 
work in Constantinople.
This plea was not, however, answered by the French and Italian governments. Thus, Britain 
was actually the only foreign government that responded to the appeal of the High 
Commissioner. This decision was to a large extent due to the hard work and constant 
appeals of Sir Samuel Hoare, General Harington and Sir Horace Rumbold. Without their 
strong commitment to the problem, the appeal of the High Commissioner might have been 
left unanswered. In any case, the British could use this issue to highlight their efforts in the 
refugee work. Moreover, they could then argue that they had provided more assistance to 
the settlement of the refugee problem than other Allied governments, despite the fact that 
the British government had always considered that the French should deal with Vrangel’s
FO 371/6872, File 38, Paper N 13517. Report on the Russian refugees at Constantinople, December 1921. PRO. 
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refugees. In all the subsequent documents this grant was carefully pointed out, as was other 
British expenditure on Russian refugees.^^
In his report in April 1922 Nansen also pointed out that the grant given by the British 
government had been of a great importance for the relief work in Constantinople, and 
thanked Sir Samuel Hoare for his work in securing the grant. In addition the private 
organisations, for example a coalition of women’s groups, the Jewish Colonisation 
Association and the International Committee of the Red Cross contributed altogether 
£9,000. The Jewish Colonisation Association alone made a gift of £1,000 and a loan of 
£3,000 for the High Commissioner. This money allowed Nansen to buy flour for ten 
thousand people for two months, during which time a large number of further evacuations 
took place.
Another important action for the assistance of Russian refugees in Constantinople was the 
establishment of a special office of the High Commissioner in the city. Sir Samuel Hoare, 
who had been working as Deputy High Commissioner of the League of Nations since 
November 1921 was chosen as the head of the new office. He left for Constantinople 
already at the end of 1921 to examine possible solutions to the refugee problem. In early 
1922 the office was officially opened to assist in the evacuation of refugees and to co­
ordinate the work of existing committees and organisations that were working for refugees 
in Constantinople. This was secured by establishing a joint committee of private 
organisations, presided over by Colonel Procter, the British chairman of the International 
Relief Committee in Constantinople 6^,
The first positive step in the evacuation of refugees was the agreement of the Czechoslovak 
government to accept 5,000 agricultural workers, 1,000 students and also a certain number
See for example FO 371/8154, File 43, Paper N 1773 and File 43, Paper N2120. PRO.
League o f Nations. Official Journal. April 1922, p. 344; Skran 1995, p. 187.
FO 371/8154, File 43, Paper N 2120. Cecil Harmsworth to Lord Curzon 8.3.1922. PRO.
FO 371/8159, File 43, Paper N 8934. Report by Nansen to the third Assembly 15.9.1922. PRO.
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of children and their teachers to Czechoslovakia. This was something that had been agreed 
by the Czechoslovak government already in August 1921. Difficulties, however, arose with 
securing the transfer in practice, and by Christmas 1921, only 1,000 students and 2,000 
agricultural workers and a small proportion of children had been transferred to 
Czechoslovakia The problems with the realisation of the transfer were related to 
difficulties in connection with visas, transport, and feeding of the refugees while they were 
travelling.
Additionally, the transport difficulties through the Balkan countries were causing serious 
problems. Therefore, Samuel Hoare undertook a mission to the Balkan countries to 
negotiate on the admission of Russian refugees. Meanwhile, the Czechoslovak government, 
however, informed the High Commissioner that it was not possible for it to receive the 
remainder of the 6,000 refugees. Samuel Hoare, in the course of his mission to the Balkans, 
renewed the discussions of this matter with the Czechoslovak authorities. As a consequence 
of these negotiations, Nansen stated that there were hopes that it would be possible to 
complete the programme in the near future.
In the intergovernmental conference on Russian refugees in August 1921, also the 
Bulgarian government had agreed to accept 2,000 Russian children from the famine area of 
Volga to Bulgaria. The practical carrying out of this plan, however, produced severe 
problems, and Nansen suggested that they would instead receive 5,000 refugee children 
from Constantinople. After negotiations the Bulgarian government accepted this proposal 
and the first transport of children from Constantinople occurred in December 1921.
Sir Samuel Hoare also secured further transportations through negotiations with the 
Bulgarian government. Bulgaria also demonstrated its sympathy for Russian refugees by 
intimating its willingness to accept military refugees from the Gallipoli camp. For some
MacCartney 1931, p. 23.
League o f Nations. Official Journal. April 1922, pp. 344-45; Johnson, T.F. International Tramps: From Chaos to 
Permanent World Peace. London 1938, p. 241; Innes (1931?), p. 21.
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reason the British at first opposed the reception of military refugees in Bulgaria. Whether 
this was because they opposed the idea of keeping the military formations together by 
transferring them as a group to one country, or other objections is not clear. The British had 
been very actively trying to end their own responsibilities towards the remaining refugees 
in the camps, and would have willingly seen the transfer of their ‘own’ refugees from Egypt 
and Cyprus. However, after discussions between Nansen and the British government, the 
objections were waived. As a result about 9,000 military refugees from the Gallipoli camp 
were received in Bulgaria. It also promised to take further 1,000 agricultural labourers and 
their families, as well as an additional few hundred children and adults to Bulgaria.^^
The Constantionople office also acted as a kind of labour exchange for Russian refugees 
registering them by occupation and trying to find them employment in various countries. 
Nansen constantly pointed out that they could evacuate large numbers of refugees in special 
categories to the countries where they would find employment, if  they just had the 
necessary material means for that. In the spring of 1922 it was also decided to establish 
League of Nations offices, similar to that in Constantinople, Sofia and Belgrade, as well as 
to include labour exchanges in these offices.
In his report Nansen pointed out that establishing these exchanges would be advantageous 
both to the refugees themselves and to the governments that had granted them hospitality. 
According to him the labour exchange in Yugoslavia, under the authority of the State 
Commission that was responsible for refugee questions, had worked admirably. By April 
1922 10,000 out of the 23,000 able-bodied refugees had secured employment through the 
services of the labour exchange, and were therefore no more a burden upon public funds. 
Nansen pointed out that success of the labour exchange in Yugoslavia could be of great 
advantage in dealing with refugee problems in other countries.^’
League of Nations. Official Journal. April 1922, p. 345; MacCartney 1931, p. 23. 
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During the first months of its existence the Constantinople Office and Samuel Hoare 
worked actively towards securing the transfer of refugees from Constantinople to other 
countries. Important work was done by Hoare in securing visas for refugees who had 
friends in other countries to whom they could go, or who had enough money upon which 
they could support themselves elsewhere.
Despite the progress in the dispersal of the refugees it was, however, firmly acknowledged 
both by Nansen and Hoare that the question of finance had to be solved in order to continue 
the work in Constantinople. Samuel Hoare stated in his letter to Nansen on 8 March 1922 
that he felt that solution could be found only by bringing together the representatives of the 
various governments concerned. Nansen agreed to Hoare's view that an immediate meeting 
of the Council was needed because of the acuteness of the situation. An alternative method 
was proposed by Sir Eric Drummond, the Secretary-General of the League, of circularising 
the various governments with the report of Hoare's mission in Constantinople. Both Hoare 
and Nansen, however, considered that the situation was too acute for this kind of action, 
being too slow. In order to obtain wider attention to the problem Hoare wrote a letter to 
The Times stating the number of refugees still in Constantinople and suggesting that the 
League of Nations should undertake responsibility for them and arrange means for further 
placement of refugees.^"*
At the meeting of the Council on 24 March 1922 Hoare presented a report on the Russian 
refugees in Constantinople in which he pointed out the invaluable help he had obtained 
from Colonel Procter, the chairman of the joint committee, and Captain Bumier, the 
representative of the International Red Cross, as well as from various Russian and Jewish 
organisations. The assistance of the Allied High Commissioners, the various diplomatic 
missions and the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces. General Harington, had also 
been of outmost importance to the work of the Constantinople Office.
League o f Nations. Official Journal. April 1922, p. 346.
Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/472. Letter from Samuel Hoare to Nansen 6.3.1921.
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The problem of the Russian refugees, however, still remained very serious. Hoare stated 
that of 35,000 refugees in and around Constantinople about 24,000 wanted to settle in other 
countries, and of these 24,000, about 15,000 were either wholly or partially destitute. He 
pointed out that there had been different proposals for the solution of the problem, for 
example the repatriation of the refugees to Vladivostok. Hoare, however, considered this 
highly impractical because of the high cost of the operation as well as for various other 
(political?) reasons. His opinion was that the only satisfactory solution to the problem was 
to transfer refugees to countries where they could find employment.
Hoare estimated that in order to carry out the evacuation of at least those 15,000 destitute 
refugees, a sum of £30,000 was required to cover the expenses of the Constantinople Office 
and the cost of transport. He pointed out that if this sum could be secured from various 
governments, the problem could be solved before the end of the summer. This view was 
shared by Nansen who also firmly insisted on the necessity of securing £30,000 5^. Hoare 
was, however, also of the opinion that the simultaneous dispersal of large masses of 
refugees was not desirable, but that the evacuations should be dealt with in stages and all 
possibilities for the departure of individuals should be encouraged. He also pointed out that 
the League should be constantly exploring the possibilities of repatriation, even though no 
Russian would be compelled to return against his own will. However, he stated that most of 
them would wish to return at some point to their own country, and the League should 
therefore send a representative to the Genoa Conference and insist upon proper safeguards 
being granted by the Bolshevik government. However, the most important question at 
present was the securing of the £30,000 for further evacuations. 6^
The first reactions of the British and French governments towards Hoare’s suggestion were 
not enthusiastic. In the second meeting of the Council in March 1922 the report of Colonel 
Procter was presented. Procter pointed out that out of 30,000 refugees the Constantinople 
Office was in the position to feed only 12,000 until 1 June 1922, and that help was therefore
League of Nations. Official Journal. June 1922, p. 613.
League o f Nations. Official Journal. May 1922, pp. 401-403; Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/472. Report by Hoare.
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urgently needed. At the discussion, Mr. Fisher, the British member of the Council, stated 
that the British government had always considered that France should deal with the 
Vrangel’ emigration while Britain dealt with the Denikin one. However, the British were 
willing to subscribe £10,000 of the required £30,000, provided that the remainder would be 
found by other organisations and governments.
In the draft resolution proposed by Fisher, he further pointed out that the British 
contribution of £10,000 was to be considered as an ‘absolute and final maximum’. The 
other governments would have to find the remaining £20,000 needed and if this succeeded, 
it should be considered strictly the limit and the League should not engage itself in any 
expenditure over this amount. Also, as soon as this sum had been expended, the League 
should withdraw its Deputy High Commissioner from Constantinople and close the office 
there, unless additional contributions were coming from other s o u r c e s .
Nansen continued to stress the urgency of the situation and the importance of the grant of 
£30,000 for the ending of the Constantinople problem but the results in persuading other 
governments to provide funds for the task were not too promising. At the Council meeting 
in July 1922 he informed the member states that only £17,000 of the required £30,000 had 
been promised by different governments. In addition to the British, the governments of 
Belgium, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, Japan and Switzerland had promised to give 
assistance. The absence from the list of Germany, France and Italy, the major European 
powers in addition to Britain, clearly tells of the reluctance of these governments to enter 
into new financial commitments towards the refugees. The good news was that the 
American Red Cross had offered to guarantee the balance of £30,000. The High 
Commissioner nevertheless hoped that the members of the League would contribute the 
whole sum and the £15,000 contribution offered by the American Red Cross could be hold 
in reserve as a safety margin.
FO 371/8328, File 3215, Paper W 3216. Second meeting of the 17th Session o f the Council 25.3.1922. PRO.
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Nansen pointed out that since the establishment of the High Commission 9,000 refugees 
had been evacuated from Constantinople, and that there were still about 18,000 refugees 
left in the city. A special conunittee had been appointed to deal with the administration of 
the £30,000 fund, consisting of the delegates of the High Commissioner, Coloner Procter 
and M. Bumier, as well as of Mr. Ringland representing the American Relief 
Administration and Major Davis from the American Red Cross. *8
At the same meeting Mr. Fisher, the British member, enquired whether the cost was likely 
to exceed £30,000, and how soon the work could be completed. Nansen stated that the work 
in Constantinople was difficult, but that he was confident that satisfactory results would be 
gained. He also thought that the amount of £30,000 would certainly enable the larger part of 
the work to be carried out, but further urged that the money from the American Red Cross 
should be kept as a reserve fund, and the member states should contribute more. He stated 
that the guarantee could be given that if the Council obtained a favourable answer to his 
request, it would not be necessary to make any further demand.^^
In the end the total contribution made by member states of the League was even smaller 
than was first announced; only £11,700 was secured in this way. There was also some 
controversy about the £10,000 grant promised by the British government. The British seem 
to have originally promised the grant because they thought that it would come from a 
surplus of the money they had paid to the League of Nations in other instances.
All this even led to the suggestion by Emrys Evans from the Foreign Office that Britain 
should withdraw its offer of the grant of £10,000 to the League. Mr. Childs, who was 
working with the refugees in Serbia, however, informed Evans that the League had already 
collected the necessary £20,000 from other sources, and Evans’ suggestion, put down in the
Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/618. Report by Nansen to the League o f Nations Council 20.7.1922; FO 371/8159, File 
43, Paper N 8934. Report by Nansen to the Third Assembly 15.9.1922. PRO.
League o f Nations. Official Journal. August 1922, p. 807.
FO 371/9335, File 46, Paper N 6233. Report by Nansen 14.7.1923. PRO.
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Minutes of the Foreign Office, was destroyed.The letter of Emrys Evans to Philip Noel- 
Baker in September 1922 pointed out that in Evans’ opinion the fact that the sum of 
£10,000 had not been paid yet to the League’s account was due to a misunderstanding. it 
turned out that at that point the money had actually not been paid ‘owing to an oversight’, 
but the mistake was corrected and the money was paid to the League already during the 
same month. 93
Nevertheless, the British clearly seem to have felt that they should have been given more 
credit for their actions in the refugee question. This was expressed, for example, by Emrys 
Evans in his comment to the Report of the Fifth Committee to the League Assembly. His 
view was that Nansen had not treated Britain fairly in his reports, and no mention had been 
made of the British subscription of £10,000 towards the evacuation of refugees from 
Constantinople. 94 This criticism was not quite justified because Nansen had stated on 
several occasions that the British government had promised £10,000 for the evacuation, 
although in later reports it was not specifically pointed out that it was in fact Britain that 
had supplied £10,000 of the £11,700 provided by governments.
Between September 1922 and September 1923, a total of 13,286 refugees from 
Constantinople were resettled. Of these France took about 1,700 refugees, Yugoslavia about 
1,900, the USA over 2,000, Germany few hundred and Britain only 25 refugees. 95 The 
total number of refugees that were admitted to Britain from Constantinople probably did 
not exceed one hundred. Considering the British official attitude regarding the admission of 
Russian refugees this is not very surprising. During the next couple of months in 1923 the 
evacuations continued, so that for example in December a further 1,450 refugees were sent
9  ^ Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/618. Report by Mr. Childs on his visit to London and Paris (n.d).
92 Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/613. Emrys Evans to Philip Baker 13.9.1922.
92 Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/613. R.A. Leeper to Hon. C. Tufton 125.9.1922.
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to France, and smaller amounts to other countries. A few hundred refugees were also 
repatriated to Russia.
By far the biggest number of refugees was, however, taken in by the Bulgarian government. 
During the few months from the end 1922 to the beginning of 1923, it agreed to receive
1,000 invalids and as many workmen with their families, 600 children and 5,000 refugees 
from the American Relief Administration’s feeding list as well as many individual refugees. 
In his report to the Council in February 1923 Nansen pointed out that by this policy 
Bulgaria had offered home to no fewer than 75 per cent of 10,000 refugees that constituted 
the remaining refugee problem in Constantinople. However, it seems that the Bulgarian 
government did not take quite as many refugees as stated above, but something like 4,500 
refugees between September 1922 and 1923
Additionally, Jewish associations provided important assistance in the evacuation of Jewish 
refugees and with their help several hundred Jewish refugees were assisted to travel to 
Palestine and the USA. 9^ The Chairman of the Jewish Colonisation Association, Lucien 
Wolff, who was actively helping Nansen with the Jewish refugees, estimated that there 
were about 3,000 Jewish refugees in Constantinople in September 1922. Wolff considered 
that about half of them would need to be evacuated, and half would be absorbed locally.
The Council of the Colonisation Association placed a sum of 250,000 francs at the disposal 
of the Constantinople Office, which was to be administered in consultation with local 
Jewish societies and a special commissioner that had been sent to Constantinople by the 
association.
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According to Nansen’s report to the Council in July 1923, the High Commissariat had 
secured the evacuation of over 20,000 refugees to 44 different countries. All this had cost 
around £50,000; £26,000 of this was provided by governments and the American Red Cross 
and £23,300 by the High Commissariat from the private funds. In September 1923 
Nansen reported that the Constantinople problem had been practically solved even 
though some small-scale evacuations still continued. At the end of 1923, there were fewer 
than 7,000 refugees left in the city.
The closing of their frontiers by the Soviets in mid-1923 made the legal emigration of 
individual refugees or groups practically impossible. 0^4 The evacuations from the Turkish- 
ruled Constantinople were, however, made possible by the special agreements between the 
Turkish government and the High Commissioner. With the intermediate role of Nansen the 
Turks had introduced a special order in May 1923, under which the Russian refugees 
leaving Constantinople under the auspices of the League of Nations were exempted from 
paying all taxes except a small visa fee payment, and even this payment was waived as a 
result of representations by the High Commissariat. At his request, the Russian refugees 
were also exempted from having to produce Turkish identity certificates on departure.
The situation of the Russian refugees who had stayed in Constantinople got worse in 
January 1924 when the Turks handed over the Russian Embassy and the consulates in 
Constantinople to the Soviets. After this the High Commissioner’s Office took the semi­
official role of protecting the rights and interests of the few thousand Russian refugees who 
had stayed in Constantinople. Nansen stated that the situation of the refugees in 
Constantinople had become increasingly critical and for example the Russian organisations
League o f Nations. Official Journal. August 1923, p. 1042.
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in the town were severely suppressed. Therefore negotiations were started with the French 
government for further groups to be allowed to emigrate there.
The departure of refugees from Constantinople was, however, made more difficult by the 
decision of the Turkish government that all Russian refugees intending to leave 
Constantinople would have to obtain a special Turkish passport marked ‘Russian political 
refugee’. In 1926, under the pressure from the Soviets, the Turkish authorities also 
issued a decree that before 1 August 1927, all Russian refugees were obliged to either 
obtain Soviet or Turkish nationality, or leave the country. An appeal was made by the High 
Commissioner and it was once again answered by the American charitable organisations. 
With their help about 4,700 Russians were evacuated. About 1,400 remained in 
Constantinople, the majority of whom would apply for Turkish nationality,
5.4. Agreement Between the British Government and the High Commissioner
While participating in the international efforts for the assistance Russian refugees, the 
British government remained very occupied with the refugees it still maintained in camps in 
Egypt and Cyprus, as well as in Serbia. As stated earlier, the government was clearly of the 
opinion that the British expenditure towards these refugees had already been too high and 
different ways to end the British responsibility for them were continuously explored. 
Attempts had been made to come to an agreement with the Serbian government on their 
acceptance of the refugees in return for a lump sum of money. The Soviet government had 
also been approached by the British with a request of granting a general amnesty to all 
Russian refugees, which would enable their repatriation to Russia. At the end of 1921 
neither one of these attempts had, however, proved successful.
 ^ Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/623. Report by the High Commissioner on Russian refugees, 6 March 1924. C. 103. 
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At the time Nansen was appointed as High Commissioner, the British were ever more eager 
to bring the maintenance of Russian refugees from public funds to an end. The British 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Cecil Harmsworth’s statement in June 1921 
clearly shows that British were getting quite nervous about continuation of British 
resources being used on the maintenance of Russian refugees. In his comment on the
refugees he used quite strong and outspoken language by stating that ‘these Cossacks, 
Kalmuks, priests, generals, judges and ladies constituted nothing but intolerable nuisance’. 
He continued that if the International Red Cross could not arrange matters the British 
should seriously consider informing the able bodied refugees that, at least after a certain 
date in the near future, the British government was going to discontinue their dole.^^^ This, 
however, was an exceptionally forcible comment and the other Foreign Office statements 
were not quite so outspoken, although there was clearly a consensus at the Foreign Office 
on the importance of solving the question in the near future.
After the appointment of Nansen as the High Commissioner the British, as well as the other 
League of Nations members, placed their hope on him being able to solve the refugee 
problem in a short period. Both Nansen and the two Great Powers, France and Britain, 
shared the view that the best solution for the problem would be the return of the majority of 
the refugees to their homeland. Nansen personally started his work as the High 
Commissioner with the hope that a large part of the refugee problem could be solved by 
repatriation in a similar way to that which he had organised an earlier exercise for prisoners 
of war.^^o Because of serious famine in Russia during 1921 the negotiations with the Soviet 
government on repatriation were not, nevertheless, started until the summer of 1922. 
Negotiations with Krestinskii, the Soviet representative in Berlin were started in August.
Initial success in the matter was gained through the agreement between Nansen and the 
Soviet government in the provisions of the repatriation plan in the autumn of 1922.
’08 skran 1995, p. 149.
109 pQ 371/6867, File 38, Paper N 6310. Cecil Harmsworth’s comment 20.6.1921. PRO. 
’ ’ 0 Simpson 1939, p. 202.
201
Included in these provisions was the consent of the Soviet government to state explicitly 
that the provisions of the general amnesty of November 1921 applied to all returnees. Also 
importantly, Nansen would be allowed to appoint representatives in Russia who could stay 
in contact with the refugees who had returned to Russia. In addition to these provisions, the 
Soviet government also agreed that refugees who had returned to Russia could visit foreign 
countries in small groups and tell their compatriots about life in Soviet Russia.
The repatriation of small groups of refugees started in October 1922 from Bulgaria, which 
was the only host country that agreed to allow the Soviet Red Cross delegation to supervise 
the process. In the beginning everything went well and repatriation proceeded according to 
the agreement. However, after a few months the agreement started to fail. After the initial 
approval of the Soviet government to allow refugee delegations to Bulgaria, it soon stated 
that reports from the High Commissioner should be a sufficient way of informing potential 
returnees. The problems were also intensified by the reports in the Russian émigré press 
that the Soviets shot many of the refugees that returned to Russia. As a consequence of 
these claims the High Commissioner’s Office investigated the issue but they could not find 
any evidence of mass killings, although it confirmed that many former officers, for 
example, had disappeared mysteriously. These events nevertheless further increased the 
unwillingness of Russian émigrés to return to Russia under Bolshevik rule.
Despite the awkward news, pressures for repatriation increased and other governments, 
such as Poland, Romania, Albania and France wanted to extend the agreement to the 
refugees in their countries. Before any plans were carried out, the whole issue took a 
different turn because of the overthrow and murder of Stamboliiskii in June 1923, the pro- 
Soviet head of the Bulgarian government with the aid of some White Russians. After the 
incident both the Soviet and the Bulgarian governments refused to restart repatriation and it 
also brought to end the repatriation plan in general. Altogether only 3,000 refugees were 
repatriated from Constantinople, as well as about 6,000 mostly Cossack refugees from
 ^  ^  ^ Skran 1995, pp. 151-53.
202
Bulgaria and Greece. At a more general level, the repatriation plan was also very 
vulnerable because it clearly lacked the large-scale support of Russian émigrés, which, as 
stated by Samuel Ho are ‘is essential to the success of any relief or protection schemes’.
This was something that Nansen probably should have considered more carefully.
The repatriation issue also culminated in accusations against Nansen by Russian émigrés. 
Interestingly, these accusations were initiated by the Russian émigré organisations in 
Britain. A resolution was passed by various émigré organisations in London and published 
in The Times on 27 August 1923, pointing out the undesirability of the fact that the famine 
relief and refugee work were concentrated in the hands of one person, namely Nansen.
Their view was that since his work for Russian famine victims necessitated him having 
good relations with the Bolshevik leaders, he could not act according to the interests of 
Russian émigrés as High Commissioner. Thus, because of this ‘conflict of interest’ the 
émigrés appealed to the League of Nations to appoint a new High Commissioner for 
Russian refugees.
The appeal of the émigré organisations was directed to Lord Robert Cecil, British delegate 
to the Council of the League. The letter was signed by the representatives of eight Russian 
organisations: the Russian Red Cross (old organisation), Russian Refugees Relief 
Association, Russian Relief Fund, Russian Academic Group, Russian Self-Help 
Association, Russian Children’s Welfare Association, Russian Army and Navy Ex-Service 
Men’s Association and the Northern Association. The Russian National Committee also 
individually approached the League of Nations on the question and stated their view that it 
would be desirable to appoint some other person than Nansen as High Commissioner.^’^
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In the letter it was pointed out that the Russian colony in London did not require the 
immediate assistance of the High Commissioner. It was, however, precisely because they 
were ‘enjoying the peaceable hospitality of Great Britain’ and were conscious of their 
independence, that it was their duty to draw the attention to the situation of less fortunate 
refugees. According to the opinion of these organisations Nansen had completely failed to 
understand the psychology of Russian émigrés and had more than once expressed himself 
in sympathy with the Soviet authorities. An example of this was that he had even been 
elected an honorary member of the Moscow Soviet. His repatriation policy was similarly an 
unfortunate idea because, according to émigré opinion, repatriation to Soviet Russia was 
very different from return to Russia freed from Bolshevism. This was the reason for the fact 
that only about 6,000 Russians had so far consented to be repatriated. Therefore the émigrés 
appealed to the League of Nations to appoint a special High Commissioner for Russian 
refugees in replacement of Nansen. This, according to the undersigned should be a person 
‘who would not be in any way associated with the Russian government, and could deal with 
the refugee problem with an open mind’. ’
Interestingly, the opinions of two important British individuals, who both had important 
roles in the refugee work, were divided on the issue. The émigrés gained some support from 
Sir Samuel Hoare, head of the Constantinople Office. In his letter to Robert Cecil he 
pointed out that the signatories of the appeal represented the most reasonable and 
representative Russian emigrants in London. Hoare also stated that even though he had 
never been prejudiced against Nansen, he had always considered it a mistake to combine 
the roles of famine relief and refugee work together. In his opinion the active co-operation 
of the Russian émigrés was essential to the success of any relief and protection schemes. 
This he had seen in his work in Constantinople better than anywhere else. According to him 
the success of his work for the dispersal of the refugees in Constantinople was based to the 
fact that he had the unquestioned support of émigrés which guaranteed their co-operation.
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With these facts in mind, Hoare enquired if it would be possible to appoint, for example, 
‘some liberal minded British conservative, who would enjoy the trust of the émigrés, to 
supervise Nansen’s work’.
Hoare’s comments are actually quite surprising, after all, he worked closely with Nansen on 
the Constantinople refugee problem and their co-operation seemed to work smoothly. He 
might have, however, felt obliged to defend the émigré opinion, since they had highly 
appreciated his work in Constantinople. According to Russian érpigrés ‘the activities of Sir 
Samuel Hoare was like a ray of sunshine through clouds’, Cecil Harmsworth from the 
Foreign Office had approached Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, in March 1922 already 
with a view that the appointment of Nansen had been unfortunate, as at the time of the 
appointment he had been already fully occupied by his work in connection with famine 
relief. Harmsworth’s view was that Nansen should be induced to hand over his duties as 
High Commissioner to some other person, preferably Sir Samuel Hoare, if  he would be 
willing to undertake the job.
Robert Cecil, however, held a completely different point of view and he strongly rejected 
all accusations against Nansen. In his letter to Samuel Hoare he pointed out that Nansen 
was not dealing with famine relief any more, in other words that particular point did not 
arise any more. Cecil further stated that he considered Nansen ‘a man of the highest 
possible character and disinterestedness, no matter what Hoare’s Russian friends may say 
of him’. He also believed that the accusations that the repatriated refugees had been killed 
were utterly untrue. Even more surprising was his last comment, according to which he 
suspected that the attitude expressed by the émigrés had been encouraged by the French in 
order to ‘spike his guns’ at the League. He concluded that even though he was not anti- 
French, he nevertheless disliked some of their methods of diplomacy, Unfortunately, he
 ^  ^^  Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/625. Samuel Hoare to Robert Cecil 24.8.1923.
 ^ Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/625. The appeal by Russian émigrés to Lord Cecil 13.8.1923.
 ^ FO 371/8154, File 43, Paper N 2120. Cecil Harmsworth to Lord Curzon 8.3.1922. PRO.
Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/625. Robert Cecil to Samuel Hoare 28.8.1923.
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did not clarify these ‘disliked’ methods, and how they possibly differed from the British 
diplomatic measures.
Cecil’s strong support for Nansen undoubtedly helped to save him from further 
considerations of his suitability for the position. Also importantly, if somewhat 
surprisingly, the Conference of Russian Ambassadors in Paris unanimously adopted a 
resolution in September stating the importance of Nansen’s work continuing. The 
resolution was signed by Maklakov, ambassador to France and the former Russian 
Ambassadors to Rome, Constaninople, Japan and Washington, as well as by E.V. Sablin, 
the Russian Chargé d ’Affaires in London. That Sablin was among the signatories is 
especially surprising, since he was the representative of the Russian émigrés in Britain, and 
it would have therefore been more likely for him to support the opinion of the London 
émigré circles. Under the signatories of the resolution were also the representatives of the 
most respected émigré organisations, like the Union of Zemstvos and Towns, the Save the 
Children Fund and the ICRC. The Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner, 
composed of the main Russian and other relief organisations, also strongly backed Nansen 
and hoped that his work would continue.
Britain, on the other hand, after the fhistrating negotiations with the Serbian and Soviet 
governments, had started negotiations with the High Commissioner at the beginning of 
1922 on the acceptance of the remainder of the refugees under British control. The British 
government offered the High Commissioner £150,000 if he would accept the responsibility 
for the remaining 4,600 refugees maintained by the British. Most of them were in Egypt, 
Cyprus and Serbia, in addition to few refugees at Malta and T u z l a . ^ 2 2
After a few months’ negotiations, an agreement was reached between Nansen and the 
British government, and on 1 May 1922 Nansen took the responsibility for these refugees in 
consideration of the payment of £150,000. Colonel Procter, assisted by Mr. Childs, was
Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/625. Comments to the appeal of Russian émigré by (?). 
122 PQ 371/8154  ^ FMe 43, Paper N 1791. Russian refugees, FO Minutes 24.2.1922. PRO.
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given direct responsibility for the administration of these funds Nansen expressed his 
satisfaction at the fact that Procter ‘had in a very full degree the confidence and support of 
the government of Great Britain’, as well as pointing out that he could not ‘express in too 
warm terms his admiration for and appreciation of the work carried out by Colonel
Procter’.'24
Without doubt the British individuals who worked on the Russian refugee problem in 
Constantinople and elsewhere, such as Samuel Hoare, Colonel Procter, General Harington 
and Sir Horace Rumbold took their job very seriously and worked unselfishly for the 
settlement of the problem. However, at the same time they had to take into consideration 
the ‘national interests’ of their own government. Thus, Samuel Hoare, for example, stated 
that the League should take responsibility for the refugees under British control because it 
could work more effectively for the ending of the problem. He was also firmly of the 
opinion, that the sum of money offered by the British was sufficient for the League to take 
care of the problem. '25 Clearly, even if Hoare was sincere in believing that transferring the 
refugees to the care of the High Commissioner was the most effective way of dealing with 
the problem, he also realised the importance of the question for the British government. 
Because of his position he undoubtedly used his influence in the decision-making process 
of the League of Nations.
In the end the agreement between Nansen and the British government nevertheless was a 
practical solution because the High Commissioner, Colonel Procter and Mr. Childs 
managed to carry out the dispersal of the refugees from the camps, mostly to Bulgaria. 
Agreement was also reached with the Yugoslavian government on their responsibility for 
1,500 refugees in their territory. In March 1923 Nansen stated that the task of liquidating 
his responsibilities in respect of these refugees had been mostly accomplished, and he was 
even expecting to be able to show a substantial saving on the whole transaction. According
'23 FO 371/8155, File 43, Paper N 3192. Cabinet Secretariat to F 31.3.1922. PRO. 
'24 League o f Nations. Official Journal. March 1923, p. 387.
'23 League of Nations. Official Journal. May 1922, p. 402.
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to the agreement between the British government and Nansen, the High Commissioner 
could keep half of the savings on the £150,000 transaction, to be used as emergency relief 
for other refugees in Constantinople and elsewhere^^^
In the end Nansen managed to make a quite substantial saving on the transaction by 
completing the work at the cost of £110,000. The surplus due to the High Commissioner 
was included in this sum, which meant that the actual cost of the operation was 
approximately £70,000. At the beginning of May 1923 the League of Nations informed the 
Foreign Office that instructions had been given to Hambros Bank to pay £20,000 of the 
anticipated surplus to the British government ’27. The latter half of the surplus was probably 
paid later during 1923.
Thus, the British managed to end their responsibilities at a cost of less than a half of one 
year’s maintenance of refugees in Egypt, Cyprus and Serbia during 1921, when the 
government had spent approximately £20,000 a month towards the upkeep of r e f u g e e s . ’ 28  
The British government naturally appreciated the effective manner in which the High 
Commissioner managed to settle the ‘British’ refugees in Bulgaria and elsewhere. In 
conversations between Sir Frederick Butler and Mr. Robinson from the FO and Mr. Lodge 
and Johnson as representatives of the League of Nations, the former pointed out that the 
British government had very little reason to complaint about the manner in which the High 
Commissioner had settled the questions. At the time of the agreement the British were still 
spending £145,000 a year on the maintenance of refugees in Egypt and Cyprus alone, so by 
capitalising their liability at £110,000, the British clearly should not have had too many 
reasons to be dissatisfied. ’29
League o f Nations. Official Journal. March 1923, pp. 392-93.
127 PQ 371/9335  ^Füe 46, Paper N 3970 and N 4022. League of Nations to FO 2.5.1923 and Hambros Bank to FO 
4.5.1922. PRO.
’28 Johnson 1938, p. 236.
’29 Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/622. Record o f the conversations between Sir Frederic Butler and Mr. Robinson o f the 
FO and Messrs. Lodge and Johnson, 19-20.2.1924.
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Despite this there were, however, some disagreements on the terms of the agreement, due to 
the War Office argument that it had spent money on refugees after they ceased to be a 
British responsibility. According to Philip Noel-Baker, the War Office did not, however, 
have any valid claim for the £14,500.’
Consequently, conversations were held in the British Foreign Office between the Foreign 
Office and League of Nations representatives. The League of Nations representatives 
pointed out that the Foreign Office appeared to assume it had sorne say in the expenditure 
of Dr. Nansen’s share, which, according to their opinion, was not the case. They also stated 
that the League took no liability for the expenditure that had incurred to the British without 
the High Commissioner’s consent, nor did the League have any liability before 9 June, 
when the payment was completed by the British, opposed to 1 May, when it was supposed 
to have been paid. Moreover, the League had no liability for maintenance of refugees at all, 
as delays in effecting departure before the agreed date were due to the British government. 
The League also refused to take responsibility for expenditure after the departure of 
refugees, since that was ‘camp liquidation’, for which the High Commissioner was not 
responsible.
The League of Nations expressed their strong view that if the British government still 
maintained all their claims, the High Commissioner had no alternative but to refer the 
question to arbitration. The Foreign Office, from its side, expressed the hope that 
everything possible would be done to avoid ‘such an unfortunate solution of the 
difficulty’.’3’ In May 1924 Mr. Johnson approached Philip Noel-Baker with a note that the 
League of Nations was offering £1,380 to be repaid to the British government, a sum based 
on a general average of the cost of the maintenance of the refugees in Bulgaria, taken over a 
period of one year.’^^  According to Johnson, the League’s memorandum in its present form
Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/622. Philip Baker to T. Lodge, Paris 10.7.1923.
’  ^’ Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/622. Record of conversations between Sir Frederick Butler and Mr. Robinson o f the FO 
and Messrs. Lodge and Johnson at the FO, 19-20.2.1924.
Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/622. T.F Johnson to Philip Baker 14.5.1924.
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was ‘irresistible’, and he was of the opinion that the Foreign Office would certainly accept 
this offer. Although there is no information about the final result, it seems very probably 
that the Foreign Office accepted this offer. After all, it was well aware of the fact that 
without the agreement the British government would still be spending considerable 
amounts on the maintenance of these refugees.
5.5 Successes and Failures in the Work of the High Commissioner
From the very beginning of the work of the High Commissioner, it became evident that one 
of the greatest difficulties in dispersing the refugees to countries where they had fiiends or 
relatives who could help them financially or where they had possibilities in obtaining 
employment, was the problem of obtaining the necessary documents for travelling. This 
problem was especially acute in Constantinople, where the evacuation of refugees was 
impeded by the lack of necessary identity and travel documents. Most of the refugees had 
no papers at all, and those who possessed passports of the old regime were faced with the 
fact that few countries were willing to recognise them.
In addition two Soviet decrees at the end of 1921 deprived of Russian nationality those 
Russians who had lived abroad for a period of five years and had not obtained a Soviet 
passport and those who were residing abroad and had failed to register with the Soviet 
representatives. These degrees had also stripped of citizenship those who had left the 
country voluntarily after November 1917 without permission of the Russian authorities. 
Basically all Russian refugees fell under these provisions, as the far majority of them were 
determined not to obtain Soviet citizenship. Russian refugees had thus become legally 
stateless.
Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/622. Philip Baker to T.F. Johnson 19.5.1924. 
Johnson 1938, p. 259.
Simpson 1939, p. 233.
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Because of this situation, Nansen was determined to find a solution to the problem of the 
legal status of refugees and provide the refugees with some form of identity papers and 
visas. The Russian organisations mainly shared the opinion that the diplomatic and consular 
authorities of the old regime should continue to issue the passports of that regime. This 
suggestion also gained support from some governments. An alternative proposal was also 
put forward by the Russian organisations that protective passports should be issued by the 
Allied powers. None of the Allied governments, however, embraced this idea.
In this situation Nansen initiated the idea of an identity certificate for Russian refugees that 
would be internationally recognised. The issue of the legal status of refugees had been 
discussed already in the first Intergovernmental Conferences of August and September 
1921. At the first Conference two suggestions were made: the first that the necessary papers 
should be issued by the states where the refugees had found a temporary refuge; the second 
that these papers should be issued by the High Commissioner. Nansen discussed these 
proposals with the ILO, as well as with the Conference of Private Organisations, and in the 
end decided that the first proposal was preferable. After this he started to prepare concrete 
proposals concerning the granting of papers of identity, to be circulated to the member 
states of the League.
In his report of 13 May1922 to the League Council Nansen stated that he had received a 
number of replies from governments regarding the certificates of identity and visas. With 
regard to the granting of visas, Nansen had urged that the members of the League should 
agree to grant them free of charge. In relation to that he had received a reply from British 
government, according to which it had undertaken to grant all visas for Russian refugees 
free of charge. Similar replies were received from the Greek and Polish governments. The 
Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian governments already issued free visas, as did the Serbian 
government in certain cases. The French and Swiss governments had intimated that visas 
would be granted free of charge to those who had no means of paying them. Nansen urged
Johnson 1938, pp. 259-260.
League o f Nations. Official Journal. April 1922, p. 348.
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other governments to give their reply as soon as possible and pointed out the importance of 
the provision that the visas should be granted free of charge.
With regards to identity papers, the British government agreed to the proposal of Nansen to 
grant identity certificates on the model Nansen had circulated, as well as to grant them free 
of charge. The French government, on the other hand, replied that it was not legally 
possible for it to do that, but Nansen nevertheless trusted that there might be some way to 
overcome the difficulty. The French also proposed a Conference of Government 
representatives for the consideration of the government replies and for the elaboration of a 
common scheme in the matter. As a consequence of this proposal, Nansen convened an 
intergovernmental conference on 3-5 July 1922 which was attended by sixteen 
governments, including amongst others, the British, French, German, Czechoslovak, Polish 
and Yugoslav governments.
At this conference all the governments that were present agreed to the arrangement which 
created a special certificate of identity for Russian refugees, the so called ‘Nansen 
passport’. T h e  document, even though it became generally known as Nansen passport, 
was not identical to a national passport. It was an identity certificate, which, however, could 
be used as a travel document after a visa was granted by government o f f i c i a l s . The  
governments represented adopted an unanimous resolution under which the member states 
of the League and the governments of all other countries interested in the Russian refugee 
problem were recommended to adopt this form of identity certificate for their territory, and 
to recognise similar documents issued by other governments,
This resolution importantly marked the beginning of international refugee law. Under the 
terms of the agreement the documents were valid only for one year after which it was
League o f Nations. Official Journal. June 1922, pp. 615-16.
139 Skran 1995, pp. 91-92, 104.
Holborn, Louise W. ‘The League o f Nations and the Refugee Problem’. The Annals o f  the American Academy. May 
1939, p. 126.
1^1 League o f Nations. Official Journal. November 1922, p. 1138.
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renewable by the authorities of the state in which the refugee was resident. The documents 
did not, however, confer the right to return to the country of issue, unless endorsement of 
that was made on the certificate. Neither did they provide for equal treatment with citizens 
in regard to labour permits, social security, taxation and many other matters 4^2, The 
documents were originally to be issued only to Russian refugees, but the arrangement did 
not contain a precise definition of a refugee; it merely stated that they should be granted to 
refugees of Russian origin who had not acquired another nationality. Later they were 
extended to Armenian refugees by the Arrangement of 31 May 1924, and to Assyrian, 
Assyro-Chaldean and Turkish refugees by the Arrangement of 30 June 1928. The 
documents did not, however, ever become available, for example, to Italian refugees or 
stateless persons in general. 4^3
The member states of the League of Nations adopted the system of Nansen passports in a 
creditable manner. In March 1923 Nansen reported that twenty governments had agreed to 
adopt the certificate, and to recognise similar certificates issued by other g o v e r n m e n t s .  4^4 
By September 1923 altogether thirty-one governments had signed the arrangement on 
identity certificates. By1925 the number had risen into forty and in 1929 over fifty 
governments had agreed on the arrangement. 4^5
As already mentioned the British government was among the governments that agreed to 
the proposal of identity documents at a very early stage. In his letter to Emrys Evans at the 
Foreign Office, Philip Noel-Baker recognised that the success of the proceedings was very 
much promoted hy a declaration on the part of the British delegate that they were entirely 
ready to accept the proposals on identity p a p e r s .  4^6 the conference the British 
representative, Mr. Parkin, stated that the British government was prepared to grant the 
certificates free of charge to all Russian refugees at present residing in the UK. It agreed to
^42 Holborn. The Annals o f the American Academy.. May 1939, p. 126.
^43 Skran 1995, pp. 104-05; Simpson 1939, pp. 239-40.
^44 League o f Nations. Official Journal. March 1923}, p. 387.
145 Skran 1995, p. 105.
146 Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/613. Philip Baker to I Emrys Evans 8.9.1922.
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grant visas free of charge on all certificates of the same type granted by other governments. 
However, the British were eager to point out that the acceptance of the proposed certificate 
did not mean that the British would allow the Russians freely to enter British territory. 
Moreover, according to British opinion the granting of a certificate of identity would not, in 
any way, hinder control, hut on the contrary the certificates would make possible a more 
effective control than at present existed,
In practice a charge of five shillings was made for the issue of the Nansen passport in 
Britain, although it was stated that this fee would be remitted in the case of refugees who 
were destitute. The certificates were issued by the Chief Inspector of the Aliens Branch of 
the Home Office. Dr. Golden, the representative of the High Commissioner in Britain, 
was informed about the British consent to issue certificates of identity to the Russian 
refugees in the UK, as well as to recognise similar certificates issued by other countries. 
However, it was also carefully pointed out that these actions did not involve any relaxation 
of the British policy with regard to the exclusion of refugees from Britain. Furthermore, 
visas for the UK would not be granted to the holders of Nansen passports unless they were 
clearly eligible for visas under the existing regulations, or otherwise, unless special 
authorisation had bee given in any particular case.^ "^  ^Thus, it is certain that had the 
arrangement obliged the signatory countries to accept the unrestricted immigration of the 
Russian refugees who held Nansen passports between countries, Britain certainly would not 
have accepted it.
The willingness of the British government to recognise the Nansen passport for Russian 
refugees was probably also facilitated by fact that the number of Russian refugees in Britain 
was relatively small. Compared to, for example, France and Germany, the impact of the 
new arrangement would not be as important as in the countries in which there were a large 
number of Russian émigrés without valid identity documents. There is, however, no exact
Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/624. Conference on passports for Russian refugees 4.7.1922.
HO 45/19995, File 419986/5. HO to the Government Secretary, Government offices 22.9.1922. PRO. 
Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/619. H. M. Montgomery to Dr. Golden, Save the Children Fund 27.10.1922.
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information on the application of the Nansen passport system in Britain, for example how 
many of them were issued in the 1920s. In the 1926 League of Nations report on the 
application of the Nansen passport system Britain was not even mentioned among major 
host countries, i.e. those over 1,000 refugees. Why this was so is unclear, since there 
clearly must have been more than 1,000 Russian refugees in Britain at that time. The 
practice of the British government regarding certificates was that the Russian refugees were 
not required to hold them while in Britain but the passports were nevertheless required if 
they wanted to travel abroad.
The practices of other governments regarding Nansen passports also varied greatly. Thus, 
for example the German government, although working actively in the international regime 
by attending the meetings and conferences as well as by ratifying all the major 
arrangements for Russian refugees, did not in practice issue many Nansen passports. This 
practice was linked to the fact that the government preferred to deal with the former 
Russian authorities, and if  possible with the Soviet representatives. Also, for example, 
the Polish and Finnish governments adopted the passport system in principle but issued 
them only to a small fraction of refugees in their territory.
On the other hand, some countries used the system very effectively, for instance, 
Yugoslavia, Latvia and Czechoslovakia. All these countries issued certificates practically to 
all Russian refugees in their territory. Also in France, the refugees could easily obtain the 
certificates, although for example in the League’s statistics on the application of the Nansen 
certificates, no data is given for France. Russian émigrés in France could also apply for 
certificates on various questions of civil status from ‘Offices Russes’ that were given a 
definite legal status and worked in co-operation with representatives of the Nansen
Application of the Nansen Passport System for Russian refugees, 1926. A. 44. 1926, pp. 9-10. Reproduced in Skran 
1995, p. 121.
Simpson 1939, pp. 266-267.
W illiams 1972, pp. 144-45.
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Office. The Central Office under V.A. Maklakov acted on behalf of the regional offices 
as a link with the Nansen representative and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In 1925 the French government nevertheless informed the British that the only form of 
Russian passport that was properly recognised in France was the Nansen certificate and that 
no bodies representing the former Russian governments were authorised to issue passports 
any more. The French Consul General also informed the British Home Office that he was 
no longer entitled to visa passports delivered by the ‘Russian Refugees Relief and 
Travelling Permit Office’, located in the Consulate of the former Russian Provisional 
government in London, but visas for France could only be issued to holders of the Nansen 
certificates.
The Relief and Travelling Permit Office in London had been entitled to issue passports of 
the ‘old regime’ for Russians in Britain, in addition to Nansen passports, which were issued 
solely by the Aliens Branch of the Home Office. The British Labour government had 
considered the future of the Office in the early 1924, after their recognition of the Soviet 
government. There is no specific information of these considerations, but judged by the 
statement of the French Consul General, the Office continued to function at least under the 
Conservative government during 1925. However, it seems to be clear that its status was 
necessarily soon reduced, especially since in future the Nansen certificate was to become 
the ‘only accepted form of passport’ for the Russian émigrés also in many other countries, 
in addition to France, as opposed to the passports of the ‘old regime’.
The issue of the identity documents, however, also raises the more general question of the 
definition of ‘Russian refugee’, above all the somewhat ambiguous attitude of the British
Simpson 1939, pp. 299-300; Skran 1995, p. 120; Adams, Walter. ‘Refugees in Europe’. Annals o f the American 
Academy o f Political and Social Sciences. May 1939, p. 42.
Schaufuss, Tatiana.’The White Russian Refugees’. The Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and Social 
Sciences. May 1939, p. 49.
HO 45/19995, File 419986/50. British Passport Control Office, Paris to Major E.H. Spencer, Passport Control 
Department, FO 16.7.1925 and French Consul-General to Mr. Porter, HO 27.7.1925. PRO.
156 PQ 372/2093, File 1816, Paper T 1816. FO Minute by Major Spencer 18.2.1924. PRO.
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government to the question. The British government clearly seems to have had a kind of 
‘twin-track policy’ towards Russian refugees. In relation to the entry to Britain it was 
strictly pointed out that as a general rule no Russian refugees were admitted and in any case 
people were not admitted because they were ‘refugees’ but for various business or personal 
reasons. This again was facilitated by the fact that the British immigration legislation did 
not contain a statutory recognition of the right of asylum for refugees. At the same time the 
government participated in the Russian refugee question in the international arena for 
example by accepting the arrangement on identity certificates for Russian refugees and was 
therefore also implying its willingness to recognise them as a special group, as well as to 
agree to a common practice towards them. It is, however, clear that at no point was the 
government willing to make concessions on its individual policies, for example, regarding 
the admission of Russian refugees to Britain.
By 1924 it had, nevertheless, also become clear that the administration of the refugee 
question through the office of High Commissioner was inadequate. The administrative 
funds for the High Commissioner’s office were further reduced in 1923 and 1924, which 
made the work of the office even more difficult than earlier is?, in June Nansen reminded 
the League Council that his appointment was supposed to be only temporary. He also 
pointed out that the process of repatriation of refugees had been disappointing and that a 
large problem of settlement and employment of the refugees still existed, France being the 
only European country, which was able to absorb labour on a large scale. Nansen’s opinion 
was that the problems of employment, settlement and migration should be placed in the 
hands of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) which could deal with them more 
effectively. His proposal also had the support of the Director of the ILO, Albert Thomas.
The proposal was approved by the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations in September 
1924 and in January 1925 the refugee work was transferred to the ILO. The opinions of the
Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/619. Philip Baker to Major Johnson 5.2.1923 and 4/623. Report by Nansen, 6 March 
1924.
League ofN ations. Official Journal. July 1924, pp. 5, 962-63; Simpson 1939, p. 203.
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delegates were not, however, unanimous. The most enthusiastic supporter for the transfer 
was the French delegate, Mr. Sarraut. The British representative, Mrs. Swanwick, also 
strongly objected to the opinion of the South African delegate that finding jobs for refugees 
did not fall within the scope of the League ofNations. She pointed out that refugee 
assistance fell within the broad mandate of the League ofNations to promote international 
co-operation. In the Governing body of the ILO, Nansen’s proposal was not met eagerly. A 
reluctant acceptance was, nevertheless, made shortly after the resolution of the Fifth 
Assembly.
The change that occurred in the refugee work was more than a formal one, but it did not 
mean an absolute rejection of the old system. Nansen, for example remained as High 
Commissioner, although he turned his attention more to Armenian refugees and to their 
resettlement schemes, as well as to the creation of a Revolving Fund for refugee 
settlement. He, nevertheless, suggested at the Council meeting in December 1924 that 
questions of political character might arise, which might not fall within the normal 
competence of the ILO, and suggested that he would continue co-operating in this 
connection with the ILO. His proposal was approved by the Council,
The staff of the High Commissioner’s Office were transferred from the League’s Secretariat 
to the ILO, and Major T.F. Johnson, Nansen’s former assistant, became the head of the 
Refugee Section at the ILO. Between 1925 and 1929 it provided a unique service in the 
area of finding employment for refugees by making enquiries on conditions, occupations 
and employment possibilities in different European countries, as well as by arranging 
transportation and emigration of refugees to countries that offered work. In order to 
overcome immigration restrictions, prevailing in most European countries, the Refugee 
Service started a mission to South American countries to investigate possibilities for 
refugee settlement there.
Simpson 1939, pp. 203-04; Skran 1995, pp. 189-190.
Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/612. League ofNations. Report of the work for the refugees by the ILO. 
Skran 1995, p. 190; Simpson p. 204.
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This mission was headed by Colonel Procter, who had already done remarkable work for 
refugees in Constantinople. It spent five months in Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguay searching out possibilities for employment for Russian refugees. The report stated 
that there was great demand for agricultural and industrial labourers for example in 
Argentina and B r a z i l .  *^2 Despite promising circumstances, the problems in finding 
financing for the plan, especially because of the reluctance of European countries to 
contribute to the scheme, however, meant that in the end only 450 refugees managed to be 
placed, primarily to A r g e n t i n a .  *^ 3 Despite the failure of the ‘colonisation’ project, the 
Refugee Service of the ILO made important progress in finding employment for refugees 
more generally. Overall, the Refugee Service claimed to have found work for 60,000 
refugees during the years 1925 and 1929. The largest numbers of placing were, as earlier, in 
France, facilitated by active employment policy of French employers. ^^ 4
Meanwhile, the attention of the League ofNations had turned to the shortcomings of the 
Nansen certificate system. The system clearly lacked uniformity, for example in regard to 
fees. The refugees themselves considered the passports unsatisfactory, as they only 
confirmed the stateless status of their holders. In the words of Vladimir Nabokov, holding a 
Nansen passport was like ‘being a criminal on parole’. i66
Consequently, some of the defects of the original scheme were corrected in the 
Arrangement of 12 May 1926. The Conference, which resulted in the signing of the 
Arrangement, was attended by twenty-five countries, including Britain. An important 
provision of the arrangement was the definition of Russian and Armenian refugees, 
provided for the first time. The term ‘refugee’ was defined in the following way: Russian 
refugee is ‘Any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy or who no longer enjoys the
162 Philip Noel-Baker papers 4/612. League of nations. Report o f the work for the refugees by the ILO.
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protection of the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and who has not 
acquired another nationality’ The arrangement also included certain additions to the 
original arrangement, for example, the inclusion of children under 15 years of age on their 
parents certificates and agreement on transit visas to indigent refugees. Importantly, the 
arrangement also included agreement that the documents should confer the right to return to 
the country of issue, which had been considered one of the most serious shortcomings of 
the original agreement.
At the conference the arrangement was signed by the representatives of 22 states, including 
the British representative, Haldane Porter. However, for some reason the British 
government did not ratify the Arrangement, despite its initial willingness to do so in the 
Conference. According to the information provided by the League ofNations Treaty Series 
of 1929, the arrangement was in force between twenty countries. Britain was not mentioned 
among these countries, although Ireland adopted the arrangement in February 1927. ^^ 9 One 
can only speculate that after more careful consideration the British government found some 
of its provisions ‘against its national interests’. Perhaps it was the provision for the right of 
the refugee to return to the country of issue that was found unsuitable by the British 
government. In fact, this rule was only adopted by Britain in 1937. '^^  ^ On the other hand, it 
should be noted that the Arrangement in any case could only make recommendations, at no 
point could it actually impose legal actions upon states.
Under the Arrangement of 12 May 1926, the so called ‘Nansen stamp’ scheme was also 
introduced. The basic proposal was that a stamp, costing 5 gold francs, would be affixed to 
the original document. This was meant to be a kind of duty, collected from the well-to-do 
for the benefit of the poorer and the price of the stamp was not to be obligatory for those
 ^ League ofNations. Official Journal. July 1926, p. 985. Arrangement relating to the issue o f Identity Certificates for 
Russian and Armenian refugees, supplementing and amending the previous arrangements dated 5 July and 31 May 1924. 
League ofNations. Official Journal. July 1926, pp. 983-86; Simpson 1939, p. 240.
League ofNations. Treaty Series 1929, Vol. LXXXIX, pp. 48-52. Document no. 2004. Arrangement relating to the 
issue o f identity certificates to Russian and Armenian Refugees, signed at Geneva May 12, 1926.
 ^ Simpson 1939, p. 242.
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refugees who could not afford paying it. Although the system was not always received with 
sympathy it, nevertheless, benefited refugees as a group, because a fund was established 
through the sale of these stamps. Through the provision of small loans for establishing 
businesses, for example, many refugees were assisted in their attempts to become self- 
supporting.
Interestingly, especially since the government did not ratify the 1926 Arrangement, Britain 
also seemed to have adopted the Nansen stamp scheme at least to some extent. It is, 
however, difficult to state the number of stamps sold in Britain because of the lack of 
statistics. In the League’s statistics on administration of Nansen stamps in 1927, Britain is 
not mentioned. France, on the other hand had issued almost 5,000 stamps during 1927, the 
highest number of the governments mentioned in the s ta t i s t i cs . In  the 1930s, the 
surcharge from the Nansen stamp in Britain varied from 2,500 to 7,900 Swiss francs a year. 
From 1932 to 1936 the total in Britain was 19,615 Swiss francs. At the same period the 
figure for France, for instance, was 584,651 francs and the total sale of Nansen stamps was 
904,364 francs. In most of the countries the stamps were sold by government authorities or 
other representatives. Regarding British practice it was stated that ‘surcharges were fixed by 
the authorities’.!^ ^
Another important agreement in relation to the legal status of Russian refugees was signed 
at the Intergovernmental Conference in June 1928, attended by fifteen governments. The 
conference resulted in signing of the Arrangement of 28 June 1928 by the representatives of 
twelve states. The most important provisions of the Arrangement were that the High 
Commissioner was recommended to appoint representatives in different countries to take 
care of various functions, for example, certifying the identity and civil status of refugees; 
testifying to the regularity and legality of documents issued in their country of origin;
League ofNations. Official Journal. July 1926, p. 983-86; Simpson 1939, pp. 205, 240; Skran 1995, pp. 108, 193.
League ofNations. Russian, Armenian, Assyro-Chaldean and Turkish refugees. Report to the Ninth Ordinary Session 
o f the Assembly. L.N.Vlll. 1928.1 -6. Appendix III.
Simpson, Sir John Hope. Refugees. Preliminary Report of a Survey. Royal Institute o f International Affairs 1938, p. 
83; Simpson 1939, pp. 205-06.
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recommending refugees for visas, residence permits, admission to schools; aiming at 
employment and taxation equality with nationals and, finally, the relaxation of expulsion 
measures.
Britain, on the other hand, neither attended the conference, nor ratified the Arrangement. 
The Arrangement clearly had special importance, since it was the first agreement properly 
recommending favourable treatment of refugees in the matters of labour permits, social 
security, and taxation. Whether this was an important factor behind Britain’s non- 
attendance can only be speculated. On the other hand, the legal validity of the document 
was clearly very weak, similarly to other arrangements, since its only power was to make 
recommendations to the governments, not to impose any actions upon states. This was also 
realised by the League ofNations. In early 1933 a Memorandum of the Secretariat noted 
that with the exception of the Nansen passport, the arrangements were producing no effect 
upon the position of refugees and thus suggested consideration of an international 
convention.
Importantly, the Nansen Office also supported the idea of a convention. The Nansen 
International Office for Refugees had been established after the death of Nansen in May 
1930 by a decision of the Eleventh Assembly of the League. According to the decision of 
the Assembly this office was to take charge of refugee work until it would wound up in the 
course of ten years time. “^76 The work was divided between the Nansen Office and the 
Secretariat, so that the Secretariat was charged with the legal protection of refugees, and the 
Nansen Office with matters of relief and settlement.
League ofNations. A.28.1930. XIII. The Arrangement of 30 June 1928, regarding legal status o f refugees, p. 4; 
League ofNations. Russian, Armenian, Assyro-Chaldean and Turkish refugees. Report to the Ninth Ordinary Session of 
the Assembly by the High Commissioner o f the League. L.N. VIII. 1928. 1 -6, pp. 2-3.
’ ■75 Skran 1995, p. 124.
Simpson 1939, pp. 194, 206-09.
Skran 1995, p. 140.
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Thus, supported both by the Nansen Office and the Intergovernmental Advisory 
Commission, a special body created by the Council in December 1928, a draft document 
was submitted to the Intergovernmental Conference in October 1933. As a result of the 
decisions of the conference, the first refugee convention was bom under the title of the 
Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees. It was stated to be applicable 
to Russian, Armenian and assimilated refugees. Although the Convention was signed on 28 
October 1933, it only came in force in 1935 because it was required to be ratified by at least 
two states. In 1935 the Convention was ratified by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Norway. 
Later it was also ratified by Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain and Italy.
The Convention clearly represented the first attempt to create a proper legal framework for 
refugees, since those governments who ratified the Convention engaged themselves to carry 
into effect the provisions of the Convention, This, on the other hand, clearly affected the 
willingness of governments to ratify the Convention. It contained a number of important 
provisions, relating to wide range of issues, such as identity certificates, expulsions, 
welfare, relief, labour conditions and education. Because of this, it is actually somewhat 
surprising that Britain was among the governments to ratify the Convention, especially as it 
had neither attended the Conference, nor ratified the two previous Arrangements on 
Russian refugees. On the other hand, the British government made certain reservations to 
the Convention in respect of national interests, similarly to other governments. By doing so 
it could actually look after its national interests and make sure that its interests were not 
jeopardised by the signing of the Convention.
Still, the government for example agreed that restrictions for the protection of national 
labour markets should not be applied in all their severity to refugees resident in the country, 
a provision that had also been present in the 1928 Arrangement. Thus, it is unclear why the 
government was now prepared to agree to this and many other provisions, especially in a 
view that it had not ratified either of the 1926 or 1928 Arrangements that had contained
Skran 1995, pp. 124-25; Simpson 1939, p. 244.
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similar provisions. Perhaps this was to some extent to do with the fact that the situation 
of Russian refugees both in Britain and in Europe more generally had become quite 
stabilised and that their numbers in Britain had further diminished through emigration to 
the continent, as well as through the process of assimilation.
5.6. Concluding Remarks
Inter-war Europe witnessed a number of serious refugee problems. Of these the problem of 
approximately one million Russian refugees as a consequence of the Russian Revolution 
and the Civil War clearly constituted one of the most dramatic. Importantly, it also marked 
the beginning of the international refugee regime; organised co-operation between 
governments in the field of refugee assistance, beginning with the decision of the League of 
Nations to appoint Fridtjof Nansen as the first High Commissioner for Russian Refugees in 
September 1921.
As pointed out by Claudena Skran, the emergence of refugees as an international issue was 
linked to the wider process: the growth of interdependence of nations, particularly after the 
First World War. The League ofNations had been formed after the war in order to promote 
international co-operation, peace and security. Mass movements of refugees, such as that of 
the Russian refugee problem, clearly threatened the international stability. Thus, for the first 
time, refugees became a concern of the whole international community, as the individual 
states recognised the need for international co-operation.
When considering the international assistance for Russian refugees the importance of 
Nansen’s personal role cannot be ignored. His death in 1930 was a tremendous loss to the 
League’s refugee work.^^^ However, underlying the success of his work was the consent of
Simpson 1939, pp. 244, 566-594; Skran 1995, pp. 124-130. 
Skran 1995, p. 291.
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the member states of the League ofNations to assist Russian refugees, as well as the 
leadership provided by the League ofNations. Clearly, irrespective of League’s success in 
the refugee field, the importance of the mere fact that it was willing to take the issue of 
refugees under its protection can not be denied. This is all the more important, as the 
Covenant of the League did not oblige the members to accept any such responsibilities 
Therefore, the statement of F.P. Walters that the refugee work of the League ofNations was 
unpopular with the member states can be considered a somewhat overstated view. 
Member states continued to co-operate and support the refugee assistance of the League and 
its agencies throughout the 1920s. In view of this, the international refugee regime can 
be stated to have originated in inter-war Europe.
However, it is still fair to say that without the active role and work of certain individuals 
and private organisations, as well as the leadership provided by the League Secretariat, it is 
unlikely that the governments would have joined together in the refugee problem, despite 
the fact that there were shared interests in uniting the actions of the governments. The 
decision of the governments to assist Russian refugees was also clearly facilitated by the 
fact that it was, after all, a quite limited action of ‘generosity’, directed originally towards a 
single group of refugees from Bolshevik Russia. Had it been a more ‘grandiose’ plan of 
helping other refugees and needy people, it most probably would not have been accepted by 
the governments involved.
The considerations above also apply to the British government. The government had clearly 
showed its reluctance to accept responsibility for even a small number of Russian refugees 
and was very unwilling to enter into new commitments. The British government’s decision 
to participate in the international refugee regime in helping Russian refugees was of course 
guided not only by humanitarian, but also selfish motives. The government was, for
'  ^^  Walters 1952, p. 187: Holborn. The Annals o f the American Academy. May 1939, p. 124. 
 ^82 Walters 1952, p. 188.
1^3 Skran 1995, p. 285.
Skran 1995, pp. 99-100.
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instance, very eager to end its responsibilities for those Russian refugees that were still 
maintained in the camps and in Serbia at British expense and thus started negotiations with 
the High Commissioner on this aspect right after the establishment of his office.
Nevertheless, on the whole the British participation in the work of the League and High 
Commissioner for Russian refugees in the 1920s was quite active. After missing the initial 
intergovernmental conference on Russian refugees in August 1921, the government 
attended all the following conferences until 1928. Britain also ratified the Arrangement of 5 
July 1922, regarding the identity certificates for Russian refugees, although this was not the 
case with the subsequent Arrangements relating to Russian refugees in the 1920s. 
Financially, the British actually provided more assistance for Russian refugees in 
Constantinople than any other member state of the League. At the level of individuals, the 
British participation was perhaps even more active. Many prominent workers in the refugee 
field in the early 1920s were British nationals, among them were, for example. Sir Samuel 
Hoare, Colonel Procter, Philip Noel-Baker, Sir Horace and Lady Rumbold and General 
Harington. Similarly, a number of British private organisations worked actively for the 
assistance of refugees.
Still, it is clear that the British government employed a ‘double standard’ in the Russian 
refugee question. Although the government participated in the international conferences on 
Russian refugees and thus implied its willingness to adopt a common practice towards 
them, at no point was the government prepared to make concessions to the individual 
policies it had adopted in the Russian refugee question. The ratification of the agreement on 
identity certificates, for example, had no impact on the policies of the government 
regarding the admission of Russian refugees to Britain. It was carefully pointed out by the 
government that its acceptance of the agreement did not in any way hinder the control of 
the entry of Russian refugees. On the contrary, it was believed that the certificates would 
facilitate an even more effective control.
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In the latter part of the 1920s Britain also ceased to participate in the intergovernmental 
conferences and failed to ratify the Arrangements on Russian refugees. Furthermore, the 
British government did not appoint a delegate to the Refugee Section of the ILO, or later to 
the Nansen Office, as it had previously done under the High Commissioner for Russian 
Refugees iss. This might well be due to the fact that the Russian refugee question was not 
considered of utmost importance in Britain because of the small number of refugees in the 
country. However, it is also possible that after the British government managed to end its 
responsibility for those refugees it had been maintaining in the camps, it had less 
‘intemational’ interest in the Russian refugee problem.
skran 1995, p. 118.
227
CHAPTER 6: RUSSIAN ÉMIGRÉS AND BRITISH SOCIETY
The final chapter of my thesis will explore the Russian émigré community that was bom 
in Britain after the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War. The earlier chapters have 
shown that the British government clearly adopted a strict policy of non-admittance in 
relation to Russian refugees. This policy was naturally fundamental in the development 
of the Russian émigré community; its size and make-up.
According to the report by Dr. Goldenweiser, compiled for the Refugee Survey of Sir 
John Simpson, the strict immigration laws and the difficult economic situation meant 
that mass emigration of Russian refugees to Britain was impossible. He also stated that 
all this had influenced what kind of people could come to Britain and continued that 
they were mainly from higher social classes; businessmen, intellectuals and nobility. 
Additionally, many had emigrated to Britain already during the war. '
Even if the popular stereotypes of the Russian émigrés, such as that they were all nobles 
and princes, are as wide of the mark in the British case, as they are in general, it is 
nevertheless probably true that the émigré community in Britain was somewhat more 
homogeneous in its composition, than for example those in France, Germany or 
Yugoslavia. This was largely due to the selective policies of the British authorities, 
which determined what kind of people could come to Britain. Nevertheless, as in other 
countries of emigration, the majority of Russian émigrés in Britain were faced with 
economic difficulties when starting their new lives in exile.
The following chapter will outline the characteristics of this émigré community. The 
chapter will concentrate on the early stages of émigré lives in the 1920s. Attention will 
be drawn to the legal status of Russian émigrés in Britain, to Russian organisations that 
existed, to the Orthodox Church and its role in preserving the Russian identity of the 
émigrés. The chapter will evaluate how the émigrés managed to adapt to life in Britain 
and what kind of relationship they had with British society. Comparisons to better
 ^ Goldenweiser 1938, p. 1. Refugee Survey 1937-38. Special Reports VI. Law (2). Royal Institute o f Intemational 
Affairs.
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known émigré communities, such as that in France, will be made in order to point out 
similarities and differences between different host countries.
6.1. The Legal Status of Russian Refugees
The question of the legal status of refugees has already been partly considered in the 
earlier chapters, primarily as regards to the processes at the time of the entry, such as 
landing and residence permits, employment, passport and visa practices. It has also been 
noticed that in the intemational level Britain ratified for example the Arrangement of 5 
July 1922, on travel and identity documents for Russian refugees.
In his report Dr. Goldenweiser pointed out that the legal situation of Russian refugees in 
Britain reflected the English legal system. Compared to the bureaucratic legal system in 
the continent, the British system was based on individual treatment of cases, on personal 
references and on the personal judgement of the government official. According to him 
there was sympathy for victims of political persecution, but on the other hand, a national 
egoistic attitude clearly prevailed, especially towards employment. There is nothing 
very surprising in this view; the practices of the British government in relation to the 
admission and employment of refugees and immigrants clearly witnessed these 
principles.
Generally speaking, Russian refugees in Britain did not have any special status in 
comparison to other foreigners. All the aliens in Britain fell under the provisions of the 
Aliens Order, 1920. The practices that followed after the landing were also clearly 
formulated by immigration legislation. After the Immigration Officer, who was an 
official of the Home Office, had approved the landing of an alien, a landing permit was 
issued. To this permit any additional conditions were added under which the 
alien/refiigee was allowed to remain in the country, such as the time he was allowed to
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stay in country, instructions that the alien should not take employment during his stay 
without special permission, etc. ^
Under Article 6, Part II of the Aliens Order, 1920, all aliens in Britain were obliged to 
register with the registration officer of the district in which they were resident. In the 
registration a special certificate was provided which gave a legitimisation to stay in 
Britain.^ For the actual residence permit, the alien had to apply to the Aliens Branch of 
the Home Office, which was solely responsible for issuing residence permits. The 
residence permits were normally first granted only for a short period not exceeding a 
year, after which period they could be renewed for further periods of a year or less. Only 
after the several years of residence would the permit be made unlimited as regards to the 
period of residence.'*
It has been already earlier pointed out that the aliens were not admitted to work in 
Britain, unless a permit for that was issued by the Ministry of Labour. As we have seen, 
it was clearly stated by the Home Secretary that ‘under present conditions aliens should 
not have facilities to come to this country for the purpose of employment’.^  Although 
individual exceptions were made especially towards those with important businesses in 
Britain, generally this rule was strictly followed.
The restriction to take employment was usually added to the permit of residence, and it 
was sometimes only after several years of residence that this condition was cancelled. ^
It was particularly for this reason that the Home Office wanted to ascertain that persons 
admitted were able to support themselves, or supported by someone in Britain.
However, since it is clear that not very many Russian émigrés in Britain actually could 
support themselves for a long period without acquiring employment, the restrictions 
regarding employment could not be strictly observed in the long run. Very few émigrés 
actually managed to bring much money, or pieces of property with them, even if  in
2 Goldenweiser 1938, pp. 2-5. Refugee Survey 1937-38. Special Reports VI. Law (2); Bentwich, p.4. Refugee 
Survey 1937-38, Vol. V. Refugees and the Law (1). Royal Institute o f Intemational Affairs.
3 Aliens Order, 1920. Statutory Rules and Orders 1920, Vol. I, pp. 142-43.
4 Bentwich, p. 5. Refugee Survey 1937-38, Vol. V. Refugees and the Law (1); Simpson 1939, pp. 268-69.
5 FO 371/1262, File 74855, Paper 81955. HO to FO 29.5.1919. PRO.
6 Simpson 1939, pp. 268-69.
230
Russia some might have held large possessions. Most of them had to leave very quickly 
and without their possessions, perhaps bringing only some jewellery. ’ Transferring 
money or property from Soviet Russia to the west proved in many cases extremely 
difficult. Even if some émigrés had possessions or investments in Britain, or some other 
European countries, this was not the case with the majority of émigrés.
Baron Aleksander Meyendorff, a well-known Russian lawyer and the vice president of 
the third Russian Duma explained the difficulties of this in his interview with The Daily 
Telegraph in March 1919, soon after his arrival at England. Meyendorff stated that 
getting money out of bank accounts had already become more difficult in summer 1917, 
and there were certain daily limits on the amount that could be withdrawn from personal 
accounts. For transferring money abroad, a permit from the Ministry of Labour was 
needed. At the beginning of Bolshevik rule, people who had savings were paid a certain 
amount of money every month, but this also changed during 1918, and it was only 
possible to get money out if some local soldier or worker proved that you had no other 
income. The gold and diamond reserves stayed as a property of the banks. *
European banks managed to assist émigrés to some degree in the process of getting 
money out of Russia, but they were not always successful, either, and of course not all 
émigrés had large savings in their accounts in Russia. Baron Meyendorff himself, while 
still living in St. Petersburg and Riga, tried several times to get some savings and 
property of his mother, as well as his own personal property, out of Russia. His mother, 
Princess Olga Gorchakov, had lived in Rome since 1882, but she still had large 
possessions deposited at Russian banks. In the end Meyendorff managed to transfer 
some money abroad. However, in practice, getting money and property out of Russia 
was very difficult. Baron Meyendorff himself was approached several times by various 
Russia émigrés, who asked his advice on this. ^
7 Horsbrugh-Porter, Anna. Memories o f Revolution. Russian Women Remember. London and New York 1993, p. 
104: Interview o f Olga Lawrence.
8 Interview o f Baron Meyendorff for the Daily Telegraph 3.3.1919. Meyendorff collection, Box 9. Finnish National 
Archives in Helsinki.
9 Muotka,Virva. Baron Meyendorff and Russian Emigrants in Europe between 1919 and 1939, pp. 32-33, 40-41, 46- 
47. Unpublished M.A. dissertation at the University o f Joensuu, Department o f History, March 1997. (In Finnish)
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In practice many émigrés in Britain faced financial difficulties, especially at the 
beginning of their lives in exile. Different Russian organisations, such as the Russian 
Red Cross (old organisation) worked actively in helping émigrés. In the long run, the 
main solution would have to be finding suitable employment for those without means to 
support themselves. It has to be remembered that the British law was actually somewhat 
more favourable than those of most other European countries, in that there were no 
restrictions of aliens working for example in many liberal professions, such as doctors, 
dentists, or barristers. Thus, according to Petr Shilovskii, a Russian émigré in Britain, 
There were nothing comparable to the tedious restrictions on employment that prevailed 
in France’. "
As a practice towards the Nansen passport, it was stated that the British government did 
not demand that Russian refugees in Britain had to hold a Nansen certificate while they 
were residing in Britain, only when they wanted to travel abroad. Every alien who did 
not have national passport could also apply a certificate of identity. The fee for issuing 
the identity certificate was seven shillings and 6 d. and that of the ‘Nansen stamp’, 
affixed to the Nansen certificate, five shillings.
Since the British government had promised to grant visas free of charge for those 
refugees who could not pay the fee, and since the Nansen certificate was internationally 
recognised certificate of identity, it could be assumed that it would have become the 
most popular form of identity certificate. However, there are no statistics on the 
application of the system of Nansen certificate in Britain. This does not necessarily 
mean that the system did not operate in Britain but might be due to the lack of statistics, 
as well as the fact that the number of Russian refugees in Britain was generally smaller 
than in many other countries.
The system regarding the practice of the Nansen certificate and its use as a identity 
certificate was quite similar, for example, in France and Yugoslavia. Also in these
0^ Bentwich, p. 5. Refugee Survey 1937-38, Vol. V. Refugees and the Law (1).
1  ^ Shilovsky, Pyotr Petrovich in Glenny and Stone 1990, p. 293.
12 Simpson 1939, p. 267.
13 Goldenweiser 1938, p. 4. Refugee Survey 1937-38. Special Reports VI. Law (2).
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countries the government authorities did not require Russian émigrés to be in a 
possession of a Nansen passport while staying in within the territory, but only if  they 
wished to travel abroad. As stated earlier, the French authorities also continued to 
recognise V.A. Maklakov’s ‘Office Central’ in Paris and the local ‘Offices Russes’ as 
successors of the old Russian government, and these offices were empowered to issue 
various certificates for Russian refugees. Their status as representatives of Russian 
refugees was properly legalised by the French government at the beginning of 1925, 
shortly after their diplomatic recognition of the Soviet government. Instructions of the 
Interior Ministry to the departmental prefects stated that the ‘Office Central’ of V.A. 
Maklakov could intervene on behalf of stateless Russians before bureaucratic bodies.
In Britain the old Russian diplomatic offices were not granted similar legal status by the 
government as the ‘Offices Russes’ in France. However, the Russian Embassy and the 
Consulate in London continued to represent the Russian refugees ‘unofficially’. Thus, 
the British government continued to consider these offices, as well as certain people, 
such as K. Nabokov and E. Sablin, as representatives of Russian émigrés in Britain, 
even though they could not maintain their official status after the Bolshevik Revolution.
At the beginning of 1924 the first British Labour government granted de jure  
recognition to the Soviet Government. As a consequence, the Russian émigrés held a 
meeting at the old Russian Embassy at Chesham House, representing several Russian 
organisations in Britain. At the meeting it was unanimously decided that E. Sablin, the 
former Russian Chargé d ’Affaires, would be requested to assume the representation of 
the rights and interests of the Russian émigré colony, and to be their spokesman ‘ in all 
matters which may have to be submitted to the British authorities’.
The resolution was signed by fourteen different Russian organisations; the Orthodox 
Paris Council, Russian Academic Group, Manufactures and Merchants’ Associations, 
Economic Society, Relief Fund, Army & Navy Ex-Service Men’s Mutual Provident 
Association, Society for Invalids and Disabled, United Council of the Russian Red
Sim pson 1939, p. 267.
Johnston 1988, p. 68: Simpson 1939, pp. 299 -300.
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Cross and Russian Charity Organisations in G.B, Russian Refugees Relief Association, 
Self-Help Association, Labour Bureau, Doctors’ Association, Self-Help Association for 
Refugees from North Russia, Sisterhood of St. Xenia, and Russian Red Cross Society 
(old organisation). Sablin complied with the request of these groups, and the British 
Home Office and the Foreign Office were informed of the resolution.
In his letter to the Foreign Office Sablin transmitted a copy of the resolution of the 
Russian organisations and pointed out that these organisations had been constituted with 
a view to assisting Russian refugees in the education of children, relief to the needy, 
medical assistance, maintenance of church services, and in support of aged and invalid 
people. He also.expressed the hope that the British government would extend to Russian 
refugees and their organisations ‘the same benevolent and kind attitude as it had in the 
past’.'^
The Foreign Office considered the whole issue very carefully, and in the Minutes it was 
pointed out that the Foreign Office should perhaps be very careful in accepting the 
phrase ‘their rights and interests’. It was also stated that even though it was true that 
under Soviet law Russian émigrés did not enjoy Soviet citizenship, the British 
government none the less should ‘walk warily’.
More importantly, in May 1924 the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Rakovskii, 
approached the Foreign Office with an enquiry relating to the article that had appeared 
in The Poslednie Novosti, émigré journal in Paris. This article had alleged that White 
Russians were in very good relations with the British Foreign Office and enjoyed its 
support. Some extracts of the article were presented by the Soviet representative, stating 
that after the British recognition of the Soviet government in early 1924, the Chairmen 
of fourteen Russian organisations asked Sablin to protect their rights and interests. He 
was said to have handed this resolution to the Foreign Office, happy with the fact that 
the Russian non-Bolshevik colony had extended its confidence to the old diplomatic
Curriculum vitae o f E.V. Sablin. Sablin family, MS. 1285. Leeds Russian Archive; Goldenweiser 1938, p. 3. 
Refugee Survey 1937-38. Special Reports VI. Law (2).
FO 371/10466, File 17, Paper N 1306. Sabline to Mr. Gregory 12.2.1924. PRO.
8^ Ibid. FO Minutes.
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representative. It was also stated that G. Gregory, chief of the Northern Department of 
Foreign Affairs, had sent Sablin a letter informing him that he would be glad to see 
Sablin at any time to discuss confidentially any questions concerning the interests of 
Russian organisations. Furthermore, he was said to have assured Sablin that the attitude 
of the British government towards Russian refugees would continue to be as courteous 
as before. In the last point it was mentioned, that the Russian Embassy was now being 
called ‘ The Chief Bureau of Assistance to Russian Refugees’.
The Foreign Office responded to the letter of Mr. Rakovskii by transmitting him a copy 
of the letter from Sablin and the reply of the Foreign Office. It was pointed out that from 
these it could be observed that the question of the non-recognition of the Soviet Union 
by Russian organisations was not raised in Sablin’s letter. Furthermore, it was pointed 
out that the ‘idea of regarding Sablin as a representative of the rights and interests of 
Russian organisations was expressly demurred to and that unofficial relationship was 
asked for and granted solely on social and charitable grounds’.
Mr. Rakovskii replied to the Foreign Office that the Soviet government did not have any 
doubt that the information given in The Poslednie Novosti was an invention. However, 
it was pointed out that late Tsarist organisations under title ’pursuing purely 
philanthropic aims’ were in reality engaged in political activities. Rakovskii continued 
that the sole object in communicating with the Foreign Office was to draw the attention 
of the British government to the intrigues of the late Tsarist officials, which, according 
to the Soviet view, ‘if not struck at the root in the beginning, may have a detrimental 
effect upon the development of the Anglo-Soviet relations’.^ * The implications of this 
comment are quite clear, and were obviously not missed at the Foreign Office, either. 
Nevertheless, a reply does not seem to have been made.
The issue of the status of the former Russian diplomatic offices was also raised by the 
new Labour government. After the resolution of the Russian organisations in 1924,
19 FO 371/10498, File 4122, Paper N 4122. Soviet Chargé d'Affaires to Foreign Secretary Ramsay McDonald 
13.5.1924. PRO.
20 FO 371/10498, File 4122, Paper N 4122. FO to Mr. Rakovski, Chargé d'Affaires o f USSR 21.5.1924. PRO.
21 FO 371/10498, File 4122, Paper N 4732. Mr. Rakovski to Mr. Mounsey 31.5.1924. PRO.
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Sablin informed the British government that he had delegated the issues of passport, 
visa, work permit and naturalisation to the former Russian vice-consul, Mr. E. Gambs, 
who worked at the former Russian Consulate at Bedford Square. This office was 
known as the ‘Russian Refugees Relief and Travelling Permit Office’ and Mr. Gambs 
and Mr. Gnu, the former Russian Consul-General, working in this office had been 
issuing passports to Russians for some years. The Minutes of the Foreign Office in 
February 1924 stated that the position of the Bedford Square Office should be 
considered carefully, and that the Home Office should also be informed of any actions it 
was proposed to be taken.^^
There is no information regarding the possible outcome of these considerations. 
However, the Labour government was short-lived, and was replaced by the 
Conservative government already in October 1924. As stated in the previous chapter, 
the Travelling Permit Office continued to function under the conservative government 
in the latter part of the 1920s. However, its power to issue passports was clearly 
diminished in the latter part of the 1920s, as other governments refused to visa passports 
issued by the officials of the former Russian governments. As seen earlier, the French 
government, for example, had informed that it would issue visas for the holders of 
Nansen passports. Nevertheless, the British government reply to the 1928 questionnaire 
of the High Commissioner for Refugees was that ‘though the Russian Refugees Relief 
and Travelling Permit Office did not have any legal status or powers, it had continued to 
perform on behalf of the refugees some of the duties that would normally be undertaken 
by a Consul’.
During the latter part of the 1920s relations between the British and Soviet governments 
broke down, and were only resumed during the next Labour government, which came 
into power in June 1929. Again, as earlier at the time of the new Labour government, 
there were enquiries from the side of Russian émigrés on the possible influence this 
might have to Russian émigrés. The Foreign Office was approached on the question by
22 Goldenweiser 1938, p. 3. Refugee Survey 1937-38. Special Reports VI. Law (2).
23 FO 372/2093, File 1816, Paper T1816. FO Minute by Major Spencer 18.2.1924. PRO.
24 Goldenweiser 1938, p. 3. Refugee Study 1937-38. Special Reports VI. Law (2).
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Mr. Lucien Wolff in December 1929/^ The Foreign Office, for its part, approached the 
Home Office on the issue, enquiring whether the legal situation of Russian refugees in 
Britain would be in any way modified by the resumption of relations between the 
British and Soviet governments.
The Home Secretary Mr. Clynes replied that he generally concurred with the reply 
which the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Henderson, proposed to send to Mr. Wolff. The only 
correction he suggested was to replace the sentence ‘it is not the intention of HMG in 
any way to modify the legal status of Russian refugees’ by the formulation that ‘HMG 
have no power to modify the legal status of Russian refugees in Britain’. The Foreign 
Office informed Mr. Wolff according to these instructions, i.e. that ‘ HMG have no 
power to modify the legal status of Russian refugees, nor have they at present any 
intention of modifying their existing practice in regard to the issue of Nansen 
passport’.Ju d g e d  by this, it clearly seems that the practices towards Russian refugees 
remained quite unaltered also under the Labour government, although it has to be also 
acknowledged that at that time the question was not a matter of major importance any 
more, as the situation of Russian émigrés had become more stabilised.
In defining the legal status of refugees, the practices of the naturalisation process have 
also an important role. For the most part, the naturalisation practices were quite similar 
in most European countries after the First World War. Nevertheless, some countries had 
more flexible practices towards the naturalisation of Russian refugees than some others. 
For example in France the naturalisation practices as regards Russian refugees varied in 
some degree. In general, a residence of at least five years was required, and the applicant 
had to be at least 18 years old. Moreover, as a rule, young men who would be liable for 
military service, agricultural labourers and families with many children were favoured, 
while single men and the elderly were not.
25 FO 371/14052, File 5773, Paper N 5773. Mr. Lucien Wolff to FO 6.12.1929. PRO.
26 FO 371/14977, File 294, Paper W 294. HO to FO 8.1.1930.
27 FO 371/14977, File 294, Paper W 1330. FO to Mr. Wolff 14.2.1930. PRO.
28 Simpson 1939, p. 315, 599.
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On the other hand children bom in France automatically became French citizens, the 
practice that was not automatically followed in some other countries. For example, 
according to the naturalisation laws in Czechoslovakia, children bom in the country did 
not gain the Czechoslovak nationality if their parents were not nationals of the country. 
Also a woman marrying an alien might lose her own nationality. In Yugoslavia 
naturalisation was quite easy until 1933, after which the rules became much stricter. The 
treatment of Russian refugees in Yugoslavia was nevertheless exceptionally generous, 
as they were granted all the rights of ordinary citizens. The same applied to Bulgaria. In 
both countries children also became automatically citizens of the country.
In Britain the naturalisation practice as regards Russian refugees, as well as regards all 
aliens, came under the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914. According to 
Article 2 of this Act, an alien could get a Certificate of Naturalisation if he had lived for 
at least five years in Britain or in the dominions, was considered to have ‘a good 
character’, a genuine knowledge of English, and wanted to become resident in Britain or 
to enter state services. Normally, however, around seven years’ residence was required 
before naturalisation was granted. The requirement of ‘ a good character’ and the 
personal qualities on the whole were carefully observed.
An application for nationality status was made to the Home Secretary, and it had to be 
supported by sponsors that were British bom. It was also required that the applicant 
published advertisements in a newspaper, so that people who might have some criticism 
against the applicant could contact the Home Secretary. The grant of the application was 
in the absolute discretion of the Home Secretary and therefore totally dependent upon 
his personal impression of the applicant, and of the quality of the personal references of 
the applicant. Also, the grant of nationality to an alien did not necessarily mean that the 
practice was extended to his wife. The practice was that the wife of the applicant had to 
make a special declaration to become a British subject. A certificate of naturalisation 
could, however, be granted to the dependants of the applicant. Under the Nationality and
29 Ibid., pp. 237, 315, 389-90; Simpson 1938. ‘The Refugee Problem’. Intemational Affairs, Vol. XVII, No. 5, 
September-October 1938, pp. 611-12.
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Status of Aliens Act of 1914, all children bom in Britain were automatically British 
subjects.
Again, it is difficult to state the exact number of Russian émigrés that were naturalised 
in the 1920s, especially as naturalised Russians were not divided into specific 
categories, i.e. Jewish, ‘White Russians’, etc. Thus there are no statistics on the 
naturalisation of Russian refugees fi*om the Bolshevik regime. In Goldenweiser’s study 
it is estimated that approximately 300 Russian refugees were naturalised per year. If this 
figure refers only to post-revolutionary Russian refugees, it can be considered quite 
high. According to Goldenweiser the British naturalisation practice could be considered 
quite benevolent. Also Simpson in his Refugee Survey (1939) stated that many Russian 
émigrés in Britain had been naturalised.^®
Generally speaking, the fact that the naturalisation of Russian émigrés in Britain may 
have been quite common might be at least partly be explained by the smallness of the 
émigré community. The question of naturalisation can by no means be considered 
simply through the degree of difficulty of the process in host countries. To a large extent 
it was also a question of the willingness of the émigrés to naturalise. Many émigrés 
actually felt that naturalisation was a ‘betrayal of their Russian identity’, and their 
uppermost concern was fear of denationalisation, or assimilation. These feelings seem 
to have been especially strong in the countries which hosted large number of émigrés. 
Naturally in those countries it was easier for émigrés to stay isolated from the host 
community and to remain within their ‘own’ community. This, on its part strengthened 
the feelings of ‘exclusiveness’ and ‘Russianness’ among Russian émigrés. In countries 
where the émigrés constituted only a small group, such as in Britain, they could not stay 
similarly isolated from the host society and therefore might not have held as strong 
opinions against assimilation or naturalisation.
Goldenweiser 1938, pp. 12-13. Refugee Survey 1937-38. Special Reports VI. Law (2); Simpson 1939, pp. 237, 
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6.2. Russian and Anglo-Russian Organisations
Very little research has been done on different organisation established by Russian 
émigrés in Britain. Since there were only a small number of émigrés, it has also been 
assumed that there were very few, if any, Russian organisations. This is actually to a 
great extent a false assumption, although in many cases it is very difficult to find 
detailed information on these organisations. Nevertheless, contrary to the general 
supposition, there were several different Russian émigré organisations functioning in 
Britain in the early 1920s.
The primary focus of Russian émigrés in the UK was the old Embassy and Consulate 
services. As mentioned, these old diplomatic organisations continued to represent 
Russians unofficially in various matters. According to Konstantin Nabokov, at the time 
of the Revolution, Russian society in Britain consisted of two different groups. The first 
group consisted of the officials of the Russian government during the war, 
predominately monarchists who were hostile even towards the Provisional government, 
and dreamt about the return to the old regime. Nabokov stated this group consisted of 
approximately 500 persons. Some of them returned to Russia after the February 
Revolution.
The second group, on the other had, consisted of political elements that were anti­
monarchist. Of these only a few were socialists and the majority of the representatives 
of the Provisional government, those occupying posts at the Embassy and the 
Consulates, supported liberal and republican forms of government. The Russian émigrés 
who left Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War consisted of different 
anti-Bolshevik elements, varying from socialist groups to the strict monarchists.
In Britain the majority of the émigrés who were active in the political arena seemed to 
have represented the ‘liberal’ fractions rather than strict monarchists. Among the 
‘ordinary’ émigrés, however, those who held monarchist convictions constituted an 
important part of émigré society. It seems that the British government also wanted to
32 Kaznina 1997, p. 20.
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restrict the entry of ‘politically active monarchists’. For example in early 1919 Mr. 
Pedder from the Home Office had stated that there are clear objections to admission of 
people who were likely to carry on monarchist propaganda.
After the February Revolution many Russians who had been living abroad, especially 
those who had been the opponents of the Tsarist regime, wanted to return to Russia. 
London became a destination for Russian subjects from other European countries, 
wishing to return to Russia. This was largely due to the fact that ‘normal’ route through 
Germany was closed due to war and there was the possibility to travel to Russia via ship 
to Norway and then to Archangel or Petrograd. To facilitate the repatriation a committee 
was established which was attached to the Embassy under the title of the Russian 
Delegates Committee. The Chairman of the Committee was I.M. Maiskii and the 
Secretary G.V. Chicherin. What the Provisional government was not aware of was the 
fact that the Committee consisted of supporters of the Bolsheviks, such as Chicherin and 
Maiskii. Chicherin’s anti-war activities were nevertheless too much to the British 
government. In August 1917 he was arrested and later returned to Russia. "^* As pointed 
out in Chapter 4, the Russian Delegates Committee nevertheless continued to assist in 
the repatriation of Russians in Britain, largely consisting of the families of those Jews 
who had returned to Russian under the Military Convention.
During the War the Russian Government Committee had been established under the 
auspices of the Embassy and Chairmanship of General Germonius with the dual aim to 
facilitate trade and defence purposes.^^ After the Bolsheviks came to power, the British 
government decided to end this committee, since it could not function at an official level 
any more. At the same time, the money belonging to the former Russian government, 
deposited in London, was sequestrated by the order of the British Treasury. This was in 
line with the decision that the money belonged to the legal successor of the Russian 
government and at that moment there was no such government recognised by Britain.
FO 371/3968, File 176, Paper 28740. Russian refugees. Memorandum on question o f allowing them to enter UK. 
PRO.
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36 FO 371/3989, File 3191. Memorandum No. 2 by Sir George Buchanan, February 1919. PRO.
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A few other organisations were established in Britain before the Bolshevik Revolution, 
or in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, mostly for the purpose of co-operation 
between Britain and Russia in the areas of culture, education and politics, and to 
facilitate trade and businesses between these two countries. Some were Anglo-Russian 
in the composition of their membership.
Among these ‘early’ Russian and Anglo-Russian organisations in Britain was the 
Russo-British 1917 Bratstvo (Fraternity), established immediately after the February 
Revolution and continued until the end of 1921. It was established by members of the 
British Parliament and representatives of Russian governmental organisations in 
B rita in .T he President of the Club was Lloyd George, and the Chairman of the 
Provisional Committee of the Bratstvo was Sir Paul Vinogradov, the professor of 
medieval history at Oxford. Other members of the Provisional Committee were 
Professors Gardner and S.P Tiurin, representative of the Union of Zemstvos and Tovms 
at the Russian Government Committee and the chairman of the Union of ‘Russian 
Commonwealth’, and A. MacCallum Scott and J. O’Grady, both members of the House 
of Commons.
The stated aims of the organisation were ‘to commemorate the great change in the status 
of Russian people which commenced with the February Revolution of 1917, and to 
afford a medium through which the two great democracies of Russia and Britain may be 
brought into closer relations with each other After the Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia, the organisation adopted a strong anti-Bolshevik stance. For its activities the 
Bratstvo rented an accommodation at 26 Chester Square, conveniently close both to the 
Houses of Parliament and the Russian Embassy.
The Russo-British Bratstvo was quite elitist in its composition, since its membership 
consisted mainly of high political actors. The Bratstvo also only accepted men as is 
members, although in the Relief Committee established under the auspices of the
37 Kaznina 1997, p. 26.
38 Tyurin, Sergei Petrovich, MS. 1274, file 73: Russo- British 1917 Bratstvo, October 1917. Leeds Russian Archive; 
Kaznina 1997, p. 27.
39 Kaznina 1997, p. 26.
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Bratstvo, there was also a ‘Ladies Section’. The Provisional Committee of the Bratstvo 
remained quite unaltered during the organisation’s whole existence. In July 1919 Sir 
Paul Vinogradov continued as the Chairman; Gardner, Tiurin, O’Grady and Scott as 
members. New members were M.A. Kedrov and TV. Shklovskii, the former 
correspondent of the Russkiya Viedomosti and Sir Francis Lowe and Colonel Pryce 
Jones. In December 1919 A.F. Meyendorff, the Vice-President of the third Duma, 
Vladimir D. Nabokov, leading member of the Kadet Party, Professor Rostovtsev, 
specialist in the ancient history in Oxford and A. M. Onu, the Russian Consul-General, 
were also invited to be members of the Committee.'^®
Included in the list of members can also be found E.V. Sablin and P.I. Ignatiev, the 
former Minister of Education who had represented the government of the Admiral 
Kolchak in Britain; General E.K. Germonius; E. Gambs; Colonel N.T. Beliaev, the 
professor of Russian history; S.L. Poliakov-Litovtsev, the editor of the ‘Russian 
Commonwealth’ in London; and B.V. Telepnev, a member of the Russian Government 
Committee. All of those mentioned were well-known and influential Russian political 
and intellectual figures of the then existing Russian émigré colony in Britain. In 
addition, many other prominent Russians also regularly visited the meetings of the 
Bratstvo, such as Konstantin Nabokov, N. Chaikovskii, the head of North Russian 
government that had been supported by the British and G. Volkov, the Russian naval 
attaché at the old Russian Embassy.
As a rule, British nationals could only join Bratstvo if they were members of one of the 
Houses of the Parliament, although some exceptions were made to this rule. The 
majority of the members of the Bratstvo were nevertheless Russians. For example, at the 
end of 1919, there were 150 members at the Bratstvo, and of them only about twenty 
were English. Nevertheless, many English who were active in Russian affairs, such as 
Bernard Pares and Harold Williams, were often present at the club, even though they 
were not official members.'"
40 Kaznina 1997, pp. 26-27, 29.
41 Ibid., p. 28.
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Besides the different sections, commissions and committees of the Bratstvo, different 
clubs were also created under its auspices. Many Russian, as well as British members of 
the Bratstvo participated in the British Russia Club. The Club was established in early 
1918 as an ‘unofficial’ organisation for the co-operation of Russian emigrants and 
British politicians, economists and other influential persons. The chairman of the Club 
was Sir George Buchanan.
The main interest of the British Russia Club was to promote trade and businesses 
between Britain and non-Bolshevik Russia. The British Russia Club also assisted 
British refugees arriving from Russia and acted as a representative of this group. The 
Club stated as its other aims as maintaining and furthering friendly relations between 
Russia and Britain; providing an authoritative body upon Russian matters and the co­
operation and support of the British government. It was also stated that the club avoided 
‘entering realms of purely political significance’. The members of the Club were mostly 
businessmen, and therefore the business aspect clearly became the main interest of the 
club, especially with a view of strengthening the position of Britain in Russian trade, 
and guarding it from the aggressive trade policies of Germany.
Despite the somewhat elitist composition of the Bratstvo it nevertheless engaged in 
practical work, for example in assisting intellectuals and their families in leaving 
Russia. They made lists of persons who were to have priority assistance getting out of 
Russia. These lists consisted mainly of members of the Duma; of officials of the former 
Ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs; and of other prominent persons. In this issue 
the Bratstvo co-operated with the Foreign Office in Britain.
Assisting prominent Russians to leave Russia was also a question that occupied the 
work of the Committee of the Russian Relief and Reconstruction Fund, the British 
organisation established in 1918 for the co-operation of Britain and Russia in the 
reconstruction of Russia. It also made lists of the persons who were considered to be in 
the ‘most imminent Bolshevik danger’ and strongly urged that all possible steps were
42 Kaznina 1997, p. 32.
43 The Russian Outlook, No. 1, Vol. 1, 10 May, p. 11.
44 Kaznina 1997, pp. 28-31.
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taken by the British government to save these people from this danger. Additionally it 
pointed out the importance of taking all possible steps for the evacuation of other 
Russian refugees. As noted in earlier chapters, these considerations were not followed 
very carefully by the British government.
The Russo-British Bratstvo also devoted much of its energy to educational questions, 
for example in the educational co-operation of Britain and Russia and the education of 
young Russians. The Educational Committee was chaired by Sir Paul Vinogradov. It 
arranged conferences to deal with questions of the ways and means of teaching Russian 
language, history, economics and other areas in Britain, as well as to the possibilities of 
sending British students to study in Russia. The Committee also used its efforts to 
facilitate the admission of Russian students to the institutions of higher education in 
Britain.^^ The Bratstvo also organised lectures on various topics relating to Russian 
history, geography, language, legal and social conditions, industry, etc., and among the 
lecturers were Professors Miliukov, Gardner, Tiurin and Pavlovskii, as well as Baron 
Meyendorff.
The Bratstvo also worked for the assistance of Russian refugees in finding suitable 
employment. In this work it was assisted by many other Russian organisations, such as 
Zemgor. The Headquarters of Zemgor were in Paris, but it also had representatives in 
Britain.'*  ^In July 1920 the question of finding suitable employment for Russian émigrés 
was discussed in detail at a meeting of Bratstvo. To further their efforts a joint meeting 
was called by the Bratstvo and Zemgor, where representatives of various Russian 
groups, institutions and prominent persons were to be invited both in the UK and 
abroad.
At the meeting of 9 July it was decided that a proper organ was needed for uniting the 
different Russian institutions and organisations abroad. It was also decided to create a 
Provisional London Committee for the establishment of the new organisation. As an
Pares collection, PAR/ 5/3/1. List of persons considered to be in imminent danger from Bolsheviks. SSEES. 
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outcome of this and subsequent meetings, ‘The Head Committee of the Russian refugee 
affairs’ was established in London, as well as a local committee, also in London, to take 
care of the question of employment in Britain. Local committees were also to be 
established in other countries.
It was stated that the central and local committees were to be created to provide help in 
the question of employment for Russian refugees through the complete autonomy of 
organisations and institutions that were invited to participate in their work. Owing to the 
acuteness of the problem of finding employment for refugees, the Head Committee tried 
to define priority groups for assistance. At the meeting of the Committee in October 
1920 it was decided that in view of the insufficient funds only women, students, elderly, 
i.e. those, who were not ‘in a position to join the ranks of the armies’, or find work 
independently, could be included in the group to be assisted in the first place. This 
information was forwarded to as advice to the local committees. Unfortunately, no 
records are left about the results of the work of Committee in this field.
As the Bratstvo united Russians with various political views and its meetings were 
constantly visited by various prominent members of the Russian émigré community, it 
actually had unifying role in the life of the Russian émigré colony. It for example made 
an initiative to unite the existing Russian voluntary organisations in London by creating 
‘a Council of Russian Societies’. Information about this project was sent to various 
Russian organisations in Britain, such as the Union of ‘ Russian Commonwealth’ 
(Narodopratstvo), Russian Circle in London, Russian Liberation Committee and 
Russian National Committee. The United Russian Council, which was established in 
early 1920 was most likely a product of this initiative. The Council was to act as an 
intermediary organ to bring together the various Russian organisations and political 
groupings in order to ‘give opportunity to a free discussion and the establishment of 
common ground of United Russian opinion’.
49 Kudriakova 1995, pp. 18-19.
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The United Council managed to absorb quite a large part of the Russian organisations in 
London. On the other band the Council did not always manage to make united 
decisions. This could be seen, for example, at the time of the resolution of the United 
Council, opposing the change of policy of the British government towards White 
Russian armies as well as the resumption of trade with Soviet Russia. This resolution 
was signed by only five Russian organisations, as some organisations that had initially 
supported the Council withdrew their support.^^
The questions of the education, employment and other social, political and cultural 
questions also guided the work of many other Russian, as well as few British 
organisations. Among these was, for example, the Russian Academic Group in Britain, 
established in 1918. The Academic Group in Britain was among the very first 
organisations abroad for uniting academic émigrés and similar groups were soon 
established in other countries, influenced by the British example. M.I. Rostovtsev, 
specialist in ancient history in Oxford, who also worked actively at the Bratstvo, had an 
important role in the creation of the Group.
The chairman of the group was Professor V. Korenchevskii, a doctor of medicine, and 
the Vice-Chairmans Professors B.V. Heroys or V.I. Isaev. The president of the group 
was Sir Paul Vinogradov, Treasurer A.M. Onu and Secretary Nicholas Hans. A 
requirement for the membership was that the members held a degree of Doctor or 
Master, were members of the Academy of Science and worked either as a Professor, 
lecturer or teacher in Britain. A list of the Russian Academic Group in Britain, probably 
from late 1918 or early 1919, contains twenty- one names The funds of the group 
consisted mainly of membership fees paid annually by the members as well as sums 
raised by collections, donations, etc. The Academic Group was located in several 
different places during its existence. Initially it had premises in Bedford Square, where
53 The New Russia, Vol. 1, No. 5, 4 March, pp. 156-57.
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the Russian Consulate was located, and later in Cromwell Road, also near the 
Consulate/^
As its aims the Russian Academic Group concentrated on uniting the Russian literary 
and scientific workers who had found refuge and hospitality in Great Britain; 
establishing connections with scientific circles in Britain and with Russian Academic 
organisations in other countries as well as helping its members to continue their studies 
and research and to improve their material conditions. It also wanted to provide for the 
needs of Russian students in Britain and to assist in the provisions of adequate 
educational facilities for the children of Russian refugees in Britain, as well as to help 
Russian scientific workers and students in Russia. A separate committee for the Relief 
of Russian Student Refugees was established to take care of the questions of Russian 
students. It was chaired by E. Sablin, the Vice-Chairman was Count G.P. Beningsen and 
the Honorary Treasurer A.M. Onu.
In 1922 another organisation was established for the relief of Russian intellectuals, the 
Committee for the Relief of Russian Intellectuals, also chaired by Sir Paul Vinogradov. 
It, however, mostly concentrated its help on starving intellectuals in Russia. In this the 
Committee worked in co-operation with the American Relief Association and the 
Universities Committee of the Imperial Relief Fund.^^ In 1921 the Russian Public 
Committee for Famine Relief was established by Russian émigrés in London. The 
Committee continued to exist until October 1922. The composition of the Committee 
again consisted of prominent members of the émigré community such as Vinogradov, 
Gardner, Meyendorff, Isaev, Tiurin, Tyrkova-Williams and Shklovskii.
References have already been made to the Central Russian Committee (CRC) of Sir 
George Buchanan and its Educational Sub-Committee. The Educational Sub-Committee 
was established during 1918, chaired by Bernard Pares, who in 1919 became the
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Palace library; Kaznina 1997, p. 35.
58 Stow Hill (Soskice) Papers, D S .l, Box 5. R.A.G/1 (Russian Academic Group). House o f Lords Record Office
59 Stow Hill (Soskice) Pares, DS.2/1, Box 6. Committee for the Relief o f Russian Intellectuals and DS. 6/2, Box 24. 
Article by B. Hollingsworth on Soskice. House o f Lords Record Office.
Kaznina 1997, p. 34.
248
Professor of Russian Languages, Literature and History at the School of Slavonic 
Studies at King’s College, and acted as a head of the school from 1922 to 1939 . In 
addition to his active work for the ‘Russian reconstruction’ and training suitable British 
and Russian persons for this, he also helped Russian students to come to study in 
Britain.
The Educational Sub-Committee appealed to the British educational institution to accept 
Russian students either on reduced fees or without charge. It also made a list of children 
of prominent Russians whom Committee especially recommended for education in the 
British schools and universities. Similarly, the Committee assisted Russian scientists 
and literary men and other specialists in finding employment in Britain. A large number 
of applications were received from Russians both wishing to send their children to 
Britain for education and seeking employment in Britain.^^
The results of the work of the Educational Sub-Committee regarding the education of 
Russian children were at least to some extent successful, as the responses of many 
universities were positive and a number of Russian students were offered places to 
come to study in Britain. This was especially so of the colleges in Oxford and 
Cambridge, as well as King’s College in London, which responded sympathetically to 
the appeal. Among the most ‘well-known’ examples of those who came to study was the 
son of P.B. Struve, Gleb Struve; the two elder sons of V. D. Nabokov, Sergei and 
Vladimir; the son of A.I. Konovalov, Sergei and the two sons of A.F. Kerenskii, Oleg 
and Gleb. ^  Both Vladimir and Sergei Nabokov studied in Cambridge. Sergei, however, 
started his studies in Oxford, together with Gleb Struve and Sergei Konovalov, who 
later became head of Russian department in Oxford. In the latter part of the 1920s 
Isaiah Berlin, whose family had come to Britain in February 1921, also studied in 
Oxford.""
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In 1921 it was estimated that there were about 180 Russian students in higher 
educational institutions in Britain. Speaking on behalf of the Conference of University 
Teachers of Russian, it was stated by Pares that about three quarters of these students 
were without any maintenance, and that they would be extremely grateful if  the Imperial 
War Relief Fund found it possible to extend any help to Russian students in England. 
The Universities Committee of the Imperial War Relief Fund took on the task and in the 
early 1920s they provided financial assistance to Russian students at British 
universities.^*
Many academics also found their way to British universities and other educational 
institutions assisted by the Educational Sub-Committee and by Pares personally. Among 
them was, for example, Baron Meyendorff, who after his arrival in early 1919 first gave 
lessons in Russian at King’s College and from 1922 to 1934 acted as Reader in Russian 
Institutions and Economics at the London School of Economics. Bernard Pares 
personally recommended Meyendorff for this post.^  ^Similarly, D.S. Mirskii, who 
arrived in London in spring 1921, was assisted by Pares to get a professorial post at the 
School of Slavonic Studies at King’s College. He also regularly produced articles for 
the Slavonic Review, edited by Pares.^° In 1932 Mirskii, however, returned to the Soviet 
Union; a decision which was largely due to the fact that he had become pro-Soviet. 
While in Britain Mirskii was connected with the political movement called Eurasianism, 
which argued that Russia was neither West nor East, but Eurasia, fusion of both 
European and Asian elements. The movement, however, clearly leaned more toward the 
East, and the leftist fraction of movement came to accept the happenings in Russia, i.e. 
the Bolshevik Revolution, as a natural result of the basic character of the Eurasian 
civilisation.
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258-60; Raeff 1990, pp. 84-85.
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In early 1919 Sir George Buchanan forwarded to the Foreign Office a memorandum of 
the Central Russian Committee (CRC) on the position of Russians in Britain. According 
to the report the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia had introduced a new 
factor into the problem of Russian relief, that of the rapidly increasing number of well- 
to-do and middle-class Russians, who ceased to receive their usual dividends from 
Russia.
Sir George Buchanan also pointed out that after the withdrawal of Russia from active 
participation in the war the position of Russian Government officials in Britain became 
precarious, and the attitude of the public towards Russians became suspicious and 
distrustful. The sequestration of the Russian government funds at the time of the 
liquidation of the Russian Government Committee caused resentment among loyal 
Russians, officers and civil servants, who found themselves thrown out of employment, 
deprived of the possibility of receiving help from the funds of the Russian government. 
A limited advance was managed to be obtained from the Treasury for their relief. A few 
were successful in returning to Russia in the last days of Kerenskii regime, some were to 
obtain war work, but the great majority were unable to find employment.
The Russian Advisory Council, consisting of many prominent Russians such as K. 
Nabokov, A.M Onu and E. Gambs, and established as an auxiliary body of the CRC in 
July 1918, used all its efforts to assist the Russian population in Britain. Their task was 
to present to the CRC the cases of those Russians that were in immediate need of relief. 
The CRC had small sums for this at its disposal, but they were stated to be totally 
inadequate. The efforts of the CRC in finding employment for Russians recommended 
by the Council also proved fhiitless.
In September 1918 the British Russian Relief Committee (BRRC) was established on 
the initiative of Sir George Buchanan, for the relief of destitute families of Russian 
officers who were fighting with the Allied forces and for the relief of both British and 
Russian refugees from Russia. From the beginning, the Committee was, however, faced 
with enormous difficulties. With limited funds at its disposal and the frequent arrival of 
British and Russian refugees in Britain, the resources of the Committee turned out to be
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completely inadequate/^ During the first year of its existence, the Committee 
nevertheless collected hinds worth over £17,000. For the purpose of relief of refugees 
from Russia workrooms were established at the Russian Embassy by Sir George 
Buchanan’s wife. Lady Georgina Buchanan. These workrooms aimed at providing work 
for Russian and British refugee women, who were said to be facing enormous 
difficulties in supporting themselves.
In order to get donations and support for their work, the Committee published appeals in 
different newspapers and periodicals, for example in The Russian Outlook, a weekly 
magazine devoted to Russian and Anglo-Russian affairs, edited and managed by 
Stafford C. Talbot and published from May 1919 to September 1920. In its appeals it 
was stated that a constant stream of both British and Russian refugees from Russia was 
pouring into Britain, and that majority of those were in an extremely difficult situation. 
In its appeal of May 1919, the Committee stated that 270 British and Russian ladies 
were engaged in the preparation of Red Cross supplies to the Russian Volunteer Armies 
at the workrooms of Lady Buchanan at the Russian Embassy. The funds of the 
Committee, however, were insufficient to support the workrooms, and the subscriptions 
were needed to carry on their work. Despite constant appeals, the response of the 
public was very limited.
In the autumn of 1919 Sir George Buchanan took a diplomatic post at the British 
Embassy in Rome, which meant that he could no longer continue as chairman of the 
British Russian Relief Committee or the Central Russian Committee. He informed J.D. 
Gregory, the head of the Foreign Office Russia Department that these committees would 
have to close at the end of October, when he left for Rome. He continued that even if it 
was possible to find anyone to continue their work, the funds at the disposal of the 
Committees were insufficient for the purpose. He recommended that Mr. Gale who had 
acted as Secretary both to the CCR and BRRC should be employed to deal with all the
72 FO 371/3989, File 3191. Memorandum No. 2 by Sir George Buchanan, February 1919. PRO.
73 FO 371/4029, File 125746. Sir George Buchanan to Gregory 5.9.1919. PRO.
74 The Russian Outlook, No. 3, Vol. 1, 24 May 1919, p. 51.
75 FO 371/3989, File 3191. Memorandum No. 2 by Sir George Buchanan, February 1919. PRO.
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cases that might arise and need help from the Committees/^ There is no further 
information relating to the Central Russian Committee. However, the BRRC seems to 
have been absorbed into the Russo-British Bratstvo, where it continued its work from 
autumn 1919. Vladimir D. Nabokov, for example, who arrived to Britain in May 1919, 
worked actively for the Committee.^^
The Russian Red Cross Society (old organisation), another pre-Revolutionary 
organisation in addition to the Zemgor, also continued its activities in Britain in the 
aftermath of the war and the Bolshevik Revolution. The Russian Red Cross Society 
(RRCS) in Britain changed its name in 1920 to the Russian Benevolent Society, and 
much later in 1978 to Russian Refugees Aid Society, under which name it still works in 
London. Nevertheless, the old name, the Russian Red Cross Society (old organisation) 
was still often used at least in the 1920s.
At the meeting in May 1919 it was stated that the Russian Red Cross Society was an 
entirely non-political organisation. The work of the Society was directed towards the 
financial and medical help of Russian refugees in Britain, the needs of children, as well 
as assisting Russian refugees in other countries.^^ The report of the Society for 1922 
stated that hundreds of thousands of Russian refugees were scattered throughout Europe 
and that there were many thousands of Russian refugees also in Britain. Many of them 
had great difficulties in obtaining a livelihood and about six hundred were in urgent 
need of help. The funds of the Headquarters of the Russian Red Cross in Paris had been 
diminished. Therefore the first task of the Russian Red Cross Society in Britain had 
been to collect sufficient funds and secondly, to unite different charitable organisations 
for the help of Russian refugees. Under conditions of restricted funds, the RRCS 
decided to unite the three most important ones: The RRCS, the Russian Relief Fund 
(RRF) and the Ex-Service Men’s Mutual Provident Association.*®
FO 371/4029, File 125746. Sir George Buchanan to Gregory, FO 5.9.1919, encloses reports o f the Central 
Russian Committee and British Russian Relief Committee. PRO.
77 Kaznina 1997, p. 29; Kudriakova 1995, p. 15.
78 The Russian Outlook, No. 3, Vol. 1, 24 May, pp. 60-61.
79 Kudriakova 1995, p. 21.
80 FO 371/9347, File 91, Paper N 1700. Report o f activities o f Russian Red Cross Society in G.B, Russian Relief 
Fund and Russian Ex-Service Men’s Mutual Provident Association for the year 1922. PRO.
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The funds for the work of the Red Cross came largely through donations and fund 
raising activities. For this purpose an Entertainment Committee was established and the 
Grand Duchess Ksenia acted as the President of the Committee. In 1922 nine different 
events were arranged, including a Gala Night, ballet, concerts and balls, producing a net 
profit of £1,788. In November 1922, the Society took part in a Bazaar organised by the 
League of Nations Union at St. Albans, where articles made by Russian refugees were 
sold. Financially this was, however, not a profitable occasion. Instead, the yearly 
Christmas Bazaar, held at Chesham House, had produced a profit of over £144. This 
was divided between the RRC, the RRF and the Ex-Service Men’s Association. A cash 
payment of £2,287 was received from the Russian Red Cross Head Office in Paris. The 
British Committee of the Russian Red Cross also assisted by £361. Adding to these 
sums donations and other receipts, the total funds raised year 1922 was stated to be £ 
5,772.
The funds were released to the Russian Relief Fund and the Ex-service Men’s 
Association for the relief of Russian refugees in Britain; to the Russian Refugees Relief 
Association for the refugees at Constantinople; to the Northern Association for the 
Russian Refugees bom in North Russia; to the Russian Academic Group for the 
education of Russian children in Britain; and to the Russian Parish Church Council for 
maintaining the hostel for Russian refugees in London. Part of the sum received from 
the headquarters in Paris was allotted to the help of the Russian refugees in Britain, and 
part to the upkeep of the Society. Because of diminished funds from the Headquarters, 
the staff of the Society had to be greatly reduced, and only consisted in 1922 of the 
Delegate and Secretary. In August 1922 Baron Raush, the Special Delegate had resigned 
and Mr. D. Zinoviev took his place.
Uncle o f Kirill Fitzlyon (Zinoviev). Kirill Fitzlyon’s wife, Mrs. April Fitzlyon is the General Secretary o f the 
Russian Refugees Aid Society, the successor of the Russian Red Cross Society. Dmitri Zinoviev worked actively at 
the Benevolent Society until long after the World War II. One of his greatest achievements was the purchase o f two 
houses for elderly and invalid Russian émigrés. Also a third House was purchased in the early 1960s. D. Zinoviev 
died in 1963. (Reference: Obituary at The Times, 17 January 1963. Michael Glenny collection, GLE/1/1/9.) O f the 
three houses, two were later sold as the time reduced the number of old émigrés. One house is still kept, functioning 
as a hostel and old people’s home at Chiswick, and taken care by the Russian Refugees Aid Society. (Reference: 
Interview o f Kirill Fitzlyon, 29 November 1996.)
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The help provided for refugees was divided into medical help, hostel, labour help, 
charity help (children, clothing, etc.) and help for Russian refugees abroad.*  ^The 
Society had agreements with a few doctors to treat Russian refugees free of charge and 
in some cases the Red Cross paid the hospital fees. A hostel for Russian refugees was 
functioning at Chiswick, bought by Prince lusopov and Mr. O. Zelenov, which until 
October 1922 was under the supervision of the Russian Parish Church Council. They, 
however, had problems finding the finance for its upkeep. In December 1922 a 
substantial donation was received from Sir Walter Gibbons for the maintenance of the 
hostel on the condition that it was handed over to the Russian Red Cross, and this was 
then agreed. During the last two months of 1922 there were 41 residents at the hostel. It 
was stated that those living in the hostel were the poorest of the refugees, to whom even 
the nominal charge, 2s. 3d., which was made towards the upkeep, was causing 
difficulties.
The Red Cross Society also tried to assist refugees in finding employment, although it 
was stated that there were severe difficulties in this. General relief was also provided for 
those in need, as well as assistance for those who wanted to emigrate elsewhere. During 
1922 a total of 116 families received charity help and the total of grants amounted to 
£1,185. Special help was provided for children, for example, for educational purposes. 
The Russian Relief Fund, which had paid for the maintenance and education of the 
Russian children in Britain, had to discontinue their help in January 1922 owing to their 
lack of funds. The Russian Academic Group took part of their work and decided to 
organise some courses of study for the children during their holidays, and by travelling 
from one centre to another during the school terms. The Red Cross Society assisted 
them in this with the sum of £74 during 1922. Gifts of clothing were also provided to 
the refugees in need, and during 1922 a total of 1,287 garments were given out to 199 
persons.
The RRCS also wished to draw attention to the kind attitude shown to them especially 
by the British Red Cross Society and the British Committee of the Russian Red Cross
82 FO 371/9347, File 91, Paper N 1700. Report of activities of Russian Red Cross Society in G.B, Russian Relief 
Fund and Russian Ex-Service Men’s Mutual Provident Association for the year 1922.
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(BCRRC) that had assisted the work of Russian Red Cross by donahons/^ The BCRRC 
also assisted directly needy Russian families with weekly and monthly payments, as 
well as assisting in the payment of school fees. It had also participated in the Hurst farm 
settlement in Hedley, established in October 1920, which employed a number of 
Russian refugees. Owing to the financial position of the BCRRC, it was, however, 
stated in 1922 that the number of Russian workers on the farm had been considerably 
reduced.
Additionally, the RRCS also wanted to thank ‘several of their British friends’ who had 
assisted in collecting funds. The Society concluded its report of the year 1922 by stating 
that it hoped that generous assistance of the British charity would continue in future, as 
in the situation of exhausted funds, their work depended entirely on their assistance’.
The Russian Relief Fund, mentioned above, also actively supported Russian refugees in 
Britain. It had been founded in 1918 by Lady Egerton and several ‘English friends in 
Russia’, and it was affiliated to the RRCS. The general principle of the Fund was to 
assist and help any Russian refugees from the Bolshevik regime. The notable feature of 
the Fund was to provide education for Russian children in suitable schools, and to pay 
their school fees. The funds at the disposal were, however, also largely reduced, and 
during 1922 the Relief Fund was able to pay school fees only in few cases, when earlier 
it had managed to pay for more than 100 children. They, however, assisted by 
introducing Russian families to school authorities, and many were accepted on reduced 
fees or even free of charge. The Fund also assisted those refugees who wanted to go 
abroad; in 1922 eleven families were assisted. The budget of the Fund in 1922 was 
L2,586.
The aim of the Ex-Service Men’s Association was to give material and moral help to 
Ex-Service men of the former Russian Army and Navy. The principle upon which the 
work was carried out was to give loans to its members to enable them to start work and
83 ibid.
84 FO 371/8217, File 6462, Paper N 6462. Work o f the BCRRC, draft of the report 4.7.1922. PRO.
85 FO 371/9347, File 91, Paper N 1700. Report o f activities of Russian Red Cross Society in G.B, Russian Relief 
Fund and Russian Ex-Service Men’s Mutual Provident Association for the year 1922.
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generally to find employment for its members. During 1922 permanent employment 
was found for three members and temporary work for sixteen. The budget of the 
Association was quite small, in 1922, for example, £429.^^
In 1923 the Appeal for the Russian Clergy and Church Aid Fund was established in 
Britain. The President of the Fund was Rt. Rev. Dr. Russell Wakefield; Chairman of the 
Committee, the Rev. G. Napier; Honorary Secretary, W. Tudor Pole and Vice- 
Presidents the Bishops of London, Wales, Edinburgh, Dublin, St. Albans, Truro, 
Winchester. Bernard Pares acted as the Honorary Treasurer. In October 1925 Pares 
replaced Tudor Pole as the Honorary Secretary
A large proportion of the funds of the Appeal Fund was used for bringing relief to 
imprisoned and exiled clergy in Russia and abroad. The Fund also supported the 
Russian Student Christian Movement, which had been established in various refugee 
communities throughout Europe, as well as the Russian Theological Academy in Paris, 
which had been opened in 1925. The Russian Student Christian Movement had its 
branch in London, headed by V. Korenchevskii, the Chairman of the Russian Academic 
Group. The headquarters of the movement were in Paris, but it was stated that the 
movement was especially attracted by the Anglican Church life, and a number of its 
members had participated at conferences organised by the British Student Christian 
Movement.®^
There were also several ‘political’ Russian organisations established from 1918 
onwards, which mainly aimed at the restoration of the anti-Bolshevik regime in Russia. 
Most of them, as well as their publications have already been mentioned in earlier 
chapters. Among the most influential of these organisations was undoubtedly the 
Russian Liberation Committee. It was established in February 1919 on the initiative of 
M. I. Rostovtsev, P.N. Miliukov and A.V. Tyrkova-Williams. Other members of the 
Committee were V.D. Nabokov, A.V. Rumanov, H.W. Williams, D.D. Gardner, S.V.
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Denisova, V. I. Isaev, I. V. Shklovskii-Diones, P.B. Struve, J. Krukston and A. Borman. 
The task of the Committee was stated to be ‘the liberation of Russia and the upheaval of 
its prestige’. The Committee was located at 173 Fleet Street, then at the centre of British 
joumalism.^® Meetings of the Committee were held once a week in order to discuss 
important questions related to Russia and to decide about the actions of the Committee. 
In the meetings it was, for example, decided to print short slogans as propaganda, such 
as ‘Russia United and Free’ and ‘No Bolshevism’ at the publications of the Committee; 
to circulate the ‘White book’ on Bolshevism and to arrange meetings with prominent 
English persons.^’
During its first year the Committee issued a monthly Bulletin, devoted to Russian 
affairs. In February 1920, because of the change in the Allied attitude towards Russian 
White armies, due to their recent retreat, the Committee started to issue a weekly journal 
called The New Russia. In August 1921 the review changed its name to The Russian 
Life, now published once a month, which continued until March 1922.^  ^In addition the 
Committee also published separate pamphlets, among which were for example ‘Why 
Soviet Russia is starving’ by A.V. Tyrkova and ‘Russia and England’ by P.N. Miliukov. 
The pamphlets, as the other publications of the Committee, took a strong stand for the 
struggle against anti-Bolshevik Russia and for the continuance of the Allied support of 
the White forces. They, for example, strongly condemned the change in the British 
attitude and policy at the beginning of 1920 as a consequence of the retreat of Kolchak 
and Denikin, and later the lifting of the blockade of Bolshevik Russia and the peace 
negotiations with the Bolsheviks.^^
The Russian National Union was established by Russian émigrés in 1919 in order to 
unite the anti-Bolshevik forces in their struggle against Bolshevism. The headquarters of 
the Union were in Paris. In London a branch Committee of the Union existed under the 
title of the Russian National Committee. The first General Meeting of the Russian
H.W. Williams Papers, Add. 54466, Vol. X X X I, f. 18. British library, department o f manuscripts; Kaznina 1997, 
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National Committee in London was held on 12 April 1919. The resolutions of the 
meeting stated that it was a duty of all Russians to ‘rally round their solid, reunited, 
mighty and sovereign Russia’ and that it was essential to uphold the spiritual authority 
of the Orthodox Church as well as to reconstruct the Russian army. It was concluded 
that the Committee ‘firmly believed in a final triumph of justice and truth in Russia’. 
Later in July it was stated that the National Committee in London was formed by 
Russians residing in London, who, in normal times would have belonged to different 
political parties, but at that present juncture were united in a con;mon bond to establish 
a united and powerful Russia.^^
Another anti-Bolshevik émigré organisation was the Union ‘Russian Commonwealth’ 
(Narodopravstvo), established in London at the end of 1918. ‘Russian Commonwealth’ 
was stated to be the watchword of the Union, meaning a self-governing, free and 
independent Russia. As its objects the Union had the uniting of Russians who 
repudiated the Bolshevik rule, advocating a democratically elected Constituent 
Assembly. It considered the republican order to be the best guarantee of the peaceful 
development of Russia and believed in close co-operation with the Allied governments. 
It was further stated that the Union advocated a commonwealth and not autocracy in any 
form, even a constitutional monarchy, and that the enemies of the Union were 
Bolshevism, Tsarism and Prussianism.
The Chairman of the Union was Professor S.P Tiurin and as a Vice-Chairman acted I.V 
Shklovskii-Dioneo. In addition to them the Committee of the Union consisted of five 
other members. The Union was divided into different sections, known as the Literary 
Section, Section of Economic Problems and Information Bureau. The offices of the 
Union were located at Sardinia House, Kingsway. The Union also published a twice- 
monthly magazine called The Russian Commonwealth where they argued the anti- 
Bolshevik cause, lobbied for the representation of anti-Bolshevik groups at the Peace 
Conference and opposed the Prinkipo proposal, a joint meeting between the Bolshevik 
and anti-Bolshevik forces for purpose of peace discussions. The review continued until
95 The Russian Outlook, No. 2, vol. 1, 17 May 1919 and No. 10, Vol. 1,12 July 1919.
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January 1920, after issuing 12 numbers. The main reasons for its discontinuation was 
the departure of the editor S. Poliakov-Litovtsev to Paris, since he had played a crucial 
role in the magazine.
In addition to these there were a few other independent Russian or Anglo-Russian 
periodical publications in Britain in the early 1920s. One of these was the weekly 
magazine The Russian/Russkii zhurnal, published in both English and Russian from 
October 1918 to August 1919. It was founded and edited by Edouard S. Liubov and the 
editorial offices were at Southampton Street, Holbom.
It was stated that the journal was devoted to Russian affairs, the struggle against the 
Bolsheviks, support for existing Russian organisations and their activities in London 
and to provide information relating to Russian affairs in general. During 1919 the 
editorial took a clear stand against the proposal to invite Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik 
forces to Prinkipo by stating that the invitation ‘not only repudiates the policy of 
ostracism but constitutes in reality a recognition of Lenin-Trotskii government’. In 
August 1919 the journal also pleaded against the British decision to withdraw its troops 
from Northern Russia.^*
Another Russian paper appeared briefly in early 1922, Russkii P u t\ edited by N.V. 
Sipiagin. Issued only three times, the editorial of the first issue in March 1922 stated 
that the task of the journal, as of all émigré journals, was the liberation of Russia, as, 
according to the editorial, Bolshevik Russia was not Russia. There existed another 
Russia ‘under’ the Soviet one, and that should be the main target of care for all. In its 
second issue the paper reminded the Russia émigrés of the work they should do for the 
restoration and renewal of Russia.^^
One more weekly journal deserves a mention. This is The Russian Outlook, published 
from May 1918 to September 1920 and edited by Stafford Talbot. The paper published 
articles of both British specialists in Russian affairs and prominent Russian émigrés.
97 The Russian Commonwealth, Vol. 2, No. 13, November 1919.
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The Russian Outlook reported regularly about the situation in Russia, and the paper 
strongly supported the anti-Bolshevik cause. In its first issue it was pointed out that 
according to the Foreign Office White Paper fewer than 5% of the Russian population 
was sympathetic to the Bolshevik regime. It also published the views of a number of 
prominent Russians, such as Miliukov, Tiurin, Chaikovskii, Poliakov-Litovtsev, Hessen 
and Dessino. In later issues the journal continued to stress the importance of the 
Allied support to the White forces and later condemned the change in their policy, 
especially that of the British government. It also introduced and presented the activities 
of different Russian organisations and the émigré colony in general.
6.3. Life of Russian Émigrés in Britain in the 1920s
The remainder of this chapter will concentrate on the life of the Russian émigré 
community in Britain, primarily during the first decade of exile. Geographically the 
émigrés lived mainly in London, or other towns nearby, for example Oxford. Although 
there were Russian émigrés in many other places outside London, the only proper 
‘émigré colony’ existed only in London.
The smallness of the Russian émigré community in Britain without doubt affected 
various sides of life of the émigrés. If considering, for example, the question of 
assimilation of the émigrés into British society, the smallness of the colony could affect 
it in two different ways. It could mean that the social relationships of the émigrés were 
more easily concentrated inside the Russian community, since the émigrés knew each 
other better in a smaller community. The fact that the British authorities had carefully 
obeyed the rules for entry and used very selective measures in determining who could 
be admitted also influenced the composition of the community in an ‘homogenising’ 
manner.
100 The Russian Outlook, No. 1, Vol. 1, 10 May 1919.
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Thus, the strict policies in admission meant that the majority of those admitted had 
either enough money to support themselves and/or had influential British connections. 
At very least they had to have some influential sponsors or friends in Britain who would 
support their case and promise to look after them financially. Although many émigrés 
faced great material and financial difficulties, especially in the beginning, the overall 
material situation of the émigré community was, nevertheless, better than that of 
Russians, for example, in France or Yugoslavia.
However, the smallness of the émigré colony could also facilitate the early intermixing 
of the émigrés with the British. It is evident that during the whole 1920s Russian 
émigrés in Britain socialised to a large extend with each other and the émigré 
community was an important ‘source of support’, both social and material. However, it 
does not seem that the existence of the close and small émigré community excluded 
relations with British society. Quite the opposite, according to émigré accounts, they 
socialised and intermixed with the British from the very beginning and were quickly 
absorbed into British society.
The fact that even the first generation émigrés, particularly those who arrived to Britain 
in the early 1920s as children with their parents, almost without exception married 
British subjects also speaks of their easy and quick assimilation. With the second 
generation of Russian émigrés this was of course even more so, so much that marriage 
between two second generation Russians in Britain was very unlikely. Thus, unlike in 
France, where the Russian émigré community remained ‘unmixed’ for much longer and 
even the second generation of émigrés often married each other, in Britain this was not 
the case.
The smallness of the Russian émigré community undoubtedly eased assimilation, but it 
might also have something to do with the reception of the émigrés by the host society. It 
seems that despite the negative attitude of the British authorities, as well as at least to
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some extent of the British public towards the admission of Russian refugees to Britain, 
after their arrival émigrés were treated with hospitality, more so than in some other 
countries of emigration. According to Kirill Fitzlyon, the first generation Russian 
émigré in Britain, the British treated Russian émigrés ‘extremely well’, and Britain was 
‘wonderful nation to come into and live in’.'°^
The émigré accounts in some other countries of Russian emigration were not quite as 
positive. In Czechoslovakia the left-wing circles, influential amqng workers and 
intellectuals were in fact quite hostile towards Russian émigrés.’®^ Also in France, at 
least in view of some émigré accounts, the Russian émigrés were not received well. 
According to Tatiana Gabard, a Russian émigré in Paris, Russian émigrés were only 
invited to France because they were needed, and the ‘attitude of the common people was 
awful’. T h e r e  were similar experiences in Germany. For example, in the opinion of 
Michael Gordey, Russian émigré in Berlin, it was very difficult to have a close 
relationship with German people. This, on its part, meant further isolation of the 
émigrés from the German society.’®* In words of Nina Berberova: ‘The German Berlin 
was only a background for these years, sickly Germany, sickly money, the sickly trees 
of Tiergarten’.’®^
Following on from earlier, it seems that, unlike for example in France or Germany, 
Russian émigrés in Britain were not so afraid of denationalisation, in other words 
assimilation. If this had been the case, they would not have, for example intermarried so 
quickly and frequently and the relationship with the British would have been more 
restrained. This does not equal to the suggestion that Russian émigrés in Britain lost 
their Russian identity. Definitely, at least the first generation of Russian émigrés in 
Britain remained very ‘Russian’ throughout their lives in exile. The words of a Russian 
émigré Mark Wolff: ’the influence of England on us became very important, but my
104 inteviews of Mr. Kirill Fitzlyon, 29 November 1996, Mrs. Barbara Whittal, 21 January 1997; Interview o f Mrs. 
Sophia Bocharska. In Michael Glenny collection, GLE/1/1/5. SSEES.
105 Interview o f Kirill Fitzlyon, 29 November 1996.
106 Chinyaeva 1994, p. 294.
107 Tatiana Gabard in Glenny and Stone 1990, p. 284.
108 Interview of Michael Gordey. In Michael Glenny collection, GLE/1/1/5. SSEES; Williams 1972, pp. 322-323.
109 Berberova, Nina. The Italics Are Mine. London 1969, p. 165.
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house remained a Russian house and I have never tried to pretend that I am British’ ' 
seem to describe well the feelings of the first generation of émigrés.
The fact that the Russian émigrés in exile in general struggled to maintain their Russian 
identity and resist assimilation was due to fact that they considered themselves as 
representatives of ‘true’ Russia, as opposed to the ‘false’ one represented by the 
Bolsheviks. Therefore, in exile they maintained the structure of the ‘old Russia’ as well 
they could and made efforts to preserve and carry on the traditional and genuine Russian 
culture, which could be utilised after their return back to Russia. In this work the 
Russian language and its continuous use in exile played an important role. Language not 
only defined the tradition of Russian culture, as reflected in its literature, but it was also 
essential ingredient of the identity of Russian émigrés. It was particularly the Russian 
language, both written and oral, that tied the émigrés to their past and helped them to 
surpass their dispersion.
Thus, Russian émigrés in exile clearly continued to consider themselves as part of 
Russian nation, which temporarily had to stay outside the borders of its national 
territory. According to Benedict Anderson nation is an imagined political community. 
He continues that ‘it is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will 
never know most of their fellow-members, meet them of hear them, yet in the minds of 
each lives the image of their community’. '’^  Anthony Smith also significantly points out 
that the ‘ethnie”  ^do not cease to be ethnie when they are dispersed and have lost their 
homeland; for ethnicity is a matter of myths, memories, values and symbols. . These 
myths, values, memories, symbols and other cultural components are the fundamental 
features of national identity. Preserving these features therefore became a 
fundamental task for Russian émigrés in their efforts to maintain a Russian identity and 
unity with the Russian nation.
Memoirs o f Mark Wolff, p. 236. On microfische, at the deposition o f his daughter, Ms. Tatiana Wolff.
111 Raeff 1990, pp. 4-5, 10, 16, 47, 109.
112 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. Reflections of the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism. London and 
New York 1991, p. 6.
113 ‘Ethnie’ meaning ‘ethnic community’.
114 Smith, Anthony D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford (UK) and Cambridge (USA) 1988, p. 28.
113 Smith, Antrhony D. National Identity. London 1991, p. 14.
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These feelings undoubtedly were to a great extent shared at least by the first generation 
of Russian émigrés in Britain. However, it nevertheless seems that for Russian émigrés 
in Britain this ‘Russianness’ did not become quite as ‘exclusive’ feature, as largely 
happened for example in France, where the existence of the large émigré community 
‘fed’ the feelings of exclusiveness and isolation.
On the part of the children of the Russian émigrés the English boarding and private 
schools naturally played important role in assimilating Russian émigré children into 
British society. As pointed out, for example, by Mrs. Whittal, the first generation 
Russian émigré in Britain, at the time she finished the boarding school, she was already 
‘anglicised’ In fact, the English public education had become quite popular in 
Russia already before the Revolution, especially in educated spheres, which meant that 
many Russian émigrés very much wanted their children to be educated in British public 
schools.
It has already been mentioned that some British educational institutions agreed to admit 
Russian émigré children free of charge or with considerable reductions in fees. Different 
organisations, such as the Educational Sub-Committee of the Central Russian 
Committee and various Russian organisations, particularly the Russo-British Bratstvo, 
the Russian Academic Group and Russian Relief Fund also carried out important work 
for the educational needs of Russian émigrés.
Many British individuals also showed a great interest in the issue, and assisted Russian 
families in finding proper schools for their children, as well as helping with school fees. 
References have already been made to Sir Bernard Pares, whose personal work for 
Russian émigrés, especially in the educational field, was of great importance. Another 
person who greatly assisted in providing proper education for Russian children was Mr. 
Spalding in Oxford. Through him several Russian émigré children were assisted in their 
education at universities.
1 Interview of Mrs. Barbara Whittal, 21 January 1997.
117 Interview of Mrs. Barbara Whittal, 21 January 1997; Ignatieff 1998, p. 31.
118 Interviews of Mrs. Barbara W hittal, 21 January 1997, Mrs. Sophie Goodman, 28 January 1997 and Professor 
Dimitry Obolensky, 21 April 1998; Lady Masha Williams (sister o f Mrs. Whittal) in Glenny and Stone 1990, p. 309.
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Mr. Fynes-Clinton, an Anglican clergyman who worked actively at the Russian Clergy 
and Church Aid Fund, also showed a lot of interest in the education of Russian émigré 
children and Britain, and arranged for Anglican convents to educate some Russian 
children jfree of charge.”  ^Similarly Mr. Riley, who was a well-known promoter of 
Anglo-Russian friendship, used all his efforts to get Russian children into British 
schools free of charge. For example in 1923 over twenty Russian émigré children were 
placed in British schools free of charge. The Russian Red Cross assisted Russian 
families in paying the school fees of their children, though from the begiiming their 
resources were very limited due to the financial difficulties of the organisation.
The issue of language is also of great importance. Even if the first generation Russians 
continued to speak Russian among themselves and Russian was the language spoken at 
home with the children, the fact that the children went to English schools, socialised 
with the English children and learned the language, definitely worked towards the quick 
anglicising of the younger generation. The situation was somewhat different for 
example in France, not only because of the fact the Russian émigré community was 
much more closed, but also because of the existence of Russian émigré schools, which 
allowed Russian children to study in their own language. The same was true with some 
other places of emigration, for example in Czechoslovakia (Prague) and Yugoslavia 
(Belgrade).
In Britain there were no such Russian educational establishments, primarily due to the 
small number of émigrés in Britain. In a paper by Nicholas Hans, a Russian émigré and 
future pioneer in the field of comparative education given at the conference of the 
Pedagogical Bureau, it was stated that there was not a single Russian School in Britain.
] 19 Interview of Mrs. Barbara Whittal, 21 January 1997; Lady Masha Williams in Glenny and Stone 1990, p. 308; 
Memoirs o f Alexandra Pushchina (mother o f Mrs. Whittal and Lady Williams) 1966, p. 96. In Michael Glenny 
collection, GLE/1/1/2. SSEES.
120 Report o f the activities o f the Russian Red Cross Society in Great Britain and other Russian charity 
organisations in London for the year 1923. Archives o f the Russian Refugees Aid Society. Nicholas House, Bedford 
Park, London.
121 FO 371/9347, File 91, Paper N 1700. Report o f the activities o f Russian Red Cross Society... for the year 1922. 
PRO.
122 Rossiiskaia Emigratsiia v Turtsii, lugo-Vostochnoi 1 Tsentral’noi Evrope 20-h Godov. Moskva 1994, p. 89; 
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Instead Russian children studied at British schools either at their own expense, or with 
grants from various charities.
Despite the fact that there were no Russian schools in Britain the émigrés had their 
representative in the Russian Pedagogical Bureau in Prague. The Pedagogical bureau 
had been established in 1923, to serve as a centre of research and documentation for 
various educational ques t ions .The representative of Russian émigrés in Britain was 
Nicholas Hans, more specifically representing Russian teachers in L o n d o n . I n  Russia 
Hans worked as a Director of Education in Odessa until 1920 when he emigrated to 
Britain. In Britain he first taught Russian, then worked as a secretary of the Russian 
Academic Group in London and finished his Ph.D. at the School of Slavonic Studies at 
King’s College on Russian Educational Policy. Dr. Bernard Pares acted as a tutor for his 
Ph.D. and later recommended Hans for various university posts.
There were also some attempts to arrange peripatetic courses in Russian studies during 
the school holidays in the 1920s. This project was taken up by the Russian Academic 
group in 1922. In summer 1923, a special Children’s Colony was organised by the 
Academic group, attended by about fifty émigré children, who were instructed in 
Russian language, history and geography by Russian teachers and a p r i e s t .A pa r t  from 
this there is not much information about the continuation and the success of these 
courses. According to P. Kovalevskii, the émigré historian, these courses were soon 
discontinued.However, some summer courses for children were still going in the late 
1920s. For example in 1928 a house was rented at Ewell and a number of Russian 
children spent four weeks studying Russian language, history, geography and the 
Orthodox religion.
^24 Biulleten’ Pedagogicheskogo Biuro po delam srednii I nizshei russkoi shkoly za granitsei, No. 2, p. 46. Prague 
1923.
125 Raeff 1990, p. 55.
126 Biulleten’ Pedagigicheskogo Biuro, No. 1, p. 5. Prague 1923.
127 Nicholas Hans collection, NH 5/2/1, 5/2/3, 5/2/13. The Institute o f Education Archives. University o f London.
128 FO 371/9437, File 91, Paper N 1700. Report on activities o f Russian Red Cross Society in Great Britain... for 
the year 1922. PRO.
129 Report o f the activities o f the Russian Red Cross Society in Great Britain and other Russian charity 
organisations in London for the year 1923. The archives o f Russian Refugees Aid Society.
130 Kovalevskii P. E. Zarubezhnaia Rossiia. Istoriia I kul’tumo-prosvetitel’naia rabota russkogo zarubezh’ia za 
polveka (1920-1970). Paris 1971, p. 57.
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That there were these kind of attempts to educate the émigré children in Russian 
language and culture indicates that the Russian émigrés in Britain were worried about 
their children growing up without knowledge of Russian history and culture. The 
common feature of the Russian emigration was their desire to preserve the children’s 
knowledge of Russian culture, so that in a future free and non-Bolshevik Russia, to 
which the majority of the émigrés continued to believe in, they would have skills to play 
a constructive role.
Although the émigré community in Britain was more homogeneous in its composition 
than in some other countries of emigration, all the groups of ‘the old Russia’ could be 
found in the émigré community in London, beginning with the Court represented by the 
Grand Duchess Ksenia. This also meant that even if refugee status in a sense reduced 
everyone to the same level, the émigrés, nevertheless, continued to follow the same 
protocols and etiquette as they had in Russia. The hierarchy of titles was also very much 
kept up. For example, the Grand Duchess Ksenia was always addressed as the Grand 
Duchess by all the émigrés in London, and the former titles like Count, Countess or 
Prince, Princess, were also continued to be used. It can therefore be stated that the 
Russian émigrés in Britain at least at the beginning of the emigration largely ‘kept to 
their particular class’.
There also seemed to have been some resentfulness from the side of the supporters of 
the ‘old rule’, the monarchists, towards those émigrés who had supported the February 
Revolution and Kerenskii. As stated by Vladimir Nabokov, among certain Russian 
émigrés ‘patriotism and politics boiled down to a snarling resentment of which was 
directed more against Kerenskii than against Lenin’. A l s o ,  for example Baron 
Meyendorff and David Soskice, both of whom supported Kerenskii, were not ‘looked at 
well’ by certain monarchists and were even considered to be ‘Red’. David Soskice had 
gone to Russia in the summer of 1917 as a correspondent of the Manchester Guardian 
and had become a private secretary of Kerenskii, before escaping to Britain in
132 Raeff 1990, p. 48.
133 P.Shilovsky in Glenny and Stone 1990, pp. 291-92.
134 Interview o f Mr. Kirill Fizlyon, 29 November 1996; P. Shilovsky in Glenny and Stone 1990, pp. 291-292 and 
Lady Masha Williams in Glenny and Stone 1990, p. 308.
135 Nabokov 1969, p. 201.
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November 1917. Before this he had lived in Britain and worked actively in the Society 
of Friends of Russian Freedom, opposing the oppressive Tsarist policies. This, of 
course, made him a quite unacceptable person in the eyes of the monarchists. With time, 
however, opinions became at least somewhat more conciliatory.
Generally speaking the Russian émigré community in London was actually less 
politically oriented than in many other countries. Many political parties that succeeded 
and flourished in some other countries of emigration did not do sp in Britain. In the late 
1920s, for example, a branch of the party called ‘Mladorossy’, the Young Russians, 
which spoke of a ‘monarchy with soviets’, was established in London. According to 
Ivan Bibilin, who was a member of ‘Mladorossi’ group in London, it became somewhat 
popular, lasted for a while but then faded out.
There were of course members of various Russian parties and political groupings among 
the Russian émigrés in Britain, for example V. D. Nabokov and P.N. Miliukov, both 
members of the Kadet Party. However, in general the role of politics among Russian 
émigrés in Britain clearly seems to have been less important than in many other 
countries. Perhaps the fact that many of those who were politically active, such as 
Miliukov and Nabokov, soon emigrated to other countries also speaks for this.
On the whole, it seems that the Russian émigré community in Britain was quite united, 
and the émigrés supported each other and socialised with each other frequently. Very 
few émigrés seem to have isolated themselves from émigré society, although there are 
few examples of this kind of behaviour. According to for example P. Shilovskii, who 
had been involved at the monorail project in Russia and was well-known specialist in 
gyroscopic research, his family held aloof from the Russian colony for a long time. He 
and his wife arrived in England in 1922.
^36 The Stow Hill (Soskice) papers, DS.2/1, Box 6. Interview with D. Soskice in London and DS.6/5, Box 24. 
Article by Hollingsworth on Soskice in European Studies Review, 6 (1976); Interview o f Sophie Goodman, 28 
January 1997; Lady Masha Williams in Glenny and Stone 1990, p. 306.
137 Interview o f Ivan Ivanich Bibilin. In Michael Glenny collection, GLE/1/1/6. SSEES; Raeff 1990, p. 9.
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According to him, this isolation from the émigré community was due to ‘instinctive 
reactions of fear’ which they as ‘representatives of old Russia’ felt even in England, 
beyond the reach of the Soviet system. This feeling of fear might have been influenced 
by the fact that they had lived in Soviet Russia for a few years before they emigrated to 
Britain. Shilovskii was granted a visa to England by the Soviet authorities in order to 
study new technologies, but was asked to sign an assurance that ‘they will behave 
correctly in relation to Soviet government while abroad’. Also, visas were only granted 
to him and his wife, and their children were kept as ‘hostages’, so that the parents would 
return to Russia. Shilovskiis, however, managed to get the children out of Russia and to 
England. Petr Shilovskii’s two brothers, nevertheless, continued to live in Soviet Russia, 
and he had to consider also their well-being. According to the testimony of Shilovskii, 
after a few years also they became recognised and close members of the émigré 
community in London.
There were many uniting social structures for the émigrés, such as the Red Cross and 
other charitable organisations, the annual Bazaar, the Balls and other social occasions, 
dinners, and most importantly the Orthodox Church. In various financial and other 
difficulties, the support of the existing charitable organisation and fellow Russian 
émigrés proved most important. Many British individuals also provided assistance for 
the émigrés, although, as seen earlier with the appeal of George Buchanan’s Committee, 
the ‘large public’ was not always very responsive to the appeals for the assistance of 
Russian refugees. However, for example, the Shilovskii family was helped by several 
English friends financially. A good friend of theirs, for instance, offered a large sum of 
money to live on until their affairs would improve. They were also assisted by other 
scientists familiar to P. Shilovskii, as well as by a good fiiend of his wife. Moreover, 
in cases when a British person had supported the application of a certain Russian émigré 
or émigré family and promised they would look after them financially, he or she was 
actually ‘obliged’ to support them in the case of financial difficulties.
138 p. Shilovsky in Glenny and Stone 1990, pp. 290-91 ; Selected extracts from the memoirs o f P.P. Shilovsky, 
vol. 3 In Michael Glenny collection, GLE/1/1/4. SSEES.
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The more well-to-do Russian émigrés also offered their help when they could. So, for 
example Baron Meyendorff financially assisted many of his émigré friends, living in 
various countries around Europe As pointed out by P. Shilovskii’s daughter, Olga 
Lawrence, there was no social security, but ‘in an emergency friends would rally round 
and help’.'"^ '
To some extent, the small number of émigrés in Britain, at least in a long run, made 
finding employment easier than in the countries of mass emigration. As noted earlier, 
unlike in France, for example, in Britain there were no restrictions, at least in principle, 
foreigners taking employment in the liberal professions, such as doctors, barristers, etc. 
To work at the English Bar, for example, foreigners were required to take exams in law. 
Once they passed the exams, they, however, were able to practice law. In this way some 
Russian advocates managed to start practising law, and were able to help many of the 
compatriots with legal issues; on many occasions free of charge. Many émigrés also 
managed to use their knowledge of different languages; French, German, Russian and 
English, and to achieve various jobs through that, for example in banking and other 
businesses, or by doing translation work and giving lessons in Russian language.
Many émigrés started their life in exile in Britain living in hotels, as did the majority of 
Russian émigrés in other countries of emigration. Some of them continued to live in 
hotels for some time, but the majority of émigrés soon rented a flat or house, or bought 
one, depending on the financial situation they were in. There was not a ‘White Russian’ 
district in London similar to that existing in the East End of London in the case of the 
earlier Jewish Russian refiigees, although it seems that quite a few Russian émigrés first 
concentrated in West Kensington and areas around it.
Socially the most important gathering was probably the annual Bazaar of the Russian 
Red Cross, attended by all Russian émigrés but also their English friends. The Bazaars
140 Meyendorff collection, Box 20. Finnish National Archives in Helsinki.
141 Interview o f Olga Lawrence. In Michael Glenny collection, GLE/1/1/5. SSEES.
142 Memoirs of Mark Wolff, pp. 271-272, 288-89.
143 Interviews o f Mr. Kirill Fitzlyon, 29 November 1996, Mrs. Barbara Whittal, 21 January 1997 and Sophie 
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were started in the early 1920s to collect funds for the Russian Red Cross, and they soon 
became the highlight of the year for the whole émigré community. This was probably 
largely due to the fact that the Bazaar was not a political occasion, and people could go 
there and meet each other in a relaxed atmosphere. In the latter part of the 1920s, the 
Russian Orthodox Church, for example, had gone through a division. The Bazaar, on the 
other hand, remained free of all political considerations.
There were a number of other social occasions arranged by the éipigré community. 
Different Balls were arranged several times a year, as were also concerts, ballets and 
theatre performances. The famous Diaghilev Ballet, for instance, held its performances 
in London, and Madame Leonidova, who had founded her own ballet company after she 
had emigrated to Italy, helped to set up a theatrical company conceived by Russian 
émigrés. She also gave ballet lessons for émigrés who joined the company, held in 
Russian Embassy at Chesham House with the permission of Sablin. Different concerts 
and performances were also held at the Russian Embassy, and later in the ‘Russian 
House’ of Evgenii Sablin. His house became the centre of the émigré life, especially 
after the Embassy buildings had to be released for the use of the representatives of the 
Soviet government. This happened in 1924, after the recognition of the Soviet 
government by the British Labour government. After this Sablin brought a large 
Victorian house in Kensington, which came to be known as the ‘Russian House’ in 
London.
The Russian House also acted as a meeting place for the visitors from abroad; writers, 
artists and intellectuals from other centres of emigration, especially from Paris. All this 
was facilitated by the fact that Sablin did not consider the Russian House as his personal 
possession; he himself used only four rooms of the house, and rest of it was given over 
for the use of Russian organisations and society in general. Sablin himself continued to 
play an important role in social, cultural and political life of the Russian émigré society
^45 Interview o f Mrs. Barbara Whittal, 21 January 1997; P. Shilovsky in Glenny and Stone 1990, p. 296.
146 Memoirs o f Dimitry Rostov. In Michael Glenny collection, GLE/I/1/2; FO 371/9347, File 91, Paper N 1700. 
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and act as their representative in different matters, especially to the British authorities, 
as well as to the League of Nations and High Commissioner of Russian refugees.
Another key person at the centre of the émigré community and its activities was 
Princess Ekaterina Golitsyn, who worked actively for the Russian Red Cross and 
especially their annual Bazaars. She and her husband managed to set up a successful 
small antiques business in London, and her commercial and social activity made her an 
important and visible person in both Russian and British circles. According to 
memoirs of Aleksandra Puschina, Golitsyns’ house in Chesssington, Surrey, was ‘one of 
the most hospitable and friendly Russian homes in London’.
A special role in the cultural and social life of the Russian émigré society was the ‘Days 
of Russian Culture’, celebrated on 8 June, Pushkin’s birthday. This was by no means an 
event exclusively of Russian émigrés in Britain, but was celebrated in various countries 
of Russian emigration. Among the initiators of this celebration were the Russian 
Pedagogical Bureau in Prague, the Zemgor, the Board of the Union of the Russian 
Academic Organisations Abroad, the Association of Russian Teachers’ Organisations 
Abroad and the Association of Russian Student Organisations Abroad.
In March 1925 these organisations had a general meeting on the issue and as a 
consequence of this meeting they issued an united appeal to Russian people abroad, to 
local Russian associations, societies and groups to organise yearly a ‘Day of Russian 
Culture’ as a desirable means of uniting all Russians.’^ ’ This appeal was soon taken up 
by all the centres of the Russian diaspora, and the ‘Days of Russian culture’ became an 
effective way of encouraging especially the younger generation to become actively 
involved in Russian cultural life. With the celebration of these days, Pushkin became a 
symbol of Russian cultural tradition for émigrés, as well as means to express their
148 Kaznina 1997, pp. 24-26; Kudriakova 1995, p. 47.
149 p Shilovsky in Glenny and Stone 1990, p. 296 and Lady Masha Williams in ibidem, p. 307. 
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national consciousness independently of political or even religious views. Similarly, he 
was a symbol of their links with the past, links with Russian culture and country.
During celebratory days Russian émigrés in different countries of emigration read works 
of Pushkin, as well as enacted various theatrical and musical performances. Scholars 
lectured in Russian clubs, churches and schools, to address primarily the young 
generation and to acquaint them with the literary, artistic and historic tradition of 
Russia. In Britain the Day of Russian Culture started to be celebrated in 1926, after 
which it became an annual tradition, in which the whole Russian émigré community 
took part. In London a literary circle called the Pushkin Club (or circle) was also 
established, with a reading room and small library with Russian b o o k s . T h e  Northem 
Society, established by Russians evacuated from North Russia, also arranged theatrical 
performances, dance parties and literary gatherings with the aim of keeping the younger 
generation familiar with Russian culture.
The more frequent social occasions were dinners, which were held regularly and which 
gathered many members of the émigré community together. They were held in turns by 
émigré families and most of the people who attended were other Russian émigrés, 
although their English friends were also often invited. In these gatherings there would 
be Russian food, at least Russian bread and salted cucumbers and herrings, that were 
sold at the two existing Russian grocers in Fulham. These dinners served as important 
uniting bond for Russian émigrés.
Finally, the meaning of the Orthodox Church and the orthodox religion to Russian 
émigrés can not be emphasised too much. It served as a spiritual centre; as an uniting 
organ between Russian émigrés, their Russian identity and religion, but also as a general 
meeting place for émigrés. Clearly the role of the Church became important for the 
émigrés as a bond to the past, as an incarnation of the Russian religion and Russianness,
^^2 Raeff, Marc. ‘The First Russian Emigration’, p. 11. Article in ‘Obozrenie’ November 1985, translated by 
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especially important in the difficult situation where the émigrés found themselves, as 
stateless exiles in a foreign country.
The Orthodox Church enjoyed an important position in the life of not only individual 
Russian émigrés, but also the Russian émigré community on the whole. According to 
Lady Masha Williams, Russian émigré in London, the Church was the main thing in the 
lives of Russian émigrés and the whole of life centred around the Church. On Sundays 
everyone met in the church, and after church the émigrés gathered to someone’s house 
for tea. As pointed out by P. Shilovskii, attending more or less regularly to the 
service was a sign that one belonged to the émigré community. Non-attendance at the 
Orthodox Church would have meant that one was inclined towards Soviet orientation or 
that one was no longer concerned with the interests and honour of the Russian 
emigration.
Thus, the Church clearly was of the major importance to Russian émigrés also in 
Britain, where the relationship to the British society was quite relaxed and 
unproblematic. On the other side, the fact that the British authorities seem to have 
adopted a positive attitude towards the Orthodox Church and showed respect for it 
naturally helped to keep the relationship between them and émigrés unstrained and 
easy. Again, in this kind of situation the Orthodox Church became more a positive 
way of expressing and preserving the Russian identity, instead of becoming a way to 
make a distinction between the host society and émigré society in a ‘negative way’.
During the 1920s the Anglican and Russian Orthodox Churches actually became quite 
closely connected. It has been already mentioned earlier that help was provided by the 
Anglican leaders to the Russian Clergy and that the Russian Student Christian 
Movement was especially attracted to the Anglican Church life. In January 1927 the 
leaders of the Anglican Church organised the first conference between the Russian 
Student Christian Movement and interested English student groups in St. Albans. This
Interviews o f Kyril Fitzlyon, 29 November 1996, Mrs. Barbara Whittal, 21 January 1997, Mrs Sophie Goodman, 
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159 p Shilovsky in Glenny and Stone 1990, p. 295.
160 p. Shilovsky in Glenny and Stone 1990, p. 294.
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was a small gathering with some twelve Russians and twenty English. Among the 
Russian leaders present were, for example, Nikolai Zernov, leader of the Russian 
Student Christian Movement and Sergei Bulgakov, dean of St. Sergius, the Russian 
Theological Institute in Paris. The British participants included Bishop Charles Gore, 
Rev. O. F. Clark, as well as Zoe Fairfield and Amy Buller, secretaries of the British 
Student Christian Movement.
The second meeting took place in St. Albans in late December 1927 and early January 
1928. This conference was an even greater success than the first one and led to the 
establishment of the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius. Evlogii, Metropolitan of 
Western Europe and Walter Frere, Bishop of Truro, were elected Presidents of the 
fellowship and Sergei Bulgakov became Vice-President. The first number of the 
quarterly magazine, the Journal of St. Alban and St. Sergius, appeared in June 1928. 
Until the beginning of the Second World War, the main feature of the work of the 
Fellowship were the conferences conducted on a high theological level. At first, 
participants in the conferences were mainly Russian Orthodox and English theological 
students and clergymen. Later, however. Orthodox firom Romania, Serbia and Greece, 
Lutheran Swedes and American Episcopalians, for example, also attended. The 
Fellowship also became responsible of the visits of Russian students to Britain, and 
every summer some 50 Russians from Paris spent their holidays either in theological 
colleges or with English families.
Interestingly, also the division of the Orthodox Church seemed to have been somewhat 
easier and undisputed than in many other countries, although the Church went through 
division also in London. By and large, the division of the church was a complicated and 
serious matter, which influenced the lives of Russian émigrés in all the countries of 
exile.
^61 Zernov, Nicolas. The Russian Religious Renaissance of the Twentieth Century. London 1963, pp. 141, 268-69; 
Raeff 1990, p. 137.
162 Pares collection, PAR/7/4/1. Religious News Sheet of the Russian Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris, No. 
3, May 1928, pp. 3-4; Zernov Nicolas and Militza. Fellowship of St. Alban & St. Sergius: A Historical Memoir. 
Oxford 1979, pp. 5-8.
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The first dispute occurred as early as 1921 when Russians were able to convoke a 
Church Council in Sremski Karlovci, in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
Metropolitan Anthony, former metropolitan of Kiev, was appointed the Presiding 
Bishop of the Council. Metropolitan Anthony was a strong monarchist and a resolution 
was made by the Council in support of the old dynasty. Metropolitan Evlogii, who had 
been appointed head of all the Russian parishes in Western Europe by Patriarch Tikhon 
of Moscow on 8 April 1921, voted in the minority against the resolution. Evlogii, unlike 
Anthony, wanted to keep the Church strictly non-political. After the arrest of Tikhon in 
1922, Metropolitan Anthony and the Karlovci Council refused to accept Evlogii’s 
appointment. Compromise was, however, reached and Evlogi retained his status as the 
bishop of Western Europe, while the Balkans and Palestine were headed by Anthony.
After the death of Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow in 1925, the tension again increased. The 
Metropolitan Anthony and his supporters regarded themselves as the only free 
spokesmen of the whole Russian Church. The Karlovci Council decided to curtail the 
autonomy of Metropolitan Evlogii. Evlogii, however, reftised to accept the decision, and 
the majority of his bishops and clergy remained in his side. This meant open breach 
between the two parties.
In 1927 Evlogii accepted the Metropolitan Sergius, appointed in Moscow after Tikhon’s 
death, as the legitimate Acting Locum tenens, which meant that he also accepted 
obedience to the Moscow Church. Although the opinion of the majority of his supporter 
was that they could not declare loyalty to the communist rule, relations with Moscow 
were maintained until 1930. In 1930 Metropolitan Sergius issued a declaration stating 
that the Russian Orthodox Church had never been persecuted by the communists. 
Metropolitan Evlogii refused to sign this declaration, and instead placed himself under 
the Ecumenical Patriarch Photius at Constantinople. After the Second World War, 
shortly before his death, Evlogii however, returned under the Moscow Patriarch.'^"
^63 Zemov 1963, pp. 215-219; M-N. B. History of the Russian Orthodox Church in London 1707-1977. London (?) 
1978, p. 36; Papers o f Archbishop R.T. Davidson, Vol. 477, ff. 153-159; Headlam Papers , Ms. 2650, ff. 201-207. 
Lambeth Palace Library.
 ^64 Zernov 1963, pp. 218-220, 369; Williams 1972, p. 122, footnote 23.
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Consequently, also the Orthodox Church in London was divided in the late 1920s into 
two jurisdiction: the ‘Karlovci’ jurisdiction, known as the Russian Orthodox Church 
Abroad and the ‘Evlogian’ jurisdiction. Thus, Russian émigrés in London, depending on 
their ‘conviction’ chose either the ‘Karlovci’, or ‘Evlogian’ Church. Generally, the 
membership of the Karlovci Church practically always signified monarchist 
convict ions 'Since there was only one church building these two churches took 
turns, holding their services alternative Sundays. However, as mentioned, this division 
did not seem to have caused a serious drift in the personal relations of émigrés. Some 
émigrés even attended both services. In any case, the relations between émigrés 
remained largely unaltered and the émigrés continued to socialise together and met at 
various social functions even if they belonged to different sections of the church.
The more serious schism was the decision of the ‘Evlogian’ church in London to go 
under the Moscow Patriarch after the Second World War. This was strongly criticised 
by the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (Karlovci church). In the opinion of the 
supporters of the Karlovci section there could never be communication with the 
Moscow Church, as it was ruled by the Soviets.
6.4. Concluding Remarks
The great majority of the Russian émigrés abroad shared a general belief in the collapse 
of the Bolshevik regime, which would enable their return to Russia. This belief was 
sustained for a long time after the short-term hopes for the downfall of Bolshevism had 
collapsed. This was also the case with many Russian émigrés in Britain. However,
Headlam Papers, Ms. 2650, ff. 201-207. Lambeth Palace Library.
166 The church, St. Phillips’s, was located in the Buckingham Palace Road. It was a former Protestant Church, 
handed to Russians by the Anglican Church. After the Second World War the site of the church had to be vacated for 
the Victoria Bus station. (Reference; Interviews of Mrs. Sophie Goodman, 28 January 1997 and Father Sergei 
Hackell, 10 February 1999.)
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judging by the accounts of many émigrés, there were quite a few first generation 
Russian émigrés in Britain who did not live in the past, neither raised their children 
believing in past. Perhaps this also partly explains why the Russian émigrés in Britain 
seem to have settled relatively easily to new circumstances in exile. Thus, the relations 
between the émigrés and the British, for example, seem to have been quite relaxed and 
friendly; the émigrés made friends with the British and the children of the émigrés went 
to the British schools and universities and were therefore quickly absorbed to the British 
society. All this clearly seems to have been easier and quicker than in many other 
countries of emigration.
The smallness of the émigré society for its part eased the process of assimilation. 
However, it has to be acknowledged that the attitude and the reception of the émigrés by 
the host society also played its role. Despite a strict policy of the British authorities in 
admitting refugees, the attitude of the host society towards those émigrés that were 
admitted was much more hospitable. Although Russian émigrés were not offered for 
example financial assistance by the state, some British organisations and individuals 
worked actively in assisting émigrés for example in the fields of employment and 
education. Russians themselves established and worked actively in several organisations 
and clubs in Britain, both individually and in co-operation with the British.
The social life of the Russian émigrés in Britain was concentrated around different 
functions; the Bazaar, concerts, theatre, dinners and, most significantly, the Russian 
Orthodox Church, which served as an important bond between the émigrés, their 
religion, and Russian identity. Despite the overall easy relationship between émigrés 
and British society, Russianness and Russian identity remained important, particularly 
to the first generation of émigrés. For the émigré children, however, this concept of 
Russianness became less distinct due to fast assimilation process.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
Inter-War Europe witnessed several refugee movements. Of these, the Russian refugee 
problem, in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War, was clearly 
one of the most serious, affecting both individual countries of refuge, as well as the 
international community as a whole. Consequently, many individual European countries 
assisted Russian refugees to various degrees and, most importantly, actions were also 
taken on the part of the whole international community for their assistance.
My thesis has concentrated on the role of the British government in the Russian refugee 
question, and has thus sought to illuminate an area that has largely been neglected in 
earlier studies. This is primarily because Britain did not develop into an important 
centre of Russian emigration, unlike, for example, France or Germany. This, despite the 
fact that Britain was the Allied power most heavily involved in the Russian Civil War in 
assisting White Russian forces. After the war, the British government completely 
‘forgot’ its earlier statements of the ‘moral obligations of honour’ to assist those 
Russians who had remained loyal to the Allied cause. Although Britain, as the one of 
the major powers in the political arena of inter-war Europe, could not stand completely 
aloof from the Russian refugee question the government was reluctant to accept 
individual responsibility for Russian refugees.
This reluctance can be best seen in the government policy towards the admission of 
Russian refugees to Britain. Despite the long-established reputation of Britain as a 
country of liberal refuge for those seeking political asylum, the British government 
adopted a very strict attitude against the entry of Russian refugees to Britain. At the end 
of 1917, the then Home Secretary Sir George Cave proposed that facilities should not be 
given, save in exceptional cases, for Russians to leave Russia for the United Kingdom. 
The main factor behind these considerations was that Russian refugees were anticipated 
to be very numerous and, more importantly, unlikely to be of economic value to Britain.
As a consequence, it was officially stated that as a general rule Russian refugees were 
not admitted to Britain and the government laid down strict conditions for the admission 
of individual refugees. The most important of these, although by no means always
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sufficient in itself, was that the person permitted to enter had to be able to support 
himself and possible dependants, as no Russian refugees in Britain were to be supported 
from public funds. Thus, evidence of support from some source was always required 
before leave to land was given. With this requirement the Home Office wanted to 
ascertain that those admitted would not be competitors in the labour market, as it was 
stated that under existing conditions aliens should not be admitted for the purpose of 
employment. In general these rules were strictly enforced, although individual 
exceptions were made, for example, for those Russians who had supported British 
forces in Russia; for certain upper-class Russians on humanitarian grounds, especially if 
they had close British connections; for prominent businessmen and other well-to-do 
refugees, as well as for educational and academic purposes.
Economic considerations clearly had an important role in the British policy towards 
Russian refugees. According to the official view the economic situation in post-war 
Britain did not enable the country to welcome any incursion of aliens. Economic 
difficulties were also an important factor for the passing of immigration legislation. The 
1905 Aliens Act was an official response, strengthened by public pressure, to the 
immigration of large numbers of Jewish immigrants from Russian Poland who were 
considered to be causing many social and economic problems. Similarly, the economic 
and political upheavals of post-war Europe were important contributors to the passing of 
the 1919 Aliens Restriction Act.
In an uncertain post-war situation the government was thus determined to apply strict 
rules against the entry of all aliens, including Russian refugees. More importantly, 
although economic problems and the growth of unemployment largely explain the lack 
of sympathy for Russian refugees, the question was also linked more generally to anti­
alienism in British society and the decline of liberalism as a political philosophy, both 
evident before the First World War.
The outbreak of the First World War further increased anti-alien feelings in Britain and 
heightened the pressures for the stricter control of the entry of aliens. As a consequence, 
the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 was mshed through Parliament in the course of a
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single day. Strong anti-German sentiment resulted in official actions against the German 
population in Britain. Between 1914 and 1919, the British authorities repatriated over
20,000 Germans from Britain.^
‘Friendly’ aliens, such as Russian Polish Jews, also faced opposition. The greatest 
tension was linked to the military conscription issue, and the reluctance of some Jews to 
serve in the allied forces. In addition to the antipathy this caused in general public, it 
also became increasingly unacceptable to the government. In July 1917 the British and 
Russian governments signed a Military Service Convention, by which Russian Jews 
could be compelled to serve either in Russian or British forces.
The post-war parliamentary debates leading up to the passing of the Aliens Restriction 
Act of 1919 featured anti-German and anti-Semitic feelings and racism. Although the
1919 Act, unlike the 1914 one, emerged only after a long debate there is no doubt that 
these feelings had strong support also in official circles, as seen for example in the 
comment of one Member of the House of Commons stating ‘we don’t want German 
blood any more in this country’. Undoubtedly the possibility of gaining firm control 
over Jewish immigration also played a role in the passing of the 1919 Act. The 
deportation of Russian Polish Jews was already taking place under 1914 Act, and 
continued with the removal of those Jewish aliens that fell foul of the 1919 Act.^ In the 
1920s, as well as throughout the 1930s Jews continued to encounter discrimination in 
the fields of housing, employment and education. Alien Jews also had to face deliberate 
long delays in naturalisation.^
The continuity of anti-alienism in post-war Britain could be seen in that the 1919 Act, 
initially passed only for a period of one year, was in fact renewed annually until 1971. It 
was also complemented with Orders in Council, such as those of 1920 and 1925. The
1920 Aliens Order stipulated, for example, that any alien seeking work in Britain was 
required to obtain a permit from the Ministry of Labour. The 1925 Aliens Order, the
Holmes 1991, pp. 23-25; Cesarani. ‘An Alien Consept’, pp. 35-36. In Cesarani & Kushner (eds.) 1993. 
^ Holmes 1991, pp. 26-27; Holmes 1988, pp. 112-13.
 ^ Holmes 1991, pp. 32-33, 90; Cesarani. ‘An Alien Consept’, p. 40. In Cesarani & Kushner (eds.) 1993.
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Special Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order, was passed in order to ‘close a 
loophole in the 1919 Act’ by placing restrictions on the entry and employment of 
coloured seamen, a question which had led to a number of outbreaks of collective 
violence during early 1919. Chinese seamen suffered their share of violence, although it 
was their association with drug dealing that caused most resentment. The 1919 Act 
showed its usefulness by limiting the immigration of alien Chinese effectively 
accompanied with the deportation of a number of drug dealers.
Together these laws provided an effective method, by which successive British 
governments, irrespective of their political view, controlled the entry, employment and 
removal of various immigrant and refugee groups during the inter-war years. Although 
the Labour government, which came in power in 1929, proved somewhat more 
sympathetic to the plight of aliens than the Conservative ones, the essentials of the 1919 
Act remained firmly in place. This can be seen, for example, in the refusal of the Labour 
Home Secretary, J.R. Clynes, to grant political asylum to Leon Trotskii in Britain.^
The example of Trotskii, i.e. the refusal of the British government to grant asylum to a 
person, who clearly was a political refugee, can also be applied to the ‘White’ Russian 
refugees from the Bolshevik regime. The maintenance of strict admission policies not 
only towards various immigrant groups, but towards refugees as well, was facilitated by 
the fact that the existing immigration legislation did not contain a statutory recognition 
of the right of asylum for political refugees. The 1905 Act had contained a special 
clause for the right of asylum for political refugees but it was not included in the 
subsequent legislation. This question had proved controversial, especially during the 
passing of the 1919 Act. At the time assurances had been given by the Home Secretary, 
Edward Shortt, that ‘any decent political refugee would be admitted’, even if the law did 
not contain special provisions for this.
What ‘decent political refugee’ really meant and who could be categorised as one, is less 
clear. For example in the case of Russian refugees ‘decent’ seem to have required more
^ Foot 1965, p. 113; Holmes 1988, pp. 107-113, 140; Cesarani. ‘An Aliens Consept’, pp. 40-41. In Cesarani & 
Kushner (eds) 1993.
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than just being a genuine, non-criminal political or religious refugee. The government 
authorities were naturally unwilling to admit Bolshevik sympathisers but they also seem 
to have been reluctant to admit politically active monarchists, as it was not in the 
interest of the British government to support those Russian émigrés who were carrying 
out monarchist propaganda.
However, the great majority of Russian refugees from Bolshevik Russia were ‘ordinary’ 
refugees, who, although they might have been monarchists in their personal conviction, 
would not have been engaged in political activity for monarchism. Thus, the rule that 
any decent political refugee would be admitted was clearly not followed in the case of 
Russian refugees. Instead, along with other immigrant and refugee groups, they were 
caught up with the provisions of the Aliens Restrictions Acts of 1919 and the Aliens 
Order of 1920, which endowed the Home Secretary and immigration officers with wide 
powers over the landing, employment and deportation of all aliens. The absence of a 
statutory recognition of the right of asylum enabled the government to consider Russian 
refugees as part of ‘normal’ immigration.
Whether these considerations justified the strict policy of the British government not to 
admit Russian refugees to Britain is of course quite another matter. In this, the British 
policy can also be compared with, for example, the policy of the German government, 
which, despite the harsh economic situation, was much more liberal in issuing entry 
visas to Russian refugees. During the early 1920s the French government also issued 
visas liberally to Russian émigrés; in fact the government deliberately encouraged 
immigration of Russian émigrés for employment purposes to compensate for the 
population losses of the First World War. Facilitated by liberal admission policies these 
countries hosted between 100,000-200,000 Russian refugees compared with less than
10,000 émigrés in Britain.
Additionally, many smaller countries, such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia practised 
far more liberal policies towards Russian refugees. The Czechoslovak government, for 
example, invited a number of students, academic and agricultural workers to its country, 
and a specific programme, the so called Russian action was initiated by the government
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for the assistance of Russian refugees. This deserves a special mention, as 
Czechoslovakia was the only European country with a comprehensive programme of 
assistance for Russian refugees. The Yugoslav government also worked actively for the 
settlement of Russian refugees on its territory as well as offered them financial 
support 5.
With the collapse of General Vrangel’s army in November 1920 and the huge refugee 
problem it entailed, Russian refugees also became a concern for the whole international 
community through the actions of the League of Nations. Following an 
intergovernmental conference in August 1921 the League Council appointed Norwegian 
Fridtjof Nansen as the first High Commissioner for Russian Refugees. The main tasks 
of the Commissioner were: to co-ordinate the efforts for the assistance of Russian 
refugees; to develop plans for repatriation or, alternatively, for dispersal of refugees, 
particularly from Constantinople; and to define the legal status of Russian refugees.
Although from the beginning the League’s and High Commissioner’s work was 
hampered particularly by financial difficulties, the actions taken for the assistance of 
Russian refugees, in particular the evacuation of a large number of refugees from 
Constantinople as well as defining the legal status of refugees, were clearly of the 
utmost significance to the settlement of the Russian refugee problem. Neither can one 
deny the importance of the mere fact that the member states of the League were willing 
to take the issue of refugees under the auspices of the League. The Covenant of the 
League, for example, did not contain anything, which would have formally obliged it to 
do this. Significantly, this action marked the beginning of the international refugee 
regime; the active co-operation of states in the field of refugee assistance. From this 
starting-point, the regime gradually increased its scope for the assistance of many other 
refugee groups, until the outbreak of the Second World War put an end to its activity.
Humanitarian considerations undoubtedly played a part in the decision of the member 
states of the League to assist Russian refugees. However, there were also other reasons. 
Although there had been serious refugee movements before the First World War, it was
5 R aeff 1990, p. 29.
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only after the War that the international community realised that united efforts were 
needed in order to solve the ‘problem’ of refugees. The League of Nations, for its part, 
had been formed in 1919 by forty-two governments ‘in order to promote international 
co-operation and to achieve international peace and security’. As the huge flow of 
refugees from one country to another clearly posed a threat to the international stability 
and security, the League of Nations decided to take the issue of refugees under its 
auspices.
It was especially the two Great Powers, Britain and France that had a special interest in 
the Russian refugee question. By August 1921 the French government had spent 
approximately £3.8 million on Russian refugees. Britain had spent £1 million on 
Russians it had taken responsibility for as a consequence of the evacuation of General 
Denikin’s forces and in August 1921 it still maintained some 5,000 refugees in Egypt, 
Cyprus and Serbia at a cost of £20,000 per month. Many other countries that had been 
assisting Russian refugees certainly had an interest in ‘internationalising’ their financial 
burdens.
Although it is clear that by participating internationally in the assistance of Russian 
refugees Britain served its own national interests, it has to be recognised that of all the 
members of the League, Britain did in fact provide the most financial assistance. Britain 
was, for instance, the only member of the League to respond to the appeal of Nansen at 
the end of 1921, by giving a grant for the assistance of Russian refugees in 
Constantinople, as well as donating substantial sum of money for the evacuation of 
Russian refugees from Constantinople during 1922.
The British assistance was largely guaranteed by the active work of certain individuals 
in the field of refugee assistance, such as Sir Samuel Hoare, the head of the 
Constantinople Office, Philip-Noel Baker, the member of the Secretariat of the League 
most directly concerned with refugee issues. General Harington, Allied Commander-in- 
Chief in Constantinople, Colonel Procter, chairman of the International Relief 
Committee and Sir Horace Rumbold, British High Commissioner in Constantinople. 
Thus, particularly at the individual level, British participation in the international
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assistance of Russian refugees was very active and these people had a crucial role in the 
international assistance of Russian refugees.
However, it also has to be recognised that at no point was the British government 
willing to compromise its own policies, for example, as regards the admission of 
Russian refugees to Britain. At the time of the ratification of the agreement on identity 
certificates for Russian refugees the British government was careful to point out that the 
agreement would not in any way hinder the control of the entry of Russian refugees. The 
number of refugees admitted to Britain from Constantinople was probably less than a 
hundred. After Britain had managed to end its responsibility for refugees maintained in 
Egypt, Cyprus and Serbia, by coming to an agreement with the High Commissioner, the 
government showed less interest in the question of Russian refugees at the international 
level. In the latter part of the 1920s Britain for example failed to ratify the arrangements 
relating to Russian refugees and to appoint a delegate to the Refugee Section of the ILO 
or to the Nansen Office.
Nevertheless, it is evident that Britain had an important role in the working of the whole 
international refugee regime during the inter-war years. Although all the member states 
of the League were involved, or at least could be involved in the refugee work, some 
countries clearly had more influence than others. Also, even though the international 
refugee regime was centred on the refugee agencies of the League these agencies had to 
turn to the League Council and Assembly for funding and approval, and the Secretariat 
for expertise. The head of the Secretariat was the Secretary-General, a position initially 
held by Sir Eric Drummond of Britain and later by Joseph Avenol of France.
In the Council of the League only Britain and France served continuously as permanent 
members between 1920 and 1946, which greatly facilitated the involvement of the Great 
Powers in refugee issues. The success of the settlement of various refugee problems also 
clearly depended on the support of the Great Powers, as they were the major financial 
powers in inter-war Europe and thus played a crucial role in providing financial support
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for refugee assistance. On the other hand they could also effectively veto projects if they 
did not agree with the proposals.^
Britain’s attitude towards refugee assistance, in addition to the Russian case, varied over 
the inter-war period. Initially Britain offered strong support, for example, for Greek 
refugees as a consequence of the Greco-Turkish war in the early 1920s. British support 
for Nansen’s recommendation of the international loan scheme for the refugee 
settlement in Greece proved to be decisive for its success. Similarly, Britain supported 
the loan scheme in Bulgaria for the settlement of Bulgarian refugees from Greece and 
other surrounding countries. However, by the late 1920s, British willingness to assist 
refugees had waned, culminating in the speech of Austen Chamberlain, the British 
Foreign Minister, at the 1928 Assembly, in which he called an end to all aid to refugees.
The British unwillingness to participate had a direct impact on the success of some 
projects. For example British refusal to support the loan for the settlement of Armenian 
refugees in Erivan helped to kill the scheme, as French and Italian governments stated 
they would only take part if the British did. When acting together the two Great Powers 
were especially influential. For example in 1935 Britain and France effectively opposed 
a proposal before the League Assembly which would have resulted in the creation of 
one agency to deal with all refugees.^
The rise of Hitler in Germany in the early 1930s started a new refugee wave, which 
differed from that of the exodus of Russian refugees in that it lasted for much longer. 
Interestingly, it was during this refugee crisis that British policy went through a 
significant change, particularly as regards the admission of refugees to Britain. Until 
1938 the British government remained quite aloof from the crisis, and the government 
offered asylum only to a few refugees with connections and means for support.
At the international level, the newly appointed High Commissioner for Refugees 
coming from Germany, James G. McDonald, unsuccessfully tried to persuade Britain to
 ^ Skran 1995, pp. 76-77, 97, 279-280.
Skran 1995, pp. 159-161, 169-175, 280-286.
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contribute towards the cost of refugee relief. However, following the German 
occupation of Sudetenland in October 1938, strengthened by public pressure, the 
government decided to adopt a more liberal admission policy. It was at this time that the 
government began to distinguish between aliens and refugees; a distinction which was 
not observed at the time of exodus of Russian refugees, and as a consequence the 
number of refugees from Germany increased in Britain. By the outbreak of the Second 
World War Britain hosted over 50,000 refugees that had fled Fascist rule.^ As regards 
asylum these refugees thus came out better than the Russian refugees from Bolshevism 
over a decade earlier.
Despite the reluctant attitude of the British government in admitting Russian refugees, a 
distinctive Russian émigré community was bom in Britain in the early 1920s. However, 
the admission policies of the British authorities largely determined both the size and the 
make-up of this community. Because of strict mles governing admission, the number of 
Russian refugees in Britain remained much smaller than in many other countries of 
emigration. As those who were to be admitted had to qualify both at the financial and 
personal level, Russian émigrés in Britain were a more homogeneous group than in 
many other countries. Thus, the Russian émigré society in Britain consisted mostly of 
well-to-do and upper-class émigrés or academics and students, for whom exceptions 
were made more easily.
On the continent the émigré societies were in general more heterogeneous in their 
composition. France, for example, hosted a large number of intellectuals, but also a 
number of soldiers and civilians arriving in the aftermath of the collapse of the armies of 
General Vrangel’. Due to the nature of the special programme of assistance for Russian 
émigrés, the Russian émigré society in Czechoslovakia consisted mainly of students and 
intellectuals, but also of agricultural workers. In Germany, on the other hand, there were 
a large number of Baltic Germans, Jews and other non-Russian nationalities. Of pure 
Russian nationals, the two dominant groups in Germany in the early 1920s were the 
upper classes and intelligentsia, although with the warming of German and Soviet
 ^ H olm es 1988, pp. 146-47; Skran 1995, pp. 221-22, 232-33.
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relations many monarchists found Germany inhospitable and moved on to Paris or the 
Balkans.
The strict provisions for entry as regards financial position meant that the overall 
material situation of Russian émigrés in Britain was better than in many other countries, 
even if many émigrés in Britain also faced financial difficulties especially at the 
beginning of their exile. Also, although the granting of employment permits was strictly 
observed by the British Ministry of Labour, in the long run, the smallness and the 
composition of the émigré community in Britain made it easier to find proper 
employment. In Britain, unlike for example in France, there were no restrictions, at least 
in principle, on foreigners being employed in liberal professions, such as doctors, 
teachers and lawyers. In France these restrictions meant that many educated émigrés had 
to earn their living by taxi-driving or manual work; the work prospects of those without 
qualifications were even less promising.^
The Russian émigré community in Britain, due to its nature and development, was also 
in other ways somewhat different from those of the larger communities, for example, in 
France or Germany. The notion of the existence of Russia Abroad, well expounded by 
Marc Raeff, implies that Russian émigrés in their countries of exile formed a society, 
which transcended the barriers of national frontiers. Thus, the Russian émigrés in the 
various countries of exile continued to consider themselves as a united Russian nation 
despite the fact that they were scattered in different countries.
According to Raeff, an important contributory factor to the way that the Russian 
émigrés constituted themselves into society was the fact the émigrés were committed to 
carrying on a meaningful Russian life and aimed at preservation of traditional Russian 
culture so that their children would be able play a constructive role in a future free 
Russia. In this way the Russian language and literature became of utmost importance, 
and various educational, cultural and religious institutions served as the tools of 
preservation and maintenance of Russian identity and culture.
 ^ Johnston 1988, pp. 77-78.
^0 Raeff 1990, pp. 5, 10, 47-48.
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The information gathered from the accounts of Russian emigration in the well-known 
centres, such as Paris, Berlin or Prague supports this point of view. In all these places, at 
least during the first decade of exile, Russian émigrés largely isolated themselves from 
the host societies and the fear of denationalisation (i.e. assimilation) was the uppermost 
concern of the émigré communities. Therefore the émigrés socialised mainly with their 
fellow émigrés. Individual contacts also generated some common economic enterprises 
that also strengthened the sense of isolation from the host societies. This isolation is 
evident in the writings of Russian émigrés. Vladimir Nabokov in his autobiography 
speaks of his secluded years in Germany by stating that among the sprinkling of 
Germans and Frenchmen he had no more than two good f r i e n d s . xo Nina Berberova, 
the Russian Berlin was the only Berlin she knew and the German Berlin was only ‘a 
background for these years’.
Therefore, it is all the more interesting to note that in Britain the Russian émigrés do not 
seem to have isolated themselves from the host society, at least to the same extent as in 
many other countries of emigration. On the contrary, according to émigré accounts, 
Russian émigrés socialised with the British from the very beginning, even if  contacts 
with the fellow émigrés were very close and émigré society remained an important 
source of support, both social and material. Also, unlike for example in France, already 
the first generation émigrés, primarily those who had arrived as children in the early 
1920s, almost exclusively married British subjects. All this suggests that assimilation 
into British society was both an easier and a quicker process than in many other 
countries.
Although the smallness of the émigré community in Britain at least partly eased 
assimilation, reception of émigrés by the host society also has to be taken into account. 
Interestingly, especially when considering the strict policy of the authorities against the 
entry of Russian refugees to Britain, those émigrés who were admitted do not seem to
 ^  ^ Raeff 1990, pp. 4, 42-43; Johnston, Robert. ‘ Die Haupstadt der russischen Diaspora’. In Schlogel, Karl (ed.). 
Der Grosse Exodus. Die Russische Emigration und ihre Zentren 1917 bis 1941. Munich 1994, pp. 273-75; 
Chinyaeva 1994, pp. 35, 182-83, 294.
Nabokov 1969, p. 213.
Berberova 1969, p. 165.
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have faced hostilities. According to émigré accounts Russian émigrés were treated well 
and they managed to make good friends among the British.
In many other countries of emigration the émigré accounts were less positive. In 
Czechoslovakia, despite the relatively small number of Russian émigrés and the 
governmental programme of assistance for Russians, the left-wing circles that were 
influential among workers and intellectuals were in fact hostile towards Russian 
émigrés. Although Russian émigrés themselves wanted to maintain their national 
identity and often deliberately isolated themselves from the host society, this hostility 
hardly increased their willingness to assimilate. The host societies in the larger centres 
of Russian emigration, such as Paris or Berlin, did not always welcome Russian émigrés 
either, even if this fact has been often overshadowed by the notion of the unwillingness 
of the émigrés to assimilate.
An important factor working towards the assimilation of Russian émigrés into British 
society was that in Britain émigré children were educated in British schools, universities 
and other educational establishments. This compared with the situation on the continent 
where many Russian émigré children attended Russian primary and secondary schools, 
and even universities. Russian schools aimed at preserving the children’s knowledge of 
Russia and traditional Russian culture were considered of utmost importance in the fight 
against denationalisation of the Russian youth in exile, together with the educational 
work of families.''^
Although the effort to teach émigré youth in Russian schools was quite short-lived and 
the number of Russian schools had dwindled drastically by the late 1930s in the 
1920s a variety of Russian schools could be found in the main centres of emigration.
For example in France, Germany and Czechoslovakia there were both Russian primary 
and secondary schools, as well as various institutions of higher education, such as the 
Russian University in Prague, the People’s Universities both in Paris and Prague and the
Dolgorukov, Petr. ‘Chuvstvo rodiny u detei’, pp. 168, 181. In Zenkovskii, V.V (ed.). Deti Emigratsii. Sbomik 
state!. Prague 1925; Kovalevskii 1971, pp. 35-37; Raeff 1990, pp. 4, 48.
 ^  ^ Johnston 1988, p. 88; R aeff 1990, p. 57.
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Russian Scientific Institute in B e r lin T h e se  educational establishments strengthened 
the feeling of Russianness among émigré children and slowed down the process of 
assimilation. In Britain, the opposite was the case and since no Russian schools existed, 
all the émigré children attended British schools, which, again, eased their assimilation 
into British society.
In addition to schools there were other important tools for the preservation of Russian 
identity, such as the press and literature, the Orthodox Church and various émigré 
organisations, both cultural and political. The small size of the émigré community in 
Britain meant that the level of these activities was much lower than in the main centres 
of emigration, although in the early 1920s there were several Russian organisations, as 
well as newspapers and journals in Britain. Compared to, for example, Paris, Berlin or 
Prague, they were, however, quite short-lived, concentrating on the first few years of the 
1920s. The literary and artistic ‘elite’ of Russian emigration was also concentrated on 
the continent; the few well-known émigrés in Britain, such as Pavel Miliukov or 
Vladimir Nabokov, only stayed for a short period.
Perhaps an even more significant difference was in the level of émigré politics. The 
Russian émigré society in Britain was less politically active, and many political parties 
that were strongly represented in the continent played no active role among Russian 
émigrés in Britain. The absence of active émigré politics undoubtedly also smoothened 
relations between the émigrés and their host society.
Whilst there was no great level of political activity, socially and culturally the Russian 
émigrés in Britain were much more active. There were a variety of concerts, bazaars, 
balls and dinners and the majority of émigrés regularly attended the Orthodox Church. 
As in other countries, the role of the church as a significant bond between émigrés and 
their Russian identity was considered very important. However, attendance at the 
Orthodox Church do not seem to have strengthened the feelings of isolation, as often 
happened in the larger centres of emigration. That the British authorities seem to have
 ^  ^ Schlogel. ‘Berlin: Stiefmutter unter den russichen S tad ten', pp. 243-44; Sladék, Zdenek. ‘ Prag: das “russische 
Oxford” pp. 224-25; Johnston. ‘ Paris: D ie ...’, p.271. All in Schlogel (ed.) 1994; Raeff 1990, pp. 60- 65.
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adopted a positive attitude towards the Church and, during the 1920s, close connections 
were established between the Anglican and Russian Churches undoubtedly helped in 
this.
The Russian Student Christian Movement was particularly attracted to the Anglican 
Church life, even if the headquarters of the movement was in Paris. Close contacts led 
to the establishment of the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius and to a series of 
conferences between Russian and English student circles. The fellowship also sponsored 
study visits of Russian students to Britain which helped Russian students to overcome 
their sense of isolation.
Thus, Russian emigration in Britain has a somewhat different story to that of emigration 
to many other countries in Europe. Firstly, unlike, for example the French, German or 
Czechoslovak governments, the British government adopted a very strict policy against 
the admission of Russian émigrés. Consequently, the number of émigrés in Britain 
remained quite small, and due to selection criteria the composition of the émigré 
community in Britain was more homogeneous than in many other countries, consisting 
largely of educated, upper-class and well-to-do elements.
Secondly, despite the negative attitude towards the admission of refugees, those 
Russians that were admitted seem to have been received well in Britain. There was thus 
a clear difference between the official policy and the social attitude. Whether the 
Russian case can be generalised is, however, quite another matter. It is evident, for 
example, that the anti-alien attitude expressed at the time of the passing of various 
immigration laws was not limited to official circles but had also public support. 
Moreover, although immigration controls probably partly eased the social resentment 
towards aliens through the effective control of the size and ‘quality’ of immigration, the 
inter-war years witnessed continuing hostility towards immigrants, casting a shadow 
over the often-emphasised tolerant image of British society.
Not all the immigrant groups were, however, targets of hostility. Both the official and 
social responses towards immigrants were often marked with complexity and ambiguity.
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Most intensive hostility was nevertheless often directed towards those immigrant groups 
that were seen as economic, social or cultural ‘threats’ to the host society. The hostility 
expressed, for example, towards Russian Polish Jews, coloured seamen or Chinese 
during inter-war years can be largely understood through a mixture of these factors.'^
As we have seen, the reception of Russian émigrés was more relaxed. One might be 
tempted to explain all by the small size of the group but on the other hand there is 
evidence that even very small groups were sometimes unable to escape hostility, as 
happened, for example, to German gypsies in Britain before the First World War.^^
Thus, other factors were probably more significant in explaining the unproblematic 
relations between Russian émigrés and British society. Among these, the fact that 
Russian émigrés in Britain went through a strict process of selection in admission was 
undoubtedly important. That the majority of those who were admitted were either well- 
to-do, upper class or educated elements, made their reception easier, especially as many 
of them also had close British connections, which had facilitated their entry. The 
émigrés themselves seem to have showed great appreciation of the fact that they were 
admitted to Britain, managed to make good friends among the British, thought highly of 
British education and thus wanted their children to be educated at British schools. All 
this worked towards their easier assimilation into British society.
■^7 Holmes 1988, pp. 107-113, 300-301, 311-12; Holmes 1991, pp. 73-79, 91-92. 
 ^  ^Holmes 1991, pp. 83-84.
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